Kretzmann

Kretzmann’s paper is a response to Plantinga. Remember, much of Plantinga’s paper is directed against Evidentialism. Plantinga takes his own view to be at odds with Evidentialism. As such, Plantinga attempts to refute Evidentialism.

Kretzmann is an Evidentialist. Not only does he hold that the Evidentialist Credo is true, he claims that it is an obvious and trivial “canon of rationality”. Kretzmann thinks that Plantinga’s paper doesn’t present a threat to Evidentialism. In fact, Kretzmann thinks that Plantinga fails on two counts. He claims that:

  • Plantinga has not successfully refuted Evidentialism
  • Plantinga’s view is not even in opposition to Evidentialism.

    • Refutation of Evidentialism?

    Plantinga claims to have refuted Evidentialism. But Kretzmann finds this claim very puzzling. As we saw, Plantinga’s paper discusses a number of different views and traditions. As a result, it can be hard to see where Plantinga’s “refutation of Evidentialism” is contained. As I explained in class, Plantinga’s official argument against Evidentialism was that:
    1. Evidentialism is based on Classical Foundationalism.
    2. Classical Foundationalism should be rejected.

    C. Therefore, Evidentialism should be rejected.

    Kretzmann’s Response

    Kretzmann disagrees with Plantinga first premise, the claim that Evidentialism is based on Classical Foundationalism. As Kretzmann points out, Plantinga never seems to defend this claim. At best, Plantinga has shown that Natural Theology is committed to Classical Foundationalism. But, while Plantinga has shown that Natural Theology subscribes to the Evidentialist Credo, this doesn’t show that the Credo itself depends on Classical Foundationalism.

    Further, Kretzmann thinks that, intuitively, Plantinga has the issue completely reversed. If there is any connection between Classical Foundationalism and Evidentialism, Kretzmann thinks that Classical Foundationalism is based on the Evidentialist Credo. (As Kretzmann points out, you can take Classical Foundationalism as one attempt to construct an epistemological view that respects the Evidentialist Credo.)

    The 14-Year-Old Theist

    Even if Plantinga’s official refutation of Evidentialism fails, we might still think Plantinga gives us additional reasons to reject Evidentialism. For example, you might think that one such reason is contained in Plantinga’s discussion of the “14-year-old theist”.

    In this example, it looks as if the 14-year-old’s belief in God is completely reasonable, even though it is based on no evidence whatsoever.

    If that’s the correct description of the case, then it seems like a reason to reject Evidentialism. If the 14-year-old theist’s belief isn’t based on evidence, then it seems like the Evidentialist would have to say that the belief is unreasonable. But since we want to say that the belief is reasonable, it looks like Evidentialism is false. Intuitively, Evidentialism seems to say the wrong thing about the 14-year-old-theist.

    Kretzmann’s Response

    Kretzmann claims that the 14-year-old theist does not present an objection to Evidentialism. His response is to say that Plantinga hasn’t accurately described the case. Kretzmann claims that the 14-year-old does have evidence (which is sufficient relative to his situation) in support of his belief. The theist has been reading the Bible, he’s been getting religious instruction from other members of his community and he’s surely done a bit of thinking on his own. (Notice that if the 14-year-old couldn't defend his belief to the other members of his community at all, his belief would seem unreasonable.)

    Plantinga doesn’t regard any of these things as providing the theist with evidence, but this is where Kretzmann disagrees. According to Kretzmann, the real problem is that Plantinga has focused on an unnaturally narrow conception of evidence. This ultimately leads to a misinterpretation of the Evidentialist Credo.

    Plantinga’s Misinterpretation

    Kretzman claims that Plantinga misinterprets the Evidentialist Credo in a number of ways. Most importantly, Kretzmann thinks that Plantinga has interpreted “evidence” too narrowly. According to Kretzmann, Plantinga confines the term “evidence” to only refer to evidence that is both “ulterior” and “propositional”:
  • “Propositional Evidence” for a belief is another fully formed belief you have (that such and such is the case).
  • “Ulterior Evidence” for a belief goes beyond the belief itself to some other stuff (that such and such is the case).

    • Plantinga’s Alternative to Evidentialism?

    Kretzmann claims that, in virtue of his misunderstanding of the Evidentialist Credo, Plantinga’ own view isn’t really at odds with Evidentialism.

    Remember, Plantinga claims that it can be reasonable to believe in God even in the absence of evidence. On the surface of course, this view sounds like exactly the kind of thing that the Evidentialist would reject. But, if Kretzmann’s right, Plantinga’s claim can’t be taken at face value. Plantinga is only allowing belief in God to be reasonable in the absence of a very specific kind of evidence, namely evidence that is both “ulterior” and “propositional”.

    But Plantinga spent a good deal of time pointing out (in response to the Great Pumpkin Objection) that belief in God cannot be reasonable if it is completely unsupported. In his terminology, belief in God still must have “grounds”. As we saw, these “grounds” seem to consist of various religious experiences.

    But Kretzmann thinks that these “grounds” that Plantinga points to in support of belief in God are just another kind of evidence. These grounds may not provide “ulterior” and “propositional” evidence, but they do provide evidence of a different sort. Kretzmann claims that these “grounds” are just the kind of thing that the Evidentialist is interested in assessing. Thus, for all Plantinga’s claims to the contrary, if Kretzmann is right Plantinga hasn’t really said anything that the Evidentialist can’t agree to.