The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology

Plantinga attempts to that the Evidentialist Objection misses its mark since it rests upon Classical Foundationalism. In developing his positive view, Plantinga intends to take a cue from those theologians who offered (what he labels) the “Reformed Objection to Natural Theology”.

Given this label (as well as section titles like “The objection initially stated”) one would expect that Plantinga is going to state some objection to Natural Theology. Instead, what we seem to get is a number of diverse claims without real argument or justification. That is, this is an “objection” unlike the other objections we have seen, i.e. which are arguments to some conclusion.

Plantinga discusses three theologians: Bavinck, Calvin, and Barth. In what follows, I will simply list the important claims made by Bavinck and Calvin. The discussion of Barth is a bit richer, and so I'll examine it in more detail.

Bavinck

  • Argument is not needed for rational justification; the believer is entirely within his rights (with respect to how he ought to believe) in believing in God even if he has no evidence.
  • Arguments or proofs are not, in general, the source of the believer’s confidence in God.
  • We cannot come to knowledge of God on the basis of argument; the traditional arguments just don’t work.
  • Scripture “proceeds from God as the starting point” and so should the believer.
  • Belief in God relevantly resembles belief in the existence of the self and of the external world. (In neither of these do we typically have proofs or arguments or need proofs or arguments.)

    • Calvin

  • We all have a strong tendency or inclination to believe in God.
  • This belief is triggered by a common experience: “The Starry Heavens Experience”—upon looking at the wonderment of the world, the belief in God naturally arises in us.  (Note that this is not the Design argument; no reasoning is going on.)
  • This belief is often suppressed by sin.  Were it not for sin, people would believe in God to the same degree that they believe in the external world.
  • The Normative Consideration: A theist ought not to believe on the basis of argument, for if he does his belief is likely to be “unstable and wavering.”

    • Barth

    When discussing Barth, we finally seem to get an actual argument against Natural Theology. Barth presents the Natural Theologian with a dilemma. (Unfortunately, Plantinga thinks Barth’s argument is fallacious. However, seeing the fallacy involved in the argument will be relevant to a response to an objection Plantinga anticipates against his view.)

    The Barthian Dilemma

    Barth argues that the believer who attempts to do Natural Theology faces a dilemma. The basic dilemma runs as follows:
    Imagine the theist who employs an argument in support of their religious belief
    Barth claims that to give an argument, the theist has two options:
  • She can adopt the “standpoint of unbelief”, or
  • She can pretend to do so.

    • Both options are bad, so she ought not try to give an argument at all.

    “Standpoint of Unbelief”

    Obviously, the success or failure of Barth’s argument depends on what he means by the “standpoint of unbelief”. To evaluate the dilemma, we need to know what this standpoint is, why it is supposed to be so bad, and whether or not the Natural Theologian can avoid commitment (either “real” or “pretend”) to it.

    When in a debate with someone about the existence of God, neither side should start with the claim that God exists or doesn’t exist. (As I described in class, to do otherwise would simply “beg the question”.) Rather, one would have to start with a set of propositions that both sides can agree upon and see where they lead you rationally.  To prove the existence or nonexistence of God (to settle the debate) would involve exhibiting a deductive argument whose premises are drawn from the agreed upon propositions.

    Barth takes this to show that if you want to enter into a non-question-begging debate about God, you must adopt the “standpoint of unbelief”. You must  hold that:

    “Belief in God is rationally permissible for a person only if he or she has a good argument for it.”
    (Notice how close this is to the Evidentialist’s Credo.)  According to Barth, one who adopts this standpoint has an “ultimate commitment to the deliverances of reason rather than God.” (80) And Barth thinks this is very bad. It is sacrilegious in a certain way. Anyone who adopts such a standpoint is putting reason above God.

    On the other horn of the dilemma, you could avoid this sacrilegious standpoint by merely pretending to adopt it. But, for Barth, this option isn’t much better. After all, if you merely pretend to adopt this standpoint, then you are being dishonest.  That’s not good either.

    So for Barth, to avoid the problem, you must avoid Natural Theology altogether. You must reject the "standpoint of unbelief" entirely, which means rejecting the project of arguing about God.

    Escaping "between the horns"

    Plantinga rejects the dilemma. Seeing how he does is instructive in understanding his larger view. He says that we can “escape between the horns”. Why must one who is engaged with another about the existence of God actually adopt the standpoint of unbelief? And why must she pretend to do so?

    Of course in a debate it won’t be convincing to just assume that God exists—you do after all have to give your interlocutor some reason or argument. (Plantinga, thankfully, agrees that it is unacceptable to simply “beg the question”.) But Plantinga claims that there’s no reason to think that the believer herself would have to believe on the grounds that she provides to her interlocutor. She may just be trying to show the person that the existence of God does in fact follow from other things he believes, but she can be up front about not herself believing for those reasons. So she doesn’t have to adopt the standpoint of unbelief and place reason above God, nor does she have to pretend to do so.

    Plantinga’s Use of the Reformed Objection to Natural Theology

    What all of the members of this tradition have in common is a commitment to the idea that:
    It is rationally acceptable to believe in the existence of God without evidence, proof, or argument.
    And this is the key insight that Plantinga wishes to draw from the Reformed Objection when developing his positive view.

    However, Plantinga will also draw some other comments of Reformed Theology. Very briefly, two additional points are crucial when it comes time for him to respond to various objections to his view:

  • First, when responding to the Great Pumpkin Objection, Plantinga agrees with Calvin about the strong tendency to religious belief, and with Calvin’s view about the experiences which trigger such belief.
  • Second, when discussing the Role of Arguments, Plantinga’s response to the Barthian Dilemma will be crucial.
    • Back to Plantinga