My aim in the seminar will be to articulate and defend a coherence theory of moral justification.  To this end we'll begin with a quick run through of standard epistemological positions, distinctions, and arguments (skepticism, foundationalism, coherentism; internalism and externalism; the regress and epistemic ascent arguments; Gettier problems and reliablism).  This will all be by way of setting the background for discussing specifically the epistemology of morals, the main focus of the seminar.  While I hope to tilt attention (and devotion) towards coherentism, we'll spend time on a variety of views.  The main readings for the course will be papers from a book coming out with Oxford University Press under the joint editorship of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, although they will be supplemented by classic contributions to the field.
Participants will be asked to prepare seminar presentations and there will be one seminar paper due at the end of term. (Because the book we'll be focussing on is still in preparation, there will be time for the authors of various chapters to take account of whatever feedback participants in the seminar have to offer.)