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# Organizational Diversity, Vitality and Outcomes in the Civil Rights Movement

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*Sociologists often assert, but rarely test, the claim that organizational diversity benefits social movements by invigorating movement vitality and facilitating success. Our analysis of black civil rights organizations shows that goal and tactical diversity of a social movement is largely a function of organizational density, level of resources available to the movement, and the number of protests initiated by the movement. Goal diversity increases the rate of protest, whereas tactical diversity increases the likelihood of achieving a desired policy outcome. These findings advance our understanding of social movements and organizations by illuminating how organizational dynamics of a social movement might change over time, and in turn how this change might affect the vitality and desired outcomes of social movements.*

Does the diversity of goals and tactics in a population of social movement organizations (SMOs) matter to social movements, and if so, how? It is difficult to answer this question because few studies have addressed it systematically. Organizational theorists have claimed that organizational diversity matters for the persistence and success of certain organizational forms, but they disagree about what factors allow diversity to flourish (Hannan and Freeman 1986; Carroll and Hannan 2000; Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Hannan 2005). Social movement scholars have also claimed that rising diversity matters, but they disagree as to whether its effect on movement outcomes is positive or negative (Oberschall 1973; McAdam 1982; Gamson 1990; Morris 1993; Tarrow 1998).

The lack of systematic analysis on the causes and consequences of organizational diversity in social movements is a serious gap in research given that SMOs are often "carriers" of social movements and they anchor, direct and sustain collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Minkoff 1991; Tarrow 1998; Clemens and Minkoff 2004; Andrews and Edwards 2004; Minkoff and McCarthy 2005). Thus recent reviews of research on social movements have challenged researchers to examine more closely the role of organizational diversity in social movements (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Clemens and Minkoff 2004). We take

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up that challenge in this article by addressing two related questions. First, what factors shape the diversity of goals (desired ends) and tactics (means to these ends) in a given population of SMOs? Second, does goal and tactical diversity affect social movement vitality and outcomes?

In the first part of this article, we examine endogenous and exogenous factors that can affect the level of goal and tactical diversity in a social movement and explore the effect of change in organizational density on goal and tactical diversity. We expect that (up to a certain peak number) the addition of new organizations to a movement promotes innovation in goals and tactics (see Carroll and Hannan 2000). After some carrying capacity is reached, however, the addition of new organizations to the social movement should spark competition and dissensus, leading to a decline in goal and tactical diversity. This research also studies the effect of a variety of exogenous factors on goal and tactical diversity, including political opportunities, countermovement activity, and resources.

In the second part of this article, we examine the impact of organizational diversity on movement vitality and movement outcomes. Diversity in goals and tactics is likely to attract new kinds of participants with different sorts of identities, loyalties and politics. In other words, a rising level of goal and tactical diversity should broaden the potential base of audience for a social movement. This argument suggests that rising diversity in goals and tactics ought to have mainly beneficial effects on movement vitality and movement outcomes. For purposes of this article, movement vitality refers to the strength of a movement, and movement outcome refers to the achievement of some finite goal or goals of a movement. Movement vitality is measured by the number of protests generated by the movement, and movement outcome is measured by the likelihood of the movement achieving desired policy changes (see Gamson 1990).

By providing a systematic analysis of the causes and consequences of organizational diversity within a specific social movement, this article contributes to the growing literature that integrates theories and research on organizations and social movements (Davis et al. 2005).

## **Causes of Organizational Diversity in Social Movements**

### ***Effects of Legitimation and Competition on Diversity***

According to density-dependence theory, two forces drive the founding and mortality rates in organizational populations: legitimation and competition (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Carroll and Hannan 2000; Hannan 2005). At low levels of organizational density, increases in the number of organizations with a certain form will legitimate that form, in the sense that it acquires a taken-for-granted quality. The result will be an increase in the founding rate and decrease in the mortality rate of organizations using that form. However, as the number of organizations with a given form continues to rise, competition among organizations takes over, which eventually decreases the founding rate of new organizations and increases the mortality rate of existing organizations (Carroll

and Hannan 2000). Density-dependence theory has been especially useful in explaining the vital rates of SMOs (Minkoff 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Hannan and Freeman 1987, 1989; Carroll and Hannan 2000), niche competition among local SMOs (Stern 1999), and protest activity of U.S. social movements (Minkoff 1997; Issac and Christensen 2002).

What are the implications of density-dependence theory for organizational diversity in a given population of SMOs? We predict that during initial stages of a movement, when an organizational population is sparse, an increase in organizational density leads to an increase in diversity because the legitimation process likely dominates. More specifically, additions to the organizational population produce a type of “demonstration effect” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), in which an increasing density of organizations and a concomitant rise in protest activity signal to insiders and outsiders that support for the movement is rising (Tarrow 1988; Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). This process in turn encourages new organizations to join the movement, many of which are likely to take up new kinds of goals and activities in order to take advantage of the perceived increase in the resource space. In sum, legitimation forces predominate when organizational numbers are low, and organizational expansion during this stage should produce an increase in diversity.

However, as organizational ecologists have found, when resource environments reach a certain carrying capacity, a continued increase in the density of organizations will eventually trigger competition among the organizations (Carroll and Hannan 2000; Minkoff 1997). According to density-dependence theory, when competition intensifies, founding rates of SMOs decrease and mortality rates increase. We argue that at a very high level of density, competition among SMOs that reduces the founding rate and raises the mortality rate ought to decrease diversity as a consequence.

Studies of the civil rights movement provide some support for this extension of the density-dependence argument. According to McAdam (1982), an increase in the number of SMOs within the black civil rights movement after 1965 intensified the level of competition for scarce resources. The proliferation of SMOs triggered conflict and dissensus, which precipitated a slowdown in the rate of innovation in goals and tactics (McAdam 1983). In short, McAdam suggests that a continued increase in organizational density likely leads to movement retrenchment because of increasing inter-organizational competition (see also Tarrow 1998). Thus we theorize that at high levels of organizational density, competition intensifies and slows the founding rate and raises the mortality rate of SMOs; as a result, the pace of innovation will stagnate and diversity will decline within that movement.

*Hypothesis 1: Diversity of goals and tactics in SMOs increases at low levels of increasing organizational density, but only up to some peak level, at which point a continued increase in organizational density produces a decline in diversity of goals and tactics.*

## ***Effects of Political Opportunities, Countermovement Activity and Resources on Organizational Diversity***

### *Political Opportunities*

The core premise of political opportunity theory is that movement mobilization is likely when changes in the political climate make collective action more likely to succeed. Examples of such opportunities are increases in the level of elite receptivity to protesters or the restructuring of existing power relations (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1998; Jenkins et al. 2003; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Scholars have also argued that political competitiveness, as exemplified by highly contested elections or party divisions within governments, can create opportunities for excluded groups to mobilize and protest (Jenkins et al. 2003; Soule and Olzak 2004).

Research on the civil rights movement suggests that political opportunities played an important role in the rise of black insurgency. McAdam (1982) found that favorable changes in the political environment during the 1950s and the early 1960s – such as the growing importance of the black vote and the continuing importance of cold war political pressures – favored the rise of black insurgency. Specifically, McAdam argues that the opening of the political opportunity structure produced a new generation of black SMOs that was able to pierce the long standing organizational dominance of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). This new generation of black SMOs was responsible for the high rate of activism that was characteristic of the early 1960s.

Favorable shifts in political opportunities likely increase mobilization and encourage new communities to join the movement; these communities in turn are likely to introduce new goals and tactics into the movement (even when they join existing organizations). Therefore, we expect that an increase in political opportunities has a positive effect on the overall level of organizational diversity.

*Hypothesis 2: Increasing political opportunities increase diversity in goals and tactics of SMOs.*

### *Countermovement Activity*

The conventional view is that rising activity by counterinsurgents signals a closing of political opportunities, which has mainly negative and destructive consequences for social movements and SMOs. In this view, repression by state authorities and attacks by counterinsurgents hinder protest by raising the costs of activity, deterring new recruits, and undercutting existing support. Thus, repression from either authorities or countermovement actors has been linked to decreased activity in movements, especially those with more radical goals (Gamson 1990; McAdam 1982).

However, in recent years, scholars have argued persuasively that countermovement activity can motivate and encourage mobilization. Goldstone and Tilly (2001:183) define threat as “the costs that social groups will incur from protest, or that it expects to suffer if it does not take action.” In their view, political threat is not a simple inverse measure of political opportunity because the

chances of success created by expanding political opportunities are analytically distinct from the costs or risks associated with action or non-action. That is, increased threat does not necessarily imply reduced opportunities (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). Threat may generate increased mobilization if groups faced with repression try to gain a first-strike advantage or if they perceive the cost of not acting as too high.

Past research has shown that political threats from white supremacists played an important role in the emergence of new SMOs within the black civil rights movement. According to Morris (1984:38-39), repression by white supremacists against the Southern NAACP chapters in the late 1950s “created a protest vacuum, making room for ministers to create new church-related organizations.” More generally, Morris (1984:39) claims that “the Southern Whites’ attack greatly facilitated the emergence of new social protest organizations.” (see also Jenkins et al. 2003) Given that new organizations that arise in response to increased repression or threat are likely to engage in innovative goals and tactics, we would expect countermovement violence to increase organizational diversity.

*Hypothesis 3: To the extent that countermovement activity encourages adaptation and innovation, countermovement activity increases diversity in goals and tactics of SMOs.*

### *Resource Mobilization*

Resource mobilization theory argues that it is not discontent or grievances, but rather, increased resources available to the challenging group that give rise to mass mobilization (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977). Scholars have since explored the effects of two major forms of resources on mobilization: elite support and indigenous resources. In the context of the black civil rights movement, Haines (1984) and Jenkins and Eckert (1986) have found that *elite support* was an important component of the development of professional SMOs. Alternatively, McAdam (1982) and Morris (1984) have documented the importance of *indigenous community resources* in the growth of black insurgent groups.

These findings on the positive effects of increased resources on the ability of challenging groups to establish and strengthen their organizational base suggest that it is likely that an increase in elite and indigenous resources allows existing groups to expand their repertoire of goals and tactics, while encouraging new groups to emerge with new goals and tactics. More specifically, as resources increase, organizations strive to mobilize old and new constituencies in order to garner greater support for the movement. Thus, we expect that a rise in the mobilization capacity of a movement increases its overall level of goal and tactical diversity.

*Hypothesis 4: Increasing resource mobilization – in the form of both elite and indigenous support – increases diversity in goals and tactics of SMOs.*

## **Effects of Diversity on Movement Vitality and Outcomes**

### ***Effects of Diversity on Movement Vitality***

In this study, we focus on one important dimension of movement vitality: protest levels. Protest ensures continued public attention on issues that concern the movement's constituents, and thus it constitutes an important indicator of movement strength. Conventional wisdom holds that the diversity of organizational forms benefits social movements. Writing about the U.S. civil rights movement of the 1960s, Oberschall (1973:230) notes:

"The multiplicity of civil rights organizations using different styles of protest, appealing to different constituencies, mobilizing different social strata, and in vigorous competition with each other... result[ed] in a kind of dynamism and steady civil rights activity that a well-organized, hierarchically led, better financed mass organization might not have provided in these years."

Diversity of goals and tactics in a given population of SMOs ought to increase the size of the mobilized population, which in turn should increase the movement's capacity for collective action. Using an "identity deployment model" Bernstein (1997:553) suggests that "movements choose political strategies in order to facilitate the creation of organizational forms that encourage participation and empowerment." In her view, identity movements (such as the civil rights movement, defined by specific racial, gender or sexual orientation) receive substantial rewards from diversification because strategies and goals that appeal to a broader audience increase participation. Bernstein (1997:544) argues that a "celebration of differences" (or diversity) within identity movements increases the numbers of potential supporters by offering a wider repertoire of goals and tactics, which enhances the movement's chances for success (see also Gamson 1996; Minkoff 1999). Thus, we predict that as diversity increases, protest levels ought to be encouraged, as groups seek to take advantage of previously untapped resources and establish new ways of mounting challenges.

Hypothesis 5: *Increasing diversity in goals and tactics of a given population of SMOs increases protest activity.*

### ***Effect of Diversity on Movement Outcomes***

While a growing number of scholars have explored the impact of SMOs, public opinion and protest on policy changes (Burstein and Fruedenburg 1978, Burstein and Linton 2002; Clemens 1997; McAdam and Su 2002; Andrews 2001, 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004; Soule and King 2006), only a few have directly analyzed the impact of organizational diversity on policy outcomes. Although the findings on the impact of single-issue vs. diverse SMOs on movement outcomes are mixed (Gamson 1990; Bernstein 1997; Cress and Snow

2000; Armstrong 2002), Cress and Snow (2000: 1096) suggest that “most social movement outcomes are probably obtained through multiple pathways rather than through one surefire pathway or set of conditions.” We thus hypothesize that organizational diversity has mainly beneficial effects on movement outcomes (see Andrews 1997).

Given our diversity-protest hypothesis (5), however, the question remains whether organizational diversity affects movement outcomes directly or whether organizational diversity has only an indirect influence on movement outcomes *through its effect on protest*. We suspect that diversity has a direct effect on movement outcomes, independent of protest levels. As legislators experience rising pressures and demands (which may or may not be expressed through protest activity) from lobbyists, advocacy organizations, and constituents, they are likely to become more sensitive to the concerns of the movement (Soule and King 2006). Thus, we expect a positive effect of both goal and tactical diversity on movement-related policy outcomes, controlling for protest activity.

*Hypothesis 6: Increasing diversity in goals and tactics has a positive effect on movement-related policy outcomes, holding constant levels of protest activity.*

## Data and Measures

### *Social Movement Organizations and Diversity*

#### *Black SMOs*

The organizational-level variables (i.e., measures of diversity and density) are derived from the data collected by Minkoff on women’s and racial-ethnic voluntary organizations that were active between 1955 and 1988.<sup>1</sup> The criteria for inclusion specified that a voluntary organization (1) had national membership; and (2) was concerned with the status of women or racial-ethnic minorities (Minkoff 1991). Excluded are government bodies and staff-run, non-profit organizations such as research centers and operating foundations. To compile this dataset, Minkoff used the first 23 editions of the *Encyclopedia of Associations (Encyclopedia)*, vol. 1, entitled “National Organizations.” The subset of the Minkoff dataset that we use in this study includes only black SMOs, which consists of 292 organizations and 4,241 yearly spells. Density is calculated by carrying forward the previous year’s count, then adding organizational foundings and subtracting the mortalities that occur during that year.

#### *Diversity of Goals and Tactics in Black SMOs*

Both measures of diversity come from Minkoff (1991, 1995a), which is based on open-ended surveys by the *Encyclopedia* about each organization’s “primary goals” and “main types of organizational activities.” There was considerable diversity in the population as a whole: 23 distinct goals and 51 different activities (or tactics, as we label them) were listed (see Appendices A and B). The type and number of goals and tactics could and did change from year to year for any given

organization. In addition, there were demographic changes (i.e., foundings and mortalities) in the population that contributed to shifts in organizational diversity.

We used the Simpson Index to calculate the annual level of diversity of goals and tactics associated with the population of SMOs in any given year:

$$S = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^I P_i^2 ,$$

where  $P_i$  is the proportion of organizations in the  $i$ th category of goals or tactics, and  $I$  is the total number of categories of goals or tactics in any given year. This index indicates the probability that two randomly chosen organizations are involved in different goals or tactics. The value of  $S$  increases as the level of diversity increases and it is bounded by zero and  $1-1/I$ . Thus, the larger the number of categories and the more uniformly dispersed the organizations among those categories, the greater the diversity (Blau 1977; Agresti and Agresti 1978).

### ***Movement Vitality and Movement Outcomes***

We first focus on civil rights protest as a key dimension of movement vitality that signals a growing support for the movement's claims and goals. We calculated annual counts of all protests involving civil rights claims made by blacks (sometimes joined by whites). As used in this article, a civil rights protest includes nonviolent demonstrations, marches and rallies that articulate demands for the expanded civil rights of blacks. This data is a subset of the larger dataset collected by Olzak, which contains information about all ethnic collective protests and conflicts among all groups that occurred within 318 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs)<sup>2</sup> between 1954 and 1992. A protest event is defined as continuous action that occurs in the same SMSA, by the same actors, expressing the same pro-civil rights claim, with no gaps of longer than 24 hours.<sup>3</sup> The Olzak dataset is coded from daily reports of the *New York Times*.

There is growing research on possible issues of non-representativeness associated using *New York Times* to construct protest or riot event counts (Oliver and Maney 2000; Tilly 2002; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Earl et al. 2004). According to this research, size, proximity, drama or violence involved, and police presence increase the chances of inclusion in a national newspaper (McCarthy et al. 1996). However, alternative sources such as police records, city-level case studies or local newspaper clippings are often very limited (and perhaps also systematically flawed) in terms of their geographic or temporal coverage. For example, the *New York Times* (Dao 2004:A1) reported the startling fact that the *Herald-Leader*, a local Lexington Kentucky newspaper, "virtually ignored" all local incidents pertaining to civil rights protests, sit-ins, demonstrations and boycotts throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In short, we searched for alternative sources of information on civil rights protest, but we found no other continuous source of data on protest that compared favorably with the *New York Times*. Our measure of movement outcomes is the annual federal budget for the Commission on Civil Rights (CCR).<sup>4</sup> Meyer and Minkoff (2004) found that variation in the federal budget for CCR is a useful indicator of the movement's ability to achieve institutional

goals. These authors have argued persuasively that these budget appropriations are critical for the successful implementation of civil rights policies and that this measure constitutes a good indicator of the federal government's commitment to the goals of the civil rights movement.

### ***Political and Resource Environment***

#### ***Opportunities and Countermovement Activity***

We use two related, but distinct dimensions of the political environment: political opportunity and countermovement activity. These concepts are difficult to operationalize (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), but the following measures have proven to be useful in past research: 1.) political opportunity is measured by the presence of allies in power, represented by a dummy variable where 1 indicates the years in which there was a Democratic Party president in power; 2.) countermovement activity is measured by the annual count of white mob attacks on blacks, which is a subset of the larger dataset collected by Olzak on ethnic conflicts and protests.<sup>5</sup>

#### ***Elite and Indigenous Resources***

We measure elite support by combined annual foundation and corporate philanthropic funding for all charities in 1982 constant dollars. For discussion of this measure as a proper operationalization of resources for civil rights organizations, see Minkoff 1997, 1999. The mobilization potential for indigenous support within the black community is measured by the annual count of NAACP members and by annual membership in black churches. The log of membership in black churches was detrended due to a high correlation of this measure with time (Jenkins et al. 2003). As another measure of relative resources, we use the natural log of the ratio of black-to-white income (Jenkins et al. 2003).

Table 1 summarizes the key concepts, measures and sources of data, and Appendices C, D and E report descriptive statistics for the covariates included in Tables 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Due to data availability, the number of observations in each analysis is different.

### **Methods of Analysis**

#### ***Diversity and Federal Civil Rights Budget as the Dependent Variables***

We conduct time-series analyses for the regression models that treat organizational diversity and the federal civil rights budget as dependent variables. Residuals are plotted over the yearly waves of data and found that, contrary to our expectations, there was little evidence of serial correlation. Our investigations showed that in comparing specifications, the ones that used one-year moving averages fit the data substantially better than ordinary least squares regressions and any other time lag specifications. Moving-averages take into account the possibility that there is a systematic dependence on prior history, specified in terms of lagged time (Box and Jenkins 1976). There was no evidence of first-order autoregressive

**Table 1: Definitions and Data Sources for Variables Used in the Analysis**

<b>Concept</b>	<b>Measure</b>	<b>Data Source</b>
Organizational diversity	Simpson Index of diversity of goals and tactics	Minkoff Data on minority-membership organizations
Organizational density	Number of black civil rights organizations in the population	Minkoff Data on minority-membership organizations
Movement vitality	Annual count of black civil rights protest events	Olzak Data on civil rights protest (Olzak and West 1995)
Movement-related policy outcome	Annual federal budget for the Commission on Civil Rights (in 1982 constant dollars)	Meyer and Minkoff (2004)
Political opportunity	Democratic president in power	Jenkins et al. (2003)
Countermovement activity	Annual count of whites' attacks on blacks	Olzak Data on whites' attacks on blacks in the U.S. (Olzak and West 1995)
Elite resource mobilization	Combined annual foundation and corporate philanthropic funding (in 1982 constant dollars)	American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel (1989)
Indigenous resource mobilization	Annual count of NAACP membership	Jenkins et al. (2003)
	Annual count of membership in black churches (detrended)	Jenkins et al. (2003)
	Ratio of black-to-white income	Jenkins et al. (2003)

effects for lagged protests. Therefore we report estimates of a (first-order) moving average process (without differences) across yearly observations, producing a single time-series model:

$$(1) \quad Y_t = \alpha + \beta x_{t-1} + \phi_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

where  $Y_t$  is the level of diversity of goals or tactics, or level of federal civil rights funding, measured at time  $t$ ;  $x_{t-1}$  is a set of relevant covariates measured at time  $t-1$ ;  $\beta$  represents a set of parameters indicating the effects of these covariates; and  $\phi$  is the first-order moving average parameter reported at the bottom of the tables wherever relevant.

### ***Protest Count as the Dependent Variable***

Following the standard method of analyzing event count data, a Poisson regression is employed to estimate the effects of covariates on the protest count:

$$(2) \quad \Pr (Y_t = y_t) = \frac{e^{-\lambda} \lambda^{y_t}}{y_t!},$$

where  $Y_t$  is a discrete, non-negative random variable, and  $y_t$  is the observed protest count. This is a one-parameter distribution with a mean and variance of  $Y_t$  equal to  $\lambda$ . To incorporate a set of covariates,  $x_{t-1}$ , including a constant, the parameter  $\lambda$  is specified to be:  $\lambda = \exp(x_{t-1} \beta)$ . An exponential function is specified to ensure a non-negative event count (Cameron and Trivedi 1998:3). Here  $x_{t-1}$  refers to a set of covariates measured one year prior to the dependent variable. Because there is evidence of overdispersion in the event counts (when the variance of the event count is larger than its mean), we used negative binomial regression models estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood.

## Results

### *Analysis of Diversity in Goals and Tactics*

Figures 1 and 2 plot the levels of organizational density and diversity, respectively, of the black civil rights movement between 1955 and 1988. Figures 1 and 2 show that density initially increased and then began to decline after the mid-1980s. This suggests that founding rates exceeded mortality rates at the beginning of our observation period, but that by the end of the period, this trend had reversed itself.

Figures 1 and 2 also show that while the number of black SMOs rose (rapidly up through the early 1970s, and then more gradually throughout the 1970s and the 1980s), diversity of both goals and tactics first rose and then declined. Thus, increasing growth in organizations in the later period did not lead to increasing diversity in goals or tactics. What these figures suggest is that increasing density of organizations had diminishing returns to diversity. To better understand the environmental influences that may have created these dynamics, in Table 2 we turn to the effects of organizational and social movement variables on diversity.

Models 1 and 3 present estimates of the effects of exogenous factors on goal and tactical diversity, respectively. Models 2 and 4 include estimates of the effects of organizational density. In both models 2 and 4, the density-dependence hypothesis finds robust support. The first-order effect of organizational density is positive and significant, and the second-order effect is negative and significant.<sup>6</sup> In Model 2, density reached its peak at 127 organizations. Beyond that number, additions to the organizational population significantly reduce goal diversity. The same kind of curvilinear effect holds for tactical diversity (the turning point occurs at 108 organizations in Model 4). This evidence suggests that effects of legitimacy and competition on organizational diversity behave in ways that are consistent with the density-dependence argument we presented earlier.<sup>7</sup>

Our measure of political opportunity – allies in power – has no effect on diversity in any of the models in Table 2. Similarly, the number of attacks on blacks has no significant effect on diversity. Thus, hypotheses 2 and 3 find no support.

In offering Hypothesis 4, we reasoned that because increased availability of resources enhances the capacity of a social movement to mobilize, an increase in funding ought to encourage organizational diversity within this enriched social movement sector. Consistent with this prediction, resources in the form of foundation and corporate contributions increase goal diversity (Model 2). But the same does not hold for tactical diversity (Model 4) once we control for organizational density. On the other hand, an increase in the (logged) number of NAACP members increases diversity of tactics (Model 4), but it does not affect diversity of *goals* (Model 2). Similarly, membership in black churches increases only diversity in tactics (Model 4). The black-white income ratio, another measure of resource




Figure 1. Density and Goal Diversity of Black SMOs, 1955-1988

mobilization, has no effect on goal or *tactical* diversity, controlling for organizational density (models 2 and 4). In sum, measures of elite support (charitable funding) increase goal diversity, while some measures of indigenous resources (NAACP and membership in black churches) increase tactical diversity.

Finally, because leading social movement theories would lead us to expect that protest encourages diversity, we included lagged protest count in all of the models in Table 2.<sup>8</sup> Models 2 and 4 in Table 2 provide support for this prediction, controlling for organizational density. This finding is consistent with perspectives that suggest that when levels of (mainly nonviolent) protest rise, social movement cycles approach their apex, which in turn encourages diversity (Tarrow 1998).




Figure 2. Density and Tactical Diversity of Black SMOs, 1955-1988

**Table 2: Effects of Social Movement and Organizational Variables on Diversity, 1956-1988**

Independent Variables	Goal Diversity		Tactical Diversity	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Organizational Density in 1000s ( <i>t-1</i> )	—	1.434*** (.304)	—	.431** (.152)
Organizational Density Squared in 1000s ( <i>t-1</i> )	—	-.006*** (.001)	—	-.002** (.001)
Count of Black Civil Rights Protests ( <i>t-1</i> )	.058e-03 (.059e-03)	.098e-03** (.029e-03)	.022e-03 (.012e-03)	.025e-03** (.009e-03)
Democratic President In Power ( <i>t-1</i> )	.003 (.003)	-.145e-03 (1.620e-03)	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Number of Attacks on Blacks ( <i>t-1</i> )	-.076e-03 (.120e-03)	-.199e-03 (.108e-03)	-.001e-03 (.047e-03)	-.011e-03 (.033e-03)
Ratio of Black to White Income ( <i>t-1</i> )	.121* (.049)	-.087 (.060)	.016 (.025)	-.018 (.023)
Foundation and Corporate Funding in Billions ( <i>t-1</i> )	.006*** (.001)	.004** (.001)	.002** (.001)	.001 (.001)
Ln Number of NAACP Members ( <i>t-1</i> )	.014 (.015)	-.022 (.017)	.025*** (.006)	.014* (.007)
Ln Number of Black Church Members ( <i>t-1</i> )	.010 (.023)	.007 (.016)	.020 (.011)	.020* (.010)
Time Trend	-1.644e-03*** (.181e-03)	-1.116e-03** (.423e-03)	-.581e-03*** (.071e-03)	-.212e-03 (.224e-03)
Constant	.727*** (.079)	.998*** (.098)	.791*** (.029)	.862*** (.039)
Number of Spells	33	33	33	33
Log Likelihood	126.5	135.4	158.0	160.9
Wald Chi-Square	284.5	1.6e+12	379.2	422.0
LR Test for Density Dependence (2 df)		17.8***		5.8

Notes: <sup>a</sup> ARIMA estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. <sup>b</sup> Levels of significance are \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$  (two-tailed test); (*t-1*) indicates variable measured one year prior to the dependent variable.

In summary, Table 2 provides support for the key theoretical argument that organizational density has a curvilinear effect on organizational diversity, as predicted in Hypothesis 1. Table 2 also shows that resources (both elite and indigenous organizations) have generally positive, though not always significant, effects on one type of organizational diversity or another. Thus, Table 2 provides some support for Hypothesis 4 about the importance of resource mobilization. However, Table 2 provides no support for the prediction that political opportunities (Hypothesis 2) and countermovement activity (Hypothesis 3) increase diversity.

### ***Analysis of the Protest Event Count***

Does diversity have an effect on movement vitality? Table 3 examines the effects of diversity on protest levels. Model 1 is a baseline model that includes only

organizational density and a variety of exogenous measures. Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 add goal and tactical diversity, respectively, to the baseline model. Estimates in Model 2 shows that goal diversity has a positive and significant effect on protest, and that adding it significantly improves the baseline model, as indicated by the LR test ( $p < .01$ ). But according to the estimates in Model 3, tactical diversity does not have a significant effect on protest, and adding it does not significantly improve the baseline model. This result provides partial support for Hypothesis 5, which predicted that both types of diversity would increase protest levels.

Finally, the effect of resource mobilization, countermovement violence and political opportunities on protest is somewhat mixed. Effects of charitable funding and NAACP membership are not significant in models 2, 3 and 4. On the other hand, membership in black churches and the effects of ratio of black-to-white income have negative and significant effects in models 1 through 4. The negative effect of the black-to-white income ratio appears to support grievance theories, which predict that protest declines as the racial income gap narrows.

The negative effect of membership in black churches on protest runs counter to most expectations of movement theorists, casting doubt on the facial validity of this measure. One problem with this measure fails to capture the significance of local black churches, which were arguably more critical to grassroots mobilization efforts than churches at the national level (Andrews 2004; but for a different opinion, see Jenkins et al. 2003; Biggs 2006).

Table 3 provides partial support for Hypothesis 5, which predicted that both types of diversity would increase protest activity. However, only goal diversity has a positive effect on protest levels.

### ***Analysis of the Federal Civil Rights Budget***

Table 4 examines the effect of both types of diversity on a policy outcome directly related to an important goal of the civil rights movement, the federal civil rights budget. Model 1 is a baseline model that includes the familiar endogenous and exogenous variables. Models 2 and 3 examine the effects of goal and tactical diversity, respectively, on the federal civil rights budget. Model 4 is a full model that includes both goal and tactical diversity measures.

Political opportunity and countermovement measures do not have significant effects in any of the models in Table 4, but organizational density and charitable funding do have significant effects on the federal civil rights budget. In all four models there is a positive and significant effect of organizational density on the federal civil rights budget. That is, as density of black SMOs grew, the federal civil rights budget increased (controlling for the effect of goal and tactical diversity in Model 4). Model 4 shows a negative and significant effect of charitable funding on the federal civil rights budget, which suggests that as movement goals became institutionalized, outside funding may have become less critical to movement success. In sum, Table 4 provides partial support for Hypothesis 6, which predicted that both types of diversity would increase the federal funding for movement goals.

**Table 3: Effects of Diversity on Rates of Black Protest Events, 1956-1989**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Model 1: Baseline Model</b>	<b>Model 2: Goal Diversity</b>	<b>Model 3: Tactical Diversity</b>	<b>Model 4: Goal and Tactical Diversity</b>
Goal Diversity (x 1000) ( <i>t-1</i> )	—	.070** (.024)	—	.067** (.023)
Tactical Diversity (x 1000) ( <i>t-1</i> )	—	—	.061 (.053)	.019 (.048)
Organizational Density ( <i>t-1</i> )	-.005 (.009)	-.015 (.008)	-.002 (.009)	-.014 (.009)
Democratic President in Power ( <i>t-1</i> )	.717* (.325)	.713* (.331)	.862* (.366)	.755* (.347)
Number of Attacks on Blacks ( <i>t-1</i> )	.017 (.016)	.019 (.014)	.019 (.015)	.019 (.014)
Ratio of Black-to-White Income ( <i>t-1</i> )	-15.196* (6.584)	-16.404* (7.538)	-20.321** (7.714)	-17.873* (7.916)
Foundation and Corporate Funding in Billions ( <i>t-1</i> )	.418* (.182)	-.064 (.244)	.298 (.207)	-.084 (.263)
Ln Number of NAACP Members ( <i>t-1</i> )	3.833* (1.722)	1.346 (1.829)	2.470 (2.119)	1.008 (2.141)
Ln Number of Black Church Members ( <i>t-1</i> )	-6.947** (2.429)	-6.233** (2.057)	-8.557*** (2.316)	-6.761** (2.091)
Time Trend	-.068 (.054)	.113 (.072)	-.040 (.054)	.114 (.074)
Constant	-12.441 (10.411)	-58.016** (17.446)	-59.447 (40.712)	-70.920 (39.881)
Number of Spells	34	34	34	34
Pseudo-Likelihood	-132.3	-128.7	-131.7	-128.7
Wald Chi-Square	88.7	130.5	141.9	139.2
LR Test For Diversity (1df for models 2&3; 2df for Model 4)		7.1**	1.2	7.2*

Notes: Negative binomial estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance are \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$  (two-tailed test); (*t-1*) indicates variable measured one year prior to the dependent variable.

### ***Comparison of Effects of Goal and Tactical Diversity***

Given the asymmetric findings above with respect to the effects of goal and tactical diversity, social movement dynamics might help explain these findings. It is important to note that protest represents grassroots strength or efficacy of the movement, while the federal civil rights budget represents the degree to which the movement has achieved its goal in effectuating a policy change. Simply put, protest requires mobilization and action on the part of communities and social movement members, whereas the federal civil rights budget requires action on the part of policymakers and the federal government. Thus, protest and federal civil rights budget involve distinct "targets of mobilization."

Table 4: Effects of Diversity on Federal Civil Rights Budget, 1957-1985<sup>a</sup>

Independent Variables	Model 1: Baseline Model	Model 2: Goal Diversity	Model 3: Tactical Diversity	Model 4: Goal and Tactical Diversity
Goal Diversity (x1000) ( <i>t-1</i> )	—	-.004 (.006)	—	-.001 (.004)
Tactical Diversity (x1000) ( <i>t-1</i> )	—	—	.058*** (.016)	.057*** (.016)
Organizational Density ( <i>t-1</i> )	.016*** (.004)	.017*** (.004)	.016*** (.004)	.016*** (.004)
Count of Black Civil Rights Protests ( <i>t-1</i> )	.002** (.001)	.002** (.001)	1.621e-03 (1.188e-03)	1.635e-03 (1.195e-03)
Democratic President in Power ( <i>t-1</i> )	-.012 (.102)	-.006 (.103)	.083 (.090)	.083 (.090)
Number of Attacks on Blacks ( <i>t-1</i> )	.002 (.004)	.119e-03 (4.530e-03)	-.004 (.003)	-.004 (.003)
Ratio of Black-to-White Income ( <i>t-1</i> )	5.324*** (1.496)	6.485** (2.014)	.354 (1.878)	.756 (1.941)
Foundation and Corporate Funding in Billions ( <i>t-1</i> )	-.090 (.065)	-.083 (.072)	-.144** (.045)	-.141** (.047)
Ln Number of NAACP Members ( <i>t-1</i> )	.918 (1.313)	.937 (1.259)	.449 (.890)	.460 (.874)
Ln Number of Black Church Members ( <i>t-1</i> )	3.014** (1.128)	3.228** (1.170)	.528 (1.031)	.626 (1.065)
Time Trend	-.018 (.022)	-.028 (.028)	.010 (.021)	.007 (.025)
Constant	-1.077 (7.573)	2.174 (9.397)	-50.488*** (14.166)	-48.911** (14.755)
Number of Spells	32	32	32	32
Pseudo- Likelihood	4.3	4.7	11.1	11.1
Wald Chi-Square	5.7e+11	3.8e+12	2.0e+12	3.7e+12
LR Test For Diversity (1 df model 2, 2df models 3 & 4)		.7	13.6***	13.7**

Notes: ARIMA estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance are \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$  (two-tailed test); (*t-1*) indicates variable measured one year prior to the dependent variable.

As organizational ecologists have noted in recent years, organizations often face multiple constituencies that differ in their views about what kind of organizational features or behaviors are salient (Hannan 2005; Hsu and Hannan 2005). Similarly, one can expect that different actors and groups within social movements will focus on different aspects of SMOs. Specifically, community and social movement members are likely to be more sensitive to changes in diversity of goals, whereas policymakers are likely to be more sensitive to changes in diversity of activities.

To clarify this argument we turn to research on organizations and social movements. Research on organizations often distinguishes between *core* and *peripheral* properties of organizational forms (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Carroll and Hannan 2000; Rao et al. 2000). Core features are defining properties of organizations that set them apart from other forms. These core properties include goals, authority relations, technologies and marketing strategies of organizations (Scott 1995; Rao et al. 2000). One of the main propositions drawn from this research is that goals constitute the most important core element of organizations (see Rao et al. 2000). Because goals occupy the deepest layer of “organizational depth” (Downs 1967; Hannan and Freeman 1984) they are integral to the creation and maintenance of organizational identities. In turn, organizational identities play a key role in the recruitment of new members in social movements and new consumers in for-profit markets (Rao et al. 2003; Greve et al. 2006). Carroll and Swaminathan (2000), for example, show how the beer industry experienced a remarkable renewal in the late 1990s with the emergence of micro-brewers that developed an artisanal identity that was in opposition to “industrial” brewers. In sum, to the extent that diversity in goals leads to the establishment of new organizational identities, goal diversity is likely to have a greater effect on protest levels than tactical diversity.

On the other hand, policymakers are more likely to respond to increasing diversity in tactics than in goals. In general, an increase in diversity of tactics means the movement is engaging in a broader set of activities, which is likely to reflect a growing mix of radical (protest) as well as moderate activities (lobbying and advocacy) (see Appendix B). Indeed it appears that over the life cycle of the black civil rights movement, there was a diversification in tactics as SMO activities became more moderate (Morris 1984; Minkoff 1994; McAdam 1982; Jenkins et al. 2003). In turn, these moderate and institutionally-oriented tactics are likely very relevant to the policymaking process (Baumgartner and Jones 2002; McAdam and Su 2002).

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

Our goals with this article were twofold. First, we extended theories in organizations and social movements research to explain the changes in the level of goal and tactical diversity in the black civil rights movement. Second, we examined the effects of goal and tactical diversity on movement vitality (protest level) and movement outcomes (federal funding for movement goals).

This article makes a number of contributions to both organizations and social movements research. This study extends density dependence theory to explain changes in organizational diversity. Specifically, results showed that goal and tactical diversity were influenced by changes in the density of black SMOs. Legitimation and competition forces expand and then contract opportunities that shape the level of goal and tactical diversity in SMOs. Results also showed that diversity of goals responded favorably to charitable funding, while diversity of tactics rose with the growth in NAACP membership and black church membership. In addition, an increase in the number of annual attacks on blacks did not affect the diversity of goals and tactics in black SMOs.

Movement vitality, then, is sensitive to changes in goal diversity, whereas movement outcomes are sensitive to changes in tactical diversity. Protest activity represents grassroots strength or efficacy of the black civil rights movement, while the federal civil rights budget reflects the movement's ability to achieve one of its goals to affect change in the policy arena. While diversity of goals had a significant and positive effect on the level of protest, it was tactical diversity that produced an increase in the federal civil rights budget. We suggested that movement vitality and outcomes involve distinct targets of mobilization, each of which responds differently to different dimensions of organizational diversity.

One important task for future research is to systematically map the relationship among different dimensions of organizational diversity and movement vitality or outcomes. For example, it may be equally revealing to analyze the sources and consequences of diversity in organizational age, size or networks. Future research should also explore the effect of organizational diversity on different types of outcomes, such as changes in social or cultural attitudes, a movement's ability to disrupt or moderate public debates, and the creation of committed career activists and organizers, to name only a few (McAdam et al. 1988; Giugni et al. 1999; Minkoff and McCarthy 2005).

Another important task for future research is to further investigate the conditions under which organizational diversity changes over time, extending other theories of organizations and social movements. For example, although the frame-alignment perspective has most often been used to explain the micro-mobilization process of individual recruitment (Snow et al. 1986; Johnston 2002), it may be useful in explaining organizational diversification or isomorphism (see DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Clemens 1997). Similarly, organizational theories other than density-dependence may be useful in explaining changing levels of organizational diversity. For example, Minkoff (1994, 1995b) has shown that vital rates of a certain sub-population of black SMOs depend on the density of a related but distinct population of organizations in a different social movement. This same process may also be involved in influencing changes in organizational diversity.

In these ways, an integration of social movement and organizational theories has the potential to inform our understanding of how and why organizational diversity changes over time and how these changes might matter for social movements.

## Notes

1. Minkoff (1994) reports that as the *Encyclopedia* may have encountered a two- to three-year time lag in reporting newly founded organizations, data for the years 1986-88 may be less reliable. However, we found only a few differences between the results presented in this article and analysis using the shorter time period (1955-85). Details are available upon request.
2. SMSAs are large geographical units that include rural and suburban regions (by design). Voter registration drives, early Freedom Rides, Freedom Summer, Albany and Birmingham campaigns, and various lunch counter sit-ins across the South (see Morris 1984, 1993; McAdam 1982) are included in the Olzak data.

3. Examples of these protests include civil rights marches, mass meetings and demonstrations on behalf of blacks that express grievances related to discrimination or racial policy.
4. The CCR is an agency responsible for (a) investigating civil rights complaints, (b) studying, collecting and disseminating information on civil rights issues, and (c) appraising federal laws and policies on civil rights.
5. We also explored percentages of Democrats in Congress, and measures of divided government (Jenkins et al. 2003), but these did not show any significant results. In these same models, we also explored another measure of repression, the number of arrests (during protests) and the percentage of protests with violence. However, each of these measures depends upon the number of protests in each year, making these measures problematic.
6. As might be expected, density and density-squared measures are highly correlated. If this presented problems, the standard errors would be inflated and the inclusion of both terms would worsen the fit of the model, but this is not the case.
7. We also explored whether or not diversity depends solely on the founding rate, which would imply that innovation comes mainly from new organizations, but we found no evidence for this hypothesis. This finding implies that that increases in diversity is driven by rising density that encourages *both new and existing organizations* to innovate.
8. We explored several nonlinear specifications of protest activity to test one implication of the cycles of contention argument (Tarrow 1998), but found no evidence of a curvilinear effect of protest on goal and tactical diversity. We also examined the interaction effect between protest and organizational density, but there was no significant effect of this interaction term on either type of diversity.

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**Appendix A. List of Goals in the Minkoff Data**

<b>Goals</b>	
1.	Comprehensive/radical social/structural change
2.	Providing resources and/or services to minority group members to increase the group's capacity to change society; "community empowerment"
3.	Improving the status of minorities; securing equality, civil rights; ending discrimination
4.	Increasing political, social and/or economic opportunities and/or resources available to minorities
5.	Encouraging political, social and/or economic participation/involvement of minorities; increasing visibility of minorities in social institutions
6.	Representing minority interests in policy debates, program development, public affairs, social institutions, organizations and associations, etc.
7.	Advocating on behalf of improved treatment of the group within social institutions
8.	Addressing the needs/problems of the minority community
9.	Promoting public awareness of issues of discrimination; arouse public interest in minority affairs
10.	Promoting cooperation between minority groups/individuals interested in minority affairs/issues; uniting minority individuals/communities for joint action; "community cohesiveness"
11.	Promoting awareness of issues of discrimination within the minority community
12.	Promoting self-image of the group, understanding among minority group members; "cultural enrichment"
13.	Promoting the cultural/ideological treatment and/or presentation of the minority group in education, the arts, media, social sciences, and/or humanities
14.	Promoting recognition/understanding of group by society
15.	Promoting inter-racial/ethnic harmony, cooperation, understanding/race-relations
16.	Providing resources and/or services to minority group to improve the group's capacity to participate in society and/or for the increased welfare of group members – without changes in policy/social institutions
17.	Integration of group into society
18.	Promoting "good citizenship/American ideals" within minority community and/or wider society
19.	Conserving existing social arrangements; maintenance of the status quo
20.	Resisting social change efforts
21.	Promoting friendship among minority group members
22.	General social change
23.	Self-determination

## Appendix B. List of Tactics in the Minkoff Data

<b>Tactics</b>	
1.	Lobbying
2.	Networking/coalition formation
3.	Policy/program development, recommendation, and/or design; policy/program analysis, evaluation, and/or monitoring
4.	Contemporary research/information dissemination on minority issues; act as information clearinghouse
5.	Operate speaker's bureau; present panels, lectures, conferences
6.	Reform efforts- activities unspecified
7.	Advocacy – activities unspecified
8.	“Community” organizing/mobilization and/or action programs
9.	Class-action and/or test-case litigation; constitutional/civil rights cases
10.	Leadership training/development minority candidate support
11.	Political party formation
12.	Voter registration campaigns
13.	Direct action; non-violent resistance
14.	Boycotts
15.	Marches, rallies, demonstrations
16.	Collective action – activities unspecified
17.	Political education, citizenship education, public affairs programs
18.	Electoral/political resource provision
19.	Legal services (free, reduced-fees) for individuals
20.	Legal resource referral services, legal education
21.	Legal service/resource provision
22.	Financial aid, adult education programs, vocational/educational counseling
23.	Bilingual assistance programs, bilingual education workshops and service projects, bicultural education programs
24.	General educational programs/resource provision
25.	Employment/career services vocational programs, job placement/referral, consumer education
26.	Minority business support/development programs
27.	Union organizing support/development programs
28.	Corporate consulting, planning program development, and service provision
29.	Economic resource/service provision
30.	Professional support
31.	Community development programs, technical assistance
32.	Act as a community resource – provide resource, referral services, provide general resource materials, etc.
33.	Community education/classes, consciousness-raising programs, social networking, informational/experience-sharing Activities, e.g., panels, study groups, etc., informational publications, lecture/film series
34.	Philanthropy, charity, fund-raising, provision of general financial assistance to minority group members (benevolent societies, fraternal insurance programs)
35.	Social/recreational activities
36.	Community resource/service provision
37.	Mortgage funds/residential integration programs

Appendix B (*continued*)

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38. Health care provision (e.g., medical, dental, mental health care), social service provision (e.g., elderly care, day care, substance abuse programs, youth programs/children's services, shelters for homeless)
  39. Welfare/social service education (including health, housing, social welfare), consultation, resource referral, health promotion/education
  40. Social welfare service/resource provision
  41. Promoting spiritual/religious development of minority group members, through e.g., pastoral activities, religious programs, religious education
  42. Religious resource/service provision
  43. Arts programs/exhibitions, cultural heritage/arts festivals, bi/multi-cultural programs, cultural workshops, media workshops
  44. Performing arts activities/sponsorship
  45. Historical/cultural research, library resources/facilities, research/information center, museum sponsorship
  46. Cultural exchange programs
  47. Social science research/sponsorship of minority issues
  48. Production/distribution of non-sexist and/or non-racist books, literature (including children's literature), publication of minority literature
  49. Media production efforts/activities (including print and broadcast efforts, media consultation, documentaries)
  50. Advocacy efforts, public opinion polls, anti-defamation activities, monitoring of media images/practices
  51. Cultural activities
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Appendix C. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of Independent Variables in Table 2

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Organizational Density (in 1000s)	.120	.057	1.000									
2. Organizational Density <sup>2</sup> (in 1000s)	17.606	12.674	.993	1.000								
3. Count of Black Civil Rights Protests	30.333	38.594	-.587	-.598	1.000							
4. Democratic President in Power	.364	.489	-.228	-.276	.312	1.000						
5. Number of Attacks on Blacks	8.788	8.046	-.483	-.479	.236	-.067	1.000					
6. Charitable Funding (in Billions)	5.696	1.536	.820	.776	-.376	-.081	-.474	1.000				
7. Ln Number of NAACP Members	5.989	.119	.395	.311	.051	.466	-.127	.574	1.000			
8. Ln Number of Black Church Members	.001	.059	-.083	-.127	.146	.629	.070	.096	.588	1.000		
9. Ratio of Black-to-White Income	.560	.037	.737	.668	-.486	-.098	-.320	.732	.499	-.051	1.000	
10. Time Trend	17.000	9.670	.945	.951	-.508	-.146	-.458	.837	.416	.026	.585	1.000

Note: All covariates were measured annually at t-1. Ln number of black church members was detrended.

Appendix D. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of Independent Variables in Table 3

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Goal Diversity (x 1000)	885.978	12.084	1.000									
2. Activity Diversity (x 1000)	951.500	5.647	.795	1.000								
3. Organizational Density	121.559	57.256	-.319	-.133	1.000							
4. Democrat President In Power	.353	.485	.276	.367	-.243	1.000						
5. Number of Attacks on Blacks	8.559	8.035	.081	.066	-.497	-.044	1.000					
6. Charitable Funding (in Billions)	5.768	1.570	-.048	.177	.822	-.111	-.495	1.000				
7. Ln Number of NAACP Members	5.989	.117	.348	.636	.390	.461	-.126	.554	1.000			
8. Ln Number Black Church Members	.000	.059	.218	.486	-.095	.633	.083	.069	.586	1.000		
9. Ratio of Black-to- White Income	.561	.036	.207	.353	.735	-.103	-.323	.716	.499	-.054	1.000	
10. Time Trend	17.500	9.958	-.468	-.210	.938	-.176	-.480	.849	.398	.000	.573	1.000

Note: All covariates were measured annually at t-1. Ln Number of black church members was detrended.

Appendix E. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of Independent Variables in Table 4

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Goal Diversity (x 1000)	886.657	12.094	1.000									
2. Activity Diversity (x 1000)	951.791	5.624	.812	1.000								
3. Organizational Density	122.656	56.305	-.337	-.212	1.000							
4. Count of Black Civil Rights Protests	31.063	38.980	.378	.214	-.642	1.000						
5. Democratic President in Power	.375	.492	.246	.346	-.275	.302	1.000					
6. Number of Attacks on Blacks	9.063	8.016	.026	.011	-.565	.220	-.096	1.000				
7. Charitable Funding (in Billions)	5.788	1.466	-.027	.115	.805	-.442	-.136	-.587	1.000			
8. Ln Number of NAACP Members	6.001	.099	.363	.616	.309	-.014	.479	-.298	.491	1.000		
9. Ln Number Black Church Members	0.002	0.060	.196	.477	-.116	.136	.624	.051	.064	.647	1.000	
10. Ratio of Black-to-White Income	0.561	0.037	.211	.333	.733	-.510	-.119	-.359	.734	.514	-.067	1.000
11. Time Trend	17.500	9.381	-.489	-.311	.941	-.569	-.196	-.551	.819	.314	-.006	.575

Note: All covariates were measured annually at t-1. Ln number of black church members was detrended.