

Indicators of self-rule and shared rule

1. Indicators for self-rule
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Self-rule	The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region		
Institutional depth	The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated.	0–3	<p>0 No functioning general purpose administration at regional level.</p> <p>1 Deconcentrated, general purpose, administration.</p> <p>2 Non-deconcentrated, general purpose, administration subject to central government veto.</p> <p>3 Non-deconcentrated, general purpose, administration not subject to central government veto.</p>
Policy scope	The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible.	0–4	<p>0 Very weak authoritative competencies in a), b), c), d) whereby a) economic policy; b) cultural–educational policy; c) welfare policy; d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set up, local government.</p> <p>1 Authoritative competencies in <i>one</i> of a), b), c) or d).</p> <p>2 Authoritative competencies in at least <i>two</i> of a), b), c), or d).</p> <p>3 Authoritative competencies in d) and at least <i>two</i> of a), b), or c).</p> <p>4 Criteria for <i>3 plus</i> authority over immigration, citizenship, right of domicile.</p>
Fiscal autonomy	The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population.	0–4	<p>0 Central government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes.</p> <p>1 Regional government sets the rate of minor taxes.</p> <p>2 Regional government sets the base and rate of minor taxes.</p> <p>3 Regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax.</p> <p>4 Regional government sets the base and rate of at least one major tax.</p>
Borrowing autonomy	The extent to which a regional government can borrow	0–3	<p>0 The regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit borrowing).</p> <p>1 The regional government may borrow under prior authorization (<i>ex ante</i>) by the central government and with one or more of the following centrally imposed restrictions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits) b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank c. no borrowing above a ceiling d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes. <p>2 The regional government may borrow without prior authorization and under one or more of a), b), c), or d).</p> <p>3 The regional government may borrow without centrally imposed restrictions.</p>
Representation	The extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive.	0–4	<p>Assembly:</p> <p>0 No regional assembly.</p> <p>1 Indirectly elected regional assembly.</p> <p>2 Directly elected assembly.</p> <p>Executive:</p> <p>0 Regional executive appointed by central government.</p> <p>1 Dual executive appointed by central government and regional assembly.</p> <p>2 Regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or directly elected.</p>

Shared rule	The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole		
Law making	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation.	0–2	<p>0.5 Regions are the unit of representation in a national legislature.</p> <p>0.5 Regional governments designate representatives in a national legislature.</p> <p>0.5 Regions have majority representation in a national legislature based on regional representation.</p> <p>0.5 The legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority.</p>
Executive control	The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings.	0–2	<p>0 No routine meetings between central and regional governments to negotiate policy.</p> <p>1 Routine meetings between central and regional governments <i>without</i> legally binding authority.</p> <p>2 Routine meetings between central and regional governments <i>with</i> legally binding authority.</p>
Fiscal control	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues.	0–2	<p>0 Neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues.</p> <p>1 Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but do not have a veto.</p> <p>2 Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues.</p>
Borrowing control	The extent to which a regional government co-determines subnational and national borrowing constraints.	0–2	<p>0 Regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints.</p> <p>1 Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints but do not have a veto.</p> <p>2 Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints and have a veto.</p>
Constitutional reform	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change.	0–4	<p>0 The central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution.</p> <p>1 A national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum.</p> <p>2 Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum.</p> <p>3 A legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change; <i>or</i> constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation.</p> <p>4 Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto constitutional change.</p>

Multilateral shared rule		Bilateral shared rule	
<i>A. Law making</i>		<i>A. Law making</i>	
Regions are the unit of representation in a national legislature.	0.5	The region is the unit of representation in a national legislature.	
Regional governments designate representatives in a national legislature.	0.5	The regional government designates representatives in a national legislature.	
Regions have majority representation in a national legislature based on regional representation.	0.5	The regional government or its regional representatives in a national legislature are consulted on national legislation affecting the region.	
The legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority.	0.5	The regional government or regional representatives in a national legislature have veto power over national legislation affecting the region.	
<i>B. Executive control</i>		<i>B. Executive control</i>	
No routine meetings between the central government and regional governments to negotiate policy.	0	No routine meetings between the central government and the regional government to negotiate national policy affecting the region.	
Routine meetings between the central government and regional governments without legally binding authority.	1	Routine meetings between the central government and the regional government without legally binding authority.	
Routine meetings between the central government and regional governments with legally binding authority.	2	Routine meetings between the central government and the regional government with legally binding authority.	
<i>C. Fiscal control</i>		<i>C. Fiscal control</i>	
Neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues.	0	Neither the regional government nor its representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region.	
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of national tax revenues, but do not have a veto.	1	The regional government or its representatives in a national legislature negotiate with the central government the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region, but do not have a veto.	
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues.	2	The regional government or its representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region.	
<i>D. Borrowing control</i>		<i>D. Borrowing control</i>	
Regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints.		The regional government is not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints affecting the region.	
Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints, but do not have a veto.		The regional government negotiates routinely over borrowing constraints affecting the region, but does not have a veto.	
Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints and have a veto.		The regional government negotiates routinely over borrowing constraints affecting the region and has a veto.	

<i>E. Constitutional reform</i>		<i>E. Constitutional reform</i>	
The central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution.	0	The central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the region's constitutional relation with the center.	
A national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum.	1	A regional referendum can propose or postpone reform of the region's constitutional relation with the center.	
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum.	2	The regional government can propose or postpone reform of the region's constitutional relation with the center or require a popular referendum.	
A legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation.	3	A regional referendum can veto a reform of a region's constitutional relation with the center.	
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto constitutional change.	4	The regional government can veto a reform of the region's constitutional relation with the center.	