

**POLI 751: International Relations Theory II
(International Political Economy)**

Graduate Seminar

Spring 2009

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Dept. of Political Science
UNC Chapel Hill

Tuesdays, 2:00-4:50pm
Gardner 104

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Course: <http://blackboard.unc.edu>

I. Course Overview

This seminar explores the interaction between politics and economics in the international system, with an emphasis on the theoretical development of the sub-field of international political economy. We will investigate the effects of international institutions on economic relations, the causes of cooperation and conflict in international trade and finance, and the mutual impact of domestic and international politics. We also will attempt to identify the “state of the art” in international political economy, meaning that we sometimes will focus more on recent research than on “classics.” This course is intended to lay the groundwork for future research in the fields of international political economy, international relations, and comparative political economy, as well as to help prepare students for the IPE component of the comprehensive exams in international relations.

II. Course Requirements

The principal requirement for students is to read thoroughly the assigned works and to come to seminar prepared for discussion. In addition to preparing for seminar and participating actively in discussions, the requirements for this course are:

A. Response Papers: Each student will complete **five** short (2 to 3 single-spaced pages) response papers. Each paper should be distributed to all seminar members, by posting it on the class Blackboard site. Other seminar participants are expected to read the response papers prior to class; papers are due by 4:00pm on **Mondays**.

These are analytical response papers, analyzing and discussing the required readings for a particular week. While papers may begin with a (very) short summary of the readings, the main task of the paper is critical analysis. Rather than summarize the readings, your paper should focus on what you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the readings; the possible intersections among the readings; and – perhaps most importantly – what theoretical issues and empirical questions for future research are raised by the readings. In weeks where there is more than one person writing a response paper, paper authors are welcome to coordinate among themselves, in terms of focusing their papers on some subset of the assigned readings.

The response papers will serve as a starting point for our seminar discussion. You may write papers for any of the substantive weeks during the course; to evenly distribute papers across weeks, we will divide up papers and weeks during the first class session.

B. Discussion Leaders: While all students are expected to come to class prepared to discuss each week's readings, we will also have one official "discussion leader" for each week. Each student will be a discussion leader **once** during the semester. The chief responsibility of the discussion leader is to comment on the response papers for a given week. The discussion leader should not present the response papers, as everyone in the class will have received them. Rather, the discussion leader could discuss whether he or she agrees with the writer's criticisms, or propose answers to the writer's questions, or describe how the papers help point to new research questions. Discussion leaders' comments are intended to serve as a springboard to a broader seminar discussion, so these comments can be quite brief (5 to 10 minutes). Again, discussion leader duties will be assigned during the first week of the seminar.

C. Research Design: Each student will formulate a research question addressing a question in the field of international political economy. The research design (approximately 20 pages, double spaced) should deploy theoretical literature and an empirical puzzle to set up the research question, develop hypotheses, and present a methodology for testing the hypotheses. The research design does not require execution of the research project (e.g. it does not require doing statistical analyses or writing case studies); rather, it focuses on the theoretical development of a project, which might later be turned into a conference paper or article, or might be the basis for a grant or dissertation proposal. To do the research design, you'll need to come up with a research question or puzzle (this is sometimes the most difficult part; keep this task in mind as you read for each week, and ask me if you want to read further on a particular topic); figure out what's been done on the topic or in similar areas, or the ways in which arguments about one set of phenomena could be brought to bear on your question (a literature review); develop a set of hypotheses regarding your research question; and think about how you would test these hypotheses (qualitatively, quantitatively, or formally? With which cases or with what sorts of data?).

For general discussions of research design in political science, you may want to consult Keohane, King and Verba's *Designing Qualitative Inquiry* (Princeton, 1994). Research designs will be presented to the seminar at our last class meeting (hopefully, over dinner and drinks, rather than in our seminar room!), on **Tuesday, April 28**. A draft of your research design should be circulated to the class no later than **Friday, April 24**. The final, revised version of your research design is due no later than **Friday, May 1**.

The **Final Grade** for the course is based upon participation in class discussions, including discussion leader duties (30%), Response Papers (35%), and the Research Design (35%).

III. Class Schedule

Each of the substantive weeks includes required and supplementary readings. Students are expected to read all required materials carefully, and to come to class prepared to discuss these. The supplementary readings include additional theoretical and empirical perspectives, as well as examples of additional recent work; if a particular topic interests you, or if you want more background when preparing for comprehensive exams, read these materials.

Several of the books listed as required readings are available for purchase at the UNC Bookstore; these are marked with an asterisk on the syllabus. You will be assigned all of some books and parts of others.

You may decide that you only want to purchase some of these, but you also may want to have these books in your collection. All books marked with an asterisk also should be available at Davis Library. Most of the readings for this course are articles, rather than books. These required readings are available electronically, through Blackboard (under “Course Documents”); these are marked **[BL]** on the syllabus. Blackboard readings are organized by week. If you cannot find a particular article or book, please let me know.

The graduate course focuses on theoretical issues in IPE. If you would like more substantive background in IPE, as well as on the development of IPE theory, you may want to consult Thomas Oatley’s *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy* (Pearson Longman, 2008), or Andrew Sobel’s *Political Economy and Global Affairs* (CQ Press, 2005/2006). If you would like more background in economic concepts (e.g. comparative advantage, open-economy macroeconomics), you may want to look at Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, *International Economics: Theory and Policy* (Pearson Longman, 2008, 8th edition), or at Alan Deardorff’s Glossary of International Economics (<http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/>). I also can provide you with a copy of an undergraduate IPE syllabus which points you toward readings for specific topics.

Week 1: January 13
Course Introduction, Overview of IPE

Required Reading

*Benjamin Jerry Cohen, 2007. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Introduction, Chapters 1 and 2.

*Karl Polanyi, 1944. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) and Part II (Chapters 3 through 18).

Supplementary Reading

Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa L. Martin, “International Political Economy: the State of the Sub-Discipline,” April 2001. [Also in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, 2002.]

Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), Chapters 1 through 3.

Week 2: January 22 [rescheduled from January 20; meets in Hamilton 355]
Structural Theories, State Power and International Economic Relations

Required Reading

*Cohen, 2007, Chapter 3.

*Daniel Drezner, 2007. *All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes*. Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 5.

[BL] Daniel Drezner, 2003. “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” *International Organization* 57 (Summer), pp. 643-659.

[BL] Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986—revised edition), Chapter 14 (“An Explanation of the 1929 Depression”).

[BL] Stephen Krasner, 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” *World Politics* 28.

Supplementary reading

Daniel Drezner, 1999. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Miles Kahler. 2002. "The State of the State in World Politics." In Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds., *Political Science: State of the Discipline* (W. W. Norton).

Robert O. Keohane, 1997. “Problematic Lucidity: Stephen Krasner’s ‘State Power and the Structure of International Trade,’” *World Politics* 50.

Jonathan Kirshner, 1995. *Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7.

Lisa L. Martin, 1992. *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Jacob Viner, 1948. “Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *World Politics* 1 (October), pp. 1-29.

Week 3: January 27 **Structural Theories: The Case for Cooperation**

Required Reading

*Cohen, Chapter 4.

*Robert O. Keohane, 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), Chapters 1, 4-7.

[BL] Kenneth Oye, 1985. “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” *World Politics*.

[BL] Stephen D. Krasner, 1991. “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” *World Politics* 43.

[BL] Beth A. Simmons and Daniel Hopkins, 2005. “The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theories and Methods,” *American Political Science Review* 99, pp. 623-631.

[BL] Jana von Stein, 2005. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance,” *American Political Science Review* 99, pp. 611-622. *Note: Read von Stein before Simmons and Hopkins.*

Supplementary reading

Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 2000. "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics," *International Organization* 54, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 385-400. *This special issue contains case studies of legalization, so could be useful for different substantive areas in IPE/IR.*

Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, 1987. "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization* 41(3), Summer.

Robert O. Keohane, 1988. "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (December).

Robert O. Keohane, 2001. "Governance in a Partially Globalized World [2000 APSA Presidential Address]," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (March), pp. 1-13.

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (1977; 3rd edition, 2000).

Barbara Koremenos, 2005. "Contracting around International Uncertainty," *American Political Science Review* 99 (November), pp. 549-565.

Stephen D. Krasner, ed., 1983. *International Regimes* (Cornell University Press), especially essays by Krasner and Ruggie, pp. 1-21; 195-232.

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review*.

Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52 (Autumn), pp. 729-759.

Timothy J. McKeown, 1986. "The Limitations of 'Structural' Theories of Commercial Policy," *International Organization* 40 (1), pp. 43-64.

Week 4: February 3
The Political Economy of International Trade: International Influences

Required Reading

[BL] Judith Goldstein and Lisa L. Martin, 2000. "Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note," *International Organization* 54, no. 3 (Summer), pp. 603-632.

[BL] Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67.

[BL] Moonhawk Kim. 2008. "Costly Procedures: Divergent Effects of Legalization in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures." *International Studies Quarterly* 52(3): 657-686.

[BL] Edward Mansfield, 1992. "The Concentration of Capabilities and International Trade," *International Organization* 46 (Summer), pp. 731-764.

[BL] Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer and Mathias Thoenig. 2008. "Make Trade Not War?" *Review of Economic Studies* 75(3): 865-900.

[BL] Andrew Rose, 2004. "Do WTO Members Have More Liberal Trade Policy?" *Journal of International Economics* 63, pp. 209-235.

Supplementary Reading

Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth. 2006. "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover." *American Political Science Review* 100 (2), pp. 219-234.

Christina Davis, 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1 (February), pp. 153-169.

Joanne Gowa, 1995. *Allies, Adversaries and International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), chs. 1-4.

Douglas Irwin, 1997. *Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Peter Katzenstein, 1985. *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Timothy McKeown, 1983. "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe," *International Organization*, pp. 73-91.

Helen Milner, 1999. "The Political Economy of International Trade," *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 2, pp. 91-114.

B. Peter Rosendorff, 2005. "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure." *American Political Science Review* 99 (August), pp. 389-400.

Thomas Schwartz and Mathew McCubbins, 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms," *American Journal of Political Science* 28.

Duncan Snidal, 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39 (Autumn).

Week 5: February 10
The Political Economy of International Trade, Domestic Politics (I)

Required Reading

[BL] Kishore Giwande and Bernard Hoekman. 2006. "Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States." *International Organization* 60(3): 527-561.

[BL] Gene M. Grossman, and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale." *American Economic Review* 84 (September), pp. 833-850.

*Michael Hiscox, 2002. *International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions and Factor Mobility* (Princeton University Press). Chapters 1 through 10.

[BL] Ronald Rogowski, 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," *American Political Science Review* 81 (4), pp. 1121-1137.

Supplementary Reading

Timothy Frye and Edward Mansfield, 2004. "Timing is Everything: Elections and Trade Liberalization in the Post-Communist World." *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 4 (May), pp. 371-398.

Peter Gourevitch, 1978. "International Influences on Domestic Politics: The Second Image Reversed," *International Organization* 32 (Autumn).

Peter Gourevitch, 1986. *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Michael Hiscox, 2006. "Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing." *International Organization* 60(3), pp. 755-780.

Helen Milner, 1988. *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Douglas Nelson. 1988. "Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (3):796-837.

Ronald Rogowski, 1987. "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions," *International Organization* 41, no. 2 (Spring), pp. 203-223.

Ronald Rogowski, 1989. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter, 1999. "What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54(2): 267-292.

Week 6: February 17
The Political Economy of International Trade, Domestic Politics (II)

Required Reading

[BL] J. Ernesto Lopez-Cordova and Christopher M. Meissner. 2008. "The Impact of International Trade on Democracy: A Long Run Perspective." *World Politics* 60(4): 539-575.

[BL] Judith Goldstein. 1988. "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy." *International Organization* 42 (Winter):179-217.

[BL] Witold Henisz and Edward Mansfield. 2006. "Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness," *International Studies Quarterly* 50(1), pp. 189-211.

[BL] Daniel Yuichi Kono. 2008. "Democracy and Trade Discrimination." *The Journal of Politics* 70(4):942-955.

[BL] Helen Milner and Keiko Kubota, "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries." *International Organization* (Winter 2005).

[BL] Robert Putnam, 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer).

Supplementary Reading

Susan Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, 1994. "Divided Government and US Trade Policy," *International Organization* 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994), pp. 595-632.

Ed Mansfield and Mark Busch, 1995. "The Political Economy of Non-Tariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis," *International Organization* 49, no. 4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 723-749.

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, 2000. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (June), pp. 305-321.

Fiona McGillivray, 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Helen Milner, 1997. *Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Week 7: February 24 Exchange Rates and Monetary Institutions

Required Reading

*Barry Eichengreen, 2008 [1998]. *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2nd edition, Chapters 1 through 4.

*Beth A. Simmons, 1994. *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), Chapters 1-4, 8.

[BL] Jeffrey Frieden, 1991. "Invested Interests: National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45 (4): 425-451.

[BL] David Leblang and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. "Institutions, Expectations and Currency Crises." *International Organization* 60: 245-262.

[BL] Stephanie Walter. 2008. "A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences." *International Organization* 62(3): 405-438.

Supplementary Reading

David M. Andrews and Thomas D. Willett, 1997. "Financial Interdependence and the State: International Monetary Relations at Century's End," *International Organization* 51 (3).

William Bernhard, Lawrence Broz, and William Clark, 2002. "The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions," *International Organization* 56 (October), pp. 693-723. [Part of a larger special issue of *International Organization*, October 2002, The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions].

William Bernhard and David Leblang, 1999. "Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments," *International Organization* 53 (Winter), pp. 71-97.

J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffrey A. Frieden. 2001. "The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, pp. 317-343.

Eric Helleiner, 2003. *The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

David Leblang, 1999. "Domestic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments in the Developing World," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (December), pp. 599-620.

Kathleen R. McNamara, 1998. *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Thomas Oatley, 1997. *Monetary Politics: Exchange Rate Cooperation in the European Union*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kenneth A. Oye, 1985. "The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Triangle: Monetary Diplomacy 1929-1937," *World Politics*.

Week 8: March 3
Banking and Financial Liberalization

Required Reading

[BL] Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield. 1996. "The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World." *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (Winter), pp. 35-68.

[BL] Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors. 1998. "Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failures and Wealth Transfers in the Creation of the Basle Accord," *International Organization* 52 (Winter): 35-54.

[BL] Dennis Quinn and Carla Inclan, 1997. "The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization," *American Journal of Political Science* (1997), pp. 771-813.

[BL] Frances Rosenbluth and Ross Schaap, 2003. "The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation," *International Organization* 57 (2): 307-336.

[BL] Beth A. Simmons, 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (December 2000), pp. 819-835.

[BL] David Andrew Singer. 2004. "Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization," *International Organization* 58:3 (August), pp. 531-565.

Supplementary Reading

David M. Andrews, 1994. "Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (June), pp. 193- 218.

Albert Hirschman, 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge: MIT Press).

Jonathan Kirshner. 2007. *Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Stephen Krasner, 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Dennis Quinn, 1997. "The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation," *American Political Science Review* 91, pp. 531-552.

Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. 2008. "Is the 2007 US Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison." *American Economic Review* 98(2): 339-344.

David A. Singer, 2007. *Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for the International Financial System* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

March 10 – UNC Spring Break, no class meeting

Week 9: March 17
Portfolio (Short-Term) Capital Markets

Required Reading

*Michael Tomz. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1 through 6.

[BL] John S. Ahlquist. 2006. "Economic Policy, Institutions, and Capital Flows: Portfolio and Direct Investment Flows in Developing Countries." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3): 681-704.

[BL] Scott J. Basinger and Mark Hallerberg. 2004. "Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom." *American Political Science Review* 98:2, 261-276.

[BL] Layna Mosley, "Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States." *International Organization* 54 (4): 737-773.

[BL] Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment." *Journal of Economic History* 49: 803-832.

[BL] Eric Wibbels. 2006. "Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World." *International Organization* 60 (Spring), pp. 433-468.

Supplementary reading

William Bernhard and David Leblang, 2006. *Pricing Politics: Democratic Processes and Financial Markets*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

John B. Goodman and Louis W. Pauly. 1993. "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," *World Politics* 46, pp. 50-82.

Scott Kastner and Chad Rector. 2005. "Partisanship and the Path to Financial Openness," *Comparative Political Studies* 38: 484-506.

Layna Mosley, 2003. *Global Capital and National Governments*. (Cambridge University Press, 2003). Chapters 1 through 4, and 7.

Layna Mosley and David Andrew Singer. 2008. "Taking Stock Seriously: Equity-Market Performance, Government Policy, and Financial Globalization." *International Studies Quarterly* 52(2): 405-425.

Week 10: March 24
Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Openness

Required Reading

*Cohen, Chapter 5.

*Eichengreen, Chapters 5 and 6.

[BL] Alicia Adsera and Carles Boix. 2002. "Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness." *International Organization* 56 (Spring), pp. 229-262.

[BL] George Avelino, David S. Brown, Wendy Hunter, 2005. "The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999," *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (July), pp. 625-641.

[BL] Jude Hays, Sean Ehrlich and Clint Peinhardt, 2005. "Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis," *International Organization* 59(2), pp. 473-494.

[BL] Kenneth Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, 2004. "Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production," *American Journal of Political Science* (October).

Supplementary reading

Philip G. Cerny. 1999. "Globalization and Erosion of Democracy." *European Journal of Political Research* 36 (no. 1), pp. 1-26.

William Roberts Clark and Mark Hallerberg, 2000. "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (June), pp. 323-346.

Geoffrey Garrett, 1998. "Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?" *International Organization* (Autumn).

Jude Hays, 2003. "Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies," *World Politics* 56 (October), pp. 79-113.

Thomas Oatley, 1999. "How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy," *American Journal of Political Science* 43 no. 3 (October): 1003-27.

Roland Paris, 2003. "The Globalization of Taxation? Electronic Commerce and the Transformation of the State." *International Studies Quarterly* 47: 153-182.

Dani Rodrik, 1997. *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* (Washington: Institute for International Economics).

Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?" *Journal of Political Economy*.

Nita Rudra, 2002. "Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less Developed Countries," *International Organization* (Spring), pp. 411-445.

Duane Swank and Sven Steinmo, 2002. "The New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalist Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3), pp. 642-655.

Erik Wibbels and Moises Arce, 2003. "Globalization, Taxation and Burden-Shifting in Latin America," *International Organization* 57 (Winter).

Week 11: March 31
Foreign Direct Investment and Multinational Production

Required Reading

*Nathan Jensen. 2006. *Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 through 6.

[BL] Tim Büthe and Helen V. Milner. 2008. "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 741-762.

[BL] Nathan Jensen and Guillermo Rosas. 2007. "Foreign Direct Investment and Income Inequality in Mexico, 1990–2000" *International Organization* 61(3): 467-487.

[BL] Stephen Kobrin, 1987. "Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries," *International Organization* 57 (Autumn), pp. 609-638.

[BL] Edmund J. Malesky. 2008. "Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational Leaders." *Journal of Politics* 70(1): 97-119.

Supplementary Reading

Glen Biglaiser and Karl DeRouen Jr. 2007. "Following the Flag: Troop Deployment and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment." *International Studies Quarterly* 51(4): 835-854.

Peter Evans, 1971. "National Autonomy and Economic Development: Critical Perspectives on Multinational Corporations in Poor Countries." *International Organization* 25 (3) (Summer, 1971), pp. 675-692.

Peter Evans, 1979. *Dependent Development: the Alliance of multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon. 2005. "The Governance of Global Value Chains," *Review of International Political Economy* 12:1 (February), pp. 78-104.

Elhanan Helpman. 2006. "Trade, FDI and the Organization of Firms." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 44 (September): 589-630.

Nathan Jensen. 2008. "Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment." *Journal of Politics* 70(4): 1040-1052.

Quan Li. 2006. "Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis." *Journal of Politics* 68(February), pp. 62-74.

Quan Li and Adam Resnick. 2003. "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries," *International Organization* 57(1), pp. 175-211.

Theodore H. Moran, 1974. *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Theodore H. Moran, 2002. *Beyond Sweatshops: Foreign Direct Investment and Globalization in Developing Countries* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press).

Layna Mosley and Saika Uno. 2007. Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(8): 923-944.

Raymond Vernon. 1966. "International trade and international investment in the product cycle," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 80: 190-207.

Week 12: April 7
Economic Development, Economic Growth, and the Global Economy

Required Reading

*Cohen, Chapter 6.

[BL] Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," *American Political Science Review* 100 (February), pp. 115-131.

[BL] Stephan Haggard, 1990. *Pathways from the Periphery* (Cornell University Press), Chapters 1, 2 and 10.

[BL] Adam Przeworski and James Raymond Vreeland, 2000. "The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth." *Journal of Development Economics* 62, no. 2, pp. 385-421.

[BL] Immanuel Wallerstein, 1974. "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (September), 387-415.

Supplementary Reading

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review* 91, pp. 1369-1401.

Robert Barro. 1997. *Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.

Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning. 1999. "Why Has Africa Grown Slowly?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* (Summer): 3-22. [Part of *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Symposium on Growth in Africa, vol. 13, no. 3 (Summer 1999)]

Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Week 13: April 14
International Financial Institutions, Developing Nations, and Economic Reform

Required Reading

Grigore Pop-Eleches, 2008. *From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), Chapters 1 through 6.

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Jeffrey M. Chwieroth. 2007. "Testing and Measuring the Role of Ideas: The Case of Neoliberalism in the International Monetary Fund." *International Studies Quarterly* 51(1): 5-30.

Robert Devlin, 1989. *Debt and Crisis in Latin America: The Supply Side of the Story* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Jeffrey A. Frieden, 1992. *Debt, Development and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985*.

Erica R. Gould, 2003. "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality." *International Organization* 57 (Summer).

Thomas Oatley. 2004. Why is Stabilization Sometimes Delayed? Re-evaluating the Regime Type Hypothesis," *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (April).

Thomas Oatley and Jason Yackee. 2004. "American Interests and IMF Lending," *International Politics* 41 (September): 415-429.

Randall Stone, 2002. *Lending Credibility: The IMF and the Post-Communist Transition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

James Vreeland, 2003. *The IMF and Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

M. Rodwan Abouhard and David L. Cingranelli. 2006. The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981-2000. *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2), 233–262.

Week 14: April 21
International Influences Reconsidered – Norms, Ideas and Diffusion

Required Reading

*Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett, eds. 2008. *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapters 1, 2 (Swank), 5 (Quinn and Toyoda) and 6 (Elkins et al).

[BL] Sarah M. Brooks. 2007. "When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural Pension Reforms Across Nations." *Journal of Politics* 69(3): 701-715.

[BL] Jeffrey Chweiroth, 2007. "Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets." *International Organization* 61(2): 443-463.

[BL] Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski. 2007. "Investing Up: FDI and the Cross-Country Diffusion of ISO 14001 Management Systems." *International Studies Quarterly*. 51 (3), 723–744

Supplementary reading

Nancy Brune, Geoffrey Garrett and Bruce Kogut. 2004. "The International Monetary Fund and the Global Spread of Privatization." *IMF Staff Papers* (July).

Martha Finnemore, 1996. *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998).

Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 1993. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Goldstein and Keohane, eds, *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe. 2003. "Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?" *World Politics* 56(1): 1-42.

John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-State," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, pp. 144-181.

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Week 15: April 28
Presentations of Research Designs