With
disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, one quarter of Serbs found themselves
outside the Serbian state in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The issues
concerning political transformation to democracy and economic reforms
in Serbia were overshadowed in the first half of the 1990s by the national
question and the fate of Serbs outside the country.
In this atmosphere, the explosive potential of nationalism
to mobilize and unite people around common symbols and historical vision
was fully exploited by the politicians, who forwarded popular sentiments
in the direction of militant nationalism. Such strategy allowed politicians
to solidify hold on power and externalize problems challenging the country.
The course of events in Serbia had been marked by ethnic conflict, nationalist
rhetoric, personalized politics, a failing economy and international isolation.
Amidst the uncertainty of the decade one of the few constant factors in
Serbia was the continued political leadership of the country by Slobodan
Milosevic. Having managed to stay in power following the multiparty elections
in 1990, Milosevic and his Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) monopolized
the political scene. Characterized by many observers as an opportunist,
Milosevic activated nationalist sentiments when they could prove politically
profitable, such as in the early 1990s with wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia and in 1997-98 with unrest in Kosovo.
In 1992 Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY). According to the constitution, the republics were
presidential systems and the federation - a parliamentary system. However,
the real political power lay outside the political institutions in the
hands of informal groups presided over by Slobodan Milosevic.
Despite the semblance of free multi-party elections, the
opposition had been unable to unseat Milosevic for the greater part of
the decade. The opposition was plagued by fragmentation and infighting
over a single program whereas Milosevic's SPS maintained control of the
state apparatus and set the agenda for political debate. Having inherited
not only formal political power but also real control over coercive agencies,
economic structures and mass media, Milosevic, with few exceptions, kept
a tight control over the opposition. He manipulated public opinion through
state-controlled information sources. While allowing opposition groups
and independent media outlets to exist in order to preserve the façade
of democracy, Milosevic would clamp down when they presented a threat
to his preferred political arrangement. The economy plummeted in the early
1990s due to international sanctions and unabated corruption and criminal
practices by Milosevic's allies. State, economy, security and criminal
element remained virtually linked, providing Milosevic with mechanisms
of control.
During the 1996 elections the political climate changed in Serbia. The Dayton Accords were signed with close involvement by Milosevic, who played the role of a peace-maker in negotiations. Hyperinflation, which in 1993 exceeded the record set by the Weimar Republic, was finally halted in 1994 when a new director of the central bank was appointed. Economic sanctions against FRY were lifted and the country was gaining international recognition.
With the war over, economic issues took center stage for voters. SPS used the Dayton agreement as evidence of the successful resolution of the Serbian national question and as a demonstration of the party's commitment to peace and economic prosperity.
Supporters of the "ZAJEDNO" (Together) coalition celebrate the victory in local elections
Copyright © 1996 Zoran Tatar, DUGA Magazine
source
Milosevic's refusal to accept the electoral victory of Zajedno in local elections led to mass street protests and the involvement of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which persuaded him to back down.
However, once the coalition occupied its positions in the city governments, it demonstrated its insolvency and inability to stay united, discrediting the opposition movement.
By 1997 Zajedno lost its political capital while
the nationalist party, SRS, managed to present itself as a strong opposition
party. Although by the end of 1997 the Serbian parliament and presidency
were staffed with Milosevic's allies, the year marked the erosion of his
popularity.
Vojislav Seselj and his nationalist populist party
reemerged on the political scene and Milo Djukanovic, the reform-minded
politician increasingly critical of Milosevic's regime, was elected President
of Montenegro. The lack of political and economical transformation and
the continuation of sanctions against Serbia created an atmosphere of
apathy among the population.
The popularity of Seselj's party was based on his balloting
as an opposition candidate and the program of law and order. However,
his rhetoric after the elections revealed that he had not abandoned the
extreme nationalist ideas, which he proclaimed for years.
The
escalation of the conflict with Kosovo Albanians, who wanted to gain independence
from Serbia, galvanized the Kosovo Serb population, but in Serbia proper,
people were wary of nationalist rhetoric. As Milosevic's political priorities
shifted toward Kosovo he found political allies in the rival Serbian Radical
Party (SRS), led by Vojislav Seselj. This political alliance indicated
that he opted for an isolationist and nationalist course in the resolution
of the crisis.
Indeed, the Serb forces intensified punitive operations
in Kosovo in response to the acceleration of Albanian armed resistance.
Slobodan Milosevic rebuffed Western threats of military action against
Serbia if he failed to accept an agreement on Kosovo, and on March 24,
1999, bombing raids on Serbia began. With NATO bombings, the opposition's
attempts to unseat Milosevic had crumbled as he consolidated popular support
on the basis of widely-shared anti-Western sentiments.
Serbian punitive operations did not stop during the
bombings and refugees continued to flee Kosovo. The NATO operation aimed
to incapacitate the Serb military and damage the infrastructure, but succeeded
in the later and failed in the former. On June 3, 1999, after 11 weeks
of bombings, Milosevic accepted the peace proposal drafted by G8, according
to which the UN would supervise Kosovo and the decision on its final status
was indefinitely postponed. Economic and diplomatic sanctions against
Serbia further contributed to the decline in the standard of living and
reinforced the redistributive economy and political structures that promoted
it.
