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Morrisville 1994, American Eagle | |
Last Updated: 06/08/09 |
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Title: Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain Flagship Airlines, Inc., dba American Eagle Flight 3379, BAe Jetstream 3201, N918AE Morrisville, North Carolina December 13, 1994 |
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NTSB Report Number: AAR-95-07, adopted on 10/24/1995 |
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NTIS Report Number: PB95-910407 |
| 12/13/1994 | 6/22/1996 | MORRISVILLE, NC | British Aerospace JETSTREAM 3201 | N918AE | Fatal(15) | SCHD Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter |
NTSB
Identification: DCA95MA006 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please
contact
Records Management Division
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Tuesday, December 13, 1994 in MORRISVILLE, NC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/22/1996
Aircraft: British Aerospace JETSTREAM 3201, registration: N918AE
Injuries: 15 Fatal, 5 Serious.
The airplane crashed about 4 miles southwest of the runway 5L threshold during an ILS approach. The captain had associated the illumination of the left engine IGN light, illuminated as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced tp 100% and the power levers were at flight idle, with an engine failure. There was no evidence of an engine failure. The captain failed to follow established procedures for engine failure identification, single engine appoach, single engine go-around, and stall recovery. AMR Eagle training did not adequately address the recognition of engine failure at low power, the aerodynamic effects of asymmetric thrust from a 'windmilling' propeller, and high thrust on the other engine. AMR Eagle and Flagship Airlines crew training records do not provide sufficient detail for management to track performance. Flagship Airlines management was deficient in its knowledge of the types of crew records available, and in the content and use of such records.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
1) the captain's improper assumption that an engine had failed, and 2) the captain's subsequent failure to follow approved procedures for engine failure, single-engine approach and go-around, and stall recovery. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of AMR Eagle/Flagship management to identify, document, monitor, and remedy deficiencies in pilot performance and training. (NTSB Report AAR-95/07)
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001206X02708&key=1
| 1833:33.3 | CAPT: | Why's that ignition light on? We just had a flame-out? |
| 1833:38.4 | FO: | I'm not sure what's goin' on with it. |
| 1833:39.8 | CAPT: | We had a flame-out. |
| 1833:40.7 | CAM: | [Low-frequency beat sound similar to propellers rotating out of synchronization starts and continues for approximately eight seconds.] |
| 1833:41.4 | FO: | 'K, you got it? |
| 1833:42.5 | CAPT: | Yeah. |
| 1833:42.8 | FO: | We lose an engine? |
| 1833:43.6 | CAPT: | OK, yeah. |
| 1833:45.2 | CAPT: | OK, uh ... |
| 1833:46.0 | FO: | I'm gonna turn that ... |
| 1833:46.5 | CAPT: | See if that, turn on the auto ... |
| 1833:54.2 | FO: | We lose that en' left one? |
| 1833:55.9 | CAPT: | Yeah. |
| 1833:58.9 | FO: | Watta you want me to do, you gonna continue? |
| 1834:00.1 | CAPT: | OK, yeah. I'm gonna continue. Just back me up. |
| 1834:03.1 | FO: | All right, I'm gonna ... |
| 1834:03.7 | CAM: | [Low-frequency beat sound similar to propellers rotating out of synchronization starts and continues for approximately three seconds.] |
| 1834:03.9 | CAPT: | * let's go missed approach. |
| 1834:05.0 | FO: | All right. **. |
| 1834:05.3 | CAM: | [Sound similar to single stall warning horn starts and continues for 0.7 seconds.] |
| 1834:05.7 | CAPT: | Set max power. |
| 1834:06.1 | CAM: | [Sound similar to single stall warning horn starts and continues for 0.3 seconds.] |
| 1834:06.5 | FO: | Lower the nose, lower the nose, lower the nose. |
| 1834:09.4 | CAM: | [Sound similar to single stall warning starts.] |
| 1834:09.6 | CAM: | [Sound similar to dual stall warning horns starts.] |
| 1834:09.8 | FO: | You got it? |
| 1834:10.8 | CAPT: | Yeah. |
| 1834:12.2 | FO: | Lower the nose. |
| 1834:13.2 | FO: | It's the wrong, wrong foot, wrong engine *. |
| 1834:14.7 | CAM: | [Sound similar to dual stall warning horns stops.] |
| 1834:14.8 | CAM: | [Low-frequency beat sound similar to propellers rotating out of synchronization starts and continues for approximately four seconds.] |
| 1834:14.9 | CAM: | [Sound similar to single stall warning stops.] |
| 1834:16.1 | CAM: | [Sound similar to dual stall warning horns starts.] |
| 1834:16.3 | HOT-B: | [Sound of heavy breathing] |
| 1834:17.6 | CAM: | [Sound similar to dual stall warning horns stops and single horn continues.] |
| 1834:18.2 | CAM: | [Sound similar to dual stall warning horns starts.] |
| 1834:18.9 | FO: | Here. |
| 1834:19.6 | CAM: | [Sound similar to dual stall warning stops.] |
| 1834:22.3 | CAM: | [Sound similar to dual stall warning horns start and continues to impact.] |
| 1834:24.4 | CAM: | [Sound of impact.] |
Transcript from: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/cvr941213.htm
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