Contemporary Sino-American relations have become increasingly controversial based on the potentially threatening development of China as a hegemonic power. In turn, determining the status of the relationship between China and America has become progressively more urgent. To consider China a rival would demonstrate a lack of understanding of the communist political and economic system. Conversely, to regard China as an equal partner to the United States is equally naive. A comparison of the two nations’ goals should be heavily considered in regards to Asia’s future. American policy centered on economic and military pressure along with a strategic understanding of the communist nation will cultivate a system of controlled power sharing between the U.S. and China. Rather than advancing toward partner or enemy status regarding China, the U.S. should utilize trade and military pressure, ultimately fostering a mutually respectful rivalry in the future of Sino-American relations.

Both the U.S. and China have comparable objectives concerning its future in Asia. A hunger for power, both economically and politically, prompts both of these nations to pursue fitting domestic and international endeavors. Accordingly, both nations’ activities are centered on the goal of ensuring that no country in the region acts without taking into chief consideration the interests of either China or the U.S.

Even as they possess similar understandings of their perspective goals, both the U.S. and China execute their objectives in vastly different methods. In Asia, the U.S. adheres to a general policy of prevention. Mainly, the U.S. aims to prevent any single country from gaining overwhelming power. In the last half-century, U.S. participated in three wars in Asia, all efforts in preventing a single power from obtaining regional dominance (Bernstein & Munro 232). The U.S. seeks to thwart China’s continued growth, increasing regional power, expansion of nuclear arms production, and ambition for hegemony. Through a strategy of preventative containment, the U.S. recognizes the threat posed by China as a growing regional power that may soon contest it as a fellow superpower.

A lack of political realism is evident in the bulk of America’s goals regarding Asia. The U.S. perceives the future of China in a skewed manner, suggesting that democratic influence will be effective in the growing communist nation. That is to say, the Untied States’ objectives in Sino-American relations are often based on efforts at democratization. “Political realism”, as Soong-Bum Ahn notes in his article, “would also dictate that we look at China and its future based on how it actually is and not how we would like it to be” (265). Democracy and communism are historically opposing forces, which will not be as easily meshed as skewed U.S. political realism suggests.

Chinese goals in regard to national growth within Asia are quite contrary to those of the U.S. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro’s article expands on this notion, remarking that Chinese interests are driven mainly by nationalist sentiment, with the U.S. acting not as a partner, but as an obstacle. China’s persistence toward reunification with Taiwan reflects intent to reinstate secure borders and to end the clash between the Chinese Nationalist Party of Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party of China (241). The rising power of the PRC, as well as its increasing interest in reunification, is pushing China closer to its ultimate goal; “to ensure that no country in the region . . . will act without taking China’s interests into prime consideration” (Burnstein & Munro 232). Furthermore, China seeks to replace the U.S. as the foremost power in Asia (231).

To achieve its ultimate aspiration, China must retain a system of communism and continued economic growth, thereby resisting attempts at democratization. A bureaucracy unwilling to give up its perks, an extensive history of authoritarian rule, and a strong monopolistic hold on power contribute to an expected Chinese maintenance of communist rule. It is important to note, however, that even as China has made great economic progress in the last two decades, there has been minimal political change. Historical evidence illustrates China’s ability to liberalize its economy without adjusting itself politically. Overall, the ability of the PRC to remain remotely unaltered by expanding trade is the base of the communist party structure as well as China’s ultimate strength.

In his article addressing global capitalism, Michael Santoro argues that Chinese exposure to American democracy, principally through exposure to free-market economies, will eventually prompt the nation to become a more democratic society. Via free market exposure and American aid of Chinese economic development, a middle class will emerge in China with interests distinct from those of the state. Santoro calls this affluent and educated middle class the “meritocracy cadre” (252). He asserts, “ . . . economic prosperity generally is a precondition for a stable and sustainable democracy” (252).

Considering the historically steadfast communist structure, the meritocracy argument has shortcomings to be kept in mind when considering the future of Chinese-American trade relations. It is unrealistic to assume that Chinese leaders will be oblivious to the effects of continued private American enterprise. These leaders, on the contrary, are well aware of the intertwined relationship of American democracy and free-market practices. As perceived by a great number of nations both in the past and presently, the democratic U.S. and imperialism go hand in hand. Therefore, the Chinese will strive to maintain the contemporary government-controlled economic system that has remained untouched by economic change for twenty years while benefiting from American trade – not from American democratic influence. Ahn condenses the meritocracy case’s insufficiency: “We are likely to witness a China-dominated regional system not susceptible to American influence and coercion, but open to American engagement and trade” (Ahn 267).

The U.S. must acknowledge the wills and goals of the Chinese, thereby forming a more strategic trade policy. Trade with China should be limited and monitored. As of the present, $16 billion of American goods are sold to China and $100 billion bought by the US. This huge gap creates a trade deficit of nearly $85 billion annually (lecture). As Ahn’s article emphasizes, “The core of the future of the US engagement in East Asia is economics” (267). The imbalance in Sino-American trade is one of sizeable, integral nature. It is also a situation that will not logically be disrupted by the Chinese. The U.S. should limit trade interaction in an effort to promote a healthier domestic economy where a trade deficit does not pilfer U.S. jobs and to slow down the growth of China’s economic power and consequential military strength.

Complementary to and dependent on future trade policy is a military strategy that promotes the stable maintenance of American presence. This strategy will take into consideration the Cold-War roots of the U.S. in Asia as well as the potential forthcoming military conflicts, namely in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and in maritime areas. The current U.S. military presence has established a balance that is likely to cause a negative disturbance if abruptly altered. A steady existence in the region will position the U.S. to sustain peaceful competition for influence with China.

In pursuit of its goal of domination in Asia, the US has acted as an offshore balancer, balancing coalitions in favor of American supremacy (257). Although Mearsheimer’s overall argument advocates a declining military presence in Asia, in fact, the U.S. should remain. A continued U.S. military presence will potentially prevent what the author goes on to call “the most dangerous scenario the US might face in the early twenty-first century” (262). As Mearsheimer himself points out in his counter argument, China is indeed a force to be reckoned with; it is a rapidly expanding power. In the event that U.S. military presence lessens or disappears, the expansion could quicken, inviting bolder moves by the Chinese in an effort to retain power. Likewise, if the U.S. stays, its presence may serve as a deterrent to these potential Chinese actions.

The future of Chinese-American relations has become a considerable concern for the U.S. Based on the rapid economic and military growth of China as a regional power, determining the status of America’s relationship with the growing nation has become pressing. A partnership with China implicitly indicates a lack of American understanding of both the Chinese political and economic systems. Conversely, a rivalry may prompt regional instability and consequential military clashes. Hence, the U.S. should not treat China as a destined enemy. Rather, future relations with China should incorporate policies that limit trade, abandon heavy tactical uses of democratization, and strive for the maintenance of a stabilizing military presence.

(back to top)

Contact me at hughesj@email.unc.edu