

A Difficulty for Correction

Authorities and instruments of the law in our culture describe and justify the punishments they prescribe and inflict in various, even inconsistent, ways. Nevertheless, the correction of the offender is one of their abiding concerns. For their practices, more so even than their theories, testify to the importance of this concern: after all, reform schools exist in order to facilitate the correction of impressionable young offenders; moreover, psychologists and social workers are present in regular prisons in order to correct more recalcitrant adults by more subtle means; and, finally, probation boards are notoriously more lenient with offenders who repent, or at least feign repentance, thereby showing, or at least affecting, the results of correction.

Now, this unified practice of correcting offenders masks two divergent theoretical concerns: a concern, first of all, to correct offenders in order to deter them, as well as others by their example, from offending again, and a concern, secondly, to correct offenders for their own sakes. Much of this paper will be dedicated to distinguishing these two theoretical concerns. Ultimately, though, I hope to isolate and embellish the second such concern--that is, the concern to correct for offenders' own sakes, or correction properly so-called. Indeed, I will try to elicit two neglected features of this correction. The first such feature will be an epistemic difficulty, the second a political or rhetorical presupposition. In the end, I will conclude that this difficulty can only be overcome by first recognizing and then realizing one or both of these presuppositions. In other words, then, I will argue that a problem of rational knowledge germane to correction can only be resolved by a deployment of non-rational power or persuasion.

In order to elicit these two neglected features of correction, we must first have before us a detailed account of it. Following Plato, the first philosopher to offer such an account, I believe we can do no better, for these purposes, than to consider corrective punishment as an exercise of one sort of human activity which shares features with what we, as speakers of English, usually consider several distinct human activities--'crafts', 'arts', and 'sciences'--but which the Greeks singularly considered *technai*. Specifically, I believe we can do no better, for these purposes,

than to consider corrective punishment as an exercise of a particular *technê*, the *technê* of justice. Before examining this *technê*, however, we must first consider *technai* more generally. Allow me, then, to begin my argument obliquely, with what will, at first, though hopefully not in the end, appear to be an irrelevant excursus upon the subject of *technai*. Indeed, this excursus would appear not only irrelevant but also anachronistic were we not already to grant three features of *technai*, as Plato understands them.

Let us grant with him, first of all, that each genuine *technê* aims to achieve a unique goal: for example, the *technê* of medicine aims to achieve the goal of health; the *technê* of calculation that of accuracy in the sum; the *technê* of navigation that of a given destination, etc. And let us grant with Plato, secondly, that each genuine *technê* also has an at-least-provisional account of its goal and/or the most expedient means by which this goal may be achieved: for example, the *technê* of medicine, even in its earliest stages, could describe the state of health towards which it was aiming, whether it be a balance of humours or whatever, and thus describe the various states of injury and illness as deviations from this goal, whether they be imbalances of these humours or whatever, so that the remedies this *technê* prescribed, as the most expedient means by which health may be achieved in particular circumstances, could be derived from this account, whether they be counterbalances of these humours or whatever. And finally, let us grant with Plato that each genuine *technê* may and should advance from early stages in which this account is rudimentary and flawed, through many intermediate stages in which this account becomes successively more sophisticated and adequate, toward a final stage at which this account will be flawlessly adequate and the *technê* itself will be consequently perfect. Granting, with Plato, these three features of *technai*, then--first of all, the possession of a unique goal, as well as, secondly, an at least provisional account of this goal and/or the most expedient means by which this goal may be achieved, and thirdly, historical progress in the articulation of this account--let us now draw two important distinctions, the first concerning two sorts of *technê*, and the second concerning two sorts of good achievable through the exercise of most, if not all, *technai*.

There are two different sorts of *technê*, depending on the nature of the goals that practitioners of these different sorts of *technê* pursue. First of all, there are many *technai* for which the goals to be achieved through the exercise of these *technai* are such as to be acknowledged as desirable by all, or most people, even those who have not achieved or even approached achieving these goals--that is to say, non-practitioners of these *technai*. Medicine is a good example of such a *technê*: one need not be a good doctor, or even a doctor at all, in order to acknowledge as desirable the goal that doctors pursue, that is, health. For all, or most people acknowledge health as desirable. Calculation is another example of such a *technê*: one need not be a good calculator, or even a calculator at all, in order to acknowledge as desirable the goal that calculators pursue, that is, accuracy in the sum. All, or most people acknowledge accurate sums as desirable. Let us therefore call this first sort of *technê*, that is, the sort whose goal is transparently desirable, *exoteric*.

Secondly, then, there are some other *technai* for which the goals to be achieved through their exercise are such as to be reliably acknowledged as desirable only by those people who have achieved or at least approached achieving these very goals. In other words, there are some *technai* for which the goals to be achieved through their exercise are such as to be reliably acknowledged as desirable only by good practitioners of those *technai*, or perhaps also by mere practitioners of those *technai*. Philosophy is a topical example of such a *technê*: most often one must be a good philosopher, or at least a philosopher of some quality, in order to acknowledge as desirable the goal that philosophers characteristically pursue. Now, philosophers characteristically pursue the goal of truth. Yet, in some sense, *all technai* pursue the goal of truth, insofar as all *technai* may and should advance through successive stages in which their accounts of their goals and/or the most expedient means by which these goals may be achieved become more sophisticated and adequate; for truth, as Aquinas observed, is but *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, adequation of thing and intellect. Philosophy, however, characteristically pursues highly general truth--the nature of being *qua* being, for example--and such truth is by no means acknowledged as desirable by all, or even most people . . . much to our chagrin.

Since philosophy is indeed an esoteric *technê*, in this sense, we should not be surprised that contemporary philosophy departments must struggle for fiscal survival in a culture that compels them to justify this survival to contemporary legislators, administrators and alumnae-- that is, to people for the most part unapprenticed in this *technê*. Nor should we be surprised that faculties of medicine, for example, need not similarly struggle for fiscal survival. For the *technê* that faculties of medicine institutionalize pursues a transparently desirable goal, whereas the *technê* that philosophy departments institutionalize pursues an opaquely desirable goal. That is to say, people unapprenticed in the *technê* of medicine do reliably acknowledge as desirable the goal that doctors characteristically pursue, whereas people unapprenticed in the *technê* of philosophy do not reliably acknowledge as desirable the goal that philosophers characteristically pursue. Let us therefore call this second sort of *technê*, that is, the sort whose goal is opaquely desirable, *esoteric*.

(The question of why the goals of actual exoteric *technai*, like medicine, are transparently desirable, while the goals of actual esoteric *technai*, like philosophy, are only opaquely desirable is, I think, a question of both the highest interest in its own right and eventual importance to the present argument, yet its answer seems to be both thorny and not urgently needed. As such, I will put it aside for now.)

The practitioners of all *technai*, whether exoteric or esoteric, can achieve two different sorts of goods through the practice of their *technai*. For, on the one hand, they can achieve goods like riches, power, status and prestige--goods which we will call *external*, for the following two reasons. First of all, desires to acquire and maintain these particular goods can exist independently of, and thus external to, progress toward, or achievement of, the goal of any particular *technê*, or indeed of any *technai* at all. After all, people often do exhibit desires to acquire and maintain these goods without having ever apprenticed in any particular *technê*, or indeed in any *technai* at all. Secondly, and more importantly, the acquisition and maintenance of these particular goods never constitutively require progress in any particular *technê*, or indeed in any *technai* at all. After all, their acquisition and maintenance by someone require only a *belief*,

held widely--and, in most instances, by those people external to the *technê* by means or affectation of which that person hopes to acquire or maintain these goods--that this person has actually progressed in that particular *technê*. Indeed, the acquisition and maintenance of external goods requires, and requires only, a widely-held belief that one possesses external goods. Power, for example, can be acquired and maintained so long as, and only so long as, it is widely-held that one is powerful. For as Hobbes observed, the "reputation of power, is power."

Now, on the other hand, the practitioners of all *technai*, whether these *technai* be exoteric or esoteric, can also achieve the goods germane to progression toward, or even achievement of, the particular goals of their particular *technai*--goods which we will conversely call *internal*, for the following two reasons. First of all, in the cases of esoteric *technai* at least, reliable desires to achieve the good germane to any given one of these *technai* depend upon, and are thus internal to, progress toward, or achievement of, the goal of that particular *technê*. After all, as we have seen, people cannot acknowledge these goods as desirable, let alone actually desire them, without having either achieved or even approached achieving the goals of, and thus the internal goods available through progress in, those esoteric *technai*. Secondly, and more importantly, in the cases of both exoteric and esoteric *technai*, the achievement of the good germane to any given *technê* constitutively requires, and constitutively requires only, progress in that particular *technê*, so that such an achievement is in no constitutive way helped by any belief, no matter how widely-held, that one has progressed in that particular *technê*. Unlike power, the reputation of health, for example, is not the internal good of health; nor is the reputation of truth, the internal good of truth.

Having developed these two distinctions--between, first of all, exoteric and esoteric *technai*, and between, secondly, external and internal goods--let us now consider a competition between various practitioners of a *technê*: for example, philosophy. With such an example we need not tax our imaginations much; let us simply imagine that the various papers delivered at this conference will be judged and awarded cash prizes accordingly. In this way, having written a paper for delivery at this conference, a philosopher could achieve both the internal good of

philosophy--that is, truth, or some portion of it--and also the external good of first prize, with its concomitant riches, status and prestige. That is to say, these two different sorts of good could regularly be achieved together so long as at least the following two conditions were satisfied by the competition itself.

First of all, the competition would have to be fair in several respects. For instance, because papers are scheduled for different rooms, and at different times, each could be scheduled for a room of different quality, and at a time of different suitability, from the rooms or times of its rivals. After all, if the committee that organized this conference were partial to me, say, so that my paper were scheduled for the finest room, with plush chairs and ample coffee and donuts, as well as in the late morning, while the papers of my rivals were scheduled for early in the morning after the party, in overheated rooms without coffee and only stale donuts, the competition would not be fair. Under such conditions, then, it could be the case that the philosopher who has achieved, from among the competitors, the greatest internal good of the *technê* of philosophy does not also acquire the external goods available through the practice of this *technê*. However, so long as the competition is fair in these and other similar respects, the philosopher who has achieved that greatest internal good could also regularly acquire those external goods, barring quirks of fortune and a failure to meet the next condition.

Secondly, these two different sorts of good could regularly be achieved together only if the judges who award the prizes were competent judges of good philosophy. Now, the judges of this competition we are imagining could be such as to prefer bad, but fashionable philosophy. Under such conditions, it could also be the case that the philosopher who has achieved the greatest internal good of the *technê* of philosophy from among the competitors does not also acquire the external goods available through the practice of this *technê*. However, so long as the judges are relatively competent in judging philosophy, the philosopher who has achieved that greatest internal good could also regularly acquire those external goods, barring quirks of fortune and failure to meet the previous condition.

Speaking generally now, whenever the conditions of a competition itself are such that the competitor who has achieved, among all the competitors, the greatest internal good of the *technê* that is the medium of that competition *can* also regularly acquire the greatest amount of external goods available to those competitors, on the one hand, then it may be difficult for a practitioner of this *technê* to determine whether his or her primary allegiance is to that internal good or to those external goods. Yet whenever the conditions of a competition itself are such that the competitor who has achieved, among all the competitors, the greatest internal good of the *technê* that is the medium of that competition *cannot* also regularly acquire the greatest amount of external goods available to those competitors, on the other hand, it will often be relatively easy for a practitioner of this *technê* to determine whether his or her primary allegiance is to that internal good or to those external goods. For such competitions may present practitioners of *technai* with the opportunity of acquiring the external goods available through the practice of that *technê* only at the cost of sacrificing an opportunity to achieve, or even spoiling the talent required in order to ever again achieve, more of the internal good available through the practice of this *technê*. The example of our conference should help to illustrate this point.

Were the judges in this, our imaginary conference, as well judges in most other similar conferences, to regularly prefer bad, but fashionable philosophy to good philosophy, we can imagine that our competitors, knowing this, might have considered purposefully writing fashionable papers--philosophical potboilers, as it were--in order to acquire the riches, status and prestige concomitant to prizes in this, and other similar conferences. However, were they to write such philosophy on a regular basis, they would thereby sacrifice many opportunities to progress toward the goal of their *technê*, would thereby sacrifice the opportunity to achieve more of this internal good, and might even, were they to make these sacrifices often enough, thereby spoil the talent they once had and still require in order ever again to achieve more of this internal good. After all, even potboilers demand an exhausting, and sometimes corrupting, effort, since their writers must pay constant and distracting attention to the whims of the crowd that they wish to please. Under such conditions, then, it will be relatively easy for any given competitor to

decide whether his or her primary allegiance is to external or to internal goods, since each respective allegiance will motivate a starkly different course of action: a primary allegiance to external goods, on the one hand, will motivate the production of potboilers that may furnish riches, status and prestige but will require sacrificing opportunities to achieve truth, whereas a primary allegiance to this internal good, on the other hand, will motivate an unwavering search for it that will require sacrificing opportunities to acquire those external goods. So likewise, I submit, in any other competition whose conditions are also such that the acquisition of external goods and the achievement of internal goods regularly diverge.

Now, as I will presently try to show, two starkly different conceptions of justice, and thus also of punishment, arise for a given culture depending upon whether the primary allegiances of the individuals in that culture are to external goods or to the internal good of a *technê*. In order to elicit this relationship--between, on the one hand, an allegiance to one or the other of the two sorts of good and, on the other hand, a particular conception of justice and punishment--let us imagine our conference twice over.

First of all, let us imagine a conference in which the primary allegiances of the philosophers who participate in it are to the external goods of riches, status and prestige available through victory. Moreover, let us imagine that only one of these philosophers is wealthy enough to covertly rig the selection of judges. And finally, let us imagine that the only people that could be selected by so fraudulent a process are incompetent judges of philosophy, aficionados of the sort of fashions the production of which that wealthiest of philosophers is, let us say, peculiarly capable. At this point the wealthiest philosopher is thus faced with the following choice: *either* rig the selection of the judges and write bad, but fashionable philosophy--thereby sacrificing an opportunity to achieve the internal good of philosophy, but securing an opportunity to acquire the external goods of riches, status and prestige--*or* not rig that selection and write what-at-least-now-seems-to-her good philosophy--thereby preserving an opportunity to achieve the internal good of philosophy, but failing to secure an opportunity to acquire the external goods of riches, status and prestige. Since the primary allegiance of this

philosopher, like the others, is to external goods, though, her choice of the former option is nearly inevitable; for to choose the latter would be to frustrate her own allegiance.

Now, the moment that the other philosophers at this conference discover this fraudulence they will of course denounce it as unjust and clamour for justice. That is to say, since their similar desires for the advantages of external goods are frustrated by such a rigged selection of judges, they will clamour for more scrupulous supervision of that process, and likely also for a set of rules, the infraction of which will be punishable by a deprivation of external goods severe enough to make future infraction irrational in usual circumstances. The aim of their clamour will thus be not only to render the wealthiest philosopher incapable of exercising her previous superiority in wealth, but also, as a result, to render the competition fair and equal for all, regardless of inferiority in wealth. Nevertheless, because their primary allegiances are also to external goods, we should not overlook the fact that were they themselves to become wealthy enough to rig the process of judge selection--or indeed any other facet of the conference--in their own favour, without the attendant likelihood of being caught doing so and thus suffering the deterrent consequences, they, like the philosopher whom they had earlier denounced as unjust, would circumvent the very rules of justice they had clamoured to establish; for to do otherwise would be to frustrate their own allegiance. The practice of justice, according to such a conception, then, would thereby become, for the inferior in wealth at least, an instrumental means to an external end--that is, the external end of acquisition and maintenance of more external goods than would otherwise be possible.

So much for this, the *external* conception of justice and punishment, one that emerges from primary allegiances to external goods. Let us now turn to another, the *internal* conception of justice and punishment, one that emerges from primary allegiances to an internal good. In order to approach this emergence in the same way that we approached that earlier emergence, though, let us imagine a subsequent conference, one in which the primary allegiances of the philosophers who participate in it are not to the external goods that are contingently available through the practice of the *technê* of philosophy, but to the internal good achievable only in

progress toward, or achievement of, the goal of that *technê*. Yet let us also imagine that the circumstances of this second conference are otherwise identical to the circumstances of the first one, so that, as before, only one of the philosophers is wealthy enough to covertly rig the selection of judges, and so that, as before, the only people that could be selected by so fraudulent a process are incompetent judges of philosophy, aficionados of the sort of fashions the production of which that wealthiest of philosophers is peculiarly capable.

Now, he is thus faced with the same choice as was his counterpart: *either* rig the selection of the judges and write bad, but fashionable philosophy--thereby sacrificing an opportunity to achieve the internal good of philosophy, but securing an opportunity to acquire the external goods of riches, status and prestige--*or* not rig that selection and write what-at-least-now-seems-to-him good philosophy--thereby preserving an opportunity to achieve the internal good of philosophy, but failing to secure an opportunity to acquire the external goods of riches, status and prestige. Given that the primary allegiance of this philosopher, like the others, is to that internal good, though, his choice of the latter option is nearly inevitable; or so it would seem, since to choose the former would be to frustrate his own allegiance. However, I submit, his choice of the latter option is not so nearly inevitable as was his counterpart's choice of the former option. To see why, we must remember the first, and more subtle, feature of the distinction between external and internal goods.

Desires to acquire and maintain external goods, remember, can exist independently of, and thus external to, progress toward, or achievement of, the goal of any particular *technê*, or indeed of any *technai* at all. After all, people often do exhibit desires to acquire and maintain these goods without having ever apprenticed in any particular *technê*, or indeed in any *technai* at all. In fact *most* people, even those who have thoroughly apprenticed in a particular *technê* or *technai*, exhibit desires to acquire and maintain these goods to some degree (though the primary allegiances of these people need not be, and often are not, to these goods). These desires thus seem to be a nearly, if not entirely, ineliminable constituent of human nature. Consequently, even when the primary allegiance of someone is to the internal good of his or her *technê*, like

any one of the philosophers at our second conference, his or her desires for external goods could occasionally become so strong as to temporarily eclipse this primary allegiance, so that he or she is thereby tempted to sacrifice an opportunity to achieve the internal good available through the practice of that *technê* in order to secure an opportunity to acquire or maintain those external goods.

Aristotle observes that the study of ethics by a youth will be futile, since a youth does not effect his moral knowledge, being too easily "guided by his passions," or, we might add, too easily tempted by external goods. And yet, given what has been said about the internal goods germane to esoteric *technai* like philosophy, at least, this is precisely what we should expect. For in the cases of esoteric *technai*, desires to achieve the good germane to any given one of them depend upon, and are thereby internal to, progress toward, or achievement of, the goal of that particular *technê*. Without having apprenticed in an esoteric *technê*, therefore, people will not reliably desire the internal good available through progress in that *technê*. And consequently, any youth who has just begun to apprentice in an esoteric *technê* will have a weak allegiance to that opaquely desirable internal good, so weak as to be easily eclipsed by settled desires for transparently desirable external goods.

Let us therefore imagine that the wealthiest philosopher in our second example is at least similar to, if not really, a youth, in the respect that he is easily tempted by external goods to frustrate his primary allegiance to the internal good of philosophy. When he is not being so tempted, however, he will reflectively acknowledge that it is better for him to *suffer* one of his competitors to rig the selection of the judges and write bad, but fashionable philosophy in hopes of securing riches, status and prestige, than for he himself to *do* so; for his primary allegiance is not to those external goods but instead to the internal good of philosophy. And this acknowledgment should remind us of Socrates' conclusion that "to do wrong is worse than to suffer it". Moreover, if the wealthiest philosopher in our second example has once been so tempted and caught, he will, at least retrospectively, acknowledge that it was better for him to have faced *punishment* for having been so tempted than to have acted with *impunity*; for

effective punishment, we will assume, will have *both* chastened the passion or desire that led him to succumb to a temptation that frustrated his primary allegiance, *and* thus made it easier for him to satisfy the desires constitutive of that allegiance in the future. And this acknowledgment should remind us of Socrates' conclusion that once one has done injustice "it is a greater evil to escape punishment". For impunity would have left that passion or desire intact, perhaps even allowing it to grow, "making his soul festering and incurable," as Socrates says, thereby making it likely that he would have frustrated that allegiance again.

Let us now highlight just one of the many important differences between these two competing conceptions of justice, in order to distinguish them sufficiently before concluding with the epistemic difficulty and political or rhetorical presuppositions unique to the second. First of all, even though these two conceptions may often recommend both the same rules of justice and the same punishments for those who have broken them, they will nonetheless *justify* these same rules and punishments differently. For example, as we have seen, each conception will recommend both rules proscribing the rigging of the selection of judges in philosophy conferences, and punishments for those philosophers who break these rules. However, whereas the conception of justice that emerges from allegiances to external goods will justify these rules and punishments by arguing that they are required in order to deter the wealthiest philosopher from frustrating *other* philosophers, the conception of justice that emerges from allegiances to the internal good of philosophy will justify these same rules and punishments by arguing that they are required in order to prevent that wealthiest philosopher from frustrating *himself*.

Correlatively, in affairs of the culture at large, each conception may often recommend both the same rules of justice and the same punishments for those who have broken them. For example, each will likely recommend both rules proscribing the rigging of the election of politicians, and punishments for those citizens who break them. However, whereas the conception of justice that emerges from allegiances to external goods--that is, external or *deterrent* justice--will justify these rules and punishments by arguing that they are required in order to deter the wealthiest citizens from frustrating *other* citizens' acquisition and maintenance

of external goods, the conception of justice that emerges from allegiances to the internal good of the *technê* of justice--that is, internal or *corrective* justice, properly so-called--will justify these rules and punishments by arguing that they are required in order to prevent those wealthiest citizens from frustrating *themselves* in their own efforts to achieve this internal good.

In this way, an advocate of corrective justice may actually justify punishments to someone whose primary allegiance is indeed to this internal good, by drawing practical conclusions from first principles that acknowledge the desirability of this good, since such a person will endorse such first principles. But how may such an advocate justify these punishments to someone whose primary allegiance is *not* to this internal good, since such a person will not endorse such first principles? In other words, how may a correctionist justify corrective punishments to someone who has no wish, reflective or otherwise, to be corrected?

Now, this justificatory difficulty becomes acute when we consider the spectre of the following epistemic difficulty: if justice is not only a *technê*, but furthermore, an *esoteric technê* (as I would argue it is, though not now, since it has been one of the burdens of this short paper to begin exposing the unique, large, and perhaps insurmountable obstacle such an argument must face), so that desires for the good achievable through, and only through, the exercise of that *technê* depend upon, and are thus also internal to, progress toward, or achievement of, the goal of that *technê*, those who have not apprenticed in the *technê* of justice will have no reliable desire for either the direct benefit derived from the exercise of that *technê*, or, consequently, the indirect benefit derived from punishments that encourage its exercise. Such people will therefore reject as false any first principles that acknowledge the desirability of this putative good. Indeed, as a result of this rejection, such people will contemptuously regard the behaviour of the just as foolish, not only because all of the pains that the just must take to be just will appear to be entirely without intrinsic reward, but also because some of the pains that the just must take to be just will directly compromise their own acquisition or maintenance of external goods like riches, power, status and prestige. And we find such a contemptuous regard in Callicles' exhortation to Socrates: "My good fellow, 'cease your questioning, and practice the fairer music of affairs'".

We should expect, in this way, that the thoughtful among those who have remained unapprenticed in the *technê* of justice will take their own pains to construct elaborate psychological explanations of how otherwise intelligent people, like Socrates, could be so foolish. The history of modern ethics is a museum of many such explanations. Thus, whereas Hume explains justice by positing an addiction to general rules, Nietzsche does so by positing a manifestation of *ressentiment* and the ascetic ideal, Freud by positing an internalization of the father, and Foucault by positing a homogenizing micro-physics of power--to name only the most striking works. Yet Plato once sculpted the characters of Calicles and Thrasymachus, characters whose eruptions anticipate just such latter-day psychological explanations: the first explains justice as a mollifying spell cast over the noble few by the ignoble many, whereas the second explains justice as an ideological tool of the strong for the domination of the weak. Moreover, just as Plato once anticipated these sorts of explanations, so too he provided the only solutions that are available to the epistemic difficulty that provokes them. In sum, it is these Platonic solutions that explicitly recognize and then realize the political or rhetorical presuppositions of correction.

For only in the Republic, or a similarly illiberal institution, can corrective punishments be satisfactorily justified. After all, corrective punishments can be satisfactorily justified in any institution illiberal enough first to compel apprenticeship in the esoteric *technê* of justice before being able to justify that compulsion to the compelled. As we have seen, if justice is indeed an esoteric *technê*, no corrective punishment could be justified to anyone unapprenticed in that *technê*, since such people will not reliably acknowledge as desirable the internal good which it pursues. As an aside, then, let us notice that no corrective punishment could ever be justified to, say, a member of Hobbes's state of nature, or, for that matter, anyone so unfortunate as to find himself in Rawls's original position. That is to say, no corrective punishment could ever be justified to the sort of ideal agent so often found at the hypothetical origins of liberalism. For justification of corrective punishment must be retrospective: it can only be justified in the eyes of

those who have already been corrected, since only they will acknowledge as desirable, let alone actually desire, the internal good achievable through exercise of this *technê*.

Thus, one way to lead the unapprenticed to acknowledge this good as desirable will be power--the implementation of which will, of necessity, be non-rational. For even if this power leads the unapprenticed to acknowledge the truth, it can do so by manipulating pleasures and pains, for example, by anger, deprivation, violence. And yet, a second way to lead the unapprenticed to this acknowledgment will be persuasion--the use of which will also, of necessity, be non-rational. For even if this persuasion leads the unapprenticed to acknowledge the truth, it can only do so with alluring analogy, metaphor and other rhetorical devices--though it might also resort, in desperation, to strategic decoy and lying. After all, such persuasion seeks to instill a reliable acknowledgment that the internal good of the esoteric *technê* of justice is desirable. But, as we have seen, this acknowledgment cannot be rationally acquired by any way except progress in justice.

Now it might be true that power is insufficient to goad the unapprenticed to progress in justice, since it might be true that such people also require a simultaneous belief that the power they suffer in the name of this progress is in some indirect way desirable. If this were true, however, a combined deployment of power and persuasion would then be necessary. Persuasion could non-rationally instill this belief in order that power might non-rationally effect this progress. If this were true, though, we should not be surprised to find this combined deployment within the Republic and other institutions similarly designed to both pursue and promote the pursuit of the internal good of the esoteric *technê* of justice. For in such institutions, apprentices begin with belief non-rationally instilled--in other words, they begin with faith. This faith is only the beginning of their apprenticeship, however. By a schedule of punishments they hope to progress toward, and at some time eventually achieve, the internal good of justice. And when they have done so, they expect, they will then acknowledge this good as desirable no longer by faith but instead by actually experiencing it as such. Consequently, they are not fideists. They

expect their non-rational faith eventually to be rationally justified; eventually--that is, the moment they reach that good in which they have for so long believed.

ABSTRACT

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Authorities and instruments of the law in our culture describe and justify the punishments they prescribe and inflict in various, even inconsistent, ways. Nevertheless, the correction of the offender is one of their abiding practical concerns. Yet this practical concern to correct offenders masks two divergent theoretical concerns: a concern, first of all, to correct offenders in order to deter them, as well as others by their example, from offending again, and a concern, secondly, to correct offenders for their own sakes. Generally, this paper tries to distinguish these two theoretical concerns. More specifically, though, it also tries to elicit two neglected features of the second theoretical concern, what is correction properly so-called. The first such feature is an epistemic difficulty, the second a political or rhetorical presupposition. In the end, this difficulty can only be overcome by first recognizing and then realizing one or both of these presuppositions. In other words, as Plato taught, a problem of rational knowledge germane to correction can only be resolved by a deployment of non-rational power or persuasion.

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