

Job Insecurity at the Intersection of
Labor Market and Welfare State Structures

Lindsey M. King

Proposed dissertation research
Department of Sociology
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
April 24, 2008

Committee members:
Arne Kalleberg (Chair)
Adam Grant
Ted Mouw
Francois Nielsen
Cathy Zimmer

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Introduction.....	1
II.	The problem: Diverging trends in job insecurity.....	4
III.	Literature review: Structural antecedents and attitudinal outcomes of job insecurity.. ..	6
	A. The model.....	7
	B. Cognitive insecurity.....	8
	C. Labor market structure.....	8
	D. Welfare state structure.....	11
	E. Perceptions of labor market risk.....	12
	F. Organizational commitment.....	14
IV.	Theoretical framework.....	17
V.	Research paper summaries.....	19
	A. Research paper 1: Job security trajectories in the national context	21
	B. Research paper 2: The relative impact of present working conditions and future employment prospects on job security.....	32
	C. Research paper 3: Impacts of perceived insecurity and marketability on organizational commitment.....	39
VI.	Methods.....	48
	A. Data.....	48
	B. Variables.....	51
VII.	References.....	54
VIII.	Appendices.....	58

LIST OF TABLES

1. Relationship between employment protection legislation and social protection for western Germany, Norway, Great Britain and the United States.....	23
2. Spending on active labor market programs and unemployment from 1989 to 2005.....	26
3. Change in the index of employment protection legislation for temporary and permanent contracts from 1989 to 2005.....	29
4. Unemployment rate and proportion long-term unemployed from 1989 to 2004.....	30
5. Organizational commitment as a function of perceived job security and perceived mobility prospects.....	45
6. ISSP countries included in each wave of the Work Orientations Module.....	50

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Change in average perceived job security in four OECD countries, 1989-2005.....	5
2. Model of the conceptual antecedents and outcomes of job insecurity.....	7
3. Research Paper 1 in the context of the model.....	22
4. Research Paper 2 in the context of the model.....	33
5. Research Paper 3 in the context of the model.....	42

INTRODUCTION

Job insecurity, a worker's evaluation of the likelihood and cost of job loss, has become firmly entrenched as one of the most salient and pressing issues facing modern workers. Various changes in the structure of labor markets since the early 1980s--the rise of contingent work, the erosion of the psychological contract, and mass layoffs in times of economic prosperity--all imply a steady degradation of long-term employment relationships and a shift toward an insecure and itinerant workforce. Concerns over the decline of actual employment stability--the death of so-called "jobs for life"--arose with economic changes in the early 1980s. Predictions regarding the fate of employment relationships ranged from severe (employers will respond to heightened competition by increasing the proportion of workers in flexible employment relationships) to apocalyptic (the need for flexibility will eventually drive stable employment relationships into obsolescence). These changes were proposed to be matched by heightened insecurity, as previously-protected workers were exposed to risks such as layoffs from which they had previously been immune.

Although the decline of stable employment relationships may have been overstated in some cases, there is nevertheless cause for concern. Employees may still enjoy long tenure, but they are now exposed to a greater array of unforeseeable risks beyond simply the risk of job loss. Layoffs are no longer a strategy of last resort, but occur even during economic upswings. Workers are becoming increasingly responsible for keeping themselves marketable, as employers are unwilling to provide for training and skill maintenance. Employees must now bear a greater share of insurance costs, as health care or pension benefits are scaled back. Workers face dramatic income loss when unemployment extends over months and benefits are sparse. These risks point to an increase in the unpredictability of workers' employment trajectories--an unpredictability that directly contributes to feelings of insecurity.

Employees' need not experience a direct threat to their jobs to feel insecure, explaining why the incidence of insecurity is far greater than the incidence of actual involuntary job loss. Rather, the persistence of job insecurity arises when workers are unsure how to plan for or control employment outcomes, creating a sense of powerlessness that contributes to a host of negative consequences:

- inability to adapt to changing circumstances (De Witte, 2005; Green, 2006)
- a sense of unfairness (Jacoby, 1999)
- stress and anxiety (Burchell, 2002; Jacobson, 1987; Paugam & Zhou, 2007)
- pessimism about one's career (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007; Schmidt, 1999)
- decreased job satisfaction (De Witte & Naswall, 2003)
- withdrawal of organizational commitment (Ashford, Lee & Bobko, 1989; King, 2000)

In general, job insecurity leads to diminished mental health because "well-being is related to the workers' ability to foresee, control, and especially to cope with bad events" (Green, 2006: 129).

Secure workers feel equipped to handle the vicissitudes of a changing economic environment; insecure workers feel no such sense that all will turn out well. This lack of situational clarity causes workers to rely heavily on their subjective evaluations of the environment, given that objective cues provide no clear indicator of appropriate responses (Roskies, Louis-Guerin & Fournier, 1993). In the face of ambiguity, workers are left to draw their own conclusions about what their future holds.

Since Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt's (1984) treatise on the theoretical underpinnings of perceived job insecurity, hundreds of research studies have explored the antecedents and outcomes of job insecurity. Unfortunately, most of this research assumes that insecurity is primarily affected by either the immediate organizational context, job characteristics, or individual attributes. Significantly less attention has been given to institutional influences on job insecurity, although it is highly unlikely that differences in average national levels in insecurity can be explained entirely in terms of organizations, jobs and individuals. For this reason, the next stages of insecurity research must

consider how welfare state and labor market structures jointly shape workers' evaluations of their work careers. Generally, welfare states and labor markets have been considered separately in job insecurity studies, yet I argue that these two institutions interact to create unique national patterns of insecurity that cannot be accounted for when each element is considered independently.

A similar trend has occurred in organization commitment research, a topic that enjoys international popularity among psychologists. Because few sociologists have shown interest in organizational commitment, research generally involves psychological analyses of individuals. The sociological studies that have placed organizational commitment in the international context focus on the impact of objective insecurity, indicated by the prevalence of temporary contracts, on organizational commitment. However, this once again explains issues such as insecurity and commitment entirely in terms of workers' relationships to their current employer. Overall, this research project will explore how workers evaluations of their employment situation—indicated by perceived job insecurity and organizational commitment—are impacted by factors beyond the immediate organizational environment.


The outline of this research proposal is as follows: First, I will outline why current macro-level perspectives on job insecurity insufficiently explain actual trends. The second part of the proposal introduces the model that will serve as a general framework for my research. The literature review will then summarize existing research on each portion of the model and the relationships between concepts. I will then outline the theory of welfare production regimes, which serves as the theoretical foundation for my research questions. The subsequent sections of the research proposal outline the three papers to be included in the dissertation; within each is a discussion of research questions, their associated hypotheses, and the data sets I intend to use in hypothesis testing. The appendices contain the specific survey questions to be used in each research paper.

THE PROBLEM: DIVERGING TRENDS IN JOB INSECURITY

The forecast that stable employment would fade in prevalence, replaced by a labor force composed entirely of precariously-employed workers, has not come to pass. Although precarious forms of employment have undoubtedly gained a larger share of the labor force since the 1980s, nations have developed vastly different responses to precarity and risk. As Beck (2000) states, “All Western countries are similarly affected by the informalization and individualization of paid work. But this epochal change is perceived and valued differently in different cultures.” (111). The variety of national responses is evidenced by job insecurity trends in OECD countries. From the 1980s through the turn of the century, job insecurity exhibited the predicted steady decline in some countries; but in others, such as Norway, perceptions of job security changed little. In yet others, of which Britain is a prime example, the downward trend in workers’ evaluations of their job security seems to have reversed itself (Green, 2006).

In all, there seems to be no consistent trend in job security among countries (Paugam & Zhou, 2007). As seen in Figure 1, workers in West Germany, Great Britain and the United States grew less secure in their jobs between 1989 and 1997, while Norwegian workers’ perceptions of job security changed little. Between 1997 and 2005, however, the attitudes of West German and US workers remained steady; British workers experienced a renewed sense of security in their jobs; and Norwegian workers became markedly more insecure in their jobs.

Figure 1. Change in average perceived job security in four OECD countries, 1989-2005




This finding contradicts predictions of a steady downward path of job insecurity. The current literature is unable to sufficiently explain national differences in job insecurity trajectories, due to the levels of analysis to which job insecurity research has restricted itself. In particular, job insecurity research emphasizes the influence of organizational or psychological phenomena on workers' evaluations of their jobs. Yet national differences in average insecurity levels cannot be fully accounted for by characteristics of organizations and individuals. How can we make sense of national differences in job insecurity trends? The context of insecurity research needs to be expanded to include macro-level factors that impinge on the structure of employment relationships and how workers evaluate those relationships.

LITERATURE REVIEW: STRUCTURAL ANTECEDENTS AND ATTITUDINAL OUTCOMES OF JOB INSECURITY

Figure 2 below presents a model of the proposed antecedents and outcomes of job insecurity. Insecurity, at the hub of the model, results from the intersection of welfare state structure, labor market structure, and perceptions of employment prospects in the internal and external labor market. Job insecurity, in turn, influences levels of organizational commitment, although this relationship is modified by labor market prospects and job characteristics. The literature review separately discusses each component of the model and its relationship to job insecurity.

Figure 2. Model of the conceptual antecedents and outcomes of job insecurity



Cognitive insecurity

In the nascent stages of job insecurity research, insecurity was proposed to be dependent on individual and organizational characteristics (Ashford, Lee & Bobko, 1989; Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984; Jacobson, 1991). As such, empirical research primarily used case studies to examine the effects of organizational change on workers' perceptions of job loss threat (Hartley, 1991; Jacobson, 1987; Mauno, Leskinen & Kinnunen, 2001; van Vuuren, Klandermans, Jacobson & Hartley, 1991). Findings confirmed the original theoretical propositions of Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1984): Job insecurity is a combined function of the perceived degree of threat to one's job and an inability to counteract the threat. The threat in question is unemployment: workers become insecure when they believe there is a chance their job could be terminated, thereby throwing them into joblessness. In this stream of research, job insecurity thus depends on organizational conditions and individual characteristics (Chirumbolo & Hellgren, 2003; Hartley, 1991; Mauno, Leskinen & Kinnunen, 2001).

The idea that insecurity arises from the threat of job loss suggests that perceptions of job insecurity lie at the threshold between employment and unemployment (De Witte, 2005). Job insecurity, conceptualized as the threat of job loss, necessarily forces workers to consider their chances in the external labor market. When workers consider their career trajectories, the questions they ask go beyond the current employer: "If I lose my job, what happens to me then?" If workers foresee a positive outcome, insecurity is unlikely; if negative, insecurity results.

Labor market structure

This realization that perceived job insecurity is influenced by, not only organizational and individual characteristics, but also by labor market conditions, ushered in the second wave of insecurity research. In one of the first studies of this type, Schmidt (1999) found that aggregate insecurity perceptions of U.S. workers closely followed the national unemployment rate. The

correlation between national unemployment levels and workers' subjective job security has since received strong support, and holds to be an international phenomenon (Auer & Cazes, 2003; Erlinghagen, 2007; Paugam & Zhou, 2007). However, some research suggests there may be more to this story. Green (2006), for example, concluded that a slight drop in Britain's unemployment rate between 1977 and 2002 was not matched by any discernible trend in job insecurity. In Britain, unemployment trended persistently downwards over the past several decades, while perceptions of job security plummeted and then rebounded over the same time period. In addition, job insecurity has been found to relate strongly to the *long-term* unemployment rate (Erlinghagen, 2007), suggesting that unemployment affects insecurity because it brings about severe negative repercussions; a protracted period of unemployment may entail significant income loss and a diminishing probability of finding employment equal to or better than the lost job. Even if a worker's job is not actually at risk, the unemployment rate provides a gauge of likely outcomes.

Thus, it seems that extended or repeated spells in the external labor market--or even the expectation of such--contribute significantly to perceptions of insecurity. Workers who are in objectively insecure employment situations--namely, those on temporary contracts--tend to be less secure in their jobs than workers with more stable employment arrangements. Thus, it seems that those who are objectively most at risk of unemployment are the most insecure. Intuitively, workers on temporary contracts should feel more insecure because they are at greater risk of actual job loss, a proposition that has been confirmed in most studies (De Witte & Naswall, 2003; Erlinghagen, 2007; Maurin & Postel-Vinay, 2005, but see Bockerman, 2004). Paugam and Zhou (2007) provide conditional support for the greater insecurity of temporary workers: the insecurity disparity between temporary and permanent workers varies by country. The narrowest gap is among Danish workers, while workers in France demonstrated the expected strong polarization of insecurity by employment contract type.

Insecurity thus seems to stem in part from the perception of change: whether from employment into unemployment or from one job to another. Workers who perceive change to be potentially disruptive, in terms of labor market or income stability, will likely feel insecure in their present jobs. Contrarily, workers who feel they will be able to transition smoothly from one employer to another or workers who do not foresee significant income loss upon transition (either into another job or into unemployment) will maintain high levels of perceived job security. Insecurity depends on workers' assessments of the risks to which they will be exposed and the potential severity of those risks (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984; Jacobson, 1991).

However, risk levels do not entirely determine whether workers will feel insecure. Insecurity, in most conceptualizations, is a function of unpredictability and uncontrollability (Ashford, Lee & Bobko, 1989; Burchell, 2002; De Witte, 2005; De Witte & Naswall, 2003). In the face of potentially changing circumstances, workers are unsure how to respond. As noted by De Witte and Naswall (2003):

Job insecurity first of all implies unpredictability: it is unclear to the persons concerned what their future holds. This makes it difficult to react adequately, because it is unclear *if* one should do something or not. Besides unpredictability, uncontrollability also plays a part. Various authors consider this lack of control or the experience of powerlessness to deal with the threat, as being the core dimension of job insecurity. (158)

Whether changes come from the organization, the labor market, or the larger national context, the inability to foresee and manage change causes workers to evaluate their employment situations as insecure. Thus, anything that increases situational clarity and creates a perception of stability and continuity will significantly affect subjective evaluations of insecurity.

Welfare state structure

From a review of the literature, no clear pattern emerges regarding the impact of welfare state structure on subjective assessments of job insecurity. The effect of employment protection (the strength of employment protection legislation) on job insecurity remains contested (Anderson &

Pontusson, 2007; Bockerman, 2004), yet the preponderance of the evidence points to a weak relationship. Most studies find that “patterns of perceived job instability and the institutional features of European countries are not consistent with the popular notion that the perception of job instability declines as the strictness of labor standards and the strictness of employment legislation increase in European labor markets.” (Bockerman, 2004: 306). In this case, perceptions of job insecurity correlate only loosely with the strictness of employment legislation (Robinson, 2000), as evidenced by workers in France and Spain, whose jobs are protected by strong regulations, yet exhibit average to low security levels. This argument is supported by the consistent finding that job tenure, in and of itself, is not predictive of job insecurity (Auer & Cazes, 2003; Erlinghagen, 2007; Gallie, 2007; ILO, 2005); legislation that promotes employment stability should also be expected to weakly affect job insecurity. Strong employment protection need not lead to workers’ feeling more secure in their jobs: strict employment legislation can lead to higher unemployment due to employers’ reluctance to hire new workers (Gangl, 2004).

Social protections, particularly the manner in which welfare states deal with unemployment, affect workers’ appraisals of their job insecurity. Unemployment compensation cushions the impact of unemployment, thereby bolstering workers’ sense of job security. International comparisons reveal a strong correlation between the level of unemployment benefits and aggregate job insecurity perceptions. The income stabilizing effects of generous unemployment benefits functions to reduce fear of job loss (Robinson, 2000). However, this finding is not robust, as some studies conclude that labor market conditions, especially the unemployment rate, exert a far greater influence on job insecurity than the extent of expenditure on social welfare (Erlinghagen, 2007). In sum, it is unclear whether welfare state spending on social protections has a direct effect on workers’ appraisals of insecurity or whether the welfare state operates indirectly, through its effects on labor market conditions.

And although active labor market policies--those which provide training for workers and facilitate mobility--have not been thoroughly explored in connection with job insecurity, existing evidence points to a salutatory effect. As noted by Auer, Berg, and Coulibaly (2005), Danish and British workers experience similar levels of job tenure, yet levels of job security among Danish workers far exceed those of their British counterparts. The Danish welfare state is designed to promote flexicurity, combining low job tenure with high mobility--a strategy reflected in labor market protections that focus on active retraining for the unemployed. Whereas Danish workers enjoy facilitated mobility, British workers lack an unemployment "safety net": the incidence of poverty among British unemployed workers was at 49% in 2000. In the same year, only 7.6% of Danish unemployed experienced poverty (Gallie, 2007).

Perceptions of labor market risk

From the above argument, it can be summarized that job insecurity arises from the interaction of mobility and income instability (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984): Highly mobile workers are unlikely to feel insecure if they can maintain a constant and decent standard of living (ILO, 2005). However, mobile workers who experience significant fluctuations in income or who rotate through a series of low-wage jobs that provide unsatisfactorily for their needs are unlikely to feel secure in their jobs. Conversely, long-tenured workers who do not expect significant income loss are likely to feel more secure than workers who have enjoyed long tenure but anticipate a sharp income drop upon employment termination. This last finding is commonly associated with older workers, for whom "it is the job loss wage penalty more than the job loss incidence that drives the perception of job instability" (Bockerman, 2004: 306).

In keeping with the definition of job insecurity as uncertainty, both mobility and income stability reduce the uncertainty of labor market outcomes--in the former case, workers can easily find a similar job, in the latter, workers will not fall into poverty if a job cannot be immediately replaced.

The range of outcomes to which workers may be exposed is reduced through these two mechanisms, both of which are mediated by the welfare state. Changes in welfare state policy can thus either expand or contract the range and severity of risks to which workers are exposed, thereby aggravating or alleviating job insecurity. Welfare states may also choose to concentrate insecurity among disadvantaged groups--in France, for instance, the polarized labor markets into highly secure and highly insecure workers. On the other hand, the United States offers notoriously few protections to workers, thereby spreading instability among all groups of workers rather than concentrating instability within particular groups such as temporary workers. The ease of hiring and firing workers in the United States accounts for the low incidence of temporary work, as flexible employment relationships are generally unnecessary when employment contracts with permanent workers can be easily formed and broken.

A national framework of strong employment protection may lead to heavier reliance on flexible work arrangements in order to circumvent stringent hiring and firing rules, yet the effect on insecurity depends strongly on the accompanying framework of social protections for workers. The Scandinavian countries have thus far been most successful in balancing employment and worker protections--the Danish system of “flexicurity”, characterized by flexible employment relationships coupled with national supports that facilitate mobility and protect income in the case of unemployment, has created a nation of highly secure workers despite a median length of tenure that is among the lowest of OECD countries (Auer & Cazes, 2003; Estevez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 2001). Conversely, Spanish workers witnessed a dramatic increase in the incidence of flexible employment relations in the 1990s as employers sought to get around rigid employment protections (Green, 2006); correspondingly, perceived job security among workers in Spain dropped from 1996 to 2001, with an average security level well below other European countries (Paugam & Zhou, 2007).

Organizational commitment

Organizational commitment involves more than identification with an employer's values; commitment is an affective orientation that includes, in addition to value identification, involvement in organizational activities that contribute to the ongoing success of the firm and a sense of belonging or membership that a worker would be reluctant to relinquish. Mowday, Steers, and Porter (1979) define organizational commitment as containing "(1) a strong belief in and acceptance of the organization's goals and values; (2) a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization; and (3) a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization." (226). In this conceptualization, commitment is defined in terms of an emotional attachment.

Conceptualizations of commitment have, since Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979) been expanded beyond the affective dimension. Other conceptualizations of commitment cast it a sort of cost-benefits analysis, in which individuals weigh the benefits of staying against the costs of leaving, or as a normative attachment, in the sense that one "should" be loyal to one's employer. To compare the three approaches, "Employees with a strong affective commitment remain because they *want* to, those with strong continuance commitment because they *need* to, and those with strong normative commitment because they feel they *ought* to do so." (Allen & Meyer, 1990: 3). These three elements, taken together, capture the multifaceted nature of commitment. For example, employees may feel a strong sense of loyalty to the employer, yet also be aware of alternative employment options which they forgo out of a feeling of obligation. They do not need to stay, yet do so because they feel they should.

Affective commitment arises from an emotional attachment to the organization, whereas normative commitment stems from placing a high value on loyalty. The difference between "should" and "want", however, is not perfectly clear, as the two commitment measures have been found to be moderately correlated (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Thus, desire and obligation to maintain

organizational membership are somewhat conceptually entangled. Continuance commitment, conversely, depends on external factors such as the availability of suitable employment with another employer. This type of commitment should therefore be reflected in perceptions of marketability-- highly marketable employees with transferable skills will display low continuance commitment. Workers who have devoted a significant amount of time or effort to developing firm-specific human capital, on the other hand, will lose any investment made in these skills once they leave the organization. The need to stay--in order to realize the full benefits of skill investment--is very high. A worker's perceived sense of marketability partly determines continuance commitment, which comprises the cost of leaving and the benefit of staying (Van Breugel, Van Olffen & Olie, 2005). Organizational commitment thus seems to depend both on intra- and extra-organizational factors. Affective commitment derives from experiences within the organization, normative commitment from socialization experiences or cultural expectations, and continuance commitment from external labor market conditions.

Organizational commitment, marketability and insecurity

Currently, organizational commitment at the national level has been studied exclusively in terms of affective commitment. Although links between marketability and affective commitment have not been explicitly studied, what has been found thus far indicates that highly marketable employees are not necessarily the least committed. In the context of production regimes, liberal market economies such as the United States actually produce a highly committed workforce. Scandinavian countries, representative of coordinated market economies, exhibit dramatically lower levels of organizational commitment (Hult & Svallfors, 2002). This finding is unexpected, given that employers in the United States tend to emphasize marketability over loyalty, and workers have strong incentives to invest in transferable rather than firm-specific skills (Estevez-Abe, Soskice &

Iversen, 2001). Scandinavian firms, on the other hand, rely on a workforce with firm-specific or occupation-specific skills, which should therefore generate high organizational commitment.

Intuitively, workers in objectively insecure employment arrangements should display markedly lower organizational commitment. Workers on temporary contracts have little incentive to invest in emotional attachments to the workplace, as the relationship has a definite end-point. However, this preconception fails empirical testing in several countries. Temporary employees do not react to objective insecurity with reduced commitment. In comparisons of the relative effects of objective and subjective job insecurity, subjective job insecurity was found to be much more detrimental in its effects on both job satisfaction and organizational commitment (De Witte & Naswall, 2003). Subjective job insecurity thus threatens valued emotional attachments to the workplace, causing workers to withdraw support as a precautionary maneuver (Ashford, Lee & Bobko, 1989; King, 2000).

Employee withdrawal also manifests itself in turnover intentions. Subjective job insecurity not only lowers organizational commitment, but also increases the propensity to leave. Marketability exacerbates turnover intentions in that “the most valuable employees tend to be the first to leave” (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984: 443): although workers may wish to leave the organization, they will not actually do so if they perceive a low likelihood of job replacement (Greenhalgh & Sutton, 1991). The relationship between job insecurity and turnover, while problematic in and of itself, becomes an especially pressing issue for employers when the most qualified employees are the most likely to leave (Chirumbolo & Hellgren, 2003).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The framework for this dissertation assumes that welfare states and labor markets jointly impact workers evaluations of and attachments to their employers. The consistent finding that insecurity depends on uncertainty means that any aspect of the work environment that reduces unpredictability and enables workers to foresee some sort of continuity in their employment trajectories will affect perceptions of job insecurity. The recognition that context--from the level of the organization to the state--matters importantly for individual perceptions has ushered in a new wave of insecurity research, which explores the effect of the welfare state on insecurity. Part of the explanation for international variations in job insecurity trajectories lies in the regulatory framework surrounding labor markets. Employers respond to changing economic conditions by altering the employment contract, yet the degree of alteration and the severity of repercussions for employees depends heavily on the regulatory framework in which labor markets are embedded.

Welfare states can make career trajectories more predictable, and lessen the instability inherent in labor market transitions. The contextual nature of job insecurity is described by Erlinghagen thusly:

Self-perceived job insecurity is a result of an evaluation process in which both higher-level contextual factors at the macro level (e.g. legislation, standards, economic environment etc.) and the actors' individual resource endowments (education, income etc.) at the micro level have to be taken into account. Thus self-perceived job insecurity is the result of an individual assessment by an actor embedded in a number of different environments. (2007: 4)

Placing employment relationships within the context of the welfare state is a necessary step in understanding variations in national insecurity trajectories. Despite the intuitive conclusion that the structure of the welfare state should strongly impact employment relationships and workers' evaluations of their employment stability, the national context has been largely neglected in studies of workers' perceptions (notable and recent exceptions are: Anderson & Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen, 2007). The protections afforded workers differ greatly between countries, and

insecurity trends can likely be explained in part by institutional responses to the changing nature of work.

Welfare state structures both regulate and reinforce labor market structures; acknowledgment of their mutual interdependence has given rise to a new model of markets, the “welfare production regime”, which considers welfare states and labor markets to be complementary institutions (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 2001). The strategies adopted by welfare states significantly impact the type and variety of labor market risks to which workers are exposed. In particular, job protections, which either promote employment tenure or flexibility, must be balanced with worker protections, which either mitigate the repercussions of labor market failure or facilitate labor market mobility. For example, a welfare state that favors flexible employment relations and low levels of employment protection legislation can reduce the risks inherent in unstable employment relationships (such as unemployment and loss of income) by investing heavily in worker protections such as unemployment benefits and job training, thereby reducing the impact of job loss or the difficulty of job mobility (Auer, Berg & Coulibaly, 2005). Welfare state and labor market structures together impact job insecurity: welfare states correct labor market failures, while the structure of the labor market may render some features of welfare states obsolete. Mismatches between the two result in risks being borne by workers rather than the labor market or the welfare state.

RESEARCH PAPER SUMMARIES

Broadly outlined, this research project will explore the antecedents and outcomes of job insecurity at both institutional and individual levels. Research paper 1 examines job insecurity as a result of institutional arrangements, focusing on the joint influence of welfare state and labor market structures. I hypothesize that fluctuations in these institutional structures cause shifts in job insecurity. Perceptions of job insecurity thus depend on how current welfare state and labor market structures compare to previous periods. Structural stability, rather than the absolute levels of welfare state provisions or unemployment rates, reduces insecurity whereas structural changes increase insecurity.

Research paper 2 examines the relative impact of workers' internal and external labor market prospects on job insecurity. Given that job insecurity derives from evaluations of the likelihood and cost of job loss, workers should consider both their future with the present employer and their desirability to other employers when assessing how secure they feel in their jobs. Employees who positively evaluate their chances in the internal or external labor market will display low levels of job insecurity. Additionally, perceptions of labor market risk are strongly influenced by welfare state structure. Countries with lax employment legislation tend to have fluid labor markets, which should thereby reduce job insecurity by increasing the perceived likelihood of rapid re-employment. Conversely, countries with strict employment legislation may discourage firing, but also discourage hiring, thus increasing the costs of job loss.

Research paper 3 will provide an international comparison of organizational commitment as influenced by both job insecurity and perceptions of marketability. It has been found that US workers are some of the most committed workers, while Swedish workers exhibit low levels of commitment--a finding that contradicts the predictions of welfare state typologies. I argue that indices of organizational commitment may mask important differences between countries. US

workers may display strong organizational pride, yet they are also highly likely to leave for a competing job offer. It seems that workers who are highly marketable do not necessarily decrease their affective attachments to their employers. Conversely, workers in countries with both low job security and low mobility tend to display lower levels of organizational pride than countries with either high aggregate security or high average mobility. I propose that organizational commitment is impacted by perceptions of both job insecurity and mobility, but that components of commitment must be examined separately to fully understand national differences.

Research paper 1: Job insecurity trajectories in the national context

Summary


In the initial stages of job insecurity research, insecurity was proposed to derive from perceptions of the immediate organizational context. Contextual antecedents were then expanded to include labor market structures such as unemployment rates. In the third stage of insecurity research, the scope contextual influences grew to include the structure of welfare states. However, the impact on insecurity of changes in any of these structures has been primarily restricted to the level of organizations or labor markets. The welfare state receives proportionally less attention, most likely because it is assumed that national structures are fairly stagnant. Yet welfare state structures do change significantly, albeit at a slower rate than organizations and labor markets. This study focuses on two research questions:

Research question 1: How have changes in welfare state structure shaped national trends in job security?

Research question 2: How is a nation's aggregate level of job security affected by changes in labor market conditions?

Because “social policy and the labor market have become interwoven and mutually interdependent institutions” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 149), these institutions will be studied simultaneously to uncover their independent and joint effects on employees’ perceived job insecurity. Figure 3 highlights the portions of the model to be studied in this research paper. In general, both the welfare state structure and labor market structure are hypothesized to influence perceived job insecurity. Specific hypotheses derived from the literature are outlined at the end of this section.

Figure 3. Research Paper 1 in the context of the model



Research design

This paper will combine national-level data on employment protections and aggregate levels of unemployment with individual-level perceptions of current employment arrangements. The analysis will include four post-industrial countries: western Germany, Great Britain, Norway and the United States. These countries represent a variety of welfare state and labor market structures. Auer and Cazes (2003) outline a simplified model of the relationship between employment protection legislation and social protection; three of the four cells contain the countries used in this analysis. The only cell not included is the high EPL/low social protection cell, exemplified by Japan. The table below displays the relationship between social protection and EPL for the countries in this study.

Table 1. Relationship between employment protection legislation and social protection for western Germany, Norway, Great Britain and the United States

	High level of social protection	Low level of social protection
High level of EPL	Western Germany	
Low level of EPL	Norway	Great Britain United States

Using the three waves of the Work Orientations Module, I will explore how perceptions of job insecurity have responded to changes in both the welfare state and labor market. The welfare state structure will be measured using OECD data on job and worker protections. Job protections are measured by the strictness of employment protection legislation, which indicates the ease with which workers transition between employers. Worker protections are subdivided into mitigating factors--passive strategies measured by the extent of unemployment benefits--and facilitating factors--measured by government spending on active labor market programs. Labor market

structure will be measure by the unemployment rate and the proportion of long-term unemployed workers (in which unemployment lasts for at least six months). Change in welfare states will be measured by comparing differences in welfare state structure between each wave of the ISSP Work Orientations Module. Two indicators will be used to assess labor market changes: the first indicator will measure shifts in unemployment and long-term unemployment rates between survey years; the second will measure change in the few years preceding each survey. Anderson and Pontusson (2007) conclude that short-term changes in labor market structure exert a greater impact than long-term changes; to assess the differential impact of annual change versus change over a longer time span, both measures will be included.

Significance

Although many aspects of the labor market and welfare state, when examined at one point in time, do not seem to affect workers' evaluations of their job security, the impact of *changes* in these institutions has yet to be examined. With regard to welfare state structure, workers expect certain provisions from the welfare state; changes in these relationships and structures may lead to unpredictability--one of the defining features of insecurity. Examining the effect of employment protections on insecurity in terms of employees' expectations could account for the persistently high levels of job security among employees in the United States despite the dismal level of protections afforded them: "A possible explanation of job insecurity's independence from welfare state policy preferences in the U.S. is that, out of experience, citizens in this category of welfare state simply have no expectation of heightened social protection even in times of severe economic downturn" (Mughan, 2007: 302). U.S. employees remain unaffected by welfare state provisions because there are few and they expect few. Conversely, "[t]here remains a 'governmental habit' in Europe; that is, European citizens still look to the state to shield them from risk" (Jacoby, 1999). Insecurity is

therefore not entirely dependent on the actual levels of employment and social protection; it is when these protections are taken away that uncertainty, and therefore insecurity, grows.

It may thus be that, in protective welfare systems, workers are more susceptible to changes in welfare state structure than in liberal market economies. Workers in social-democratic systems (represented by the Scandinavian countries) and conservative systems (such as Germany and France) should thus react more strongly to changes in welfare state provisions and protections than do workers in liberal systems (the United States and the United Kingdom), in which provisions generally remain at a persistently low level. Conversely, workers in liberal welfare systems are likely to be affected more so than workers in protectionist states by changes in labor market structure. Workers in the United Kingdom, for example, should exhibit a higher insecurity decline than workers in Germany when the long-term unemployment rate rises, as UK workers are but weakly protected from the income loss attendant on unemployment, whereas German workers enjoy income protection during extended spells of unemployment. Thus, changes in welfare state structures and the condition of the labor market jointly impact workers' evaluations of their job security. In examining macro-level influences on workers' beliefs regarding the security of their jobs, the welfare state and the labor market, as "mutually interdependent institutions" (Esping-Anderson, 1990) must be jointly taken into account.

Research question 1: How have changes in welfare state structure shaped national trends in job security?

A welfare state's employment philosophy can be seen in the relative expenditure on various aspects of social protection, particularly active labor market programs and unemployment protections. These two types of welfare state spending represent the welfare state strategies of facilitation and mitigation. Active labor market programs serve to facilitate worker-job matching, providing training and employment services. Unemployment protections, on the other hand,

mitigate the detrimental effects of job loss, providing income stability. The Table 2 below provides the ratio of active labor market spending and unemployment spending.

Table 2. Spending on active labor market programs and unemployment from 1989 to 2005

	Year	Active Labor Market Programs	Unemployment	Ratio Active/ Unemployment
Germany	1989	15,366.8	11,538.4	1.33
	1997	21,229.7	33,781.7	0.63
	2003	23,442.0	37,524.7	0.62
Great Britain	1989	4,916.7	4,714.6	1.04
	1997	3,219.9	4,466.4	0.72
	2003	5,286.0	2,687.3	1.97
Norway	1989	8,021.8	10,198.9	0.79
	1997	12,908.2	9,127.0	1.41
	2003	12,321.7	11,547.8	1.07
United States	1989	15,594.4	26,879.1	0.58
	1997	14,334.5	22,095.0	0.65
	2005	14,625.4	54,312.2	0.27

Source: OECDStat

As seen in the table, the United States obviously favors a strategy of providing for unemployment rather than training workers to enter or re-enter the labor force. This strategy became more prominent from 1989 to 2005, as the ratio of active labor market spending to unemployment spending fell from over half of the amount spent on unemployment to just over one-quarter. This is due to the dramatic increase in spending on unemployment, rather than a decrease in active labor market programs. Great Britain, conversely, has shifted to a strategy based on decreased spending on unemployment, yet increased spending on social programs geared toward training and employment services. Germany, for which the ratio of spending was skewed in favor of active measures in 1989, seems to have reversed strategies, spending an dramatically-increasing amount on unemployment and only a slightly increasing amount on active labor market programs. Yet part of the unemployment spending increase between 1989 and 1997 was to help East Germans transition to a reunified Germany, a situation that is obviously country-specific. When reunification efforts are

removed, the gap narrows between active labor market spending and unemployment spending, but still favors unemployment. Norway has generally equally favored active and passive programs: the increase in the ratio of active labor market spending to unemployment is largely reflected in a budgetary reclassification of elementary education from the social security budget to the active labor market budget. When elementary schooling is removed from active labor market spending, it seems that active spending actually grew from 1989 to 1997, but sank to 62% of unemployment spending by 2005, when active labor market spending was less than in 1989.

In sum, the United States and Germany favor passive measures, although Germany has displayed a greater change in policy than the US, in which passive measures have always been preferred over active measures. Great Britain has vacillated in its policy emphasis, currently favoring active over passive programs. Norway has displayed a gradual weakening of active measures, when schooling is removed from the equation, and active policies received slightly less funding in 2005 compared to 1997, while passive measures received more. The Norwegian welfare state emphasis on labor market mobility, coupled with a decrease in active labor market programs, should cause insecurity perceptions to increase from 1997 to 2005. Welfare state stability from 1989 and 1997 should manifest itself in stable evaluations of security among Norwegian employees.

Changes in strategy should impact job insecurity because workers must adjust to changing circumstances. Workers in the United States should therefore exhibit the least change in job insecurity over the past several decades. German workers should experience heightened insecurity from 1989 to 1997, as the level of active labor market spending per unemployment dropped significantly (not shown in table), but the subsequent period of policy stability should cause perceptions to also stabilize. British workers, after a period of fairly equitable spending on active and passive strategies, experienced a shift in welfare state strategy toward active measures. Yet predictions regarding British workers are ambivalent: on the one hand, the increased emphasis on

training and employment services may have created greater confidence in the prospects of re-employment, yet decreased spending on unemployment benefits may have generated fear regarding the costs of job loss. For Norwegian workers, unemployment spending fluctuated between 1989 and 2003, although the average spending per unemployed actually increased steadily during this period.

Changes in employment protection legislation, rather than the actual level of protection, should also impact job insecurity. As already stated, objective levels of employment protection have little bearing on workers' evaluations of employment stability. However, employment protection legislation grew steadily weaker in many European countries over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. The strength of employment protection legislation waned dramatically in Germany between the late 1980s and mid-2000s--from an overall index score of 3.17 in 1989, the strength of protection index fell steadily through the following decade to 2.21. However, most of the change is reflective of continually easing restrictions on the use of temporary workers. The index score for workers on permanent contracts rose slightly, from 2.58 in 1989 to 2.68 in 1997--a figure which has since remained steady.

A similar situation exists in Norway: a weakening employment protection index score was due primarily to relaxed restrictions on temporary work, while protections for permanent workers did not change at all between 1989 and 2007. Even with a falling index score, Norwegian workers, regardless of employment contract type, are still protected by strict employment protection legislation, although regulation of temporary contract remains stricter than restrictions on permanent contracts. British workers enjoyed a minor tightening of employment protection: restrictions on use of both permanent and temporary increased between 1997 and 2003, after a period of legislation stagnancy. Despite the improved index score on employment protection, Great Britain still offers near-minimal protections for workers. The United States is the exception in this regard, as the near-absence of employment protection that has existed for decades still remains at the same low level.

Table 3 summarizes the changes in employment protection legislation (EPL) from the late 1980s to the mid-2000s.

Table 3. Change in the index of employment protection legislation for temporary and permanent contracts from 1989 to 2005

Country	Year	EPL overall	EPL regular work	EPL temporary work
Germany	1989	3.17	2.58	3.75
	1997	2.46	2.68	2.25
	2004	2.21	2.68	1.75
Great Britain	1989	0.60	0.95	0.25
	1997	0.60	0.95	0.25
	2003	0.75	1.12	0.38
Norway	1989	2.90	2.25	3.54
	1997	2.69	2.25	3.13
	2003	2.56	2.25	2.88
United States	1989	0.21	0.17	0.25
	1997	0.21	0.17	0.25
	2003	0.21	0.17	0.25

Source: OECDStat

Research Question 2: How is a nation's aggregate level of job security affected by changes in labor market conditions?

Worsening or improving labor market conditions should also affect insecurity, as changes in the labor market imply a shift in the pervasiveness or severity of risk. The effect of changing labor market conditions on insecurity has been demonstrated by Anderson and Pontusson, who find that “rising and persistent high national unemployment rates are associated with higher cognitive job insecurity” (2007: 228). The increased prevalence of unemployment creates uncertainty for a greater number of workers, thus expanding the ranks of insecure employees. Table 4 provides a comparative assessment of unemployment rates from 1989, 1997, and 2003/2004; the last column displays the proportion of unemployed workers who have been out of work for at least six months.

Table 4. Unemployment rate and proportion long-term unemployed from 1989 to 2004

Country	Year	Unemployment rate	Proportion long-term unemployed
Germany	1989	5.62	66.3
	1997	9.91	68.4
	2004	11.22	70.8
Great Britain	1989	7.25	55.3
	1997	7.05	54.7
	2003	4.64	38.1
Norway	1989	5.00	27.1
	1997	4.07	26.4
	2003	4.64	25.2
United States	1989	5.27	9.8
	1997	4.94	15.8
	2003	5.08	19.5

Source: OECDStat

In Germany, the unemployment rate swelled to almost 10 percent of the labor force in 1997, from a previous low of 5.62 percent in 1989; unemployment continued to rise through 2004. The long-term unemployment rate rose only slightly from 1989 to 2004, yet began and remained incredibly high. Throughout the late 1980s and mid-2000s, over two-thirds of unemployed persons had been so for at least six months. Thus, it seems unemployment in Germany carries more dire consequences in terms of time spent out of the labor force in comparison to other post-industrial countries. Great Britain's labor market situation, however, seems to have improved over the years: after a long period of high unemployment from 1989 to 1997, the unemployment rate dipped under 5 percent. There was also a notable decline in the long-term unemployment rate: whereas over half of all unemployed were among the long-term unemployed in both 1989 and 1997, the proportion of long-term unemployed workers fell to 38 percent by 2003. Norway and the United States displayed relative stability in the unemployment rate, although Norway's unemployment rate was likely to contain a higher proportion of long-term unemployed.

The United States exhibited, by far, the lowest incidence of long-term unemployment in 1989, but this number steadily rose over the years, reaching almost 20 percent by 2005. This increase, paired with a weak system of unemployment benefits, likely resulted in worsening economic conditions for many workers. Improving labor market conditions for British workers from 1997 to 2005 should translate into higher feelings of job security. German workers should show a decline in perceived job security from 1989 to 1997, the period in which negative labor market outcomes rose, yet perceptions of security should have leveled off by 2005 as labor market conditions, while worse than before, remained stable. Labor market conditions should show the weakest effects in Norway, whose workers experienced little change in both the unemployment and long-term unemployment rate. United States workers' evaluations of their job security should be unaffected by the fairly steady unemployment rate, but should react with greater insecurity to the rise in the long-term unemployment rate.

Hypotheses

Appendix A describes the concepts and operationalizations that will be used to test my hypotheses. The hypotheses under investigation are as follows:

CHANGES IN WELFARE STATE STRUCTURE

H1: A weakening of employment protection legislation increases job insecurity.

H2: Reduction of welfare state spending on passive social programs such as unemployment benefits aggravates workers' perceptions of job insecurity.

H3: Reductions in active welfare state programs increase job insecurity.

CHANGES IN LABOR MARKET STRUCTURE

H4: Increases in the unemployment rate exacerbate workers' perceptions of job insecurity.

H5: Increases in the proportion of unemployed workers who are unemployed long-term result in heightened perceptions of job insecurity.

Research Paper 2: The relative impact of present working conditions and future employment prospects on job security

Summary

This paper will provide a comparative analysis of workers' assessments of their internal and external labor market prospects, and the relative impact of each on perceived job insecurity.

Arguably, external labor market prospects are more problematic in countries with strict employment protections, as strong legislations governing employment relationships generally hamper mobility.

Countries with lax employment protection legislation create a framework of employment flexibility, facilitating mobility and reducing workers' concerns about skill transferability. Thus, countries with strong employment protections will contain workers with concerns about their employability, as the potential costs of job loss (in terms of finding an equivalent job or skill loss) are high. In countries

with weak employment protection legislation, poor internal mobility prospects should not significantly influence perceived job insecurity, as labor market structures emphasize mobility.

Conversely, workers in countries with strict protections will be more troubled by perceptions of disposability and lack of promotion opportunities, resulting in high insecurity. Figure 4 highlights the aspects of the overall model on which this paper will focus.


Research Question 1: How does labor market fluidity impact workers' evaluations of the career prospects in the internal and external labor markets?

Research Question 2: How strongly does one's current employment situation affect perceptions of job security?

Research question 3: How strongly does a workers sense of marketability impact perceived security in the current job?

Overall, the more problematic internal or external mobility are, the more perceptions of job insecurity will be aggravated.

Figure 4. Research Paper 2 in the context of the model



Research design

I will examine the relative impact of internal and external labor market prospects on perceptions of job insecurity, placing both within the regulatory framework of employment protection legislation. To assess perceptions of both labor market prospects and job insecurity, I will use the 2005 wave of the ISSP Work Orientations Module. This paper expands the scope of previous studies by examining countries that are not usually included in models of welfare state or production regimes. Because many countries beyond the EU and the US have not received much empirical attention, this is an attempt to broaden job insecurity research into previously-neglected territory. Countries under consideration in this analysis include the commonly included Western European countries and the United States, but also a large number of Eastern European and Mediterranean countries, as well as several industrial nations such as South Korea and the Philippines. Appendix D provides a list of the specific countries to be included. The expansion of job insecurity research into underexplored countries is necessary to demonstrate that job insecurity is a global issue, not a post-industrial phenomenon.

Significance

Research Question 1: How does labor market fluidity impact workers' evaluations of career prospects in the internal and external labor markets?

The national context matters significantly for workers' perceptions of job security. Within the national context lies a "culture of risk": labor markets and welfare states together convey a message to workers that emphasizes flexibility or stability. Workers who expect to change employers often, for example, are unlikely to invest in firm-specific skills, but instead focus on transferable skills that will translate easily between firms (Estevez-Abe, Soskice & Iversen, 2001). In this type of labor market, workers with firm-specific skills will feel insecure, realizing that their skills may not serve them well in the external labor market. In countries that have shifted significant amounts of

risk onto employees, these same employees have responded by embracing risk as a career strategy. Workers in liberal market economies, which stress deregulation and flexibility, are actually less concerned about losing their jobs than workers in countries which strictly regulate employment relationships. It seems that, just as employers adjust to changing circumstances, so too do employees. Workers strive to actively shape their career trajectories; recognizing that circumstances are changing, employees adapt.

Findings regarding the effects of employment protections on perceived job insecurity are mixed. Although the evidence is scant, most research concludes that the strictness of employment protection legislation weakly impact perceptions of job insecurity (Bockerman, 2004; Erlinghagen, 2007; Robinson, 2000). The dissenting finding comes from Anderson and Pontus son (2007), who conclude that tighter restrictions on employment relationships tend to reduce insecurity. However, legal protections may affect job insecurity by affecting workers' mobility prospects. Labor market institutions such as government regulations can either hinder or facilitate mobility between employers. Strict legislation may reduce employers' ability to fire workers, but also makes them more reluctant to hire new employees. Gangl labels this the "reluctance-to-hire" hypothesis: "dismissal protection increases fixed labour costs to employers because of the implied restrictions on employer job termination rights...employment protection implies higher job security for workers in the first place, but may also generate more risk-averse hiring behaviour by employers as a second-order effect" (Gangl, 2004: 174). A strictly regulated labor market may therefore increase the proportion of long-term unemployed workers--a labor market condition that has been shown to increase subjective job insecurity. A lax regulatory environment, conversely, enables employers to easily hire and fire workers--a condition that may increase the risk of job loss, but also facilitates mobility, thereby reducing the risks associated with job change (Auer, Berg & Coulibaly, 2005). Employment

protection may thus not directly affect the conclusions workers draw about their job security, but may instead impact workers' perceptions of their mobility prospects.

With regard to the differential impact of internal and external labor market prospects, internal labor market prospects should matter more for workers in countries characterized by strict worker protections, as these workers are more dependent on the firm for their welfare. Job insecurity among weakly protected workers should be more strongly impacted by external rather than internal mobility concerns, as workers see employability as the key to career success. Felstead, Burchell, and Green (1998) assert, "what matters most for some purposes is not so much security in the current job itself, but security in maintaining the qualitative level of one's employment" (p. 181). This study will extend the extant literature on job security by linking job security to workers' evaluations of their career prospects both within and beyond their employing organization. Job insecurity is analyzed in terms of internal and external labor market prospects, a perspective informed by theories that describe job security in terms of two components: (1) the likelihood and possible outcomes of job loss and (2) workers' control over the threat and outcomes of job loss. These dimensions are captured in a concrete sense by workers' evaluations of internal labor market conditions and evaluations of external labor market prospects. These two aspects of job security--present working conditions and possible career outcomes--have received little empirical attention, and their relative impact has not yet been firmly established.

Perceived risk of job loss may be an important contributor to a sense of insecurity, but it is by no means the sole determinant; perceived job security also depends on one's prospects in the external labor market. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, predictability and control strongly determine perceived job security. Skill transferability, on the one hand, creates predictability over external labor market outcomes--transferable skills make one more marketable, and therefore more likely to quickly find another job. Workers who are indispensable to the firm, on the other hand,

exert control over careers in the internal labor market, as employers are highly unlikely to rid themselves of an employee who is crucial to firm success. Workers' subjective evaluations about how marketable or disposable they are impacts perceptions of insecurity. These two factors--skill transferability and disposability--have important implications for job insecurity (Breen, 1997). Skill transferability and indispensability to the firm both reduce uncertainty, giving workers a sense of control and predictability over their career outcomes.

Research Question 2: How strongly does one's current employment situation affect perceptions of job security?

Job insecurity arises in response to perceptions of *involuntary* job loss. Voluntary job change, which is both predictable and controllable, does not generate the same level of uncertainty as the potential of unwanted and unforeseeable job loss. Thus, risk carries different implications for job insecurity, depending on whether it is freely chosen or unwillingly forced upon workers. Workers who believe their employment situation is precarious (regardless of the actual risk of job loss) are highly likely to feel insecure. Breen notes the impact of risk thusly: "Clearly some workers are more susceptible than others to the transfer of risk to them. The most susceptible are those who lack skills or who are readily replaceable--in other words those workers to whom employers have no necessary long-term commitment." (Breen, 1997: 480). Insecurity should run high among workers who feel they could be easily replaced.

Research question 3: How strongly does a workers sense of marketability impact perceived security in the current job?

The quality of employment transitions, not necessarily skill transferability per se, seems to be the main component in the perceived cost of job loss, the second component of job insecurity (in addition to the perceived likelihood of job loss). If a labor market transition is likely to be from a good job to a bad job, this will negatively impact job security, no matter how seamless the transition may be. Perceptions of security depend on whether a worker will be able to replace a job with a *qualitatively equivalent* one (ILO, 2005; Anderson & Pontusson, 2007). The exception to this is in the

case of workers in low-quality jobs, for whom the belief that they can easily replace one low-quality job with another one is unlikely to lessen job insecurity. In sum, job insecurity, which is determined by the perceived likelihood and perceived costs of job loss (Ashford, Lee & Bobko, 1989), is influenced by a worker's evaluations of employment prospects in both the internal and external labor market.

Hypotheses

Based on the current state of the literature, I have derived the following hypotheses:

INTERNAL LABOR MARKET PROSPECTS

H1: Workers who perceive they are highly disposable are also highly insecure in their jobs.

H2: Job insecurity is higher among workers with few perceived promotion prospects in the firm.

EXTERNAL LABOR MARKET PROSPECTS

H3: Job insecurity is inversely related to mobility, as highly mobile workers are also highly secure in their employment prospects beyond the current employer.

H4: Workers who feel they could easily replace their current job with an equivalent one express less job insecurity than workers who perceive difficulties in replacing their job.

EMPLOYMENT REGULATION

H4: In strictly-regulated labor markets, workers evaluate their external labor market prospects more negatively than workers in loosely-regulated labor markets.

Appendix B summarizes the specific ISSP and OECD measures to be used in statistical analyses.

Research paper 3: Impacts of perceived insecurity and marketability on organizational commitment

Summary

Psychological research predominates in the field of organizational commitment. For this reason, cross-national comparisons of commitment are few, except tangentially in meta-analytic research (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch & Topolnytsky, 2002). Two sociological studies that compared national commitment levels in the context of production regimes (Hult, 2005; Hult & Svallfors, 2002) were unable to explain national differences in organizational commitment. These studies hypothesized that liberal market economies such as the United States, which the production regime literature describes as “dependent on a highly motivated management and a low-skilled, low-wage mass of workers where work performance should be induced by external control rather than by commitment to task and company” (Hult, 2002: 252), should produce a nation of uncommitted workers. Conversely, coordinated market economies such as Norway should contain highly-committed workers, as the reliance on firm-specific skills necessitates employment and welfare-state structures that encourage attachment to employers. However, the opposite trend was found: US workers exhibited the highest commitment levels; Swedish workers the lowest. This does not mean, however, that national typologies are inadequate for explaining organizational commitment. It does however, indicate that production regime typologies perhaps misconstrue the nature of employment relationships.

One confounding factor in these studies is the use of indices to measure affective organizational commitment (how emotionally attached workers are to their employers). Specifically, the Hult (2005) and Hult and Svallfors (2002) studies created an index measuring (1) pride in one’s organization; (2) willingness to work harder than necessary to help one’s organization succeed, and (3) the likelihood of rejecting a job offer with another organization in favor of staying with one’s current employer. Indices assume that workers who score high on one dimension will also score

high on the others. In the case of the three aforementioned aspects of commitment, workers tend to score similarly on the first two dimensions, but the third dimension is uncorrelated with the others. A strong sense of pride and a willingness to exert extra effort on behalf of the organization do not necessarily translate into a decreased propensity to leave if an alternative employment opportunity appears. Apparently, use of an organizational commitment index masks important differences between countries.

Additionally, it has generally been assumed that an ample supply of good jobs leads to a committed workforce. Yet my analyses reveal that workers in developing or industrial countries--countries that theoretically contain a high supply of bad jobs--display commitment levels far higher than workers in many post-industrial countries. This trend does not hold across all industrialized nations, though. In particular, former Communist countries in eastern Europe generally score abysmally low on all dimensions of organizational commitment--a finding that has yet to be discussed within the organizational commitment literature.

Oddly, nations in which workers highly rank both their job security and mobility prospects appear to also rank highly in their workers' average commitment, a trend that is unexpected given that flexibility and security are generally thought to be antagonistic and that flexibility is generally thought to lower commitment. Apparently, labor market flexibility correlates only weakly with workers' perceptions of their job security. Economies that emphasize marketability and skill transferability seem not to create a nation of insecure workers, nor do strongly protected workers necessarily feel secure. Flexibility and commitment are thus not mutually exclusive. These counterintuitive findings give rise to several research questions that have yet to be addressed. The concepts under consideration in each research question are highlighted below in Figure 5.

Research question 1: How do countries differ on various dimensions of organizational commitment?


Research question 2: Why are workers in (1) liberal post-industrial and (2) industrial economies more secure than workers in (3) coordinated market economies or (4) post-communist countries?

Research question 3: How do perceptions of insecurity and mobility interact to affect organizational commitment?

Research design

Using the 2005 wave of the ISSP Work Orientations Module, I will explore the relationship between marketability, insecurity and affective organizational commitment in a variety of countries. Unlike previous studies that have explored commitment exclusively in post-industrial European and North American countries, this paper will include countries at various stages of development in Eastern and Western Europe, Asia, and North America. The specific countries included in this analysis are listed in Appendix D. Because job characteristics are generally proposed to be the strongest predictors of organizational commitment, they are included as possible moderators between the effect of both job insecurity and mobility prospects on organizational commitment. The ISSP survey questions that will be analyzed are outlined in Appendix C.

Figure 5. Research Paper 3 in the context of the model.



Significance

Insecurity and organizational commitment

Generally, insecure workers demonstrate marked decreases in organizational commitment (King, 2000; Ashford, Lee & Bobko, 1989; De Witte & Naswall, 2003; Chirumbolo & Hellgren, 2003). This lack of organizational commitment may manifest itself in subtle ways, particularly through an unwillingness to engage in organizational citizenship behavior--actions that benefit the organization but are beyond the scope of one's formal job description and are therefore primarily dependent on the goodwill of employees (King, 2000). However, workers who are employed in objectively insecure jobs such as temporary work do not display lower organizational commitment than their permanently-employed counterparts (De Witte & Naswall, 2003). This indicates that organizational commitment may not depend on the validity of the psychological contract (Ashford, Lee & Bobko, 1989). Workers who are at the greatest risk of job loss are not necessarily the least committed. In this case, subjective perceptions seem to matter more than objective reality.

Intuitively and empirically, highly marketable workers are less committed to their employers and more inclined to quit than workers with relatively unmarketable skills (Greenhalgh & Sutton, 1991; King, 2000). A meta-analysis of the antecedents of commitment found skill transferability and the availability of alternative employment to be moderately correlated with continuance commitment, while affective commitment was correlated with turnover intentions (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch & Topolnytsky, 2002). Overall, it seems that workers who are marketable and insecure in their jobs display lower organizational commitment than similarly insecure workers whose skills are not valuable outside the organization.

International differences in organizational commitment

The chart below plots workers' affective organizational commitment according to the average levels of mobility and job security. With the exception of Spain, high security, high mobility

workers exhibit high to medium levels of pride and effort willingness, yet are likely to accept another job that offers more pay. Thus, workers in the top left cell feel strong affective attachments to their employers, but they would nonetheless accept another job offer. High security workers with medium to low mobility exhibit different commitment patterns. Former communist countries Slovenia and Russia both show high security levels, medium-to-low mobility levels, and low affective organizational commitment on most dimensions. Both Mexico and western Germany, conversely, display fairly high commitment levels and a low propensity to leave the organization for a competing offer. Thus, high security and high mobility seem to breed an opportunistic workforce who will remain committed to their organizations unless a better offer appears.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, low security, low mobility workers generally exhibit low levels of affective attachment to their work, and a moderate-to-low likelihood that they would turn down a job offer from another organization. Eastern European and former Communist countries seem to struggle with commitment issues. Eastern Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Russia contain workers who perceive low average mobility prospects and low security (with the previously-noted exception of Russia). All three measures of organizational commitment are also accordingly low. Interestingly, low security, low mobility workers are—much like high-mobility workers—highly likely to take a job with another organization.

Table 5. Organizational commitment as a function of perceived job security and perceived mobility prospects*

		Mobility		
		High	Medium	Low
Security	High	Denmark(MML) Ireland(HHM) United States(HHM) Spain(LLL) New Zealand(MMM) Great Britain(MML) Canada(HMM)	Slovenia(MLL) Mexico(HHH)	W. Germany(MMH) Russia(LLL)
	Medium	Dominican Rep.(HHH) Austria(MML)	Philippines(HHH) Sweden(LLL) Norway(MML) Israel(HHM) South Africa(MHM)	Japan(LMH) Switzerland(HHH) Belgium(MLH) Portugal(MMH)
	Low	Cyprus(MMH)	Finland(LLM) Taiwan(LHM) France(LLL) Latvia(LLL)	Hungary(LLL) E. Germany(HML) Czech Republic(LLM) Bulgaria(LMM) South Korea(LHH)

*The three letters contained in parentheses describe dimensions of affective organizational commitment. Relative to other countries in the dataset, countries are ranked as high (H), medium (M) or low(L) with regard to, respectively:

1=Pride in organization

2=Willingness to work harder to help organization succeed

3=Likelihood of turning down another job offer to remain with organization

In general, medium security, low mobility workers display the lowest proclivity to leave. This cell contains the greatest share of workers who are highly likely to refuse a competing job offer out of a desire to remain with their current employer. Japanese, Swiss, Belgian and Portuguese workers all express a strong desire to maintain organizational membership, despite levels of pride and effort willingness that are not any higher than countries in other cells. Conversely, low security, low mobility workers are the most negative in terms of organizational commitment: Eight of nine

countries in the low security, medium-to-low mobility cells have very little pride in their employer; five of nine countries in these cells show, on average, a low willingness to exert more effort on the organization's behalf; and most countries display a moderate to low desire to maintain organizational membership.

Developing economies that are primarily dependent on agriculture or industry and also tend to rely heavily on foreign capital investment—Mexico, South Korea, the Philippines and the Dominican Republic—exhibit exceedingly high levels of organizational commitment on all three indicators. The only exception to this is South Korea's lack of pride in their organizations.

Otherwise, workers in these countries rank highly on all three commitment indicators: pride in the organization, willingness to work harder to ensure organizational success, and likelihood of turning down another job in order to stay with the organization.

Hypotheses

To summarize, the propositions I intend to test are:

H1: Workers in liberal market economies exhibit higher organizational commitment than workers in coordinated market economies.

H2: Organizational pride and willingness to exert effort on the organization's behalf are uncorrelated with the likelihood of accepting a job with another organization.

H3: Perceived job insecurity leads to lower levels of organizational pride.

H4: Low mobility prospects tend to decrease organizational pride.

H6: As job security decreases, willingness to work harder for one's organization decreases.

H7: Perceived mobility prospects are positively related to willingness to exert extra effort for the organization.

H8: Job insecurity interacts with perceived mobility prospects to affect organizational pride.

H9: Job insecurity interacts with perceived mobility prospects to affect workers' willingness to work harder on behalf of the organization.

H10: Workers who evaluate their security and mobility prospects highly are more likely to exhibit a high likelihood of leaving, in comparison to workers who either score low on job security or mobility prospects.

H11: Workers who score low on both job insecurity and mobility prospects are highly likely to accept an alternative employment opportunity.

METHODS

Data

For individual-level data, I will use the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), a cross-national survey designed to capture attitudes on various socially-relevant topics. First conducted in 1986, the original survey covered four post-industrial countries: Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. With new countries added regularly, current surveys include 34 countries on five continents, thereby spanning a broad range of political and economic configurations. The ISSP was designed from the outset to assess attitudes both across countries and across time: the survey contains a fixed set of eight modules, each of which is repeated at regular intervals. Each topical module is fairly consistent across waves, as the rules of the survey mandate that no more than one-third of questions can be modified; the other two-thirds must be repeated verbatim. In addition to the topical modules, each survey uses a common set of socio-economic background variables (Uher, 2000).

The ISSP is a collaborative research program in which one of the primary goals is to make cross-national surveys as comparable as possible. To this effect, the original questionnaire, which is drafted in English, is translated into each country's language--an interactive process that requires feedback and approval from a designated "translation group" within the ISSP. Continuity across time is preserved by requiring that replicated questions maintain equivalent wording. Thus, the ISSP attempts to ensure that concepts carry a similar meaning in each translation of the survey. This by no means eliminates the possibility that concepts are understood differently across nations (Hult, 2005), but this confounding factor is given special attention in the drafting of the survey, reducing the chance that any finding of international differences is merely a product of research design.

This research project will focus exclusively on the Work Orientations Module, administered in 1989, 1997 and 2005. Table 6 indicates the countries that are included in each wave of the module. The Work Orientations Module is subdivided into three overarching categories: (1)

attitudes toward work and work commitment, (2) work organization (both attitudes and actual employment situation) and (3) the content of work. Respondents are asked about their preferences for various employment situations and job characteristics; and are also asked to evaluate their current work situation. Beginning with the 1997 module, the survey was expanded in scope to assess respondents' attitudes toward the labor market, such as evaluations of employment prospects, turnover intentions, and unemployment. The survey was also expanded to include unemployed workers: respondents who are not currently employed at the time of the survey are asked about reasons for job loss, job search strategies and perceptions of re-employment prospects. The inclusion of workers' attitudes concerning the labor market is a valuable addition to the survey, as attitudes toward one's current employer are shaped by both intra- and extra-organizational forces,

In all countries, adult respondents are chosen using random sampling. The youngest age for eligible respondents is 18 in most countries, although several countries set the lower age bound at 16. The sample in this research project will include only those respondents who are over 18 years of age and are currently working in dependent employment (i.e. not self-employed). From the 1989 and 1997 surveys, only western Germany, Great Britain, Norway and the United States will be used. Response rates in the 1989 survey range from 73% in the United States to 92% in western Germany. The high response rates for both surveys are likely affected by the method of survey distribution: The ISSP modules are, in most countries, distributed as part of a larger survey, rather than as an independently-conducted survey. Thus, respondents who agree to take part in the larger survey are also highly likely to consent to the embedded module. In 1997, response rates in the countries of interest ranged from 50% in western Germany to 87% in Great Britain (Harkness, Langfeldt & Scholz, 2000). All countries in the 2005 survey will be included in this research project; response rates varied from 17% in France to 86% in South Africa (Scholz, Harkness & Faaß, 2008). Based on comparisons provided within the ISSP codebooks, the achieved sample appears to be representative

of the total adult population in several countries. However, comparisons of census data and ISSP samples are not provided for all countries; the representativeness of all samples thus cannot be established.

Table 6. ISSP countries included in each wave of the Work Orientations Module

ISSP countries	Year		
	1989	1997	2005
Australia			x
Austria	x		
Bangladesh		x	
Belgium			x
Bulgaria		x	x
Canada		x	x
Cyprus		x	x
Czech Republic		x	x
Denmark		x	x
Dominican Republic			x
Finland			x
France		x	x
Germany (western)	x		
Germany (western and eastern)		x	x
Great Britain	x	x	x
Hungary	x	x	x
Ireland	x		x
Israel (Arabs)	x	x	x
Israel (Jews)	x	x	x
Italy	x	x	
Japan		x	x
Latvia			x
Mexico			x
Netherlands	x	x	
New Zealand		x	x
Northern Ireland	x		
Norway	x	x	x
Philippines		x	x
Poland		x	
Portugal		x	x
Russia		x	x
Slovenia		x	x
South Africa			x
South Korea			x
Spain		x	x
Sweden		x	x
Switzerland		x	x
Taiwan			x
United States	x	x	x

Variables

The main individual-level variables of interest are job insecurity, labor market prospects, organizational commitment, and mental health outcomes, although job insecurity is the centerpiece of the model and the keystone holding together all of the elements in the model. The variables of interest in each research paper are outlined in Appendices A through C. The Appendices list the concepts examined in each paper, along with the specific ISSP question wording for individual-level measures.

Job insecurity is measured with a single item: respondents are asked, using a five-point scale, the degree to which they agree that “My job is secure.” As noted by Green (2006), “This type of question does not specifically link insecurity either to the risk of job loss or to the cost of job loss. Arguably, it may lead respondents to consider the wider implications of insecurity” (p. 140). Considering that insecurity stems from uncertainty and unpredictability (De Witte), and is not entirely determined by the organizational context, a measure of job insecurity that does not specifically link insecurity to job loss risk is conceptually superior to a measure that is explicitly linked to the organization. Other researchers who have used this particular ISSP variable have collapsed response categories (Green, 2006), such that workers who disagree (or strongly disagree) that their jobs are secure are labeled as experiencing job insecurity. I follow this coding scheme and collapse the scale into two categories. I define workers as insecure if they “disagree” or “strongly disagree” that their jobs are secure.

Career trajectories are determined by mobility prospects in either the internal or external labor market. Evaluations of internal labor market prospects are measured by (1) respondents’ perceptions of their advancement opportunities and (2) respondents’ belief that they could be easily replaced within the organization. External labor market prospects are measured by several indicators of workers’ beliefs about their marketability. Skill transferability is measured by asking respondents

how helpful skills learned in the current job would be in looking for a new job. Respondents are also asked to indicate how easy it would be to find a comparable job. Taken together, these variables indicate how confident workers are in their marketability.

Several possible outcomes of insecurity and marketability are included in this analysis: organizational commitment, turnover intentions, and work-induced anxiety. Organizational commitment is based on the three attitudinal dimensions outlined by Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979). According to Mowday et al., commitment consists of “(1) a strong belief in an acceptance of the organization’s goals and values; (2) a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization; and (3) a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization.” (226). Goal or value acceptance is assessed by asking respondents the degree to which they agree with the statement, “I am proud to be working for my firm or organization.” The extent that respondents identify with organizational goals or values should be reflected in the level of pride they feel toward their employer. To ascertain willingness to exert effort on behalf of the organization, each respondent is asked to indicate agreement or disagreement that “I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization I work for succeed.” Lastly, attachment to the organization is assessed through respondents’ level of agreement with the question, “I would turn down another job that offered quite a bit more pay in order to stay with this organization.” Behavioral commitment—actions, rather than attitudes, that display commitment to the organization—is captured in a single-item measure that assesses respondents’ intentions to, in the year following the survey date, search for another job in a different organization. Respondents are asked to estimate the likelihood that they will try to find employment in another organization in the next twelve months. To measure work-induced anxiety, respondents are asked how worried they are about the possibility of job loss.

In addition, the model includes measures of workplace-specific features that may moderate between job insecurity and commitment or anxiety. Indicators that have been repeatedly proven to impact organizational commitment or work-related anxiety are (1) organizational support, in terms of the quality of interpersonal relationships in the workplace; (2) work values—what features one considers important in a job; and (3) intrinsic job features. With regard to job features, only the interest level of the job will be considered, as this is the job feature that most strongly impacts organizational commitment (Hult, 2005).

Welfare state structure will be measured using OECD data on job and worker protections. Job protections are measured by the strictness of employment protection legislation. Worker protections are subdivided into mitigating factors--passive strategies measured by the extent of unemployment benefits--and facilitating factors--measured by government spending on active labor market programs. Labor market structure will be measured by the unemployment rate and the proportion of long-term unemployed workers (in which unemployment lasts for at least six months). Like the ISSP, the number of OECD countries for which data are collected have also expanded over the years. However, limited information in earlier years of data collection precludes inclusion of some countries for which ISSP data are available. In particular, the lack of macro-level data for Hungary disqualifies it for use in time-series studies, despite Hungary's full participation in all waves of the Work Orientations Module.

Change in welfare states and labor markets will be measured in terms of (1) level of change from one survey to the next (1989 to 1997, 1997 to 2005) and (2) change in the few years preceding each survey. Anderson and Pontusson (2007) conclude that short-term structural changes exert a greater impact than long-term changes; to assess the differential impact of annual change versus change over a longer time span, both measures will be included.

REFERENCES

- Allen, Natalie J. and John P. Meyer. 1990. "The Measurement and Antecedents of Affective, Continuance and Normative Commitment to the Organization." *Journal of Occupational Psychology* 63: 1-18.
- Anderson, Christopher J. and Jonas Pontusson . 2007. "Workers, Worries and Welfare States: Social Protection and Job Insecurity in 15 OECD Countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (2):211-235.
- Ashford, Susan J., Cynthia Lee, and Philip Bobko. 1989. "Content, Causes, and Consequences of Job Insecurity: A Theory-Based Measure and Substantive Test." *The Academy of Management Journal* 32 (4):803-829.
- Auer, Peters and Sandrine Cazes. 2003. *Employment Stability in an Age of Flexibility: Evidence from Industrialized Countries*. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
- Auer, Peter, Janine Berg, and Ibrahim Coulibaly . 2005. "Is a Stable Workforce Good for Productivity?" *International Labour Review* 144 (3):319-344.
- Beck, Ulrich. 2000. *The Brave New World of Work*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Bockerman, Petri . 2004. "Perception of Job Instability in Europe." *Social Indicators Research* 67 (3):283-314.
- Breen, Richard . 1997. "Risk, Recommodification and Stratification." *Sociology* 31 (3):473-489.
- Burchell, Brendan. 2002. "The Prevalence and Redistribution of Job Insecurity and Work Intensification." Pp. 61-76 in *Job Insecurity and Work Intensification*, edited by B. Burchell, D. Ladipo and F. Wilkinson. London: Routledge.
- Chirumbolo, Antonio, and Johnny Hellgren . 2003. "Individual and Organizational Consequences of Job Insecurity: A European Study." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 24 (2):217-240.
- De Witte, Hans. 2005. "Job Insecurity: Review of the International Literature on Definitions, Prevalence, Antecedents and Consequences." *Journal of Industrial Psychology* 31 (4): 1-6
- De Witte, Hans, and Katharina Naswall . 2003. "'Objective' Vs 'Subjective' Job Insecurity: Consequences of Temporary Work for Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment in Four European Countries." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 24 (2):149-188.

- Erlinghagen, Marcel . 2007. "Self-Perceived Job Insecurity and Social Context: Are there Different European Cultures of Anxiety?" Discussion Paper 688. Berlin: DIW.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1996. *Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies*. New York: Sage Publications.
- Estévez-Abe, Margarita, David Soskice, and Torben Iversen . 2001."Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State." Pp. 145-183 in *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, edited by D. Soskice and P. Hall. Oxford University Press.
- Felstead, Alan, Brendan Burchell and Francis Green. 1998. "Insecurity at Work: Is Job Insecurity Really Much Worse Now Than Before?" *New Economy* 5(4): 180-184.
- Gallie, Duncan. 2007. "Production Regimes and the Quality of Employment in Europe." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33: 85-104.
- Gangl, Markus . 2004. "Institutions and the Structure of Labour Market Matching in the United States and West Germany." *European Sociological Review* 20 (3):171-187.
- Green, Francis. 2006. *Demanding Work: The Paradox of Job Quality in the Affluent Economy*. Princeton University Press.
- Greenhalgh, Leonard and Zehava Rosenblatt . 1984. "Job Insecurity: Toward Conceptual Clarity." *The Academy of Management Review* 9 (3):438-448.
- Greenhalgh, Leonard and Robert Sutton. 1991."Organizational Effectiveness and Job Insecurity." Pp. 151-171 in *Job Insecurity: Coping with Jobs at Risk*, edited by J. Hartley, B. Klandermans, and D. Jacobson. London: Sage Publications.
- Harkness, Janet, Bettina Langfeldt and Evi Scholz. 2000. "ISSP Study Monitoring 1996-1998." Paper presented at the meeting of the International Social Survey Program, Lisbon, Portugal.
- Hartley, Jean. 1991. "Industrial Relations and Job Insecurity: A Social Psychological Framework." Pp. 104-122 in *Job Insecurity: Coping with Jobs at Risk*, edited by J. Hartley, D. Jacobson, B. Klandermans and T. van Vuuren. New York: Sage Publications.

- Hult, Carl. 2005. "Organizational Commitment and Person-Environment Fit in Six Western Countries." *Organization Studies* 26 (2): 249-270.
- Hult, Carl, and Stefan Svallfors . 2002. "Production Regimes and Work Orientations: A Comparison of Six Western Countries." *European Sociological Review* 18 (3):315-331.
- ILO. 2005. "A Stable Workplace? A Mobile Workforce? What Is Best for Increasing Productivity?" Pp. 183-220 in *World Employment Report 2004-05: Employment, Productivity and Poverty Reduction*. Geneva: ILO.
- Jacobson, Dan. 1987. "A Personological Study of the Job Insecurity Experience." *Social Behaviour* 2: 143-155.
- Jacobson, Dan. 1991. "The Conceptual Approach to Job Insecurity." Pp. 23-39 in *Job Insecurity: Coping with Jobs at Risk*, edited by J. Hartley, D. Jacobson, B. Klandermans and T. van Vuuren. New York: Sage Publications.
- Jacoby, Sanford . 1999. "Are Career Jobs Headed for Extinction?" *California Management Review* 42 (1):123-145.
- King, James E. . 2000. "White-Collar Reactions to Job Insecurity and the Role of the Psychological Contract: Implications for Human Resource Management." *Human Resource Management* 39 (1):79-91.
- Mauno, Saija, Esko Leskinen and Ulla Kinnunen. 2001. "Multi-Wave, Multi-Variable Models of Job Insecurity: Applying Different Scales in Studying the Stability of Job Insecurity." *Journal of Organizational Behavior* 22 (8): 919-937.
- Maurin, Eric and Fabien Postel-Vinay. 2005. "The European Job Security Gap." *Work and Occupations* 32 (2): 229-252.
- Meyer, John P., David J. Stanley, Lynne Herscovitch and Laryssa Topolnytsky. 2002. "Affective, Continuance, and Normative Commitment to the Organization: A Meta-analysis of Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences." *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 61: 20-52.
- Mowday, Richard T., Richard M. Steers and Lyman Porter. 1979. "The Measurement of Organizational Commitment." *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 14 (2): 224-247.
- Mughan, Anthony. 2007. "Economic Insecurity and Welfare Preferences - A Micro-Level Analysis." *Comparative Politics* 39 (3):293.

- Paugam, Serge and Ying Zhou. 2007. "Job Insecurity." Pp. 179-205 in *Employment Regimes and the Quality of Work*, edited by D. Gallie. Oxford University Press.
- Robinson, Peter. 2000. "Insecurity and the Flexible Workforce: Measuring the Ill-Defined." Pp. 25-38 in *The Insecure Workforce*, edited by E. Heery and J. Salmon. London: Routledge.
- Roskies, Ethel, Christiane Louis-Guerin and Claudette Fournier. 1993. "Coping with Job Insecurity: How Does Personality Make a Difference?" *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 14 (7): 617-630.
- Schmidt, Stefanie. 1999. "Long-Run Trends in Workers' Beliefs about Their Own Job Security: Evidence from the General Social Survey." *Journal of Labor Economics* 17 (4): S127-S141.
- Scholz, Evi, Janet Harkness and Timo Faaß. 2008. "ISSP Study Monitoring 2005." *GESIS-Methodenberichte Nr. 4/2008*. Mannheim: GESIS-ZUMA.
- Uher, Rolf. 2000. "The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)." *Schmollers Jahrbuch* 120 (4): 663-672.
- Van Breugel, Gerla, Woody Van Olffen and René Olie. 2005. "Temporary Liaisons: The Commitment of 'Temps' Toward Their Agencies." *Journal of Management Studies* 42 (3): 539-556.
- Van Vuuren, Tinka, Bert Klandermans, Dan Jacobson and Jean Hartley. 1991. "Predicting Employees' Perceptions of Job Insecurity." Pp. 79-103 in *Job Insecurity: Coping with Jobs at Risk*, edited by J. Hartley, D. Jacobson, B. Klandermans and T. van Vuuren. New York: Sage Publications.

APPENDIX A: Variables and operationalizations for Research Paper 1

Concept	Operationalization
IV: Welfare state structure	
Job protections	Employment protection legislation index score
Worker protections	Unemployment benefits per unemployed Government spending on active labor market programs per unemployed
IV: Labor market structure	
Unemployment	Unemployment rate Long-term unemployment rate
DV: Perceptions of job risk	
Job security	ISSP question wording and response categories 'My job is secure.' Strongly agree (1); Agree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Strongly disagree (5)

APPENDIX B: Variables and operationalization for Research Paper 2

Concept	Operationalization
IV: Welfare state structure	
Job protections	Employment protection legislation index score
IV: Internal labor market prospects	
Promotion prospects	'ISSP question wording and response categories' 'My opportunities for advancement are high': Strongly agree (1); Agree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Strongly disagree (5)
Perceived disposability	'How difficult or easy do you think it would be for your firm or organization to replace you if you left?' Very easy (1); Fairly easy (2); Neither easy nor difficult (3); Fairly difficult (4); Very difficult (5)
IV: External labor market prospects	
Skill transferability: Future employment	'If you were to look for a new job, how helpful would your present work experience and/or job skills be?' Very helpful (1); Quite helpful (2); Not so helpful (3); Not helpful at all (4)
Skill transferability: Past employment	'How much of your past work experiences and/or job skills can you make use of in your present job?' Almost none (1); A little (2); A lot (3); Almost all (4)
Ease of job replacement	'How difficult or easy do you think it would be for you to find a job at least as good as your current one?' Very easy (1); Fairly easy (2); Neither easy nor difficult (3); Fairly difficult (4); Very difficult (5)
DV: Perceptions of job risk	
Job security	'My job is secure': Strongly agree (1); Agree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Strongly disagree (5)

APPENDIX C: Variables and operationalization for Research Paper 3

Concept	Operationalization
IV: External labor market prospects	
Skill transferability	'If you were to look for a new job, how helpful would your present work experience and/or job skills be?' Very helpful (1); Quite helpful (2); Not so helpful (3); Not helpful at all (4)
Ease of job replacement	'How difficult or easy do you think it would be for you to find a job at least as good as your current one?' Very easy (1); Fairly easy (2); Neither easy nor difficult (3); Fairly difficult (4); Very difficult (5)
IV: Perceptions of job risk	
Job security	'My job is secure': Strongly agree (1); Agree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Strongly disagree (5)
Moderator: Organizational support	
Management-employee relations	'In general, how would you describe relations at your workplace between management and employees?' Very good (1); Quite good (2); Neither good nor bad (3); Quite bad (4); Very bad (5)
Co-worker relations	'In general, how would you describe relations at your workplace between workmates/colleagues?' Very good (1); Quite good (2); Neither good nor bad (3); Quite bad (4); Very bad (5)
Moderator: Work values	
Importance of job security	'How important is job security?' Very important (1); Important (2); Neither important nor unimportant (3); Not important (4); Not important at all (5)
Importance of promotion prospects	'How important is good opportunities for advancement?' Very important (1); Important (2); Neither important nor unimportant (3); Not important (4); Not important at all (5)
Moderator: Job features	
Interesting work	'My job is interesting': Strongly agree (1); Agree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Strongly disagree (5)
DV: Organizational commitment	
Acceptance of goals and values	'I am proud to be working for my firm or organization': Strongly agree (1); Agree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Strongly disagree (5)

Willingness to exert effort

'I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization I work for succeed': Strongly agree (1); Agree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Strongly disagree (5)

Desire to maintain membership in organization

'I would turn down another job that offered quite a bit more pay in order to stay with this organization': Strongly agree (1); Agree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Disagree (4); Strongly disagree (5)

Appendix D. ISSP survey years and countries to be included in each research paper

ISSP countries	Research paper (years included)		
	1 (1989, 1997 & 2005)	2 (2005)	3 (2005)
Australia		x	x
Austria			
Bangladesh			
Belgium		x	x
Bulgaria		x	x
Canada		x	x
Cyprus		x	x
Czech Republic		x	x
Denmark		x	x
Dominican Republic		x	x
Finland		x	x
France		x	x
Germany (western)	x		
Germany (western and eastern)		x	x
Great Britain	x	x	x
Hungary		x	x
Ireland		x	x
Israel		x	x
Italy			
Japan		x	x
Latvia		x	x
Mexico		x	x
Netherlands			
New Zealand		x	x
Norway	x	x	x
Philippines		x	x
Poland			
Portugal		x	x
Russia		x	x
Slovenia		x	x
South Africa		x	x
South Korea		x	x
Spain		x	x
Sweden		x	x
Switzerland		x	x
Taiwan		x	x
United States	x	x	x