

## **Lobbying and Issue-Definition**

Frank R. Baumgartner, Penn State University  
Jeffrey M. Berry, Tufts University  
Marie Hojnacki, Penn State University  
David C. Kimball, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale  
Beth L. Leech, Rutgers University

### **Project Summary**

We propose the expansion and continuation of research that was begun with our NSF-funded project from the January 1999 round of submissions (# SBR-9905195). In our original proposal we laid out a methodology for conducting interviews on a random sample of public policy issues and assessing the strategies and resources of lobbyists and other policy advocates as they attempt to influence the policy process. We focused especially on the use of arguments and evidence in addition to the more standard variables of material resources. In this proposal, we request funding to complete the project. We envision the creation of completely documented studies of 100 randomly selected cases of federal government policy debates. Our analyses will allow, for the first time, the systematic comparison of advocacy efforts on a broad sample of issues in government. We will compare the dimensional structures of these issues, the lobbying and advocacy efforts of those involved, the degree to which government officials themselves are advocates along with those outside government, the impact of money and material resources on coalition formation and policy outcomes, the differences between highly visible and less-visible policy decisions, and the ability of advocates to affect policy outcomes through the use of arguments, targeted lobbying efforts, and other means. Further, we integrate with the research project the creation of a massive web site to serve other researchers and students. For each of our cases, not only do we collect a range of information from public and confidential sources but all of the public information we collect, including versions of legislation, public testimony, press releases by those involved, press coverage, and lobby spending reports, is released in a comprehensive web site for each issue. This will allow other researchers access to a well-organized set of raw materials for all manner of subsequent analyses, as well as providing primary source material suitable for teaching courses on U.S. government, Congress, and public policy.

The theoretical focus of our research is based on Riker's (1986, 1996) ideas of rhetoric, heresthetics, and the related questions of decision-making for complex multidimensional issues. Policy advocates mastering the arts of heresthetics, according to Riker, would be able to affect policy outcomes simply by focusing attention on new dimensions of issues or by otherwise altering the context in which policy choices are made. However, there are many constraints on these efforts, including the strategic efforts of policy advocates who disagree, institutional factors of the sort discussed by Shepsle (1979), and other sources of stability in public advocacy. We explore these questions of strategic redefinition of policy issues and stability in some detail here, identifying specific hypotheses and showing how these can be systematically tested.

## Project Description

### Introduction

Policy advocacy, whether conducted by government officials attempting to enact a new policy, by interest group leaders outside government working alone, or by coalitions of insiders and outsiders combined, involves making arguments that others cannot ignore. Of course, it involves more than this, but at the end of the day policies are adopted (or rejected) based on some evidence that they will work, solve some problem, serve some constituency, alleviate some pain, or serve some other public purpose as judged by those government officials making the decision. Government officials are unlikely to support policies that they know will fail, though of course different decision-makers may have different definitions of success. Interest groups, lobbyists, and other policy advocates use their various resources to push policies in ways they prefer by focusing attention on the justifications for their goals. William Riker (1986, 1996) emphasized the importance of both argumentation and the context in which argument occurs in his discussion of rhetoric and heresthetics. Political actors can sometimes achieve success through the use of persuasive arguments, he argued. Further, they can achieve their aims by structuring or restructuring the decision context, affecting the order of presentation of proposals, for example, or affecting the parliamentary rules under which votes are taken. In sum, Riker noted that strategically minded policy entrepreneurs, especially those with control over procedural aspects of policy debates, can often have dramatic impacts on outcomes. In this way, the Rikerian world of the strategic policy entrepreneur differs sharply from other accounts of the policy process—more often these have focused on incrementalism, stability, and the powers of entrenched interests protecting the status quo. Riker's heresthetically skilled political entrepreneurs seem able to achieve their policy goals (often dramatic changes from the status quo) with remarkable ease. What do their opponents do? What resources must the entrepreneur control in order to change the structure of an issue debate? What sources of stability counter-balance the potentially unstable world of strategic entrepreneurs? Our project focuses on finding the proper balance in understanding the sources of stability in the policy process while also noting the opportunities for dramatic change. We take a broad view of the governmental process as scholars such as Truman (1951) and Dahl (1961) did two generations ago. Our plan is an ambitious one to assess the relative powers of stability and change in the lobbying process, and to note the relative importance of material resources, government allies, policy argumentation, and other factors in determining policy outcomes.

Riker's ideas of destabilizing policy debates through some restructuring of the decision context (e.g., the introduction of new dimensions or understandings of an issue, the elimination of a set of alternatives from the decision agenda) have tremendous potential consequences for our understanding of how democratic systems operate and make decisions since they harbor the possibility of cycling, instability, and for the dramatic policy effects of single individuals. However, they have never been subjected to serious empirical testing, and there is little evidence concerning either the relative frequency of these destabilizing maneuvers or the resources and skills that are involved either in forcing a change or in preventing a change by a rival. Our project takes these cutting-edge theoretical issues as the starting point. We attempt to compare systematically across a randomly chosen sample of policy issues in the federal government the strategic efforts of policy advocates to change others' understandings of the issue, the resources needed to produce such change, the strategies of opponents who attempt to foil these efforts, and

the institutional and other sources of stability in the political system that impede efforts to produce change. Here we attempt to merge the studies of interest groups and lobbying with the study of policymaking more generally. We note that the political system has many sources of stability even while it also harbors the opportunities for occasional dramatic policy changes.

Our project focuses on the continuation of a project for which we received initial funding from NSF two years ago. Since the spring of 1999, we have been active in our interviews, fieldwork, and other data collection tasks. We explain in detail below the logistics of what we have accomplished to date as well as what remains to be done. (Our original proposal to NSF, from January 1999, is available, along with all other information concerning our project, on our web site: <http://lobby.la.psu.edu>.) In this introduction, we focus on the theoretical questions common to both our previous and current proposals. Our project differs from most in that its scope allows the investigation of a great number of different questions. We will mention some of these in the pages to come, but we will focus on a small number of central theoretical questions so that we can illustrate in detail a few particular hypotheses and questions from the literature that we plan to test. These more focused discussions should not obscure the broad range of issues we and others will be able to explore with our data in the years to come.

Our original proposal laid out an ambitious set of issues to explore. We proposed the creation of 100 randomly chosen case-studies based on interviews with lobbyists, followed up by interviews with leading protagonists representing each major perspective or coalition on the issue and supplemented with extensive archival and internet-based searches for materials associated with the case. These materials, including press releases, statements of members of Congress, bill texts, hearings transcripts, news articles, federal lobbying disclosure reports, and PAC contribution data, would supplement our interviews and also allow any student or scholar in the country to analyze our cases just as we do through our web site. (For reasons of confidentiality, of course, our interview notes cannot be released, but instead we write an overview of each case that can be made publicly available without revealing any confidential material.) Not only would we provide a resource to those scholars interested in analyzing lobbying systematically, but we think the web site may prove exceptionally useful in teaching courses about the substance of American government as well.

Among the theoretical and substantive questions that we raised in our first proposal were the following: The impact of material resources on political outcomes; the importance of conflict-expansion and issue-definition; how lobbying and the use of evidence differ across policy domains and over time; how multi-dimensional issues are “whittled down” so that they are understood in simple terms in the political process, making possible Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) findings of low dimensionality in congressional voting; how lobbying coalitions come together, often including powerful government actors working in concert with those outside government; and what effect the skills and resources of individual lobbyists have on the policy process. As we wrote:

We seek to study the process by which groups and other advocates translate their resources (staff, research capability, official status, public respect, popular support, large memberships) into effective evidence, compelling arguments, telling sound bites, and impressive displays of public support. We plan to examine how the use of arguments and evidence shape, and are shaped by, the scope of participation in an issue debate, the venues of decision making, and the development and outcomes of the policy debate. By centering our study of lobbying on the substance of the advocacy process, we think we can return the study of lobbying to where it belongs: at the core of any understanding of

policy change and of political representation in a democracy (Baumgartner et al. 1999, p. 4).

Reviews of our proposal and a summary of the comments of the advisory panel generally indicated agreement that we were addressing important issues. The advisory panel “thought the research had strong theoretic underpinnings and was cast within a fully explicated research design. The only misgiving the panel had was that it would be difficult to tell what the research might yield so they thought a pilot study should be undertaken.” With the first segment of the project completed, we are confident that it is feasible and that the analyses we proposed can be done systematically. We will provide evidence of our abilities in the pages to follow. First, we provide some background to the general trends that we have observed in our preliminary analyses of 61 cases. Note that as of this writing we have completed most of our interviews and some of the documentary searching, but we have not fully analyzed these cases at this point. However, a number of patterns stand out quite starkly and we are confident that these can be fully documented with replicable coding procedures (see Baumgartner et al. 2000; also available at <http://lobby.la.psu.edu>). Among these are the following:

1. Every one of our 61 issues is at least potentially multi-dimensional. Advocates consistently and uniformly are able to explain various unrelated dimensions of each issue. Riker (1986, 1996) and others are therefore correct to point to the potential for instability in policy debates based on the inherent complexities of virtually all significant issues of public policy.
2. A small number of issues attract a huge proportion of the total lobbying attention. Baumgartner and Leech (2001) have shown for a large sample of issues that over 50 percent of the total lobbying effort was devoted to fewer than 10 percent of the cases. The bottom 50 percent of the cases was the object of only three percent of the lobbying. The skewed nature of lobbying efforts means that the vast bulk of the issues are debated well below the level of visibility that leads to considerable press coverage, media attention, and general awareness beyond the community of policy experts continually concerned with the issue. Similarly, we find that few of our 61 issues attract the interest of a large number of groups.
3. Most lobbying concerns the expansion or restriction of an already established government policy or program. Previous supporters and opponents of the policy or program line up accordingly.
4. Budget scoring issues predominate many discussions, especially discussions about those issues that are low in visibility. Many policymakers react to the issue solely on the basis of its potential impact on the federal budget. This is a tremendous source of predictability for low-visibility issues and points to the need for many advocates to raise the visibility of their proposals.
5. Most of our cases display a conflict between only two opposing sides, with one side proposing some change in policy and the other side either being indifferent or supporting the status quo. Policy specialists supportive of some change typically face their greatest challenge in garnering high-level attention to their issue or justifying the cost of their proposal. Struggles for attention in the face of indifference are more common than fights between opposing visions of “good public policy.”
6. Although the different sides or perspectives characterizing most issues are relatively few, many discrete arguments may be associated with each side of the debate.

7. Given the findings presented in points three through six, it is not surprisingly that the various arguments characterizing a debate are common knowledge to all members of the policy community. As long as an issue is being discussed among a community of policy experts, there are few “surprise” dimensions. Lobbyists spend their professional lives being experts on given policy issues such as the Medicare+Choice program; they know all the details and arguments. It is unreasonable to expect that a new argument will suddenly appear to the general surprise of these experts.
8. Washington policymakers monitor the behaviors of those around them and are quick to react not only to their own perceptions of what is “good public policy” but also to their judgments about the expected behaviors of other important actors. Where policymakers see that the President is going to make a priority out of 100,000 cops on the street, they may get on that bandwagon, hoping to inflect the policy slightly in a direction favorable to them (or simply to take credit for helping).
9. Procedural powers of agenda setting are extremely important in promoting or opposing the promotion of particular issue-definitions. The president and the leaders of Congress have tremendous powers of timing, scheduling, and sequencing that make them able to promote certain issue-definitions and downplay others more easily than any other actors.

These general (and preliminary) findings indicate both a set of barriers to innovation and strategic issue-redefinitions and opportunities for such behaviors, mirroring the patterns apparent in the extant literature. On the one hand, some work suggests that advocates interested in policy change can, with relative ease, act strategically to shift the terms of debate, draw in additional interested parties, and challenge the status quo. For instance, Schattschneider (1960) explained that who was involved in a conflict was determined by how that conflict was defined (i.e., the terms of the debate). If additional participants could be drawn in to a conflict, status quo opponents were more likely to realize their goal; when conflict is expanding, uncertainty about outcomes prevails. Similarly, Salisbury, et al. (1987) showed that conflict was more intense and alliances less stable in those policy areas consisting of relatively heterogeneous sets of participants. Dramatic examples of shifts in a policy debate provide provocative evidence in support of these claims.

On the other hand, in spite of numerous isolated examples, there is little scholarly evidence of sustained unpredictability and instability in the policy process. In fact, the more typical conclusion is that reached by Heinz and his colleagues (1993):

Though the velocity and volume of policy making activity may be great, the ultimate product may be a return to the place at which one started...The issues remain in much the same form over long periods of time...The participating groups and their representatives are, or soon become, old hands. Though changes do occur, innovation is generally meager and exceedingly gradual. It may seem a paradox, but the principal result of the vast amount of interest group activity may be stability in systems of policy formation (412–13).

Scholars adopting a wide array of approaches seem inevitably to face the question posed by Tullock (1981): Why so much stability? (Shepsle 1979; Riker 1996; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). If stability is most typical, then it is important to study the sources of that stability, but also to understand the possibilities for policy change on both a dramatic and more meager scale. However, to undertake this task requires a broader approach than the one adopted in most

previous studies of organizational advocacy. Specifically, we need to merge two areas of research to consider how advocates in and out of government collaborate to build support for shifts in policy, to prevent change, and to advance, more generally, their policy perspectives. We look to ideas about the scope and nature of conflict, policy instability, and expectations of success that have been given attention by scholars of agenda setting and policy development but largely neglected by interest group scholars. In addition, we rely on ideas that have been studied extensively by group researchers such as who groups interact with in government, how they act to express their policy concerns, and how their resource capabilities affect their actions.

First and foremost, efforts to understand how advocates try to affect policy—including their efforts to affect how issues are understood—must take into account the degree of visibility or salience of the issue at hand. This is not to say that we need only recognize that some issues are very visible and others are not. Rather, in order to understand what advocates are trying to accomplish and how they try to achieve their objectives, we need to focus on how and to what extent the process of advocacy differs for different types of issues and for organizations with differing objectives (see for example Berry 1977). For one, as our data suggests, it is probably wrong to presume that passage and implementation of some policy measure is what all advocates want. On issues that do not affect large populations or attract the attention of many actors, advocates' objectives probably involve building a coalition of supporters in and out of government to raise attention to the issue at hand. The actions advocates take to do this are unlikely to be part of the same repertoire advocates use on more contentious issues. As another example, a number of recent studies offer evidence of groups' success at changing the way issues are defined. West and Loomis (1999) argue that "moneyed interests" are influential in shaping policy because they can afford to generate and repeat an "interested" message that shapes the issue debate. Their study of the narratives articulated by groups through public relations campaigns, issue ads, elite advocacy ads, and other public forms of issue advocacy on four highly visible policy issues leads them to conclude that interest groups use symbolic rhetoric that is often several steps removed from the actual content of a policy issue to frame issues in ways that are favorable to their preferences. Similarly, McKissick (1997), Cobb and Ross (1997) and others argue that advocates should be expected to rely as much as possible on arguments that appeal to valence issues such as improving children's health and enhancing economic competition. Arguments like these are thought to be effective precisely because they invoke images and ideas that are hard to oppose (they mute the opposition) and (according to McKissick), they minimize an advocate's uncertainty about the reactions his or her arguments will elicit. But if an advocate uses arguments and issue characterizations strategically in order to minimize opposition and maximize support for his or her policy objectives, then advocates who are active on issues that engender minimal support and diffuse opposition should see few benefits in using arguments that invoke uncontested social values. Instead, we expect that valence arguments will be used in conjunction with visible issues that attract opposition, and that partisanship and cost-related arguments will structure much of the political reaction to low visibility policy proposals. More generally, we see limits to the use of valence arguments across advocates with different resources or capabilities (e.g., money, members, a large number of capable allies); with different objectives (e.g., attracting attention to an issue, stopping the creation of a new program, adding funds to an existing program); and across different stages of the policy process (e.g., agenda setting, floor debate). ***Hypothesis 1a:*** *Valence arguments will be used more often on high visibility issues with direct opposition than on low-visibility issues*

with diffuse opposition. **Hypothesis 1b:** *Partisanship and cost-related arguments will be used more often on lower-visibility issues than on high visibility issues.*

Second, lobbying coalitions seeking greater attention and policy change are expected to be more likely than those seeking to privatize conflict and maintain the status quo to seek government allies. Of course, we are not the first to claim that government allies are important to groups (Hall and Wayman 1990; Hansen 1991; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Hall 1996, 2000; DeGregorio 1997, 2000; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). But while extant work on groups' interactions with allies enhances our understanding of when and why allies as opposed to non-allies in government are contacted (e.g., to subsidize and mobilize them to work on a group's behalf) and how these relationships develop and are maintained, they do not speak to how the presence of allies within an advocacy coalition affects a coalition's likelihood of success. We expect that coalitions seeking change but not controlling vast material resources will be especially reliant on governmental allies. Government officials are particularly important members of lobbying coalitions and any full understanding of how lobbyists get what they want from government must include a discussion of how they work with their allies in government and how they get these allies to share their priorities. **Hypothesis 2:** *Lobbying coalitions seeking policy change are more likely than those seeking to preserve the status quo to seek government allies.*

Third, we expect that advocacy coalitions with greater material resources will have advantages in achieving policy success that coalitions with fewer resources do not enjoy. This issue is central to many previous studies about bias in the group system and our data on resources and success should be useful to many analyses of such questions. We go beyond a simple prediction of money equals power, however, and anticipate that material resources will be a significant predictor of success for advocates who seek to maintain the status quo but a less significant determinant of success for advocates seeking change. Richard Smith's (1984) work on the interpretations of advocates provides the rationale for these expectations. Smith argues that organizations with more and better quality resources than their opponents will be able to develop interpretations that are more compelling to members of Congress than the interpretations put forth by opponents. Resources, according to Smith, allow groups to acquire information about the consequences of policy and to hire creative and experienced people who can transform the acquired information into appealing interpretations. However, Smith illustrates that resources are not sufficient to explain success. Even groups with the best resource advantage could see their supportive coalitions shrink in size as time passed and proposals were altered by amendments. Thus, it is unlikely that resources alone could sustain a coalition building effort necessary to bring about policy change. **Hypothesis 3a:** *Lobbying coalitions with greater material resources will have greater policy success than coalitions with fewer material resources.* **Hypothesis 3b:** *Material resources will be relatively more important for advocates who seek to maintain the status quo as compared to advocates who seek policy change.* **Hypothesis 3c:** *Material resources and effective lobbying arguments have a positive interactive effect on policy success.*

Fourth, we anticipate that effective lobbying coalitions (i.e., those that come closer to achieving their goals) are more likely than ineffective lobbying coalitions to have many potential arguments to support their perspective, even if they focus on only a few. This expectation is rooted in the idea that lobbying coalitions that splinter will not achieve the policy changes they seek. In order to be viable, especially if they are attempting to change the status quo, lobbyists must build a large coalition. To do so, they must combine forces with other interests who may

have overlapping, but not identical, goals. The need to create a large coalition, and the disincentives for a splintered lobbying effort, mean that the mobilization of political forces will be on considerably fewer issue-dimensions than may be present in the underlying issue.

Multiple diffuse arguments are more effective, on the other hand, in preserving the status quo. We expect, therefore, successful proponents of policy change to focus on a small number of issue-dimensions. **Hypothesis 4a:** *Lobbying coalitions that successfully preserve the status quo are more likely than unsuccessful status quo seeking lobbying coalitions and successful coalitions seeking change to use many potential arguments to support their case.* **Hypothesis 4b:** *Lobbying coalitions that are successful in seeking policy change are more likely than are unsuccessful supporters of change and successful status quo supporters to rely on fewer arguments to support their case.*

Fifth, advocates who are unsuccessful in previous iterations of a debate on an issue will make use of a relatively greater number of different arguments than will advocates who previously were successful. Likely losers have an incentive to try to identify arguments that allow them to win (both McKissick 1997 and Riker 1996 make related points about unsuccessful participants in a debate). **Hypothesis 5:** *Advocates who are unsuccessful in previous iterations of an issue debate will make use of a greater number of arguments in subsequent iterations of that debate than will advocates who previously were successful.*

Sixth, advocacy efforts more often have to do with presenting a sense of momentum for the issue and with affecting others' expectations of success or failure of a policy initiative than it has to do with affecting others' beliefs about "good public policy." The importance of the expected behavior of others leads to an important element of potential instability in the policy process. The expectation of success can itself be a self-fulfilling prophecy; the perception that an issue is a "lost cause" or "not going anywhere" can itself hinder or cripple an effort to recruit coalition partners (Chong 1991). On the other hand, once it crosses a threshold of visibility, increased participation can be self-perpetuating as well, as advocates both in favor and opposed to the potential action see that the issue is "moving" (see, for example, Granovetter 1978). Without a sense of momentum, the status quo predominates. **Hypothesis 6a:** *Participation across a sample of issues will be highly skewed, with little participation on most issues, and extensive participation and lobbying on a small proportion of the issues.* **Hypothesis 6b:** *On high salience issues a greater proportion of the participants will be reacting to the lobbying activities of others; on low salience issues a greater proportion of the participants will be pro-actively seeking change.*

The hypotheses outlined above represent some but not all of those that we will be able to test. Our project is broader than most both in terms of the range of theoretical questions that can be addressed and in terms of the teaching and pedagogical value of our large web site full of primary materials concerning the policy process on a random sample of issues. We expect that these secondary artifacts of our research project may be just as important to the discipline as our particular theoretical tests. In the pages below we note our progress to date, the need for continued fieldwork, and we discuss briefly how we will construct systematic measures for the variables needed to test the above hypotheses.

## **Research Accomplishments and Work In Progress**

Our original proposal requested \$349,157 for a 36-month project, conducting 500 interviews on 100 cases. We were awarded approximately \$80,000 for the first year of the project and encouraged to report back with our findings. In our revised scope document

submitted with that grant, we expected to complete approximately 150 interviews and 30 issue-modules, or cases. Here we lay out our accomplishments so far—we have conducted 197 interviews on 61 cases, bringing us within striking distance of completing the entire project with additional funding.

*Obtaining a Random Sample of Policy Issues:* Our goal in selecting policy issues for this study was to obtain a sample that would accurately reflect the full range of issues that attract the interest of national policy advocates at a given point in time. To do this, we relied on a random sample of organization representatives to provide us with a random sample of policy issues.

Consistent with the description in our first proposal, we constructed a sampling frame of organizational “issue identifiers” using the database created from the Lobbying Reports for 1996 that were filed with the Secretary of the Senate (see Baumgartner and Leech 2001). The representatives of lobbying firms and organizations who file these lobbying reports are asked to specify the issues on which they lobby within broad policy categories (e.g., tax, Medicare/Medicaid). We took advantage of this aspect of the reports to create a sampling frame that allowed us to choose a sample of organizational issue identifiers that were likely to be among the lobbyists contacting federal officials in a typical day. That is, we did not treat each registration as a single unit in our sampling frame. Instead, registrants indicating they lobbied on multiple issues appeared multiple times in our sampling frame. So, for example, a report from a group that reported lobbying on five specific issues appeared five times in the sampling frame. In this way, organizations that are more active lobbyists had a relatively greater chance of being chosen for our sample of issue identifiers than did less active organizations. Once the sampling frame was constructed, we selected at random our sample of organizational issue identifiers.

*In-Person Interviews:* In-person interviews were then requested with representatives at the selected organizations. During this issue identification interview the organization representative was asked to select the most recent issue he or she had spent time on, and to describe what he or she had done and what the organization was trying to accomplish on the issue. The issue mentioned then became an issue for our project. We conducted the first issue identification interviews shortly after the start of the 106<sup>th</sup> session of Congress in February 1999.<sup>1</sup> The most recent issue identification interviews were completed in December 2000. Over this time period, 61 of the 93 organizations we contacted have identified issues for our study (an

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<sup>1</sup> The first 14 issues were identified by organizations that were selected during a pilot phase of the project while Hojnacki was a Robert Wood Johnson fellow, and before we received NSF support. The selection procedure we used at that time differed from our current sampling plan along two dimensions. First, the organized interests eligible to identify issues included only those that registered (or were registered by a client) to lobby Congress in 1996 about any one or more of six health-related policy categories (i.e., Medicare/Medicaid, pharmacy, health issues, tobacco, alcohol and drug abuse, and medical/disease research/clinical labs). Second, we used a different procedure to select these groups. Instead of first taking lobbying activity into account and then choosing randomly, we assigned each registrant a random number and multiplied it by the number of issues the organization reported it would lobby on. In this way, the pool of issue identifiers selected in the pilot sample are less likely than the pool selected in the current sample to include organizations that lobby on only one or two issues. The registrations for the health-related policy categories were excluded from the sampling frame from which we selected the remaining issue identifiers.

issue identifier response rate of 65 percent).<sup>2</sup> These 61 issues are listed on our web site: <http://lobby.la.psu.edu>.

We also ask our issue-identifying respondents to narrate the appeals they make when they speak with others about the issue, to specify with whom they are talking about the issue, to describe the type of opposition they face, and to provide a variety of other information about their organizations (our interview protocols are included in our web site). Among the most important pieces of additional information we seek is a description of the other actors involved in the issue debate—we ask them to describe those inside and outside of government who represent the various positions on the relevant issue. Subsequent interviews are then conducted with a subset of the individuals identified by the issue identifier, namely the main actors representing each of the distinct perspectives. The individuals interviewed include organization representatives, agency personnel, and congressional staff. The content of the subsequent interviews is identical to the issue identification interviews except that these interviews do not involve the identification of a new issue. In each interview, we continue to ask who else is involved, so that when we complete all the interviews for a given case we can be confident that we have a complete picture of the range of coalitions and interests concerned. Issues that involve few distinct views, then, require only one or two additional interviews. Issues on which there are many distinct viewpoints require as many additional interviews as there are perspectives so that we obtain a full set of information about the advocacy activities undertaken on the issue, the policy appeals used, and the targets of those appeals.

We have completed all interviews for 39 of our issues. Twenty-six interviews remain to be completed on the 22 other issues. Overall, across our 61 study issues we have contacted 224 individuals and completed a total of 197 interviews (a response rate of 88 percent). Among the issues for which interviews are completed, the number of interviews conducted ranges from 15 interviews on managed care reform to two interviews on eight of our issues. On average across our 61 issues, we have conducted approximately three interviews per issue to date, and we will have completed four per issue when our fieldwork for this set of issues is complete.

For issues involving Congress the interview set typically includes one or two organizations representing each distinct perspective, and one or two legislative staff who work for either the committee(s) of jurisdiction or the member(s) most involved in moving or opposing the issue. For issues that involve only an executive branch or independent regulatory agency, the typical set of interviews include one or two organization representatives and a relevant staff member at the agency. Most of the issues for which we have completed only two interviews have, at present, no opposition. Under these circumstances, we interview one organization representative and one person in government. If follow-up interviews (see below) reveal a previously unknown source(s) of opposition, we will complete additional interviews.

*Telephone Follow-ups:* Our interest in understanding how the advocacy efforts on these issues unfold requires that we also conduct follow-up interviews by telephone with some of our respondents. The follow-ups have been (and will be) conducted periodically at roughly eighteen months after the initial interview is completed. The follow-up interviews will be used to determine whether any changes or developments have occurred in the appeals used, objectives

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<sup>2</sup>Refusals include representatives of organizations who told us they were unwilling to participate in our project, as well as representatives who did not respond to our contact efforts. Generally, if an individual did not respond after three attempts at contact we considered it an implicit refusal.

sought, and targets selected by advocates. Attention also is given to the passage or definitive rejection of a policy action or proposal. To date, six follow-up interviews have been completed; the follow-up for a number of our issues will occur in the early part of 2001 after the end of the 106<sup>th</sup> session of Congress.

*Supplementary Data from Public Sources:* The information we are obtaining through our interviews represents only a portion of data we collect. Data to supplement the interview information is gathered by our undergraduate and graduate student assistants from a diverse array of secondary sources, then coded systematically to allow statistical comparisons across cases. These supplementary data have been (and will be) located through searches of the Library of Congress' *Thomas* web site (thomas.loc.gov), the web sites of the House and Senate, relevant agency and organization web sites, national newspapers and the *National Journal* via *Lexis-Nexis*, and the *Vanderbilt Nightly News Abstracts* for each issue. The searches are conducted using keyword search strings developed by the investigator who conducted the interviews for that issue. Our student assistants then follow a detailed set of search guidelines that have been developed for each source of supplementary data; the guidelines ensure that these data are collected systematically. To date, supplementary data from the *Thomas* web site, and from organizational web sites have been obtained for ten of our issues. The documents obtained through the searches provide the texts of bills and regulations, lists of congressional sponsors, committee and agency reports, transcripts of hearing testimony and witness lists, statements made on the House and Senate floor, press releases and other information released by members of Congress, the amount and type of media coverage of each case, and press releases and issue briefs issued by all organizations that are involved in the issues (not only those we interviewed). Since groups and agencies may update their web pages periodically, deleting coverage of these issues as time goes by, we copy the full set of our findings on our own computers. For cases with limited media coverage, copies of all stories on the issue are preserved on our computers; for highly salient cases a random sample is retained.

For each issue we also have begun to gather information about the political action committee (PAC) contribution activities of the organizations active on those issues. These data are being obtained from the files of the Federal Election Commission for the 1997 to 2002 time period. Where data are available, we will compile information on soft money and individual contributions for each issue in our sample.

Our graduate and undergraduate assistants are systematically storing all of the data we are collecting from secondary sources in our web site. For each study issue, the site provides a narrative overview of the issue that introduces the central appeals and arguments made, the nature of the opposition, the venues of activity, the participants, the advocacy activities, as well as other information. The overviews, then, provide the essential pieces of information that are gathered during our interviews purged of any information that might identify our respondents. Moreover, the site will allow easy access to all of the data we are collecting from public sources. By way of example, consider the issue about broadening access to hearing screenings for infants. A visitor to the project web site can read an overview of the issue, look at the text of six bills on the topic that were introduced, read a relevant committee report issued by the Senate Appropriations committee, access testimony that was offered by three organizations at hearings on the issue, examine a host of statements about infant hearing screenings that were made by members of the House and Senate, read press releases and issue briefs that were posted on an active organization's web site, and read five stories that appeared in various newspapers about screening infants for hearing loss. Our objective in making these data easily accessible is that

they will be a tool for teaching about advocacy and the policy making process, and a tool for researchers who seek comparable information about the debate and advocacy efforts that occurred on any one or more of our 61 issues. Each issue will be the subject of a complete set of materials on the related web pages: a general case overview as well as copies of relevant legislation, regulations, news stories, committee hearings and testimony, and press releases. Students and scholars alike will be able to make their own comparisons from this full set of lobbying materials about a random sample of issues. Basically, we are disseminating original data even before it is coded, setting a new standard for openness and usefulness to the discipline. Eventually this site will also include our complete data set of coded variables corresponding to the raw data we have collected.

*Coding.* Concurrent with our collection of supplementary data, we have begun to code information obtained through the in-person and telephone interviews. The variables we are coding are: the unique perspectives or coalitions associated with each issue; whether, how many, and what type of government allies are associated with each perspective; the types of arguments employed by each perspective; the lobbying tactics used by each perspective; and the nature of the opposition encountered by each unique perspective.

1. Each unique *perspective or lobbying coalition* associated with an issue is identified from the stated objectives of the advocates interviewed. All advocates who share a particular objective are considered part of the same perspective. Included among the latter are advocates who we do not interview but who are mentioned by the advocates we do interview as sharing their objectives. We use the term perspective rather than coalition because a perspective includes advocates who are working in a formal coalition as well as those who are not in coalition but who share the same policy goal on a particular issue.
2. The *government allies* associated with each perspective are identified through interviews with advocates. Any actor in government who shares the objectives of a perspective is considered a government ally. Both the number of these allies, and the types (e.g., agency official, member of Congress, etc.) of allies are counted for each perspective.
3. Our *argument type* variable currently has four categories: valence, cost, partisan, and non-cost technical. These categories, which are preliminary, are designed both to be specific enough and general enough to allow us to test hypotheses and relate to the extant literature. This means that we need to generate categories that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive rather than enumerate the array of arguments posed. In addition, the categories should characterize the arguments in ways that are relevant to extant discussions in the literature.
4. We are generating dichotomous variables to indicate whether each of several different *advocacy tactics* is being undertaken or not by the advocates comprising each perspective. The tactics we consider include personal contact with committee staff, contact with majority party leadership, drafting legislative language, conducting and disseminating in-house research, placing issue advertisements, and talking with members of the media.
5. We are generating dichotomous variables to indicate whether each of several different *impediments* is encountered or not by the advocates comprising each perspective. The impediments we consider include a stigmatized/unpopular target population, lack of a legislative vehicle, venue disputes between different sets of decision makers, and cost.

6. We also are generating variables to indicate whether each of several different *forms of opposition* is encountered or not by the advocates comprising each perspective. For each form of opposition (e.g., opposition from the congressional leadership), we indicate whether the opposition is not present, whether it is diffuse (e.g., cannot get the attention of congressional leaders; congressional leaders don't recognize how serious the problem is; leadership not mobilized), whether active hostility is expected, or whether active hostility is present. The forms of opposition we consider include opposition from organizations, voters, committee/subcommittee leadership, the media, agencies, and the administration.

The next variables to be coded are those which, in conjunction with the variables we are now coding, will allow us to test the hypotheses outlined above. Specifically, we will identify a continuum of issue visibility based on the amount of media and governmental attention an issue receives, we will identify the policy objectives of each perspective and the extent to which those objectives are achieved successfully, and we will devise a scheme for measuring the breadth and type of resources associated with each perspective. Information about the resources associated with each perspective will be based primarily on data we obtain from our supplementary sources and it will be collected for advocates we interview as well as for other advocates sharing the same perspective. In addition to resources, we will develop measures to categorize the type of advocates who share a similar perspective, and the degree to which there is a diversity of advocate types sharing each perspective.

Our coding approach allows us to conduct analyses at three levels. First, most of our coding begins with the interview document so that we have information about the arguments, lobbying tactics, opposition, and resources associated with each advocate interviewed. Second, our efforts to interview advocates representing each perspective or side of an issue allow us to merge the individual interview data with data we gather from supplementary source and aggregate to the level of the shared perspective, or lobbying coalition. Third, because we are obtaining systematically a wealth of information about each of our study issues, we can conduct analyses at the issue level as well. The different levels of analysis relevant to our study are apparent in the hypotheses we present above. Hypotheses one and six will be tested at the issue level whereas hypotheses two through five require testing at the level of the perspective.

The next section then lays out our plans for completing the project and explains the logistics of our proposal.

### **Proposed Research Activities**

Our plans for additional research extend directly from the work we have done so far. First, we propose to continue the development of our web site. As we complete the secondary data collection now underway for 10 issues, we will begin the secondary searches for the 51 remaining issues in our sample. Second, we propose to expand our sample from 61 issues to about 110 issues. The expansion of our sample is a critical element of our project. As we describe above, the unit of analysis for most of our hypotheses is the issue. In order to be reasonably confident about the results of our hypotheses tests, we need at least 100 cases in our sample for analysis. Third, we will compile data on the total amount of money spent on lobbying by the organizations active on each issue, regardless of whether they were part of our interview sample. This information is available through the Lobbying Disclosure Reports that the organizations must file semi-annually with the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the

Senate. Finally, because court cases and rulings are relevant or potentially relevant to a small number of our issues, our secondary data collection efforts will also be extended to identify whatever court documents (e.g., briefs, rulings) are made public for these issues.

### **Logistics, Budget, and Schedule**

As we explain above, our research begins with Washington interviews, but each case we identify leads to a range of “back-office” tasks to compile information about media and governmental attention to these issues through searches of Lexis-Nexis, organizational websites, and government documents. This second part of each case study, the “back office” work, is done collectively by our staff with at least one undergraduate being supervised by a graduate student. We have weekly staff meetings to ensure that all staff members are engaged in identical searches for their issues. Our experience thus far suggests that once a student works with their faculty and graduate student supervisor to identify the relevant keywords for searches, reads through our interviews carefully, and begins to search systematically following our search guidelines, it takes an average of 80 hours of student staff time to complete one case. Some cases, of course, are quicker; some that generate large amounts of coverage take longer. A graduate student working 20 hours per week can supervise 4 undergraduates working 10 hours per week. Our budget request for graduate and undergraduate students reflects these estimates of coding time per issue.

Each initial interview also leads to a series of subsequent personal interviews with other advocates involved in the same case, and later telephone follow-ups with a subset of respondents. These interviews were all conducted by the PI and Co-PI's in the original grant. We were able to complete over 150 interviews in our previous grant because Hojnacki as part of her Robert Wood Johnson Fellowship conducted over half of these. Teaching duties now require all of us to spend the academic year away from Washington, so we do not expect that we will be able to complete as many interviews for as low a cost as we did with the original grant. In order to complete the number of cases that we believe we need to support systematic conclusions, we expect to work in the summers of 2001 and 2002, with follow-up phone interviews taking us to December 2002, the end of the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress. This time frame will allow for two full Congresses to be covered. Our experience in the previous grant is that many issues are resolved one way or another at the end of a Congress; by interviewing over four full years and two full Congresses we will observe a great range of cases and we will be able to identify at least a preliminary outcome for all of our cases. (Note that this proposal is only for two years of funding; the previous grant covered the 106<sup>th</sup> Congress.)

Our snowball sampling procedures have worked very well. Further, our experience with the interview protocol has been very positive and we believe that we can train our most advanced graduate students to conduct these interviews themselves. (And we believe it to be an important part of the educational goal of such a project to include students where appropriate in each research activity.) Therefore our budget reflects Washington fieldwork expenses for a combination of graduate students and faculty investigators (see budget justification for a complete break-down of these costs).

## Summary of Completed and Proposed Interview Field Work:

Time Period	Interviews	Cases
Already completed as part of previous grant (with follow-ups remaining to be completed)	197	61
To be completed in Summer 2001, with follow-ups to December 2002	120	24
To be completed in Summer 2002, with follow-ups to December 2002	120	24
<b>Cumulative Totals for Current and Previous Grant</b>	<b>437</b>	<b>109</b>

As we note, interviews are only part of the work we do, and not the most time-consuming. Internet searches and coding of the results would continue through May 2003. Of course we begin these searches immediately on completing the interviews, but our experience is that our student coders must immerse themselves in one case at a time, leading to a backlog of cases after a round of interviewing. Therefore, we expect the fall and spring terms to be taken up mostly with conducting the searches and building the web pages associated with the interviews done the previous summer. In spring term 2003 we would expect to complete all the web pages and to have each case coded. Writing and analysis would take us through December 2003, though we request no funding for this period.

### Conclusion

We have identified new techniques for devising a truly random sample of public policy disputes that include not only well-known and salient issues, but also the small, unpublicized cases that comprise the bulk of issues in Washington. With our methods of identifying the objects of policy advocacy, we can explore in a generalizable way what has previously only been done in case studies. Our focus on the substance of the lobbying efforts by various advocates inside and outside of government holds the promise of putting interest groups and lobbying at the very core of our understanding of the governmental process, where Truman put them some 50 years ago. Our initial experience with the project over the past two years gives us confidence in the feasibility of our approach. More than that, the creation of our extensive web site for the distribution of information concerning these issues holds the promise to change how scholars do research on this topic and how they teach about American politics and policymaking.

The forces of stability in politics do not appear to be limited to institutional design and constitutional structures. More important even than these important elements may be the complex relations among social and professional interests and the various government officials that share their views. These professional and partisan communities in and out of Washington provide the structure to almost all public policy debates. They are open to change, to be sure. However, established ways of thinking of public policy problems are not routinely open to strategic manipulation; the forces of stability are quite profound. The sources of instability in politics remain important to understand, however. In our project, we can take the discipline a long way towards understanding these, but also perhaps for the first time in estimating their relative weights in a random sample of policy issues.

Understanding the relative powers of lobbyists and other policy advocates to affect how others understand public policy issues will give us a firm grasp of the role of interest groups in democratic decision-making. For too long, research on groups has focused narrowly on material resources and vote counting. Groups are at the center of the democratic struggle. We know little,

however, about how the vast material resources that are expended in the Washington community translate into influence over precise policy disputes. There is strong reason to suspect that material resources (staff, advertising budgets, ability to mobilize members and elites in different parts of the country) can be effectively used to thwart efforts to destabilize or to change established policies. Material resources alone will not be sufficient, however, to overcome these efforts to protect the status quo. Because the study of interest groups has so often been divorced from the study of government officials, few have noted the vast material resources that can be equaled by the simple presence of a powerful legitimating governmental ally. Government officials themselves are key elements of the policy struggle. Incorporating their efforts as part of coalitions that develop arguments in support of or in opposition to a given policy change will push us a long way towards understanding the impact and implications of lobbying in a democracy.

### **Results from Prior NSF Support**

Baumgartner: "Policy Agendas in the United States since 1945." National Science Foundation grant # SBR-9320922 for \$245,000 covering the period from Spring 1994 to Spring 1998, with Bryan D. Jones, with Research Opportunities for Undergraduate supplements in 1994 and 1995. This project led to seven completed dissertations at Texas A&M (Talbert, MacLeod, Vallabhan, True, Liu, McGonagle, Krutz) and on-going at the University of Washington (Feeley, Hunt); a number of conference papers and published articles (see Baumgartner's CV, attached to this proposal). Work continues on analysis of the project data and writing. The data bases themselves, including a complete set of congressional hearings (approx. 70,000 hearings); a sample of articles from the New York Times Index (approx. 40,000 stories, or about 800 per year), a record of all laws (18,000), every story in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (13,000), and a consistent time series of the federal budget (3,000 observations) covering the period 1947 to 1995, are available: <http://weber.u.washington.edu/~ampol/agendasproject.html>. Dissertations and other research projects are on-going at many universities using the policy agendas data.

Baumgartner and Leech: "Lobbying Strategies of American Interest Groups." National Science Foundation dissertation award, # SBR-9631232, \$8,476, July 15, 1996 to June 30, 1998. Dissertation completed based on mail survey of 800 interest groups. "Lobbying Friends and Foes in Government" (In *Interest Group Politics*, 5th ed., Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. CQ Press, 1998) based on data from this survey. Additional articles and book manuscript by Leech also in progress.

Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech: "Collaborative Research on Lobbying." National Science Foundation award, # SBR-9905195, \$80,569, August 1, 1999 to December 31, 2000. Results explained throughout this proposal; see also the references and our web site.

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- Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1999. The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee. *Journal of Politics*. 61: 999–1024.
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**FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER**

Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science

107 Burrowes Building

Pennsylvania State University

University Park, PA 16802-6200

(814) 863 8978 (phone) / (814) 863 8979 (fax)

email: [frankb@psu.edu](mailto:frankb@psu.edu) / web: <http://polisci.la.psu.edu/faculty/baumgartner/>***Education***

Ph.D., 1986, The University of Michigan. Political Science

M.A., 1983, The University of Michigan. Political Science

B.A., 1980, The University of Michigan. Political Science and French. Phi Beta Kappa

***Full Time Academic Appointments***

1998– Professor, Pennsylvania State University. Interim Head, 1999–2000; Head 2000–  
 1998–1999 Visiting Professor, California Institute of Technology  
 1997–1998 Professor, Texas A&M University  
 1992–1997 Associate Professor, Texas A&M University  
 1987–1992 Assistant Professor, Texas A&M University  
 1986–1987 Visiting Assistant Professor, The University of Iowa

***Selected Publications Related to this Grant Proposal***

*Policy Dynamics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2002. (edited, with Bryan D. Jones) Final revisions to be finished in January 2001; contract awarded November 2000. Also co-author of four chapters.

*Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. (with Beth L. Leech)

*Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. (with Bryan D. Jones)

*Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policymaking*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989.

Issue Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics. *Journal of Politics* forthcoming. (with Beth L. Leech)

The Evolution of Legislative Jurisdictions. *Journal of Politics* 62 (2000): 321–49. (with Bryan D. Jones and Michael C. MacLeod)

The Multiple Ambiguities of “Counteractive Lobbying.” *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (1996): 521–42. (with Beth L. Leech)

Nonlegislative Hearings and Policy Change in Congress. *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (1995): 383–406 (with Bryan D. Jones and Jeffery C. Talbert).

The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress. *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 673–87. (with Bryan D. Jones and Jeffery C. Talbert)

Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems. *Journal of Politics* 53 (1991): 1044–74. (with Bryan D. Jones)

Measurement Validity and the Continuity of Results in Survey Research. *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (1990): 662–70. (with Jack L. Walker)

Survey Research and Membership in Voluntary Associations. *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (1988): 908–28. (with Jack L. Walker)

### ***Current Research Projects Related to this Grant Proposal***

Collaborative Research on Lobbying. (Previously funded under NSF grant # SBR–9905195.)

Continued unfunded work on this project; see our web site: <http://lobby.la.psu.edu>.

Policy Agendas in the United States since 1945. (Previously funded under NSF grant # SBR–9320922). Our web site <http://depts.washington.edu/ampol/agendasproject.html> includes details. Several publications are in preparation related to this project. We are planning a research infrastructure grant to NSF for the January 15, 2001 round of submissions to expand on this work. (With Bryan Jones)

### ***Collaborators within the Past 48 Months***

Jeffrey Berry, Tufts University  
Jamie Gold, Penn State University  
Marie Hojnacki, Penn State University  
Bryan Jones, University of Washington  
David Kimball, Southern Illinois University  
Beth Leech, Rutgers University  
Michael MacLeod, Penn State University  
James L. True, Lamar University  
John Wilkerson, University of Washington

### ***Graduate Advisees (committees chaired since 1994)***

Jen Schoonmacher (currently enrolled at Penn State)  
Gretchen Carnes (currently enrolled at Penn State)  
Beth Leech (Ph.D., Texas A&M, 1998; currently at Rutgers)  
Michael MacLeod (Ph.D., Texas A&M, 1998; currently in private sector)  
Doris McGonagle (Ph.D., Texas A&M, 1998; currently at Blinn College)  
James True (Ph.D., Texas A&M, 1997; currently at Lamar University)  
Shalini Vallabhan (Ph.D., Texas A&M, 1996; currently at American Cancer Society)  
Eric Lundquist (currently enrolled at Texas A&M)

Total graduate advisees since 1994: 8

### ***Graduate Advising Committee***

Roy Pierce, University of Michigan (Emeritus)  
Jack L. Walker, Jr., University of Michigan (deceased)  
Joel D. Aberbach, UCLA (Formerly, University of Michigan)

**January 2001**

**JEFFREY M. BERRY**

Professor of Political Science  
Tufts University  
Medford, MA 02155  
Phone 617 627 2659  
Fax 617 627 3660  
Email [jeffrey.berry@tufts.edu](mailto:jeffrey.berry@tufts.edu)

***Education:***

A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1970  
M.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1972  
Ph.D., The Johns Hopkins University, 1974

***Experience:***

Assistant Professor (1974-) to Professor of Political Science, Tufts University  
Brookings Institution Guest Scholar, 1973-74, 1976-77, 2000  
Visiting Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1988  
Chairman, Department of Political Science, Tufts University, 1990-1993  
Associate, Center for American Political Studies, Harvard University, 1991-  
Faculty, Salzburg Seminar, Political Processes and Institutions of Government and  
Politics, July, 1995  
Chair, Organized Section on Political Organizations and Parties, American Political  
Science Association, 1999-2001

***Selected Publications Related to this Grant Proposal:***

*Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups* (Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 1977)  
*The Interest Group Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984); second edition, 1989; third edition  
(New York: Longman, 1997)  
*Feeding Hungry People: Rulemaking in the Food Stamp Program* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers  
University Press, 1984)  
*Challenge of Democracy* (with Kenneth Janda and Jerry Goldman), (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,  
1987); second edition, 1989; third edition, 1992; fourth edition, 1995; fifth edition, 1997;  
sixth edition, 1999  
*The Rebirth of Urban Democracy* (with Kent E. Portney and Ken Thomson) (Washington, D.C.:  
Brookings Institution, 1993)  
“Centralizing Regulatory Control and Interest Group Access” (with Kent E. Portney), in *Interest  
Group Politics*, 4th ed, Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. (Washington, D.C.:  
Congressional Quarterly, 1994)  
“Citizen Groups, Political Parties, and Electoral Coalitions” (with Deborah Schildkraut), in  
*Social Movements and American Political Institutions*, Anne N. Costain and Andrew S.  
McFarland, eds. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998)  
*The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings  
Institution, 1999)

“The Rise of Citizen Groups,” in Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., *Civic Engagement in American Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and the Russell Sage Foundation, 1999)

***Selected Honors and Awards:***

Graduated with “Great Distinction” in the Political Science Honors Program, University of California, Berkeley, 1970  
National Defense Education Act Title IV Fellowship, The Johns Hopkins University, 1970-73  
Brookings Institution Research Fellowship, 1973-74  
Ph.D awarded with “Distinction,” The Johns Hopkins University, 1974  
Ford Foundation Grant in Government and Law, 1976-77, study of administrative rulemaking  
Ford Foundation Grant (with Kent Portney and Ken Thomson), study of participation and democracy in five American cities, 1986-88  
Aspen Institute, Nonprofit Sector Research Fund grant (with David Arons and Gary Bass), 1999  
Gladys Kammerer Award, American Political Science Association, Best Book on American Politics, *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy* (with Kent E. Portney and Ken Thomson), 1994  
Best Book Award, Urban Politics Section, American Political Science Association, *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy*, 1994  
Aaron Wildavsky Award, Policy Studies Association, Best Book on Public Policy, *The New Liberalism*, 1999

***Current Research Projects Related to this Grant Proposal***

Collaborative Research on Lobbying. (Previously funded under NSF grant # SBR-9905195.)  
Continued unfunded work on this project; see our web site: <http://lobby.la.psu.edu>.

***Collaborators within the Past 48 Months:***

David Arons, Charity Lobbying in the Public Interest  
Gary Bass, OMB Watch  
Frank Baumgartner, Penn State University  
Jerry Goldman, Northwestern University  
Marie Hojnacki, Penn State University  
Ken Janda, Northwestern University  
David Kimball, Southern Illinois University  
Beth Leech, Rutgers University  
Patrick Lemmon OMB Watch  
Kent Portney, Tufts University  
Deborah Schildkraut, Oberlin College

***Graduate Advisees: None*** (Tufts does not offer graduate work in political science)

***Graduate Advising Committee:***

Robert L. Peabody, Johns Hopkins University (retired)  
Milton C. Cummings, Johns Hopkins University

**January 2001**

**MARIE HOJNACKI**

Assistant Professor  
Penn State University  
Department of Political Science  
107 Burrowes Building  
University Park, PA 16802  
Email: marieh@psu.edu

***Education***

B.A., Political Science, Canisius College, cum laude, 1983.  
M.S., Public Policy Analysis, University of Rochester, 1985.  
Ph.D., Political Science, Ohio State University, 1994.

***Academic Appointment***

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Penn State University, August 1994-present.

***Publications***

“PAC Contributions and Lobbying Contacts in Congressional Committees,” with David C. Kimball. N.d. *Political Research Quarterly*. Forthcoming.  
“The Lobbying Activities of Organized Interests in Federal Judicial Nominations,” with Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright. 2000. *The Journal of Politics*. 62:51-69.  
“The Who and How of Organizations’ Lobbying Strategies in Committee,” with David C. Kimball. 1999. *The Journal of Politics*. 61:999-1024.  
“Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress,” with David C. Kimball. 1998. *American Political Science Review*. 92: 775-90.  
“Organized Interests’ Advocacy Behavior in Alliances.” 1998. *Political Research Quarterly*. 51:437-59.  
“Interest Groups’ Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone.” 1997. *American Journal of Political Science*. 41:61-87.  
“‘New-Style’ Judicial Campaigns and the Voters: Economic Issues and Union Members in Ohio,” with Lawrence Baum. 1992. *Western Political Quarterly*, 45:921-48.  
“Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain Their Decisions,” with Lawrence Baum. 1992. *Judicature*, 75:300-09.

***Current Research Projects Related to this Grant Proposal***

Collaborative Research on Lobbying. (Previously funded under NSF grant # SBR-9905195.)  
Continued unfunded work on this project; see our web site: <http://lobby.la.psu.edu>.

***Selected Fellowships and Awards***

Research Fellow, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy Research Program, University of Michigan, 1998-2000.  
Faculty Research Award, Research and Graduate Studies Office, College of the Liberal Arts, Penn State University, Spring 1996.  
Faculty Research Award, Research and Graduate Studies Office, College of the Liberal Arts, Penn State University, Spring 1995.

Spencer Award for the best dissertation, 1994-95. Award given by the Department of Political Science, Ohio State University.

***Selected Professional Activities***

Referee, *American Politics Quarterly*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*.

Program committee member and Interest Group section head, 2001 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta.

Chair, selection committee, 2000 Political Organizations and Parties/Party Politics Award (an award given by the Political Organizations and Parties (POP) section of the American Political Science Association for the best paper presented in a POP session).

***Collaborators (past 48 months)***

Elizabeth Armstrong, Princeton University

Frank R. Baumgartner, Penn State University

Jeffrey M. Berry, Tufts University

Gregory A. Caldeira, Ohio State University

Daniel Carpenter, University of Michigan

David C. Kimball, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Beth L. Leech, Rutgers University

John R. Wright, Ohio State University

***Thesis/Graduate Student Advisees***

Brian Anderson, Mississippi University for Women

Emily Bahn, no institutional affiliation

Dahong Zhang, Penn State University

total number of graduate advisees: 3

***Graduate/Postgraduate Advisors***

Gregory A. Caldeira, Ohio State University

John H. Kessel, Ohio State University (emeritus)

Samuel C. Patterson, Ohio State University (emeritus)

**January 2001**

**DAVID C. KIMBALL**

Assistant Professor  
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale  
Department of Political Science  
Mailcode 4501  
Carbondale, IL 62901-4501  
e-mail: dkimball@siu.edu

***Education***

B.A., Political Science and Applied Mathematics, Brown University, magna cum laude, 1989.  
M.A., Political Science, Ohio State University, 1995.  
Ph.D., Political Science, Ohio State University, 1997.

***Fields of Specialization and Teaching Interests***

Interest groups, electoral behavior, public opinion, political methodology

***Academic Appointment***

Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Assistant Professor of Political Science, August 1998-present.

***Publications***

- Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government*, with Barry C. Burden. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Forthcoming.
- “PAC Contributions and Lobbying Contacts in Congressional Committees,” with Marie Hojnacki. N.d. *Political Research Quarterly*. Forthcoming.
- “The Who and How of Organizations’ Lobbying Strategies in Committee,” with David C. Kimball. 1999. *The Journal of Politics*. 61:999-1024.
- “Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress,” with Marie Hojnacki. 1998. *American Political Science Review*. 92: 775-90.
- “A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting,” with Barry C. Burden. 1998. *American Political Science Review*. 92: 533-544.
- “Living Up to Expectations: Public Attitudes Toward Congress,” with Samuel C. Patterson. 1997. *Journal of Politics*. 59: 701-728.
- “Attitudinal Correlates of the 1992 Presidential Vote: Party Identification and Beyond,” with Herbert F. Weisberg. 1995. In *Democracy’s Feast: Elections in America*, Herbert F. Weisberg, ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- “Data Analysis Programs for the Undergraduate Classroom,” with Herbert F. Weisberg. 1995. *Social Science Computer Review*. 13: 381-388.

***Current Research Projects Related to this Grant Proposal***

Collaborative Research on Lobbying. (Previously funded under NSF grant # SBR-9905195.)  
Continued unfunded work on this project; see our web site: <http://lobby.la.psu.edu>.

***Selected Fellowships and Awards***

Spencer Award for the best dissertation, 1997-98. Award given by the Department of Political Science, Ohio State University.

Aumann Award for the best conference paper, with Barry Burden, 1996-97. Award given by the Department of Political Science, Ohio State University.

Aman Award for the best seminar paper, 1995-96. Award given by the Department of Political Science, Ohio State University.

Multiple Year University Fellowship, 1992-93 and 1996-97, Ohio State University.

***Professional Activities***

Referee, *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *American Politics Quarterly*.

Book manuscript review, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem*, by Gary King, 1996.

***Collaborators (past 48 months)***

Frank R. Baumgartner, Penn State University

Paul A. Beck, Ohio State University

Jeffrey M. Berry, Tufts University

Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Ohio State University

Barry C. Burden, Harvard University

Marie Hojnacki, Penn State University

Beth L. Leech, Rutgers University

Stephen Nichols, California State University at San Marcos

Samuel C. Patterson, Ohio State University (emeritus)

Katherine Tate, University of California at Irvine

Herbert F. Weisberg, Ohio State University

***Thesis/Graduate Student Advisees***

Bradley Best, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

total number of graduate advisees: 1

***Graduate/Postgraduate Advisors***

Paul A. Beck, Ohio State University

Herbert F. Weisberg, Ohio State University

Dean Lacy, Ohio State University

**January 2001**

**BETH L. LEECH**

Assistant Professor  
Department of Political Science  
Rutgers University  
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1411  
e-mail: BethL@rci.rutgers.edu

***Education***

B.S.J., Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University, 1983.

Ph.D., Political Science, Texas A&M University, 1998.

***Fields of Specialization and Teaching Interests***

Interest groups, media and politics, American national institutions, policymaking, research methodology

***Academic Appointment***

Rutgers University, Assistant Professor of Political Science, August 1999-present

Texas A&M University, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science and Journalism, August 1998-July 1999

***Publications***

Issue Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics. *Journal of Politics* forthcoming. (with Frank R. Baumgartner)

*Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science*. Princeton University Press, 1998. With Frank R. Baumgartner.

Lobbying Friends and Foes in Government. In *Interest Group Politics*, 5th ed., Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. CQ Press, 1998. With Frank R. Baumgartner.

Media Attention and Congressional Agendas. In *Does the Media Govern?*, S. Iyengar and R. Reeves, eds., pp. 355-69. Sage, 1997. With Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner.

The Multiple Ambiguities of "Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (1996): 521-42. With Frank R. Baumgartner.

Good Theories Deserve Good Data, a rejoinder. *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (1996): 565-69. With Frank R. Baumgartner.

The Origins, Organization, Maintenance, and Mortality of Interest Groups. In *The Handbook of Political Science Literature and Research on Interest Groups*, Clive S. Thomas, ed. Greenwood Press, forthcoming. With Frank R. Baumgartner.

***Current Research Projects Related to this Grant Proposal***

Collaborative Research on Lobbying. (Previously funded under NSF grant # SBR-9905195.)

Continued unfunded work on this project; see our web site: <http://lobby.la.psu.edu>.

***Selected Awards and Grants***

National Science Foundation Dissertation Enhancement Grant, "Lobbying Strategies of American Interest Groups," SBR-96-31232, 1996-98.

George W. Kunze Prize (university-wide award and stipend given for outstanding scholastic achievement by a graduate student), Texas A&M University, 1998.

Program in American Politics research grant, "Legislative Lobbying," Center for Presidential Studies, Texas A&M University, 1998.

Bryan D. Jones Award for Outstanding Graduate Student Research, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, 1997

Program to Enhance Scholarly and Creative Activities research grant, Texas A&M University, 1997. With Frank R. Baumgartner.

National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship, 1993-96.

Program in American Politics research grant, "Interest Group Lobbying Strategies," Center for Presidential Studies, Texas A&M University, 1996.

***Collaborators (past 48 months)***

Frank R. Baumgartner, Penn State University

Jeffrey M. Berry, Tufts University

Marie Hojnacki, Penn State University

Bryan D. Jones, University of Washington, Seattle

David C. Kimball, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

***Thesis/Graduate Student Advisees***

None

***Graduate/Postgraduate Advisors***

Frank R. Baumgartner, Penn State University

Bryan D. Jones, University of Washington

Jan E. Leighley, Texas A&M University

Susanna Priest, Texas A&M University

**January 2001**