

What does the nation of China think about phenomenal States?

Bryce Huebner, Center for cognitive studies, Tufts University
Michael Bruno, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona
Hagop Sarkissian, Department of Philosophy, Baruch College - CUNY

Let's start with a well-worn philosophical question: What is it like to be a bat? The question seems to be well formed to everyone from philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists, to students taking introductory philosophy classes. The answer, by contrast, seems unclear. Nonetheless, we have *some* idea what it would take to answer such a question. In initially posing the question, the psychologist Brian Farrell (1950, 183) claimed that the only answer that would satisfy him would be the answer he would get if a sorceress changed him into a bat. More optimistic philosophers and cognitive scientists—particularly those who have spent some time in Medford, MA and San Diego, CA—tend to think that a detailed analysis of echolocation, including an account of the construction of quasi-spatial maps from the temporal properties of 30-120 Khz echoes, will do the trick. Hence, even though most people have no idea what it's like to be a bat, many remain convinced that there must be something that it's like.

Our capacity to attribute such phenomenal states to entities has a wide range. However, it typically gives out when we turn our attention to groups of people, or, collectivities. If we ask what it's like to be Microsoft, for example, the prospect of an answer seems quite bleak. Trying to imagine being Microsoft is likely to leave you scratching your head. What's more, offering an account of Microsoft's corporate structure doesn't seem to offer a promising answer to the question. Put bluntly, faced with the question "what is it like to be Microsoft", most philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists, as well as most students in introductory philosophy classes, are likely to look perplexed and take the question to result from a deep confusion.

Critics of functionalist theories of the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. After all, functionalism is topic neutral and allows mentality to be implemented in any physical structure that preserves functional organization. As Ned Block (1978) argues, this implies that if the citizens of China were properly organized they too would have mental states *at the level of the group*. As many philosophers point out, this seems an affront to common sense; there just isn't anything that it's like to be the nation of China. Functionalism, therefore, appears to be an incomplete or inadequate theory of the mind.

In this paper we consider the merits of appealing to this intuition that there is nothing that it's like to be a collectivity. We report empirical evidence demonstrating that collective mentality *is not* an affront to commonsense. More importantly, we report evidence demonstrating that the intuition that there is nothing that it's like to be a collectivity is culturally specific rather than universally

held. Finally, we provide evidence that the source of this intuitive resistance to collective mentality is at least partially a product of our Western cultural heritage; as such, we argue that mere appeal to the intuitive implausibility of collective consciousness does not offer any genuine insight into the nature of mentality in general, nor the nature of consciousness in particular.

1. Are we really hostile to collective mentality?

Most people are, in fact, quite comfortable ascribing mental states to collectivities. We often ascribe beliefs, intentions, and desires to a wide variety of collectivities: Google intends to add a number of additional cities to the street-level feature in Google Maps; the Democrats believe that they hold the upper hand in the upcoming election; and, the Starbucks Corporation hopes that their profit margin will increase this quarter. Put briefly, the states that philosophers typically call intentional states are readily ascribed to a variety of systems. Moreover, this result is systematic and empirically robust. In a review of linguistic data, Paul Bloom and Deborah Keleman (1995, 25) found that young children easily acquire collective nouns (e.g., family or army) that function as though they were referring only to a single entity. This occurs in cases where sets of objects "bear some salient and enduring relationship" to one another. However, this only opens up the question, what counts as a 'salient or enduring' relationship? On this point, there appears to be a wide diversity in the sorts of considerations that underwrite the commonsense understanding of what is to count as a single entity. Keeping in mind the diversity of considerations that might drive our judgments of entativity (i.e., our judgments about what is to count as a single entity), Bloom and Keleman argue that our intuitive judgments about what counts as a single entity are best understood as grounded in whatever commonsense theories we adopt to make sense of the world around us.

This suggestion raises further questions about the sorts of commonsense theories that might be able to produce these judgments of entativity. One sort of evidence that might be brought to bear on the issue of which commonsense theories might drive our mental state ascriptions is suggested by an analogy to early work on 'theory of mind' or 'mind reading'. There is a wealth of data regarding the mechanisms at play in our commonsense understanding of others as loci of psychological states.¹ One of the most famous results comes from a study of the ascription of mental states conducted by Fritz Heider and Marry-Ann Simmel. Heider & Simmel (1944) presented their volunteers with a short animated film consisting of nothing more than simple geometric shapes. In some cases, the movement of the shapes had an apparent intentional structure; when asked to

¹ This includes work on psychological developmental, autism, and the social reasoning capacities of non-human primates. For an overview of the literature and interesting positive theory, see Nichols & Stich (2003).

write down what happened in the film, most volunteers in these cases offered interpretations of the movements as the purposeful actions of animate beings. There are a number of ways in which this data can be stretched far beyond its means, and Heider and Simmel did just this in taking the data to suggest the presence of a low-level theory of mind mechanism that facilitates the ascription of mental states on the basis of apparent goal directed behavior. This mechanism, argued Heider and Simmel, allowed for the ascription of mental states even to incredibly simple entities so long as these ascriptions offered some explanatory advantage in understanding the entity's behavior. According to this view, a theory of *purposeful behavior* might underlie are ascriptions of entativity.

On the basis of Heider and Simmel's well-known experiment, Paul Bloom and Csaba Veres (1999) developed an analogous experiment to test commonsense attributions of mental states to collections of objects. Bloom and Veres found that the sorts of considerations that motivated the ascription of mental states in the original experiment could also be activated for some collectivities. When volunteers were presented with collections of objects that moved in an apparently unified way, almost everyone described the movements by ascribing mental states to groups (e.g. 'the blue circles tried to stop the green triangles'). On the assumption that the Heider and Simmel experiment tells us something interesting about the mechanisms that facilitate the ascription of mental states to individuals, this data suggests that theory of mind mechanisms can be deployed to treat an apparently unified collectivity as a locus of mentality.

Nevertheless, cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind are likely to be unpersuaded. There is a strong resistance to the idea that collectives can literally be in mental states, and the mere fact that people generally have a tendency to make such attributions does not by itself show that they are correct in doing so. Perhaps the theory of mind mechanism over-generalizes. Perhaps people would correctly reject its anthropomorphizing tendencies once they became fully competent with mentalistic concepts. In other words, mere appeal to this sort of data is unlikely to persuade *anyone*.

However, we are optimistic that such results are suggestive, indicating that there are intuitive mechanisms that facilitate the ascription of mental states, and that these mechanisms are intimately bound to theoretical considerations about what counts as an entity. So, in the remainder of this paper, we explore an alternative hypothesis. We argue that the resistance to the possibility of collective mentality, where we find it among philosophers and cognitive scientists, is a product of the theoretical model that results from being socialized within an individualistic Western culture. If our arguments are sound, this suggests that the intuitive force of such intuitions should not be taken to have the evidentiary force that philosophers have typically supposed them to have.

2. Theoretical and empirical constraints on entativity:

Although methodological individualism has been pervasive in the social sciences, there is reason to think that the prominence of individualism could be, at least to a significant extent, a cultural artifact. In defense of this claim, we appeal to the vast array of research in social psychology that purports to demonstrate pervasive cultural differences between how Western volunteers and East Asian volunteers conceptualize and understand the world. Some of this evidence is reviewed by Richard Nisbett and his colleagues (2001), who see the evidence as supporting the claim that people in the West conceive of the world in analytic terms, whereas East Asians rely on holistic considerations in organizing their experience.

The hypothesis suggested by Bloom and Kelemen, that judgments of entativity are grounded in commonsense theories, gains empirical support from the analysis of cultural variation in self-construal and the understanding of agency. In an impressive review of evidence concerning cultural differences in self-construal, Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama (1991) found that people in East Asia typically understand the self in relational and context-dependent terms, making frequent appeal to the fundamental relatedness of individuals. On the basis of this data, they suggest that East Asian culture insists on the intrinsic interdependence of persons. In stark contrast to this data, however, Markus and Kitayama found that Americans tend to understand the self as a distinct and unique entity, valuing individuality and devaluing dependence.

The interpretation of this data is further supported by a promising theoretical account of different conceptions of the self that might be adopted. Building on the data reported by Markus and Kitayama, and following the philosopher Roger Ames (1994), we wish to distinguish between two ways in which 'individual' can be understood: 1) the individual as a separate and isolatable entity, and 2) the individual as a location in a social nexus.

According to the view of the individual as a separate and isolatable entity, something counts as an individual just to the extent that it is a single, indivisible, separate entity. Such individuals can, of course, belong to a variety of different sorts of groups. However, the individual and her intrinsic properties are ontologically prior to membership in any group, and these qualities will not change when she becomes a member of a group. Moreover, considerations of individual autonomy and independence, as well as concerns about equality, privacy, and freedom, play a key role in making sense of the relations between such distinct, isolated entities—especially when they form a collectivity. Such a theory of the individual is most prevalent in Western society, and is exemplified by the understanding of the individual in the United States.

According to the view of the individual as a location in a social nexus, being an individual must be understood contextually. According to this view, an individual is a locus, or focal point, within a web of social relations, with her essential properties being a result of the social networks in which she is embedded. Hence,

the individual does not exist *prior* to the group; instead, she only gains existence by participating within one. On this view, the individual is something that occupies a particular, unique social location within a network of collectivities that are themselves understood as unique social locations. Such a view of the individual is intrinsically relational; and, while individuals remain unique locations, they need be understood as having intrinsic properties that are determined by something *beyond* herself and the particular groups to which she belongs. Indeed, according to this view of the individual, a high degree of individuality is achieved not by separation *from* social relationships, but by becoming distinguished *within* these relationships. Finally, the essential features of any particular collectivity are determined, at least in part, by the unique contributions that individuals make to the structure of the collectivity. Recalling the claim by Nisbett et al (2001), this means that the nature of the individual—as well as the nature of the collectivity—must be understood holistically rather than analytically.

If this later understanding of the individual provides a plausible understanding of self-construal in East Asian cultures, there is a significant reason to be concerned about the viability of a theory of the individual that requires a robust distinction between groups and individuals—at least in so far as such a theory is meant to provide a general account of individuality (cf., Hall and Ames 1998, and Rosemont 1991). On the one hand, individuals can be understood as entities that are constituted, though not exhaustively explained by, the relationships in which they are embedded. On the other hand, a group can be understood as something more than the mere amalgamation of discreet, intersubstitutable entities; instead, a group can be understood as an entity with its own unique identity, produced, at least in part, by the relationships that obtain between the persons that constitute it. On this view individuals and groups are mutually constitutive. The properties possessed by a group depend on the properties of the individuals that compose that group; and, the properties possessed by an individual depend on the properties of the groups to which she belongs. This suggests that groups too are unique entities. And on this view, it is at least an open empirical question which properties people are willing to ascribe to groups.

Some psychologists have thought that differences in self-construal would lead to differences in the mental states and abilities ascribed to groups in East Asian cultures and Western cultures, and such differences have been demonstrated in a number of recent studies within cultural psychology. For example, in an analysis of newspaper headlines containing attributions of mental states to collectivities and individuals, Tanya Menon and her colleagues (1999, 702), found that “while prevailing American theories hold that persons have stable properties that cause social outcomes and groups do not, the theories prevailing in Confucian influenced East Asian cultures emphasize that groups have stable properties that cause social outcomes”. On the basis of this data, Menon et al (1999) suggest that while Westerners are willing to engage in some attributions of mentality to collectivities, they are far less willing to do so than their East Asian counterparts. Michael

Morris, Tanya Menon, and Daniel Ames (2001) provide further evidence suggesting that East Asians employ a conception of agency when reasoning about what counts as entity that does not seem to be as prevalent in Western Subjects. Additionally, Kashima et. al. (1995) also argue that considerations of agency are motivated in the explanation of the intentional actions of a collectivity by East Asian volunteers.

On the basis of this data, Kashima et al. (2005) investigated how East Asians and Westerners view individuals and collectivities in terms of two different sorts of constraints on entativity. On the one had they looked to the impact of considerations of psychological essentialism, which mirrors the dominant account of the individual in Western culture outlined above. Psychological essentialism includes two components: 1) perceived internal consistency (i.e., the extent to which individuals belonging to a group resemble one another in appearance and behavior), and 2) essentialism (i.e., the properties of a collectivity as unchangeable because of an underlying essence possessed by the individuals that compose a collectivity). On the other hand, they looked to the impact of considerations of agency, on the assumption that East Asians would be more likely than their Western counterparts to ascribe the capacity for agency to collectivities. They found that insofar as being a single entity is understood in terms of psychological essentialism, individuals are perceived to be more entity-like than collectivities cross-culturally. However, when being a single entity is understood in terms of agency, individuals are seen as single entities more often than collectivities *only in Western culture* (Kashima et al. 2005, 162). In other words, East Asians are far more willing to attribute agency to collectivities than are Westerners. This, then, opens up the possibility of cultural variation in the sorts of mental states ascribed to collectivities.

3. The psychological states of groups:

In analyzing this possibility, we took as our lead a recent study by Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz (2008) purporting to demonstrate that American volunteers are willing to ascribe non-phenomenal states to groups, but not phenomenal states. They presented volunteers with sentences ascribing either non-phenomenal states (e.g., beliefs, intentions, and desires) or phenomenal states (e.g., experiencing great joy, getting depressed, and vividly imagining) to groups. They then asked their volunteers to judge the acceptability of each of the attributions. For example, they asked participants whether sentences such as ‘Acme Corp is feeling excruciating pain’ sound natural. Knobe and Prinz found that their subjects considered ascriptions of non-phenomenal states to groups acceptable (M=6.16), but they found ascriptions of phenomenal states to groups unacceptable (M=3.14). Their results were incredibly robust, so there is some reason to think that there is a sharp distinction drawn here by commonsense psychology between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states, at least by American volunteers. Moreover, this data

seems to support Block’s intuition that the nation of China could not possibly be a locus of emotional experience.

What, then, do we make of subjects’ willingness to ascribe non-phenomenal states to groups? The fact that people seem to draw this distinction does not establish that groups can be the subjects of non-phenomenal states. In fact, there are good philosophical reasons to think that a system like the nation of China will be as incapable of having thoughts as it is of having qualitative states, “and so any argument against functionalism based on such an example could as well be couched in terms of absent thought as well as absent qualia” (Block 1980, 261). In an attempt to buttress this sort of intuition, and many people might object to the sort of data presented by Knobe and Prinz by insisting that volunteers must be reading the ascriptions of non-phenomenal states to groups as acceptable *only in a metaphorical sense*.

However, in a follow-up to Knobe and Prinz’s study, Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, and Shaun Nichols (in prep) conducted an experiment in which they tested this hypothesis—namely, that the ascription of mental states to collectivities could only be understood metaphorically. Arico and his colleagues first tested whether their volunteers could distinguish between figurative claims and metaphorical claims, and then asked whether attributions of mental states to groups were to be understood as literal or figurative. In a striking result, even when those poor at recognizing metaphors were excluded, people tended to think that the ascription of mental states to groups should be understood as *literally* true.

On the basis of the theoretical and empirical evidence canvassed above favoring a robust difference between conceptions of individuality in East Asian and Western culture, we developed a simple experiment to test whether this difference in ascriptions of phenomenal and non-phenomenal states to groups was culturally robust as well.

4. A cross-cultural investigation of ascriptions of group consciousness:

Twenty-eight students from the University of North Carolina and 28 students from Hong Kong University participated, outside of the classroom, in a brief study designed to examine cultural differences in the ascription of mental states. The demographic makeup of each group was consistent with the population at each institution more broadly. The design of our study was similar that of Knobe and Prinz (2008) and Arico et. al. (in prep) insofar as volunteers were asked to rate the acceptability of various mental state ascriptions. However, unlike these previous studies, we developed an experiment designed to survey a broader range of collectivities to which people might be inclined to ascribe mental states. Whereas these previous studies had focused on ‘ACME Corporation’, we asked volunteers about more familiar sorts of collectivities. We asked, for example, whether it is acceptable to say that “Sony is experiencing great joy at its increased sales”, or that “The Catholic Church is vividly imagining the crucifixion”. Moreover, on the

assumption that East Asian culture allows for a more holistic interpretation of the world, and on the assumption that East Asian volunteers would be more likely to understand a collectivity of a locus of agency, we predicted that differences in the ascription of phenomenal and non-phenomenal states would be less pronounced in East Asian volunteers than it would be in Western volunteers.

We provided volunteers with twenty sentences, ascribing a variety of mental states to a variety of individuals and collectivities (see Appendix 1) and the following set of instructions.

Sometimes people use psychological words when talking about groups (instead of individuals). We want to know which specific words people use in this way. Please tell us whether the following sentences sound natural to you.

All of our volunteers were then asked to rate the acceptability of each of the twenty sentences on a seven-point scale ranging from ‘sounds unnatural’ to ‘sounds natural’.

Unsurprisingly, our American volunteers replicated the results reported by Knobe and Prinz (2008). Although we used a number of different collectivities that might be more familiar to our American volunteers than the ACME Corporation, our American volunteers showed a robust difference in their ascriptions of non-phenomenal and phenomenal mental states to groups. The means were as follows:

Table 1: Ascriptions of mental states to groups by American volunteers

<u>Phenomenal States</u>	
Experiencing great joy:	3.32
Vividly imagining:	2.54
Feeling embarrassed:	3.93
Feeling insecure:	3.36
Feeling relief:	4.04
<u>Non-Phenomenal States</u>	
Intending to:	6.5
Knowing that:	4.14
Wanting to:	6
Is proud of:	4.90
Thought that:	4.89

As in Knobe and Prinz’s study, even the most acceptable ascription of a phenomenal state to a collectivity (feeling relief, M=4.04) was less acceptable than the least acceptable ascription of a non-phenomenal state to a collectivity (knowing that, M=4.14); moreover, the difference between ascriptions of phenomenal (M=3.44) and non-phenomenal states (M=5.29) to groups was statistically

significant, $F(1,6) = 4.62, p < .001$. Our volunteers from Hong Kong University also found the most acceptable ascription of a phenomenal state to a collectivity less acceptable than the least acceptable ascription of a non-phenomenal state. Moreover the difference between American volunteers and volunteers from Hong Kong University as regards the ascription of phenomenal states to groups trended towards, but did not reach significance, $t(54) = 1.74, p = .089$.

However, there is a significant difference between the way in which our American volunteers and our volunteers from Hong Kong University treated ascriptions of mental states to individuals and to collectivities. Consider the following differences in the overall mean responses across all questions by American volunteers and volunteers from Hong Kong University:

Table 2: Ascription of mental states to groups and individuals

	US	Hong Kong
Individual phenomenal states	24.64	23.46
Individual non-phenomenal states	28.68	23.64
Group phenomenal states	17.18	20.29
Group non-phenomenal states	26.43	23.96

The truly striking result here is that although the responses of our American volunteers demonstrated a large difference between the ascription of phenomenal states to groups and every other ascription, this result was far less pronounced in our volunteers from Hong Kong University. To put the point more carefully, while our American volunteers found ascriptions of phenomenal mental states to *individuals* considerably more acceptable than ascriptions of phenomenal mental states to *collectivities*, volunteers from Hong Kong did *not* see such a considerable difference between the two (see Figure 1); moreover the effect of this interaction between nationality and the ascription of phenomenal states is statistically significant, $F(1, 54) = 6.60, p = .013$. Moreover, a similar difference between American volunteers and volunteers from Hong Kong University emerges when the analysis focuses on the acceptability of ascriptions of mental states to groups and to individuals (see Figure 2). Again, this result is also statistically significant, $F(1, 54) = 4.67, p = .035$.

Taken together, these results offer a striking confirmation of our hypothesis. This data provides further evidence for the claim that intuitive judgments about what can be a locus of mentality are, at least in part, determined by the culturally entrenched commonsense theories that we adopt in making sense of our world. The key differences between our American volunteers and our volunteers from

Hong Kong are explicable in terms of differing conceptions of individuality, agency, and the self. Put briefly, from the standpoint of an American volunteer who conceptualizes the self as a separate and isolatable entity, something can count as a locus of mentality just in case it is a single, indivisible, and separate entity. However, from the standpoint of an East Asian volunteer who conceptualizes the self in relational and contextual terms, considerations of separateness and isolability play a much lesser role in determining whether something can be a locus of mentality—most dramatically, even when the mentality is phenomenal in nature. The fact that these effects are present even in volunteers from Hong Kong, a location that has experienced a significant degree of westernization, quite strikingly suggests that the intuitive force of Block’s claims about phenomenal consciousness might be, at least partially, culturally relative.

4. The implausibility of collective mentality?

We began by noting that the intuition that collective consciousness is wildly implausible has garnered a great deal of philosophical support, and has been developed as an argument against functionalist theories of the mind (cf., Block 1978). There are many ways in which such appeals to intuitions are open to challenge. For example, some philosophers resist the argument by arguing that these intuitions, though pervasive, fail to demonstrate any significant philosophical or scientific constraints on an adequate theory of consciousness (cf., Chalmers 1996 and Lycan 1987). We take a different and, we believe, more promising tack. Our results suggest that the individualist intuitions that drive arguments against functionalism may not actually have as much intuitive force as is typically assumed. First, sentences in which mental states are ascribed to collectivities are seen as acceptable *across cultures*. In fact, people tend to read these sentences as saying something that is literally true (cf., Arico, Fiala, and Nichols, in prep). Now, while it does not follow from the fact that people find these sentences acceptable that they are attributing a *mind* to a collectivity, the data suggest that it will at least take *an argument* to demonstrate that these sentences ought to be understood as making claims about individual mental states. One of us (Huebner 2008) has argued that collective representation is possible under the right conditions, and that some groups actually possess the capacity for collective representation. In such cases, these ascriptions of mentality would be both acceptable from the standpoint of commonsense psychology and legitimate from the standpoint of our most promising philosophical and psychological theories of the world.

Second, the cross-cultural differences in ascriptions of mental states to groups suggest that the intuition that collective consciousness is impossible might not be nearly as secure as we, in the West, might have supposed. On the basis of a Western cultural upbringing, the idea that there could be something that it’s like to be Microsoft, or something that it’s like to be the nation of China, seems wildly implausible. However, on the basis of a more holistic worldview such as the one we

find in East Asian cultures, this intuitive resistance to collective consciousness might be far less robust. In fact, there is good reason to think that many of the philosophical arguments that arise from within an East Asian, or even South Asian, cultural milieu might lead philosophers to recognize that consciousness is not a unitary phenomena that can only be ascribed to a separate and isolatable entity.²

In this paper, we have provided evidence that East Asian volunteers do not see nearly as great a difference between the acceptability of an ascription of a mental state to an individual and the ascription of a mental state to a group. This suggests at least a reason to question the deeply held Cartesian intuition that there is a one-to-one correspondence between an isolatable individual and her mind. The idea of this relation seems to be, at least in part, an artifact of the dominant cultural considerations that have played a prominent role in Western philosophy. We do not hold that this data demonstrates conclusively that there are group minds. Nor do we hold that this data demonstrates the falsity of the Western conception of the individual. However, the presence of these differences in intuition ought to give us pause in articulating our theories of the mind. We hold that the default status of individualism in the philosophy of mind ought to recognize its cultural history.

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² In defense of this claim, consider the theory of the mind developed by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (1991). In appealing to the important advances in cognitive science in the West, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch argue that the individual mind should be understood in terms of a ‘society’ of agents, each dedicated to a different sort of task. This view is, of course, familiar to many as the homuncular view of the mind defended by many contemporary functionalists. However, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch argue that this view is not merely plausible from the standpoint of contemporary cognitive science, but is a view that has a long history outside of the West. The central appeal in their work is to the Buddhist understanding of the mind (and to the tradition of mindfulness/awareness that is grounded on this theoretical basis). However, there is good reason to think that any understanding of the self and of the mind that is more holistic and relational is more likely to find the idea of a collective mind, and even the idea of collective consciousness, far more plausible.

Appendix: Survey questions

Attributions of phenomenal states to groups:

- The Ming Dynasty felt relief after the rebellion was quelled.
- Denmark feels embarrassed about losing the war.
- Destiny's Child is feeling insecure after its poor performance last night.
- The Catholic Church is vividly imagining the crucifixion.
- Sony is experiencing great joy at its increased sales.

Attributions of non-phenomenal states to groups:

- The Ming Dynasty thought that China was the greatest country in the world.
- Denmark is proud of its Viking heritage.
- Destiny's Child wants to put on a better show tomorrow night.
- The Catholic Church knows that Christmas is coming soon.
- Sony intends to release a new product in January to increase sales.

Attributions of phenomenal states to individuals:

- Tanya feels relieved after her mother's successful surgery
- Agassi felt embarrassed after he lost the tennis match.
- Paul McCartney is feeling insecure after his poor performance last night.
- That bee is vividly imagining honey.
- Dmitri is experiencing great joy at his new job.

Attributions of non-phenomenal states to individuals:

- Tanya believes that China is the greatest country in the world.
- Agassi is proud of his American heritage.
- Paul McCartney wants to put on a better show tomorrow night.
- That bee knows where the honey is located.
- Dmitri intends to start selling winter hats in January