William G. Lycan's homepage

William G. Lycan
 

E-mail:  ujanel@email.unc.edu

Another, larger photo, and another


Curriculum vitae.  (Contains links to online publications.)

 
Current course information

        (Honors) Introduction to Ethics

        Graduate seminar on Idealism (with Thomas Hofweber)
 

Recent course syllabi

        Literal and Conveyed Meaning (University of Connecticut), Fall, 2012.

        (Honors) Introduction to Ethics, Fall, 2011.

        Philosophy of Music (FYS, Music Department, with Jon Finson), Spring, 2011.

        Consciousness Seminar (UNC-Duke), Fall, 2010.

        Metaphysics of Mind (with Laurie Paul), Fall, 2009.

        (Honors) Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Spring, 2009.
 
        Philosophy of Mind (with Jesse Prinz), Fall, 2008.

         Philosophy of Mind, Spring, 2008

        Desire and Conation, Spring, 2008

        Metaphysics of Modality and Nonexistence, Fall, 2007.

        Mind-Body Dualism, Spring, 2006.

        Introduction to Ethics, Spring, 2006.

First-Year Seminar, "Mind, Brain, and Consciousness," Fall, 2005.
Skepticism and Contextualism; Virtue Epistemology, Spring 2002.

Science and Religion (with Philip Kitcher), Fall 2001.

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems, Spring 2001.

Concepts (with Dorit Bar-On), Spring 2001.
 
 

Some recent papers
"A Simple Point about an Alleged Objection to Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness" (draft).

"The Puzzle of Regretted Parenthood" (draft).

"Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity," forthcoming in a volume ed. by C. Tucker.

"Davidson's 'Method of Truth' in Metaphysics," forthcoming in a volume ed. by E. LePore and K. Ludwig.

"An Irenic Idea about Metaphor," Philosophy, forthcoming.

"Block and the Representation Theory of Sensory Qualities," forthcoming in a Festschrift for Ned Block, ed. by A. Pautz and D. Stoljar.

"A Truth Predicate in the Object Language," forthcoming in G. Preyer. (ed.), Davidson’s Philosophy: Truth, Meaning and the Mental (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

"Is Property Dualism Better Off than Substance Dualism?," Philosophical Studies, forthcoming. "Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle f Credulity

Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument,” a greatly expanded version of a shorter article that appeared in Q. Smith and A.Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); reaches a different conclusion from that of the shorter paper.
 
 

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