The Problem of Other Minds

In this class, we're now studying the philosophy of mind.
We're primarily concerned with the "Mind/Body Problem". It's important to notice that this is a metaphysical problem.
However, there is also an epistemological problem that we'll will be discussing. This is the "Problem of Other Minds".

The Question

How can I ever gain knowledge, or even reasonable belief, about the contents of anyone else's mind?

The point is this: I know that in my own case, I have a very rich mental life. I have beliefs, desires, hopes and dreams. I feel pains and pleasures and experience a wide variety of sensations.
But how can I know or have a reasonable belief the same is true of anyone else?

Notice, I certainly believe that other's have minds. (I don't hesitate for a second in believing that my mom and dad, my brothers, my close friends, students in my class, people I pass on the street, etc. have beliefs and desires, hopes and dreams and so on.) The question is: what right do I have to that belief?

Notice also that the problem isn't really one about having knowledge with absolute certainty about other minds. (We might be quite willing to admit that we can never know for sure, beyond a shadow of a doubt, about someone else's mind.) The problem is, how can we even show that such belief is reasonable?

As we will see, the problem of other minds may become especially pressing given certain accounts of the mental (given certain accounts of what minds are). As such, the problem of other minds is going to be one of the tests we will use in evaluating different accounts. (Remember our methodology.)