Foundationalism

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and reasonable belief. As I put it in class, epistemologists try to spell out the standards that separate “reasonable” from “unreasonable” beliefs.

Foundationalism is one view in epistemology. Foundationalists offer their own theory about “reasonable” belief. Specifically, Foundationalism is a view about how we ought to structure our system of beliefs in order to achieve reasonability.

The Regress Problem

The easiest way to get a handle on how it attempts to solve the Regress Problem. Remember, the Regress Problem was a problem that arose out of our Initial Definition of “Reasonable Belief. The problem arose out of the idea (stated in our initial definition) that all reasonable beliefs need to be supported by reasons that are themselves reasonable. And this seems to generate an infinite regress. So in the end, the problem is that it looks like our initial definition commits us to the idea that a reasonable belief requires an infinitely long chain of supporting reasons.

In the face of this problem, Foundationalists reject our initial definition. While Foundationalists do agree that most reasonable beliefs need to be supported by reasons, they deny that this is the case for all beliefs. Some beliefs, according to Foundationalists, can be reasonable without having any reasons supporting them. Such beliefs are called “basic beliefs”.

With the idea of “basic beliefs” in place, we can now see how Foundationalism offers a solution to the Regress Problem. If there are such “basic beliefs” then the chains of supporting reasons don’t have to go back forever. Instead, these chains can terminate. To adopt the Foundationalist terminology, these chains always terminate at “basic beliefs”.

When Foundationalism is applied to all of our beliefs, we get a view about how we ought to structure our system of beliefs. To invoke the metaphor that’s central to Foundationalism, we can see our system of beliefs (that is, the entirety of all that we believe) as a large building. We have a foundational layer of basic beliefs, and all our other beliefs must be built up from that foundation. Thus, at the level of metaphor, we can see Foundationalists recommending that we structure our beliefs like a sturdy building. We need to have a firm foundation from which we build up.

Less metaphorically, we can see Foundationalism as offering the following standard for “reasonable belief”.

For a belief to be reasonable it needs to either be:
  • a basic belief, or
  • ultimately supported by basic beliefs.

    • Properly Basic Beliefs

    So far, we’ve only seen the Foundationalists’ claim that some of our beliefs must be basic. (Again, they say that the way to avoid an infinite regress is to insist that some beliefs are basic.) But we haven’t seen any examples of basic beliefs. So, the obvious question is: “Exactly which beliefs are allowed to count as basic?” To put it another way:
    “Which beliefs are properly basic beliefs?”
    And this is a question to which different Foundationalists give different answers. (To stress, Foundationalism is a very broad label, encompassing a number of different views. A “Foundationalist” is anyone who agrees with everything that’s been said so far.)

    Classical Foundationalism

    As a very broad classification, Plantinga lumps a number of different Foundationalists under the heading “Classical Foundationalism”. As he uses the term, “Classical Foundationalism” includes:
  • Ancient/Medieval Foundationalism, e.g. Aquinas’ Foundationalism.
  • Modern Foundationalism, e.g. Descartes’ Foundationalism.

    • Ancient/Medieval Foundationalism

    Remember Plantinga’s discussion of Aquinas’ views on knowledge and faith. Aquinas’ view is a paradigm example of the kind of Foundationalism held by most Ancient and Medieval thinkers. Aquinas thought that our beliefs (both those that are based on faith and those that count as knowledge) must ultimately be supported by a foundational level of basic beliefs. But he had very particular views about what makes a belief “properly basic”. If you remember the picture we gave, Aquinas thought that both knowledge and faith must ultimately rest on beliefs that are either self-evident or evident-to-the-senses. As Plantinga puts it, for Aquinas the properly basic beliefs are those which we can “see” (in one of two senses) to be true.

    So, we can see Aquinas as offering the following “criterion of proper basicality”:

    A belief is properly basic if and only if it is either:
  • Self-evident, or
  • Evident-to-the-senses.

    • Modern Foundationalism

    We’re not going to discuss Modern Foundationalism at much length (because Plantinga himself doesn’t do so). The paradigm example of the view Plantinga has in mind is the Foundationalism held by Descartes. Descartes actually felt that the Ancient and Medieval thinkers were a bit too lenient in their standards. Descartes proposes the following, more strict, “criterion for proper basicality”:
    A belief is properly basic if and only if it is either:
  • Self-evident, or
  • Incorrigible.

    • Classical Foundationalism

    To repeat, Plantinga uses the term “Classical Foundationalism” to include the views of both the Ancient/Medieval Foundationalists as well as the Modern Foundationalists. As such, the Classical Foundationalists’ “criterion of proper basicality” is the following:
    A belief is properly basic if and only if it is either:
  • Self-evident,
  • Evident-to-the-senses, or
  • Incorrigible.

    • Objections to Classical Foundationalism

    Plantinga thinks that Classical Foundationalism should be rejected. He states two main objections to Classical Foundationalism:
    1. The Historical Failure of Classical Foundationalism. The Classical Foundationalists have very strict standards on properly basic beliefs. This leaves it a mystery how such beliefs could support many of our ordinary beliefs about the world, e.g. the belief that the world has existed for more than 5 minutes, or our beliefs in other minds.
    2. Classical Foundationalism is self-referentially incoherent. The Classical Foundationalists criterion for proper basicality can not be supported by Classical Foundationalism. The criterion doesn’t count as properly basic, nor can it be supported by properly basic beliefs.

    Plantinga’s Foundationalism

    Plantinga’s objections, as you can see, both focus on the Classical Foundationalists’ “criterion of proper basicality”. He feels that this criterion imposes too strict a standard.

    But Plantinga has no objections to the general view known as Foundationalism. In fact, his own view is a version of Foundationalism. His own version attempts to make the standards for properly basic beliefs more lenient.

    So, Plantinga doesn’t want to subtract anything from the Classical “criterion of proper basicality”, he just wants to add to it. That is, Plantinga agrees that beliefs that are self-evident, incorrigible, or evident-to-the-senses all count as properly basic beliefs. Plantinga’s objection is that more beliefs should be added to this list.

    Though Plantinga himself doesn’t propose a fully-articulated replacement criterion, there is one addition he makes that forms his positive view:

    Plantinga claims that belief in God can, under certain conditions, be “properly basic”.