Recall that one of the noticeable features of the Ontological
Argument is that it is a deductive argument that claims to be a priori
--i.e., it claims that its
premises can be known independent of experience, with only logic and
language alone. In contrast, the Cosmological Argument is an a posteriori
argument. This means
that it relies on our experience of the world--beyond the tools of
logic and language alone--to determine the truth of its premises. More
specifically, cosmological arguments begin with facts known a
posteriori such as: the universe exists, that things are in constant
flux or change, that some things are caused to come into existence by
other things, and that the universe and almost everything in it is
In addition, the Cosmological Argument is also deductive (like the
Ontological Argument), which means that it aims to be the sort of
argument whereby if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true
as well. Thus, if we find that the argument is valid, and the premises
are true, then the conclusion--that God (i.e., the first uncaused
cause, the first unmoved mover, a necessary being, etc.) exists--must
2. Aquinas' Five Ways
: The Argument From Change (or Motion)
Aquinas claims that if we look around the world, we will see
that things are always changing (or moving). For example, plants begin
change to saplings, grow to maturity, and then eventually die. Leaves
change with the seasons, birds change their plumage, etc. Even rocks
change as sentiment is slowly worn away by wind or weather. Aquinas
gives the example of wood, which changes in temperature and composition
when brought into contact with fire. For all of these various changes
in the world, claims Aquinas, something had to bring about the change.
Plants, to change from seed to sapling, have to have something outside
of them which causes this change. Wood, which changes from cool to hot,
needs something outside of it--e.g., fire--that brings about this
change, Aquinas believes that "a thing in the process of change cannot
itself cause that same change; it cannot change itself." But he also
thinks that there must be a first cause of change that is not caused to
change itself, or a first mover that is not moved--i.e., a first
The Second Way
The Argument From Causation
Aquinas claims that if we look around the world, we will see that
things are caused to come into existence by other things. Children are
caused to come into existence by their parents, who are in turn caused
to some into existence by their parents, etc. We never observe anything
causing itself, for this, Aquinas argues, would be absurd. However, the
series of causes cannot go back infinitely. If you do not have a first
cause, then there cannot be any intermediate causes, nor a last. So
there must be an uncaused first cause--and this we call God.
The Third Way
The Argument From Contingency
Contingent vs. Necessary:
Before we dive into Aquinas' Third Way, it will help to get a grasp on
the difference between contingent
things and necessary
contingent thing is one that either in fact exists, but might not have
, or one that does not
in fact exist, but might have
. For example, Alumni
Hall exists, but it might not have (we can imagine that they just never
built it); so Alumni Hall is a contingent thing. Unicorns, on the
other hand, do not in fact exist, but it seems possible that they might
have; so unicorns are contingent things. There are lots of contingent
things: you, me, your parents, my parents, etc. In contrast, a
necessary thing is one that in fact exists, but is also something that
could not have failed to exist. In other words, it is logically
impossible that a necessary being could have not existed. Many people
think that numbers are necessary things--i.e., that the world could
never have been such that numbers did not exist. Of course, relevant to
our present discussion, many think that God is similar to numbers in
this way--that is, that God could not have failed to exist, and hence,
is a necessary being.
the possible worlds analysis that we discussed in class, we can put the
distinction between contingent and necessary things this way: a
contingent thing is one that exists in at least one possible world, but
not all. A necessary thing is one that exists in all possible
worlds--i.e., there is no possible world in which this thing does not
In the Third Way, Aquinas claims that if we look at the world, we will
find that there are contingent beings all around us. We realize that
not everything is something that must be, for we observe things before
they come into existence, and then see them go out of existence.
Aquinas supposes that not everything can be contingent in this way, for
he thinks that if everything need not have been, then at one time there
was nothing. But, he continues, if at one time there was nothing, then
there wouldn't be anything now; for things cannot come into
existence by themselves, but must have been brought into existence by
something that is already in existence. Thus, it must not be the case
that there are only contingent beings. It must be that there is a
necessary being, on which the existence of all other contingent beings
depend. For Aquinas, this necessary being is God.
The Fourth Way
The Argument From Excellence
Aquinas claims that if we look around the world, we will observe that
some things are better than others. some more good, some more
beautiful, etc. He believes that such comparative terms admit of a
"best", a "most" good, etc. Aquinas thinks that there is a limit to
which all things that admit of a degree try to reach. So there must be
something that is most perfect, he argues--something that all things
strive to reach. This perfect being, he claims, is God.
In class I explained how this argument is a kind of ontological
argument. Can you see why?
The Fifth Way: The Argument From Harmony
Begin with the observation that there is order and harmony in nature.
This harmony, Aquinas argues, admits of a being with awareness and
understanding, For only a being with awareness and understanding
could direct all of nature to its goal (whatever that is) and keep
everything in order. Thus, this being with understanding must exist,
and is God.
In class I explained how this argument is a kind of Teleological
argument. Can you see why?
3. Aquinas' Second and Third
--The Argument from
(1) There are things that are caused.
(2) Nothing can be the cause of itself.
(3) There cannot be an infinite regress of causes.
(4) Thus, there had to be a uncaused first cause.
(5) The uncaused first cause is God
(6) Therefore, God exists.
Formalized--The Argument from Contingency
(1) Every being is either necessary or contingent.
(2) Not every being can be a contingent being.
(3) So there exists a necessary being upon which all
of the contingent beings depend.
(4) This necessary being is God.
(5) Therefore, God exists.
4. Elaboration on Premise (3)
of Aquinas' Second Way
In class, I read Aquinas' reasons for premise (3) of the second way.
Here, again, is what he has to say:
"Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on
to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the
first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is
the cause of the ultimate cause,
intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause
is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be
no first cause among efficient causes there will be no ultimate, nor
any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go
on to infinity, there will be no
first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor
any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false."
, First Part, Question 2, Article 3.
I summarized the above line of reasoning roughly as follows: Imagine
that we have a chain of events, A, B, and C, where A causes B, and B
causes C. Let us grant for the sake of argument that A is the first
cause, B is the intermediate cause, and C is the ultimate cause such
that if the first cause, A, wouldn't have happened, then the
intermediate cause, B, wouldn't have happened, and hence C wouldn't
have happened. Now if, contrary to our assumption, the chain of causes
A-B-C went 'on to infinity'--if something caused A, and something
caused the cause of A, and so on without end--then there would be no
FIRST cause. But, Aquinas argues, if there is no first cause, then
there can be no intermediate causes, and hence no ultimate cause. If
there were no A, there would be no B, and hence no C. But the
'ultimate cause' that Aquinas is referring to is the universe as a
whole, here and now, which we all know exists. So: if there were no
first cause, there would be no ultimate cause--nothing here and now.
Since there clearly is
here and now, it must be that there
was a first cause. Hence, there cannot be an infinite regress of
causes--i.e., Premise (3).
I claimed in class that the above line of reasoning was spurious. Can
you figure out why?
: the problem
primarily lies with a conflation between taking away a cause
and there being no first cause
. It is
true that in an infinite series of causes--a series of causes that goes
back forever, where each thing is caused by a prior cause, and so on
without end--that in such a series there
is no first
. But all that this means is that there is no thing or
event that we can point to that is the FIRST
cause (for, by hypothesis, the
causes go back forever). Yet it does NOT mean that any of the causes
are erased or taken away or removed from the series.
To illustrate the point, consider the number line of negative integers,
5. Alternative Arguments for
...-7, -6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0
If we imagine that this line represents
a series of infinite causes, then we can see that in an infinite series
of causes, there would be no first cause (for in just the same way,
there is no first negative integer in a negative integer number line).
But Aquinas seems to think that if there is no first cause, then it
will be as if
we take the 'first' cause away, or remove 'it' somehow from the series.
This is how he thinks it follows that there are no intermediate causes
and, hence, no ultimate cause. But, of course, there is no 'it' to be
taken away, since there is no first
to remove. Moreover, there isn't any cause that is removed
in any way.
It's as if Aquinas is saying something like: "Imagine an
infinite series of causes. Now go back to the very first cause of this
infinite series and take it away
(since an infinite series of causes doesn't have this (or any) first
once we take away this first cause, we remove all the latter causes
that this first cause caused, and hence, we have no ultimate cause,
which is clearly false. So there must have been a first cause."
My colleague Jason Bowers
put the point this way: On some strings of older x-mas lights, all of
the lights are connected such that if one of the bulbs is out, then all
of the lights on the string will go out. So it's as if Aquinas is
imagining just such a string, that reaches forever back. He seems to
think that having an infinite series of causes is like going way back
to the very first light of an infinite string of x-mas lights, and
taking it out. Admittedly, once we take out a light, all the rest of
the lights will go out. However, an infinite series of causes, like an
infinite string of x-mas lights, doesn't
have a first element to take out
So we can see how Aquinas' line of reasoning is
flawed: there is no first cause to take away, just as there is no
first negative integer in the series of negative integers to take away,
and just as there is no first x-mas light in a string of lights to take
Moreover, there is no sense in which any cause (or negative integer) is
'taken away,' just as there is not sense in which one of the lights is
'taken out.' So it looks like Aquinas' argument for premise (3) in the
of his Second Way is seriously flawed.
So are there any other considerations that might lend support to
of Aquinas' Second Way? Below is one suggestion:
Infinity is Weird!
One reason you might think that a series of causes couldn't go back
infinitely is that the mere idea of an infinite series of causes is
just too weird to make any sense. The problem lies not with a series of
, per se, but rather
with the fact that the series is purportedly infinite
. In other words, infinity
is just too weird of a concept to make any sense, so this is why there
cannot be an infinite series of causes.
Below are some examples of infinity's weirdness.
(i) A subset of an infinite series is just as big as the original
Here's one illustration to show why you might think that infinity is
weird: Imagine that you
have an infinite number of cockroaches in your apartment. You have
three exterminators who come to your apartment to give you an estimate.
The first says that he can eliminate 30% of the cockroaches, the second
says he can get rid of 50% of the cockroaches, while the third
that he can eliminate up to 95% of the suckers! Intuitively, it seems
you should go with the third exterminator, since he can guarantee he'll
get rid of a higher percentage of the bugs than the other guys.
However, taking 30% of an infinite number of bugs will leave you with
just as many bugs as if you had taken 50%, or even 95%: you will still
be left with an infinite number of bugs no matter which exterminator
you hire! So given your options, it seems you should just save your
money and not hire any of the three exterminators!
To see this, imagine all of the positive integers:.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, ...
Obviously, there's an infinite number of them. So assign one positive
integer to each one of your infinitely many bugs. Now take 30% of them
away--e.g., take every third number (or cockroach) away:
1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, ...
How many are you left with? An infinite! If you don't believe me, tell
me where you think the series of numbers or cockroaches ends, and I'll
always be able to show you the next one in the series. And the next.
And the next...
Now take 50% of those
away--e.g., take every other number (or cockroach) away:
1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, ...
How many are you left with? An infinite still! Again, if you don't
believe me, tell me where you think the series of numbers or
cockroaches ends, and I'll always be able to show you the next one in
the series. And the next. And the next...
Now take 95% percent of
those away--e.g., take away 95 out of every 100 numbers (or
256, 259, 262, 265, 268, ...
How many are you left with? Still
infinite number!! Again, if you don't believe me, I'll prove it to you
So, infinity is awfully
since you can divide it by 1/3 or 1/2 or
9/10 (or 1/3 and then 1/2 of that
then 9.5/10 of that
, which I
did above) and still
with just as many as you started with! Anything
that has this sort of consequence (or so this argument might run) can't
possibly correspond to any sort of coherent concept, and so an infinite
series of causes--a series that has gone on forever and has no
be just as
incoherent. Thus, there cannot be an
infinite series of causes, making premise (3) of Aquinas' Second Way
come out true.
(ii) Hilbert's Hotel
Another example is
Hilbert's Hotel. Wie will discuss this example in class.
In class, however, I will try to show that while Hilbert's Hotel is
odd and surprising, and perhaps a bit funky or weird, it does not
follow from this that an actual infinite series is impossible. One way
we showed this is by carefully laying out the example as I did in
class. At no point did we run into a contradiction, which would
have been an indication of
something that was impossible, nor were we, at any point in the puzzle,
unable to figure out which person was assigned to which room. This
indicates that infinity, while complicated and unusual, is not an
incoherent concept. In fact, once we were familiar with certain rules,
we could predict what we could do in order to make room for more and
more guests, even knowing that all of the rooms were occupied. So while
the idea of an infinite series may be unusual, its unusual-ness need
not be grounds for thinking that it's impossible.
(iii) The Infinite Series of Walls
Imagine that we are building a series of walls, where each wall
is made out of indestructable material. No matter how thin the walls
get, nothing can penetrate them. We build one wall one foot thick. Then
halfway between this wall and an arbitrary point some distance away, we
place another wall half as thick as the first wall. Then half way
between this second wall and the arbitrary point, we place another wall
half as thick as the second wall. Then we place another wall halfway
between this third wall and the arbitrary point, making sure that this
fourth wall is half as thick as the third wall. And so on. Imagine also
that we get faster and faster at constructing these walls so that
eventually we have infinitely many walls placed between our first wall
and the arbitrary point. To illustrate, imagine that the first wall is
labeled "1", the second wall is labeled "2", etc., that the arbitrary
point is marked " ° ", and that they are placed like so:
wall and the arbitrary point "
° " there will always be space to put another wall, and we will
always be able to make a wall half as thick as the wall that came
before it. So while the thickness of the walls gets thinner and thinner
the closer we get to " ° ", and the distance between any wall and
the arbitrary point " ° " gets smaller and smaller, there is never
a smallest width to a wall (since we can always half any width), and
there is never a wall that is closest to the arbitrary point (since
there is always another one halfway between any wall and the arbitrary
But now imagine that we have a red ball rolling from the left of the
series heading straight for our arbitrary point as follows:
What will happen to the ball when it reaches the arbitrary point? We
agreed in class that the ball must somehow stop. But which wall would
stop it? We've already understood that there cannot be a last wall, or
a wall closest to to the arbitrary point. That's like saying that there
is a last positive integer. For if all of the walls are assigned
positive integers, then there would be a numbered wall such that the
ball hits it. But which number would this be?
Weird, huh? (Discussion in class.)
In response to the above examples, and the claim that in light
of these, infinity is too weird to make any sense, one might argue as
follows: "Infinity is weird? B.F.D! In fact, that's exactly what is
so characteristic about infinity. Sure, it's weird. And, sure, one of
the weird things about infinity is that a subset of an infinite series
can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the original set, such
that (on one way of describing things) we are left with just as many as
we started out with. But just because infinity is weird doesn't mean
that it's incoherent
of mathematicians and set theorists, for example, can make perfect
sense of infinity. Moreover, they can make sense of some infinite
series being larger than others. They coherently work with infinity,
and find it theoretically useful to do so. So it is not enough to
(3) of Aquinas' Second Way by simply pointing to the mere weirdness of
infinity. For it's weirdness does not entail that it is incoherent."
What do you think of this response? Is there another way you might
defend premise (3)? Discussion in class.
Weird? Then what is God?
Another objection to consider is this: suppose you would like to defend
premise (3) of Aquinas' Second Way, and you do so by appeal to the
"Infintity is Weird" line of reasoning. If infinity is weird, then
perhaps it is incoherent, and thus an infinite series of causes will be
just as incoherent as an infinite anything
and so there cannot be an infinite series of causes on pain of
absurdity. But if this is the line of reasoning you want to endorse,
then you will have to be very cautious about the sort of attributes
that you will ultimate claim that God has. For many theists believe
that God is infinite in some way--either he is infinitely powerful, or
infinitely good, or knows infinitely many things (e.g., he knows that 1
+ 1 = 2, and he knows that 1 + 2 = 3, and he knows that 1 + 3 =4,
etc.), or that he is eternal (which might be a kind of infinite
existence), etc. But if you want to claim that inifnite is weird or
incoherent, then God cannot have any infinite attributes or be infinite
in anyway, or else he will be weird or incoherent as well. And you will
not want to claim that the idea of infinite is OK for some things, like
God, but not OK for others, like series of causes, on pain of being ad
hoc. So one must be careful about the "Infinity is Weird" defense of
permise 3 of Aquinas' Second Way, and make sure that this line of
reasoning is consistent with the rest of the theistic picture.
6. Even if Premise 3 of Aquinas' Second Way is True, So What?
If you haven't got a headache yet because of all this talk of
infinity, you might be thinking to yourself: "Look. Who cares
whether premise three is
true or not? I need not come down on whether there can or cannot be an
infinite series of causes. Because even if premise three is true, and
the argument does go through, what does this ultimately show anyway?
All it proves is that there was
an uncaused first cause. It doesn't show that this uncaused cause is
still around, nor does it show that there was only one. It also doesn't
show that this uncaused cause is all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good,
personal, etc. It doesn't show anything, really, except that there was
at least one uncaused first cause that got everything started. This
first uncaused cause could have been as small and insignificant and
morally indifferent as an inanimate atom. Whoop-dee-effin-do."
Response: it's true that, even if sound, this argument alone doesn't
prove what the uncaused first cause was like. It doesn't even show that
the uncaused first cause is unique. But keep in mind that Aquinas
thinks he has given 5 different arguments for the existence of God.
Each one aims to prove something different: the first way aims to show
that God is immutable, the second that God is the uncaused first cause
(the creator), the third that God is necessary, the fourth that God is
all-good (or the moral standard), and the fifth that God is intelligent
and all-knowing. So it is important whether this argument goes through
since, together with the the other arguments, and assuming that they
too go through, we have a piece-meal argument for the existence
of the traditional Judeo-Christian God. And this surely is
a big deal.
What we must keep in mind, however, is that while Aquinas meant to have
all of these 5 argument stand together, if upon individual scrutiny
these arguments show to be unsound, then it won't matter how many
arguments Aquinas has up his sleeve. 5 leaky buckets stacked together
will still leak water; similarly, 5 unsound arguments will be as good
as no arguments at all.
7. Other Objections to
Aquinas' Second Way
The Principle of
Sufficient Reason (or PSR)
One might be tempted to argue that the main intuition
behind premise (3) of Aquinas' Second Way is the thought
that the universe and everything in it had to get going at some
point; something, somewhere
had to get the whole thing started. There seem to be at least
two ideas behind this thought: (1) the intuition that infinity is
weird, and that because of this, the concept of an infinite series of
causes is just cognitively hard to grasp, but also (2) the idea that
every fact in the world has to have a reason or explanation behind it.
This second idea is commonly called the Principle of Sufficient Reason
). Since the weirdness of
infinity is dealt with above, I'll use this section to talk about PSR.
Leibniz (1646-1716) in his Monadology
§32 stated a version of PSR as follows: "no fact can be real or
existing and no statement true without a sufficient reason for its
being so and not otherwise."
To see why PSR might be an intuitive principle, imagine a
giant glowing orb hovering in our classroom. Imagine that we had a team
of scientists, mathematicians, a police
force, and entire investigative team to figure out why the orb was
there, how it got there, and what was going on. Suppose that after much
investigating, it was concluded that there was absolutely no reason why
the orb was there. There was no explanation for how this thing came
into existence, nor how it was made or who put it there, etc. It was
concluded that the orb just was
and that that was the end of it. Would this be
satisfactory? If you think not, it might be because you expect and
assume that there is an explanation
for everything. The idea that there is an explanation for everything is
essentially what the PSR is trying to capture.
Here's how all this is supposed to relate to premise (3) of Aquinas'
Second Way: you might think that the (3) has to be true because even if
there could be an infinite series of causes--that is, even if you grant
that there could be such a thing as a series of causes that goes back
forever and never had a *first* cause--you might think that such a
series would violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Why? Well,
because even an infinite series needs a reason or explanation for why the whole series
is there. In other
words, if there were an infinite series of causes, then why is the series there at all,
than not there? The idea is supposed to be that positing an infinite
series of causes doesn't get at the heart of the matter--namely, what
is the explanation for there being anything here in the universe at
One response to this line of reasoning is as follows: what explains
each individual member of the purported infinite series is the member
that came before it. Since each individual member is then explained,
this is all that's needed to explain the whole series. In other words,
once we have explained why each individual member is in the series,
there is no further question as to why the whole
series is there--for it is
explained piecemeal, by the explanation of each of the parts of the
Discussion to be continued...
PSR vs. Brute
Facts, and God
To contrast PSR, I suggested that you could have the Brute Fact
view of the universe.
This basically says that there can
such things as brute facts--things or events in the universe that
simply do not have a reason or explanation . So, essentially, this view
claims that PSR is false, and that some
things in the universe simply have no explanation as to why they
are here, or how they came about. Some things, in other words, just are
One reason to think that the Brute Fact view of the universe is correct
is because you might think that explanations have to end somewhere
. For example, you might
think that sometimes a perfectly legitimate explanation for why
something has happened is just because of coincidence or chance.
Imagine, for instance, that you go to Woody's on
Franklin St. for
lunch. When you walk in, you see that one of your other friends is
there already. "What a lucky coincidence!", you tell her, and the two
of you sit down to eat. Now, if someone were to ask why the two of you
were at the same place at the same time for lunch, it seems that a
perfectly legitimate response would be: just chance or coincidence. You
went in to lunch because you were walking by and realized you were
hungry, and your friend had just happened to do the same thing moments
before. Now maybe 'chance' counts as
an explanation here. If so, it seems we can still ask the question:
well, why was it chance that brought you two at the same place at the
same time? Yet this question doesn't seem to have a ready answer. So,
what's appealing about the Brute Fact View of the universe is that it
does seem that at some point in giving explanations--even if we grant
that sometimes 'chance' can count as a legitimate explanation--the
explanations have to stop somewhere
That you and your friend met by chance at Woody's, in other words, is
something that just seems to be a brute fact; there is no further
explanation to be had.
If this is right, and the Brute Fact view of the universe is plausible,
then what does this mean for the Cosmological Argument? What does it
mean for Aquinas' premise (3) of his Second Way?
One might contest that saying that God is the
for why there is a universe as opposed to not--e.g., saying why there
rather than nothing--is no better than saying that the universe being
here is just a brute fact. Do you think this is right? Why or why not?
No God, God, and
In class we discussed three possible theories that might explain how
and why the universe is here--or, as I put it in class, why there is
something rather than nothing: (i) the No God view, (ii) the God view,
and (iii) the Magic view. The No God view seemingly embraces the Brute
Fact view of the universe. At a certain point, science will be unable
to answer the big, philosophical questions such as why there is
something rather than nothing. Or, rather, they will just have to
resort to an answer such as: "no reason, it just happened that way."
The God view, on the other hand, will say that there is a reason why
there is something rather than nothing, and that reason is God. God
explains why things are the way they are and aren't some other way. The
Magic view is similar to the God explanation, in that Magic is the
thing that supposedly explains why things are the way they are.
However, it is interesting to pin down why
we are inclined to think that
one of these explanations is objectively better than the others. For
example, we may think that a commitment to PSR would lean us toward the
God view or the Magic view, since these explanations yield an
explanation for everything. Built into both theories is an entity or
power that provides its own expiation. When we ask why God is here or
why God did what he did, we can claim that God provides his own
explanation. God was always here, or was uncaused, or provides his own
reason for being here. Magic, similarly, can be explained as being
something special--something different from--ordinary stuff in that it
doesn't require the same sorts of reasons or causes for its existence.
It's Magic, after all! But why isn't the positing of such entities or
forces just another way of saying: "no reason why these things have the
characteristics they do. They just do! That's how they're made! It's in
their nature!" How is this ultimately much different than saying that
the universe just is the way it is?
In other words, looked at solely in terms of an explanation--not what
makes us feel
more warm and fuzzy about the universe--why is one explanation better
than the other? And what do these explanations ultimately reveal about
the distinction between PSR and the Brute Fact view of the universe.
Are they really all that different? Or are they different in principle,
but we have just failed to give any theory that genuinely adheres to
PSR? Discussion in class...
Because of time constraints, we probably won't get to discuss in
Aquinas' Third Way, the Argument from Contingency. But one thing to
consider are ways in which this argument might be better or worse than
Aquinas' Second Way, the Argument from Causation.
Discussion in class.
to Think About
Can you think of any other objections to Aquinas' Second Way, apart
from the aforementioned ways of attacking premise (3)? Are there other
might have about premise (3)? What about the other premises?
Why or why not? Discussion in class.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. For an on-line version, click here.
William L. Rowe, "The Cosmological Argument" in
and Responsibility, ed. Landau & Shafer-Landau.
Louis P. Pojman, Philosophy of
Religion: An Anthology, fourth edition.
Page Last Updated: June 25, 2008