This criterion is intended to separate the men from the boys, so to speak. I want to demarcate the really bad-ass philosophical views from the incredibly wussy ones, with some sort of principled method for doing so.

Perhaps the best way to get into the spirit of the distinction I'm after is to consider several paradigm fictional characters. For example, Arnold in Terminator 1: totally bad-ass; Arnold in Terminator 2: pretty wussy; Arnold in Kindergarten Cop: do I even have to say? However, Linda Hamilton in Terminator 2: definitely bad-ass. Here are some other examples (obviously this list is not exhaustive):
 

• Stallone in Rambo when he's sewing up his own arm: totally bad-ass
• Jesse "I ain't got time to bleed" Ventura in Predator: so bad-ass
• Samuel L. Jackson in Pulp Fiction: the paradigm (thanks daniel)
• Buffy the Vampire Slayer: c'mon...killing vamps, demons, and other random evil, all the while in FMBs and looking totally hot? So v v bad-ass.
• Indiana Jones fighting off Nazi's, safeguarding sacred relics, and getting the girl using nothing but a bull-whip: omigawd-so-bad-ass
• Indy afraid of snakes: pretty wussy, I'm sorry to say (Adam tried to argue that a bit of vulnerability makes the man, but then I remembered that he's afraid of bees.)
• William Macy in Fargo: complete wuss.
• Keanu Reaves in anything: total wuss (Daniel pointed out that maybe 'Bill and Ted's' is an exception)
• Hugh Grant in anything: wuss-o-rama, no exceptions (thanks Ishani)

Ok, so that should do for sort of getting a sense of the difference between wussy-ness and bad-ass-ness. Now we've just got to transfer the criteria from people to philosophical views. In so doing, we must remember that I am concerned with views, not endorsers of views. I understand that there are many bad-ass people who hold pretty wussy views, and pretty wussy peeps who hold bad-ass views. This might be something to keep in mind if you find yourself offended by my ratings.

I've currently settled on three elements that make a view wussy:
 

1. Epistemic Safety: whenever a view compromises metaphysical commitments for epistemological reasons, it's totally wussing     out. Rambo doesn't sit and worry about whether he knows if he's sewing his arm up right, or whether the make-shift needle will do the trick, or whether he's losing too much blood, etc. He dives right in, gore and guts and all, epistemic status be damned.

2. Semantic Tricks: whenever a view relies on semantic tricks to get out of a sticky situation, it's wussing out big time. Clinton saying that he didn't inhale or that there's a sex/bj distinction is totally wussy. Get some cojones! Say you smoked, say you had sex, and stop being such a weener. So too with philosophical views. (Just what counts as a semantic trick will have to be fleshed out a bit more.)

3. Having Your Cake and Eating it Too: C'mon. You know that win-win situations are only proposed because someone doesn't have the balls to take it outside. Games where everybody wins no tuff guy likes to play.

    1. It Doesn't Do Anything Wussy: none of 1-3 above

    2. Balls to the Walls, It Sticks to its Guns: Bad-asses stand tuff. Bite bullets. Take torture. Then ask for more.

Criterion Applied

All right. So here are some results. I will add more as I think of them; I will update this page when I can. I suspect some of my ratings will be controversial. If you have comments about the results, suggestions about my criteria, or want a certain view rated, e-mail me here.
 

• Compatibilism: Totally Wussy. We had a nice dilemma going: either determinism or indeterminism had to be true, but either way, free will had it coming. Hard problem. Tuff fight. But compatibilists come along and explain, "wait! here's a way where everyone wins! Maybe "free" doesn't mean what you think it means. If it means what we say it means, our situation's win-win. On top of all this, its totally epistemically safe. Nothing weird or bizarre like the libertarian will tell you. Easy as pie, dilemma dissolved." Wuss-o-rama.
• Modal Realism: Pretty Bad-Ass. It's definitely not epistemically safe; it takes the balls-out horn of Benaceraff's dilemma. Also, it definitely doesn't have it's cake and eat it too. You wanna talk possible worlds? Then you got possible worlds. Blam-o. However, I'm a bit inclined to think that the move about quantifier restriction is a bit of a semantic trick. Quantifiers wide open, there are purple gnomes, quantifiers narrowed there aren't? I dunno. Sounds sneaky to me. But, you gotta admit, it's pretty bad-ass with respect to the rest.
• Nominalism (in general): Pretty Damn Wussy. They've got semantic tricks up the wa-zoo. I realize I'm leaving the 'semantic trick' thing sort of hazy, but nominalists are definitely a clear case of such trickery. They paraphrase left and right, shamelessly. Also, the usual sorts of reasons for nominalism are epistemic, which is wussy sign number 1. Finally, they try to have their cake and eat it too, since paraphrasing allows them to talk tuff without commitment. If yer gonna talk the talk, walk the walk.
• Fictionalism (in general): Way Wussy. These guys are even worse than Nominalists for they full out admit that our talk of certain entities is useful, but they're just too damn wussy to commit. At least Nominalists think that the talk taken at face value isn't all that useful, since we're just using adequate paraphrases after all.  Add to this all of the epistemic reasons motivating fictionalism, and their reliance on semantic tricks, and you've got full on wuss-ocity.
• Meinongianism: Totally Bad-Ass. Absolutely no fear of commitment, next to nil on epistemic safety, hardly any semantic tricks, and my lawd does he like to bite bullets. Meinong's are tuff, no doubt. A bit insane, you say? Well, with bad-ass-ness comes a bit of craziness. Samuel L. Jackson in Pulp Fiction is not the paradigm of mental health. Also, I defend myself by pointing out that I never said that bad-ass-ness was truth-conducive (a wussy move on my part, I realize, but then, I'm no buffy).