

Chapter 8

Black Elites and Latino Immigrant Relations in a Southern City: Do Black Elites and the Black Masses Agree?

By Paula D. McClain, Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto, Monique L. Lyle, Niambi M. Carter, Gerald F. Lackey, Jeffrey D. Grynawiski, Kendra Davenport Cotton, Shayla C. Nunnally, Thomas J. Scotto, and J. Alan Kendrick¹

The United States is becoming more racially and ethnically diverse as a function of immigration, both legal and illegal, from Asia, Mexico and Latin America. Latinos are the fastest growing population, and in 2000, Latinos replaced African Americans as the largest minority group in the United States. While much of the media and scholarly attention has focused on demographic changes in traditional Latino immigrant destinations such as California, New Mexico, Texas and Arizona, the rapid growth in Latino populations is occurring across the nation. The South has undergone a particularly dramatic alteration in terms of racial composition, with six of seven states tripling the size of their Latino populations between 1990 and 2000. This settlement of Latinos in the South is no more than 10-15 years old, and new immigrants from Mexico and Latin America are settling in states like North Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee (Durand, Massey, and Carvet 2000). They bring ethnic and cultural diversity to areas previously defined exclusively as black and white.

Not only have new Latino populations migrated to urban and suburban locations in the South, they have also settled in small towns and rural areas, reinforcing projections of the “Latinization” of the American South. Examples of these “New Latino Destinations” (Suro and Singer 2000) include cities such as Atlanta, Georgia; Charlotte, Greensboro-Winston Salem, and

¹ This chapter is a revision of a paper presented at the Russell Sage Foundation conference on “Immigration to the United States: New Sources and Destinations,” New York, New York, February 3-4, 2005. The survey reported in this chapter was funded by a grant from The Ford Foundation (St. Benedict the Black Meets the Virgin of Guadalupe Project, Grant #1025-1445). We thank The Foundation and Dr. Melvin Oliver, former Vice President of Asset Building and Community Development, for their support of our research.

Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina; Nashville and Memphis, Tennessee; and Greenville, South Carolina. The increases in the Latino population between 1990 and 2000 range from the 388 % increase in the Latino population experienced in Atlanta, to growth of 809% in Greensboro-Winston Salem. The American South, once overwhelmingly black and white, now counts nearly 12% of its population as Latino.

Race has for centuries defined the legal and social history of the South, and along with it, determined the life and opportunity structures of black and white Southerners. New Latino immigrants are entering into a milieu where the black-white paradigm is the norm. What will black Southerners think about these newly arrived immigrants? Will blacks perceive Latinos as having a positive or negative effect on race relations in the South? This chapter addresses these questions on African American reactions to Latino immigrants in the Southern city of Durham, North Carolina. We address in particular black responses to the changing demography of Durham by examining attitudes of black elites toward Latino immigrants, and testing the extent to which these elite perspectives are reflected in the attitudes of the general black population. We begin with an overview of the research setting, Durham, North Carolina. We next review the literature on elite influence on public opinion and the influence of black elites on black mass public opinion, as well as scholarship on black American attitudes toward immigration in general and Latino immigration in particular. We then analyze relationship between the attitudes of black elites and black citizens of Durham on issues related to Latino immigration.

Race relations in a Southern city

Durham, North Carolina was incorporated less than 150 years ago in 1869, making it a relatively new “post-bellum” city in the South. As white Durham grew throughout the nineteenth

and early 20th Centuries, a parallel black community, Hayti, was developing just outside of Durham proper, and the first land was sold to blacks around 1877 (Anderson 1990; Boyd 1925). Racial segregation policies were codified as early as the 1870s, suggesting Durham's racial history is similar to that of other many other Southern cities. Blacks labored in Durham's mills and tobacco factories, and some members of the white business community cultivated relations with the black community. Business development within the black community was also encouraged, and in some instances, white business owners contributed money to black-owned ventures. A black entrepreneurial class in Durham grew after the founding of black-owned businesses such as North Carolina Mutual and Provident Association, The Durham Drug Company, the Merrick-Moore-Spaulding Land Company, Lincoln Hospital, Bankers Fire Insurance Company, among others. Boyd (1925:284) estimates the value of black property in Durham exceeded \$4 million in 1923. Anderson (1990) suggests that the strong black leadership in Durham and its connections to some of the major white leaders in Durham were important for maintaining peaceful relations between blacks and whites (See also Greene 1996, Brown 1997, and Houck 1941).

At the same time, Jim Crow laws governed the public spaces and social interaction of blacks and whites in the city and on the Durham railways. Blacks in Durham protested against these segregation laws as early as 1914, and the Colored Voters League encouraged blacks to vote for quality candidates regardless of partisan affiliation in 1922. The National Negro Finance Corporation was founded two years later to assist black entrepreneurs, and in 1927, the Durham Branch of the Negro Business League actively demanded equal citizenship rights for blacks. By 1935, the Durham Committee on Negro Affairs was established to address the concerns of the black community, and throughout the civil rights era, it became a powerful organization exerting

tremendous influence on local Durham politics.² As a result of the political and economic development in Durham, a strong cadre of black elites had and continues to have a great deal of political influence.

The City of Durham today is much different than it was in the early to mid-Twentieth Century. North Carolina has the fastest growing Latino population in the country, and while Charlotte has experienced the most growth, Durham's Latino population has exploded in the last ten years. Table 1 compares the racial composition of the City of Durham in 1990 and 2000. There were very few Latinos as recently as 1990, but by 2000, the number of Latino immigrants rose dramatically to almost nine percent (8.6 percent) of Durham's population. Where in 1990 there were just over 1,700 Latinos in Durham, the size of the Latino population in 2000 grew to more than 16,000. Whites remain the largest racial group in Durham, comprising 46% of the city's population, but are no longer the majority population in the city. African Americans follow closely behind whites with 44% of the population in 2000.

[Table 1 here]

Durham has a long-established history of biracial politics and is a city with a very prosperous upper and upper-middle class black community. The long-established black elite of Durham come primarily from the upper and upper-middle classes. Durham supports a number of black banks, libraries, hospitals, and numerous other businesses, along with North Carolina Central University, an institution with strong ties to the elite blacks in the city. Black political power in Durham is in the hands of a highly educated, and oftentimes very wealthy black citizenry that has been very successful in achieving their objectives, primarily through political organization. Nevertheless, like other cities in the "New South," Durham has experienced a

² Now the Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People, the organization remains a powerful force in Durham politics.

decline in industries where blacks traditionally found work, and as a result, a substantial proportion of the black population now works in the service industry. Many of Durham's Latino immigrants are from Mexico and other poor countries in Central America, and their reasons for emigrating to the United States are primarily economic.³ They seek many of the same jobs and social services as blacks in Durham. As a result, Latinos and blacks in Durham often find themselves in competition with one another.

The newness and the magnitude of Latino immigration to Durham present an important set of challenges for race relations in this Southern city. Not only does the shift in the racial make-up of the population alter the longstanding balance between blacks and whites in Durham, but the rapid influx of new workers also creates a dynamic labor market. Before analyzing the perspective of black elites in Durham toward Latino immigrants and the effects these opinions have on the attitudes of black residents of the city, we briefly review the literature addressing elite influence on public opinion.

Elite influence on black attitudes

American public opinion research consistently shows American citizens know little factual information about government and politics. Many scholars suggest this political ignorance does not inhibit the ability of citizens to form opinions and make political decisions. Rather, individuals rely on heuristics or cognitive shortcuts in political judgment and decision-making (Popkin 1994). Taking cues from political elites is one such heuristic. Elites are more experienced and knowledgeable about political matters than ordinary citizens because they exist

³In a series of articles throughout 2002 chronicling the lives of area residents living in poverty, *The Herald Sun* (Durham) provided a picture of life for Latinos in Durham. Fully 26 percent of the more than 16,000 Latinos in Durham live below the federal poverty level, and, in order to make a good living, it is necessary for them to work more than one job (Assis and Pecquet 2002: A12).

in positions of greater power and political influence. Despite the low levels of political knowledge in the mass public, most Americans nevertheless hold political predispositions based on individual interests, values, and ideological beliefs. This set of predispositions influence who they listen to and who they believe regarding political matters. Together with their own political awareness, these predispositions help ordinary citizens determine which political elites hold attitudes and ideas similar to their own. Once that connection is made, citizens take political cues from those elites. When divisions exist among political elites in their attitudes on a particular issue, the tendency is for individuals to adopt the position of elites they perceive to be the most consistent with their own political predispositions. When there is consensus among elites, however, “mainstream effects” occur among non-elite citizens, pushing them toward following the general elite position. In both situations, the effect will be most pronounced among those most politically aware (Zaller 1992).

Even when elites hold positions contrary to those of non-elites, their perspectives still have a great deal of influence by virtue of their privileged position in the dissemination of political information in terms of how issues are presented to the public and what images are brought to mind when issues are presented (Jacoby 2000; Kinder 2003; Popkin 1994). One particular elite frame that exerts considerable influence over mass opinion is encouraging group-centric thinking about political issues. In some instances, public opinion is guided by memberships in social groups and by reference groups they either sympathize with or resent (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Kinder 1998). If elites focus on the positive or negative moral qualifications of the intended beneficiaries, the power of group sentiment increases. If they frame issues in ways that deflect attention away from the beneficiaries, the power of group sentiment

declines (Nelson and Kinder 1996:1072). Thus, through framing, elites can effectively accentuate or attenuate the power group sentiment has in public opinion.

Though a general notion of political elites exists within the study of American politics, there is some variation regarding exactly who is included and excluded from such categorization. Some scholars opt for highly specific and constrained definitions, limiting the title of political elite to “those whose primary business is governing the nation” (Carmines and Kuklinski 1990: 266) or “individuals who work full-time within formal political channels and institutions” (Lee, 2002:9). Although the discussion about political elites often centers on elected officials, we view this as a strict designation that does not speak to the political experience of African-Americans. For blacks, the opportunity to be active in mainstream political institutions is a fairly recent historical development. As a result, many of the elites in the African-American community have often existed outside of formal political institutions, and come from the black community’s institutions, most notably the church. For this reason, we broaden the term elite to include not only elected officials and those who work within formal, institutionalized political networks, but also those Taeku Lee (2002:221) refers to as “counterelites,” those individuals who may operate outside of conventional, institutionalized realms of politics, but who nonetheless exert political leadership and influence among ordinary citizens.

The role of black elites in the political and social life of black communities has varied. Historically, black elite efforts to highlight issues of concern to blacks in the dominant society have always been problematic, many times entangled in ideological debates among elites (Gaines 1997; Gordon 2002; Martin 1991). For many black elites the ideology of “uplift” was essential to the upward mobility of the black community. Racial uplift ideology assumed white racism would diminish as blacks became morally and materially progressive. In order for this

uplift ideology to work, it became necessary to establish clear class divisions within black communities, and it was essential for black elites to distance themselves from the masses of blacks (Gaines 1997). This distancing worked to establish middle- and upper-class blacks as the morally and materially superior group. The result of this middle-class bourgeois ideology was an emphasis on class distinction, patriarchy, and pathology of the poor (Gaines 1997).

This ideology was not confined to urban centers but was also present in rural areas. The development of class distinctions was just as pronounced in the South where racial oppression and segregation established the social and political boundaries of black and white life. In an examination of black elites in rural Mississippi, Salamon found blacks in all of his rural locations were divided along class lines. “In virtually every locale a small clique of blacks – usually the preachers, teachers, morticians, and those with light skins – managed to set themselves apart from the masses of black sharecroppers, plantation laborers, and maids and to lay claim to a modest middle- or upper-class life-style (Salamon 1973:623).

Black elites have historically been successful in obtaining enhanced status for themselves and other blacks with skills and education, but were more limited in what they were able to achieve for blacks who were poor and unskilled (Gordon 2002; Stone 1986). Even so, black elites still remain an important part of the black community, especially in the political realm. One of the most important institutions historically within black communities has been the black church. It has consistently produced leaders that have come to speak for black America (Dawson 1994; Martin 1991; Reese and Brown 1995). It is the messages preached by black elites in black churches that connect religiosity with black political activity (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Brown and Wolford 1994; Hunt and Hunt 1977). Harris-Lacewell (2004) sees the role of black elites, many of whom she identifies as emerging from black churches, as multi-dimensional. She

suggests, "...black elites have the task of simultaneously speaking to, speaking for, and speaking with black masses. They are speaking to black people when they attempt to win adherents and frame the solutions to the black dilemma. They are speaking for black people when they are under the gaze of white power structures that attempt to understand and predict 'what the Negro wants' from the appeals of leaders. And they are speaking with black people in an intricate, reciprocal cultural reproduction of ideas" (Harris-Lacewell 2004: 206)

The question of the significance of black political elites to broader black communities is one that is currently the subject of a growing body of research. Some work shows that having black representatives as descriptive representatives diminishes the substantive representation of minority interests overall (Cameron, Epstein, and Allen 1996; Lublin 1997), yet other research suggests descriptive and substantive representation can, and do, go hand-in-hand (Haynie 200_; Tate 200_). Nevertheless, there is a psychological benefit that accrues to blacks when they see black representatives in the legislature (Shingles 1981; Gay 2002). Moreover, the presence of black elites in governing institutions improves the likelihood black constituents will contact the office of a black representative, and contributes to increased levels of trust in government (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2002; Gilliam 1996; Howell and Fagan 1988).

The research on black elites and their influence on the black mass public is considerably smaller scholarship addressing the same questions for the general population. Nevertheless, the findings suggest the connection between black elites and black masses is somewhat tenuous. As such, black elite opinion might not be reflective of or have a significant and consistent influence on black mass opinion. Eisenger (1973) found demands for control-sharing reforms in Milwaukee, Wisconsin emanated from black elites, although it was commonly viewed as a demand from the broader black community. The black masses in Milwaukee appeared to be

indifferent to control-sharing reforms. A conclusion that can be drawn from this literature is that, unlike the broader literature on the effect of political elites on public opinion, we do not know if black elite opinion influences black mass opinion in any consistent and substantial way.

Similarly, the limited literature on attitudes of blacks toward immigration presents a mixed picture of black attitudes. Epenshade and Hempstead (1996) suggest that blacks, along with Latinos and Asian Americans, are more likely to express pro-immigration views than are non-Hispanic whites, yet these findings ran counter to earlier findings (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). In reviewing fourteen national opinion polls concerning immigration available at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Diamond (1998) found that while a majority of whites supported a moratorium on immigration, a majority of blacks opposed it. Conversely, a majority of blacks also favored a reduction in the level of immigration, and when the questions addressed economic costs associated with immigration, blacks were more likely to be in favor of restricting immigration than were whites.

In an analysis of 1994 Los Angeles County Social Survey data, Johnson, Farrell and Guinn (1997) found about one-half of non-Latino and black respondents believed they would have less or a lot less political and economic influence than they currently have if immigration continued at the present rate. Thornton and Mizuno (1999), analyzing data from the 1984 National Black Election Study, suggest blacks remain more positive toward immigrants than whites, despite perceptions of economic insecurity and feelings of economic threat. On the other hand, Citrin et al. (1997) found concern about financial stress from immigration was not more significant in influencing attitudes about immigration among blacks than among whites.

The literature on black reaction to Latino immigration is even more limited.

One study from Los Angeles examines the rising tensions between older, established black communities and recent immigrants, and finds black unions in Los Angeles have fiercely criticized immigration policy and the influx of Latin American immigrants into California (Miles 1994). He identifies the source of increasing tensions as competition for scarce resources in the form of jobs and social service benefits. For example, the perception and reality is black mothers are being edged out of welfare benefits by “needier” Latino mothers (Miles 1994: 118).

Resentment of Latinos from job loss is not limited to those blacks in low-skilled jobs. Non-unionized Latino immigrants are replacing unionized black janitors, and black professionals, especially those who work in social services, are being displaced due to their lack of Spanish-language skills. Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn (1997) also identified a majority of black respondents felt that more good jobs for Asian Americans and Latinos would result in fewer good jobs for blacks. In their study of black and Latino relations in Houston, Texas. Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez (2002) found that as the Latino share of the population, relations between blacks and Latinos became more contentious. Many labor-intensive industries in Houston sought out Latino immigrant workers and in the process, displaced blacks and created a sector reserved for immigrant labor. A majority of blacks believed that the overall effect of Latino immigration had a negative effect on blacks because immigrants take their jobs, depress wages, and take more from the economy than they contribute.

Do black elites and the black masses agree?

The evidence on the influence of black elites on political attitudes among black Americans is not consistent, and the scholarship on black opinion on immigration and attitudes toward Latino immigrants leaves many questions unanswered. A case study of the city of

Durham provides one angle into the dynamics of race relations within the context of new immigration, competition, and coalition politics. Drawing on the general literature on the influence of political elites, the more limited research on black elite influence on black opinion, and the literature on black attitudes toward immigration, we develop two hypotheses. The first posits the sector of the black community with which the elites interact will influence their view on the effects of Latino immigration. Black elites who interact with the masses will have a better understanding of the needs and concerns of the average working black person than elites who interact primarily with elites, regardless of race. The second hypothesis is concerned with whether black elite opinions on the effects of Latino immigration are reflected in the opinions of blacks in general. Because black elites do not command the attention of national or even local news on a sustained basis, the only way they are able to shape public opinion is in their day-to-day interactions with people. Thus, we anticipate blacks will reflect the opinions of black elites who interact with the masses, and blacks that are part of the middle- and upper-classes will reflect the opinions of elites who interact with elites.

In order to test these hypotheses, we gathered two distinctive types of data from research subjects in Durham. In order to examine the effect of the emerging Latino population in Durham, face-to-face interviews were conducted with elites during the summers of 2002 and 2003. The purpose of these interviews was to determine the magnitude and domain of conflict and cooperation between blacks, Latinos, and whites in Durham by probing what issues were perceived to be of concern to the various ethnic groups, and whether perceptions of the former two issues were comparable across elites of different backgrounds. In addition the 2003 Durham Survey of Intergroup Relations (DSIR) collected data from 500 Durham residents.⁴ A randomly

⁴ The study was conducted by the Center for Survey Research of the University of Virginia using a Computer-Aided Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system, employing random digit dialing (RDD) and dialing of directory-assisted

generated sample of phone numbers based on exchanges valid in the Durham, North Carolina area was called, and an over-sample of numbers listed in the phone directory under a Hispanic surname was called at the same time. The survey was conducted from May 4 through June 22, 2003 and interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish (32 percent of the interviews were conducted in Spanish). A race/ethnicity quota was implemented to achieve a minimum of 150 whites, 150 blacks, and 150 Latinos; the remaining 50 respondents were not under this quota restriction and represent a number of racial/ethnic backgrounds.⁵ The sample of 500 consists of 160 whites (32 percent), 151 blacks (30 percent), 167 Latinos (34 percent), 6 Asians (1.2 percent), and 12 who gave “Other” for their racial background (2.4%).⁶ We analyze the black respondents to this survey in this chapter.

For the face-to-face elite interviews, we used a broad definition of elites to select individuals to participate in this study. All elite subjects were active in the Durham community as head a community-based or political organization, an active member or leader in an organization, an elected or appointed official in Durham City, Durham County, or at the state level. Respondents were identified through news and newspaper accounts, community meetings

Hispanic surname sample. We recognize the problems associated with drawing a sample from a listing of Hispanic surnames, for example, missing Hispanics with non-Hispanic last names, and those married to non-Hispanics. Given the recent nature of the Hispanic population in Durham and the high proportion of immigrants, however, we choose the sampling frame that would give us the highest probabilities of getting to a Latino respondent.

⁵ A total of 4208 phone numbers were attempted in the course of the survey and a total of 14,014 call attempts were made. The overall response rate was 21.6 percent. The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) rate was calculated using the full call history of each number that was recorded automatically by the CATI software. The sample is reasonably representative of the three of racial sub-populations compared to the 2000 U.S. Census, though the distribution of respondents in the sample is slightly older, better educated, and more often female.

⁶ Due to the use of the Hispanic surname sample and racial/ethnic quotas, sampling error is more difficult to calculate. The sample may be viewed as part of two separate populations. Within the RDD sample, the source of 276 completions, the probability of selection is known and the margin of error is ± 5.9 percent. Within the surname oversample, providing 244 completed interviews, all households listed under a resident with a Hispanic surname were attempted; however, Hispanics were included in RDD calling and non-Hispanics were included in the oversample. Non-Hispanics with Hispanic surnames had a greater change of selection than non-Hispanics in the RDD sample who do not have Hispanic surnames. If we assume this to be a more or less random occurrence, then the margin of error for each of the three racial/ethnic groups is roughly 8 percent.

members of the research team attended, and personal contacts through individual community activities. In some instances, snowballing techniques were used as a respondent would suggest another individual to be interviewed. A total of 23 interviews were conducted, and eight of the elites interviewed were black. We analyze the responses of black elites, and the black elites in our sample include elected officials, upper-level bureaucrats, and policy specialists, as well as activists, ministers, heads of politically-oriented organizations, and other “informal opinion leaders” who pay close attention to politics.

The elites who agreed to participate in the study were each asked an identical set of questions, and the survey included multiple choice and open-ended questions. The questions are grouped into five areas. First, elites were asked to provide some basic demographic information about themselves and their organization. They were also asked to briefly describe their personal experiences in Durham, their role in the organization, and the function of their organization in the community. Second, elites were asked to indicate on 5-point scales their impressions of the paired relationships among blacks, Latinos, and whites in Durham. These paired comparisons included what we refer to as undirected- and directed-form questions. The undirected-form questions ask about the relationship between group x and group y. For each root question, the undirected-form generates three questions for the respondent to answer. For example, individuals were asked to characterize race relations between blacks and whites in Durham, then between Latinos and whites, and finally between blacks and Latinos. On the other hand, the directed-form questions asked respondents to provide their impression of group x toward group y. In this case, the directed-form generates six questions for each root. Respondents were asked to place the attitudes of Latinos towards blacks on a 100-point feeling thermometer; then the attitudes of blacks towards Latinos; and so forth. After each question in this portion of the survey,

respondents were encouraged to further elaborate their answer. Third, the elites were asked in a series of open-ended questions about what issues they thought were of particular concern to blacks, Latinos, and whites. Respondents were also asked to discuss what issues they thought divided the various ethnic groups and about what issues they thought the groups had in common. Subsequently, elites were asked to indicate on 5-point scales their impressions about how satisfied each of the three different ethnic groups were with different aspects of life in Durham, including the performance of the schools, the police, and social service providers. Fourth, elites were asked to respond to a number of questions relating to the consequences of Latino immigration to the area and their impressions of public attitudes about this change. In general, respondents were asked to initially answer a question on a 5-point scale, and were then encouraged to further elaborate their answers. Finally, elites were asked a series of questions about Durham politics including the level of political participation of each of the different ethnic groups and the possibility of inter-ethnic political coalitions emerging in the area. Once again, respondents were asked to initially answer a question on a 5-point scale, and were then encouraged to further elaborate their answers.

In order to see how black elites and the larger black public viewed the effects of Latino immigration, we chose similar, yet not identical, questions in each of the data sets for analysis.⁷ We identified two questions from the elite surveys dealing with the perceived effects of Latino immigration. One question is, “How might you characterize race relations between blacks and Latinos in Durham?” The responses ranged on a continuum from “poor” to “fair” to “excellent.” The second question is more specific, “On a scale from one to five (where one is very negative

⁷ Given the nature of the two data sets and how they were collected, it is important to emphasize we cannot determine the causal order of influence between elite and mass attitudes. Rather, the data indicate the extent to which there is agreement between black mass opinion and the perspectives among black elites.

and five is very positive), how would you characterize the effect of the growing Latino population on race relations in Durham?” In addition to these two questions, we used two feeling thermometer questions about Latino feelings toward blacks and black feelings toward Latinos. The thermometer was on a 100-degree scale where 100 degrees represented a very warm or favorable feeling, 50 degrees represented no feeling at all, and 0 (zero) represented a very cold or unfavorable feeling.

In order to test our first hypothesis, we divided our elite sample into two categories, elites who interact primarily with the masses and elites that interact primarily with other elites. Those elites who worked with community organizations were classified as interacting primarily with the masses, while elites who were elected officials, high-level public officials and officials in elite private organizations we classified as elites interacting with other elites. Based on this classification, three of the black elites interacted primarily with the masses and five interacted primarily with other elites. In order to move beyond the simple marginal distributions of the small number of elite cases, we used traditional qualitative analysis techniques (See Lofland and Lofland, 1995) to systematically examine eight in-depth interviews with black elites. Appendix A provides a description of our methods for coding and analyzing the elite data.

In the Durham Study of Intergroup Relations (DSIR) data, we chose a question on how positive or negative the race relationships between blacks are in general as the dependent variable. Appendix B presents the question wording for the survey items in the DSIR. This measure parallels the question, but is not exactly the same as the question, asked of the elites, and respondents in the DSIR were not asked the thermometer questions. We use five factors to explain differences in attitudes about the race relationship between blacks and Latinos, including employment status, income, race relations in general in Durham, racial make-up the respondent's

residential area measured as Latinos in neighborhood, and effect of Latino immigration on black economic opportunity. We use employment status as an indicator of possible concern about economic security, and income is a measure of socioeconomic status. The presence of Latinos in their neighborhood is a measure of contact between blacks and Latinos, and the question on the effect of the Latino immigration on black economic opportunity as another measure of economic security.

In terms of perception of race relations between blacks and Latinos, 23 % of blacks feel that they are very negative or somewhat negative, 17 % think they are neither positive nor negative, and a healthy majority, 59 % feels they are somewhat positive or very positive. Blacks in Durham are distributed across the income spectrum, and 9 % make below \$15,000 while 9 % make over \$100,000, while 40 % earn between \$35,000 and \$65,000. Seventy percent of black respondents live in neighborhoods with few or no Latinos. About half (51 %) feel race relations in general in Durham are somewhat or very positive. Close to three-fourths (72 %) of the black sample is working for pay,⁸ and 61 % believe blacks will have a lot less or some less economic opportunity if immigration continues at the present rate.

We test our first hypothesis that black elite opinion on the effect of Latino immigrants on black Americans will depend on the type of elite and the sector of the community with which they interact, by how examining how black elites situated in distinct interaction settings feel about the effect of the Latino population on race relations. Table 2 shows the relationship for black elites between primary interaction location (with black masses or with other black elites) and their attitudes on the effect of Latino immigration for race relations in Durham. Because 8 black elites were interviewed, the difference necessary to achieve statistical significance between social interaction settings is far greater than we could expect in these data, and the results show

⁸ The non-working category includes those who are unemployed, homemakers, students, and retirees.

no statistically significant differences in the perceptions of black elites who interact primarily with the masses and black elites that interact primarily with other elites. What does emerge, however, is that three of the five elites who interact primarily with other elites perceive no effect on race relations from Latinos, while none of the three elites that interact primarily with the black masses chose this option. Two of the three elites who interact primarily with the masses perceive Latinos as having a positive effect on race relations in Durham, while the other perceived the effect as negative. Thus, there appears to be no consensus among elites as to the effect of Latino immigration on race relations in general in Durham.

[Table 2 here]

When asked about the feelings of blacks and Latinos toward each other, differences, while not statistically significant, do emerge. Two of the three elites who interact primarily with the black masses feel that not only do blacks have an unfavorable view of Latinos, but also that Latinos have an unfavorable view of blacks. On the other hand, elites who interact primarily with other elites are split on their perceptions on this question. Four of five elites feel that blacks either have no feeling at all toward Latinos, or are favorably disposed toward Latinos. Then again, three of these five elites believe that Latinos have unfavorable attitudes towards blacks, thus suggesting that they perceive blacks as more accepting of Latinos than Latinos are of blacks.

This view is clearly reflected in the responses to the open-ended questions in the interviews. Among black elites, there is an unease and concern about the growing Latino population in Durham. Many perceive an increased competition for jobs and scarce resources, and overall, black elites agree that blacks and Latinos have poor relationships in Durham. Moreover, there is no noticeable differentiation in the beliefs of black elites who interact mainly with elites and those that interact mainly with the masses. The black elites see the poor

relationship as existing because of the apparent competition for resources such as jobs and social services, and both categories of elites appear equally concerned. For example, an elite that interacts primarily with other elites made the following comment on black and Latino relations:

I mean, comments that I hear “Oh, why don’t you do something about those Mexicans?” We’re talking about Hispanic/Latino, but generally they describe all of them as Mexicans, which is very unfortunate because they’re not all Mexicans. “Can’t you pass a law to send them on back to where they came from? Most of them here are illegal. Taking our resources. Not paying for it.” And these are black folks in the...discussing relationships with Hispanic/Latinos. I think it’s unfortunate, but that’s the way it is.

Similarly, a black elite who interacts primarily with the black masses also referenced the increasing tensions between blacks and Latinos:

Is that you know Latinos are beginning to be the minority that African-Americans used to be. Black people were feeling like you know hey they’re taking our jobs, they’re taking housing, they’re doing this, they’re doing that, Black folks don’t understand because they don’t understand white folks were not all speaking the same language. So I do know that with regards jobs that were entry-level positions, [unknown] labor positions, the Latinos are getting those jobs. African-Americans are not very happy about that, those that are looking for employment. I think that...that is posing a problem within the community as well.

What is interesting, however, is that black elites describe the relationship as improving because of what they see as a conscious attempt on their part to unify these two communities around the very issues that they previously have been divided, including public housing, jobs, and cultural diversity. Thus, the results for our first hypothesis one are mixed. Elites differ on the effects of Latino immigration on race relations. A majority of elites who interact with other elites see no effect, while those who interact with the masses see an effect, but are not in agreement as to whether the effect is positive or negative. There is elite agreement on the perception of poor relations between blacks and Latinos.

We move next to analyze the data relevant to our second hypothesis that working class blacks in Durham will reflect the opinions of elites who interact with the masses, and blacks who

are part of the middle- and upper-classes will reflect the opinions of elites who interact with other elites. In order to test this hypothesis, we estimated a logit regression model using the data from the DSIR.⁹ Table 3 shows the results of the ordered-logit analysis. The results show that black respondents in our survey who are not employed are more likely to feel positively about race relations between blacks and Latinos than do blacks who are employed. Substantively, non-working blacks are about 30 % more likely to feel race relations between blacks and Latino are positive. However, black respondents with higher incomes are slightly more likely to feel positively about race relations between blacks and Latinos. In addition, those who hold more positive feelings about race relations in Durham generally are also more likely to feel positively about black-Latino race relations. Substantively, blacks of the mean income level are about 7 % more likely to feel race relations between blacks and Latinos are positive. Blacks who feel that race relations in Durham are generally positive are about 36 % more likely to feel that relations between Blacks and Latinos are positive.¹⁰

[Table 3 here]

Our analysis also shows neighborhood contact with Latinos is not a statistically significant indicator of blacks' perceptions of race relations between blacks and Latinos in Durham. However, the estimated coefficient on this measure is positive, indicating blacks with more Latinos living in their neighborhoods tend to feel more positively about black-Latino race relations. Blacks' perceptions of the amount of economic opportunity blacks will have if immigration continues at its present rate is also not statistically significant in the model. But, like neighborhood contact, the estimated coefficient is positive, as expected, which may indicate

⁹ We use Clarify to compute predicted probabilities for values of the dependent variable while holding the predictor variables at their means or some other value in the ordered logit analysis (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001,2003).

¹⁰ The substantive effects discussed were computed using the STATA program Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001, 2003).

blacks who feel continued immigration will have a positive impact on blacks' economic opportunity also feel more positively about black-Latino race relations.

What these results suggest is that while blacks who are not employed feel positively about relations between blacks and Latinos, those who are employed may be a little apprehensive about the nature of the relationship. Although the sign of the coefficient is significant for those not employed, given the distribution of the response categories, the fact that the attitudes of employed blacks are not significant gives us pause. Moreover, given the overwhelming proportion of black respondents who feel continued immigration will lead to decreased economic opportunity for blacks, it appears that at least for the moment those fears have not had an effect on their positive perceptions of black and Latino relations.

Attitudes among black elites and masses in Durham

Our analysis of the interviews with black elites and survey data from black citizens of Durham suggest several interesting patterns of confluence between elite and mass black attitudes toward Latino immigrants. Elites who interact primarily with other elites perceive little or no effect of the new Latino immigration on race relations in Durham. It is possible that these elites have little contact with Latino immigrants or they interact with Latino elites and have a different view of the dynamics that exist between blacks and Latino immigrants in Durham. While those who interact primarily with the masses do identify an effect, they are not in agreement as to whether the effect is positive or negative. Clearly, the masses with which each of these leaders interacts encounter a different set of dynamics between the masses of blacks and Latino immigrants, with some positive and others negative.

This finding is similar to those of Sonenshein (1993) in Los Angeles. While black, Latino and Asian American elites were building coalitions, the masses of these three groups were increasingly in competition for scarce resources. Yet, the black elites who interact with other elites might not be as Pollyannaish as their numeric scores indicates, for they do express some apprehension over the nature of relationships between blacks and Latino immigrants in their open-ended responses to the questions suggest. Yet elites in general feel relations between the two groups are poor and that Latinos, by-and-large, have a negative view of blacks.

Regarding black citizens of Durham, it is clear the public is concerned about some aspects of Latino immigration, such as diminished economic opportunity and skittish about their employment. But they are a little more positive about relations between blacks and Latinos than are the black elites. The indicators of diminished economic opportunity and employment may be gray clouds on the horizon, but they are not imminent. This suggests that, for the moment, blacks are not as negative about relations with Latinos as the elites perceive.

Yet what do these mixed results suggest about the future of black-Latino relations in our Southern location? Elites are essential to sending cues to the general populace about their attitudes toward issues and the nature of political debates. The cues Durham black elites appear to be sending is that relations between blacks and Latino immigrants are contentious. These elite signals could result in two types of reactions. On the one hand, their anxiety could introduce more anxiety among the general black population than presently exists creating even more tensions than might already exist. On the other hand, their perceptions of contentious relations might propel them to join with white and Latino elites to join together to intervene in and reduce these perceived tensions. If the latter reaction occurs, then it will help to mitigate whatever tensions their cues might increase, while at the same time creating venues where black, white

and Latino Durham residents can engage each other. This engagement might lead to the formation of coalitions that might be beneficial to all three groups. Therefore, the mismatch between elite and black mass attitudes might actually be a positive for black attitudes toward Latino immigration in general and black and Latino relations in particular.

The phenomenon of Latino migration to the American South is such a recent phenomenon that it is difficult to capture not only its dynamics, but also the possible effects new immigrants are having on race relations. In many ways, our study raises more questions than the data can address, and many of our answers have been far from definitive. Yet, given the recent nature of Latino immigration into the South and the absence of an established body of literature dealing with the social and political aspects of Latino immigration into this region of the country, exploratory research is a good beginning point. While the data constrain us from extrapolating beyond our research setting of Durham, North Carolina, the questions explored and issues raised are critically important and require additional study in more regions of the South. Latino immigration will only increase in the coming years, and scholars of Southern politics and history need to begin to address its current and long-term effects.

References

- Allen, Richard L., Michael Dawson, and Ronald E. Brown. 1989. "A Schema-Based Approach to Modeling an African-American Racial Belief System." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 421-441.
- Anderson, Jean Bradley. 1990. *Durham County*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Assis, Claudia and Julian Pecquet. 2002. "Hispanics' Search for a Better Life Pushes Durham into Poverty." *The Herald Sun*, 25 September, A12.
- Bobo, Lawrence and Franklin Gilliam. 1990. "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 84, no. 2, pp. 377-393.
- Boyd, William Kenneth. 1925. *The Story of Durham, city of the New South*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Brown, Leslie. 1997. *Common Spaces, Separate Lives: Gender and Racial Conflict in the Capital of the Black Middle Class*. Ph. D. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University. Archives Ph.D. B878C.
- Brown, Ronald and Monica Wolford. 1994. "Religious Resources and African American Political Action." *National Political Science Review*, no. 4, pp. 30-48.
- Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 794-812.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 858-881.
- Dawson, Michael. 1994. *Behind the Mule*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Diamond, Jeff. 1998. "African-American Attitudes Towards United States Immigration Policy." *International Migration Review*, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 451-470.
- Durand, Jorge, Douglas S. Massey, and Fernando Charvet. 2000. "The Changing Geography of Mexican Immigration to the United States: 1910-1996." *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 1-16.
- Easton, David. 1953. *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Eisenger, Peter K. 1973. "Support for Urban-Control Sharing at the Mass Level." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 669-694.

- Espenshade, Thomas J., and Katherine Hempstead. 1996. "Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U. S. Immigration." *International Migration Review*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 535-570.
- Espenshade, Thomas J. and Charles A. Calhoun. 1993. "An Analysis of Public Opinion toward Undocumented Immigration." *Population Research and Policy Review*, vol. 12, pp. 189-224.
- Gaines, Kevin. 1997. *Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gay, Claudine. 2002. "Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship between Citizens and their Government." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 46, no. 1, pp 717-732.
- Gilliam, Frank. 1996. "Exploring Minority Empowerment: Symbolic Politics, Governing Coalitions, and Traces of Political Style in Los Angeles." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 56-81.
- Gordon, Karen Ferguson. 2002. *Black Politics in New Deal Atlanta*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Greene, Christina. 1996. *Our Separate Ways: Women and the Black Freedom Movement in Durham, NC 1940s-1970s*, Ph. D. in History. Durham, NC: Duke University. 39 Archives G7990.
- Harris-Lacewell, Melissa. 2004. *Barbershops, Bibles, and BET: Everyday Talk and Black Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Haynie, Kerry L. 2001. *African American Legislators in American States*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Houck, Thomas H. 1941. "A Newspaper History of Race Relations in Durham, North Carolina, 1910-1940. A.M. Thesis, Durham, NC: Duke University. H835.
- Howell, Susan and Deborah Feagan. 1988. "Race and Trust in Government." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 343-50.
- Hunt, Larry L. and Janet G. Hunt. 1977. "Black Religion as Both Opiate and Inspiration of Civil Rights Militance: Putting Marx's Data to the Test." *Social Forces*, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 1-14.
- Jacoby, William G. 2000. "Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending." *American Journal of Political Science*. vol. 44. no. 4, pp. 750-767.
- Johnson, James H., Walter C. Farrell, Jr., and Chandra Guinn. 1997. "Immigration Reform and the Browning of America: Tensions, Conflict, and Community Instability." In *The*

- Handbook of International Migration*, eds. Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasnitz, and Josh DeWind. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications.
- Kinder, Donald R. 2003. "Communication and Politics in the Age of Information." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, Robert Jervis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kinder, Donald R. 1998. "Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics." In *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th edition, eds. D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fisk, and G. Lindzey. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 347-361.
- Lee, Taeku. 2002. *Mobilizing Public Opinion: Black Insurgency and Racial Attitudes in the Civil Rights Era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lofland, John and Lyn H. Lofland. 1995. *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis*, 3rd edition. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Lublin, David. 1999. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Martin, Ben L. 1991. "From Negro to Black to African-American: The Power of Names and Naming." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 106, no. 1, pp. 83-107.
- McCubbins, Matthew and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 165-179.
- Miles, Jack. 1994. "Blacks vs. Browns." In *Arguing Immigration: Are New Immigrants a Wealth of Diversity...or a Crushing Burden?*, ed. Nicolaus Mills. New York: Simon & Shuster.
- Mindiola, Jr., Tatcho, Yolanda Flores Niemann, and Nestor Rodriguez. 2003. *Black-Brown Relations and Stereotypes*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Nelson, Thomas E and Donald R. Kinder. 1996. "Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 1055-1078.
- Popkin, Samuel L. 1994. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Reese, Laura and Ronald E. Brown. 1995. "The Effects of Religious Messages on Racial Identity and System Blame among African-Americans." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 24-43.
- Salamon, Lester M. 1973. "Leadership and Modernization: The Emerging Black Political Elite in the American South." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 615-646.
- See, Letha A. (Lee). 1986-87. "International Migration and Refugee Problems: Conflict between Black Americans and Southeast Asian Refugees." *The Journal of Intergroup Relations* vol. 14, pp. 38-50.
- Shingles, Richard D. 1981. "Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 76-91.
- Sonenshein, Raphael. 1994. *Politics in Black and White: Race and Power in Los Angeles*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stone, Clarence N. 1986. "Atlanta: Protest and Elections are Not Enough." *PS: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 618-625.
- Suro, Roberto and Audrey Singer. 2002. "Latino Growth in Metropolitan America: Changing Patterns, New Locations." *Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy and The Pew Hispanic Center*, (July) pp. 1-18.
- Tate, Katherine. 2003. *Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and their Representatives in the U. S. Congress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Thornton, Michael C. and Yuko Mizuno. 1999. "Economic Well-Being and Black Adult Feelings toward Immigrants and Whites, 1984." *Journal of Black Studies*, 30(1): 15-44
- Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. 2003. "CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results." *Journal of Statistical Software*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 1-29.
- Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. 2001. *CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, version 2*. Cambridge: Harvard University.
- U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1990 Census of Population*.
- U. S. Bureau of the Census, *2000 Redistricting File*.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Table 1: Racial composition of City of Durham, North Carolina, 1990 and 2000

	% in 1990 (n)	% in 2000 (n)	% change in share of population
Whites	51.6 (70,513)	45.5 (85,126)	-6.1
Blacks	45.7 (62,393)	43.8 (81,937)	-1.9
Latinos	1.3 (1,713)	8.6 (16,012)	+7.3
Mexicans	30.8 (528)	64.2 (10,343)	
Puerto Ricans	21.5 (369)	6.7 (696)	
Cubans	8.8 (150)	14.7 (236)	
Other Hispanics	38.9 (666)	29.6 (4,737)	
Asian Americans	1.9% (2,676)	3.6% (6,815)	+1.7
American Indians	0.2 (358)	0.3 (575)	+0.10
Total Population	136,611	187,035	

Source: U.S. Census

Table 2: Black Elites' Perceptions of Latino Population on Race Relations in Durham

Effect of Growing Latino Population on Race Relations	Sector of Community in which Black Elites Primarily Interact	
	Masses	Elites
1 (Very Negative)	0	0
2	1	1
3 (No Impact)	0	3
4	1	1
5 (Very Positive)	1	0
Column Totals	3	5

Table 3: Predicting Perception of Race Relations Between Blacks and Latinos in Durham
(ordered probit estimates)

	Coefficient (standard error)
Employed	-.8460** (.42)
Income	.1911** (.0841)
Feelings about Durham race relations	.7793*** (.19)
Number of Latinos in neighborhood	.2112 (.17)
Perception of blacks' economic opportunities	.2749 (.18)
N	125
Chi-Squared	30.09***
Pseudo R ²	.09

*** p<.01 (two-tailed test); ** p<.05 (two-tailed test); * p<.10 (two-tailed test)

Source: 2003 Durham Survey of Intergroup Relations

Appendix A: Methods for coding and analyzing elite data

The first step was to develop a coding scheme for the interviews through a process of examining the data in one interview, fitting a coding scheme, and then testing the coding scheme against data in other interviews and then making the necessary revisions. The next step was to test the reliability of the interview coding by having two independent analysts recode three interviews each and compare their results with the results of the first coding. As is common in qualitative processes, particular attention was paid to comparative analysis and the development and refinement of potential hypotheses. To aid in this process, the qualitative analysis program, Atlas Ti 5.0, was used to code and analyze the data, as well as to generate network views of the various hypotheses.

When using Atlas Ti 5.0, all transcripts are loaded into the program and then coded electronically. Using Atlas offers advantages to the researcher by making the process of coding scheme development markedly easier. A single-code can be changed, merged, or deleted from all interviews by directly editing the coding list. Using traditional pen and paper methods, each interview transcript would have to be individually changed. Thus, the malleability of the program encourages a more accurate representation of the qualitative data in the coding scheme and reduces the likelihood of any coding errors because of human oversight. Perhaps the strongest advantage to using Atlas Ti 5.0 occurs after coding is complete. At this stage, Atlas has several search functions that by using the coding list, allows the researcher to search some or all of the transcripts using Boolean and semantic search strings. Moreover, these search functions allow for quantitative data to be read into the program and then linked to the transcript files. For this research, this last feature was used to filter the transcripts by demographic information contained in the quantitative data file. It also allowed us to pull out responses from elites categorized as interacting primarily with the masses and elites interacting primarily with other elites. Atlas Ti 5.0 is a systematic and efficient program for qualitative data analysis.

Appendix B: Question wording for 2003 Durham Survey of Intergroup Relations (DSIR)

Race relations between blacks and Latinos: The race relationships between blacks and Latinos in general, are they: 5 very positive; 4 somewhat positive; 3 neither positive or negative; 2 somewhat negative; 1 very negative?

Employment status: What is your employment status? Are you: (1) employed; (2) home maker; (3) unemployed; (4) student; (5) retired; (6) other (specify). Indicator was recoded to 1=employed; 0=everything else (home maker, unemployed, student, retired, and other).

Income: I am going to read you a list of income categories. Please tell me which category best describes the total income of all members of your family living in your house in 2001 before taxes. Please stop me when I get to your family's income. (1) 0-\$15,000; (2) \$15,001-\$25,000; (3) \$25,001-\$35,000; (4) \$35,001-\$45,000; (5) \$45,001-\$55,000; (6) \$55,001-\$65,000; (7) \$65,001-\$75,000; (8) \$75,001-\$100,000; (9) \$100,001 or more.

General race relations in Durham: In your opinion, racial relationships in Durham today are: (5) very positive; (4) somewhat positive; (3) neither positive nor negative; (2) somewhat negative; (1) very negative?

Residential race make-up: In your neighborhood, how many of the residents are Latino? (5) All of the residents; (4) Most of the residents; (3) Some of the residents; (2) A few of the residents; and (1) None of the residents.

Economic opportunity: What about economic opportunity? If immigration to this country continues at the present rate, do you believe black people will have more or less economic opportunity? Would you say: (5) probably would have a lot more economic opportunity than now; (4) some more opportunity than now; (3) no more or less opportunity than now; (2) some less opportunity than now; (1) a lot less opportunity than now?