I am a 2010 PhD Candidate in the Department of Economics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. My research interests include Game Theory, Games with Reputation, Intellectual Property, and Industrial Organization.
My dissertation explores the effect of a patent holder’s private information about expected litigation awards on litigation timing. I develop a signaling model where the patent holder faces an initial act of infringement and foresees the potential for additional acts of infringement in the future. The patent holder must decide when to litigate, knowing that the timing of any litigation, or lack their off, may affect an infringer’s decision to commit additional acts of infringement. I show that patent holders with sufficiently high award expectations have an incentive to delay litigation to encourage infringement. I argue that this predatory patent holder behavior is not necessarily prohibited under current patent law.
In the future I hope to strengthen my empirical research skills, as I am currently co-authoring an empirical paper about the welfare effects of user generated content. I will be attending the AEA conference in Atlanta, Georgia this January. I look forward to hearing from you.
