Research
The Guerrilla Proto-State: Vietnam,
Northern Ireland, and Colombia
My research focuses on irregular armed groups and
the "proto-state," or the statelike structures
and processes that define relations between armed
groups and local communities. My research on both
active and defunct Colombian armed groups reveals
that the proto-state is a significant factor in determining
survival of guerrillas and paramilitaries. ("Greed
and Grievance in Colombia," APSA, 2005). Examples
of proto-state institutions are small-landholder credits
(e.g., to coca farmers), conflict resolution centers
(i.e., divorces), mafia-style protection, and institutions
of fear like roving death squads. These institutions
can be benign, detrimental, or more ambiguous in their
effect on classes that armed groups purport to represent.
I am currently applying for pre-dissertation funding
to travel to Vietnam and Northern Ireland to extend
my research. Northern Ireland and Colombia are cases
of long-running civil conflicts with long-active irregular
armed groups. The case of Vietnam is important because
it is a case of complete revolutionary overthrow.
As a revolutionary case, the Viet Cong enable me to
control for variation on the dichotomous variable
"logic of guerrilla strategy," which is
derived from the greed-grievance dichotomy. The two
values are "revolutionary" and "survivalist"
-- grievance versus greed.
I hypothesize that different models of pseudo-sovereign
governance vary according to two Cold War/Post-Cold
War indicators: access to revenue-generating resources
and illegal arms flows, on the one hand, and policies
of the regional hegemon, on the other. By affecting
the local nature of civil conflict at the proto-state
level, international effects associated with these
two geopolitical phases fundamentally transformed
the internal dynamics of civil wars.
