William G. Lycan's homepage

William G. Lycan
 

E-mail:  ujanel@isis.unc.edu

Another, larger photo, and another


Curriculum vitae.  (Contains links to online publications.)

 
Current course information

On leave, Spring, 2012; visiting at Victoria University of Wellington.

On leave, Fall, 2012; visiting at the University of Connecticut.

Phil. 160H, Honors Introduction to Ethics, will be offered in Spring, 2013.
 

Recent course syllabi

         (Honors) Introduction to Ethics, Fall, 2011.

        Philosophy of Music (FYS, Music Department, with Jon Finson), Spring, 2011.

        Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Spring, 2011.

        Consciousness Seminar (UNC-Duke), Fall, 2010.

        Metaphysics of Mind (with Laurie Paul), Fall, 2009.

        (Honors) Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Spring, 2009.

        Philosophy of Mind (with Jesse Prinz), Fall, 2008.

        Desire and Conation, Spring, 2008

        Metaphysics of Modality and Nonexistence, Fall, 2007.

        Mind-Body Dualism, Spring, 2006.

        Introduction to Ethics, Spring, 2006.

First-Year Seminar, "Mind, Brain, and Consciousness," Fall, 2005.

Reference and Meaning, Fall, 2003.

Literal and Conveyed Meaning (Colloquium for Philosophy Majors), Spring, 2003.

Skepticism and Contextualism; Virtue Epistemology, Spring 2002.

Science and Religion, Fall 2001  [with Philip Kitcher].

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems, Spring 2001.

Concepts, Spring 2001  [with Dorit Bar-On].
 
 

Some recent papers
"Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity" (draft).

"A Simple Point about an Alleged Objection to Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness" (draft).

"The Puzzle of Regretted Parenthood" (draft).

"An Irenic Idea about Metaphor" (draft).

"Block and the Representation Theory of Sensory Qualities," draft for a Festschrift for Ned Block, ed. by A. Pautz and D. Stoljar.

"A Truth Predicate in the Object Language," forthcoming in G. Preyer. (ed.), Davidson’s Philosophy: Truth, Meaning and the Mental (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

"Is Property Dualism Better Off than Substance Dualism?," Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.

Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument,” a greatly expanded version of a shorter article that appeared in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); reaches a different conclusion from that of the shorter paper.
 
 

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