Media Criticism

Li Wen


 

Citation:
Article one: Robert Lemos(2002). "Security-flaw guidelines hit pothole" http://news.com.com/2100-1001-862994.html

Article two: Germanow, A. Wysopal, C. Geer, D. Darby, C.(2002) "The Injustice of Insecure Software". http://www.atstake.com/research/reports/atstake_injustice.pdf

Article three: James S. Rothfuss, Jeffrey W. Parrett "Go Ahead Visit Those Websites, You Can't Get Hurt...Can You?". http://security.isu.edu/papers/Internet/Internet1.htm

Summary on Article one:

With the increasing number of vulnarablity, a draft guideline on how security bugs in software should be responsibly disclosed to the public was sent to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). However the draft was withdrawn because IETF, the organization that sets technical standards on the Net, said in comments that human procedures are not its purview.

The author further explained that the proposal outlines how and when researchers should release information on software security holes and the steps software makers should take to fix problems as soon as possible. The aim of the draft is to help companies eliminate vulnerabilities, help customers minimize the risk from security flaws, and provide tools for identifying security holes and managing a company's response.

However, as the author mentioned, the draft doesn't hold software makers to any set deadline to fix the problem. As long as the company is acting in good faith, the proposal says, the researcher should not make the information public. This can actually give major software vendors, such as Microsoft, a breathing space.

The author also indicated that the writers of the draft will try to find the proper forum to turn in the draft.

Summary on Article Two:
In the article "The Injustice of Insecure Software", the authors emphasize on the following points:
1. More and more flaws in software, together with increasing number of security vulnerabilities demands a change in software design.
2. There are three kinds of risks that are caused by flaws in commercial and custom software. Transferred risk means risk that a customer takes by using a commercial product. Owned risk means risk a company takes by building a solution in-house. Uncertainty means that company faces risks regardless of the technology or solution deployed.
3. Software license contracts has always saved software vendors from incurring liability from the risks they transfer to their customers, however it is only a matter of time before a vendor is held responsible for failing to address the security in a product.
4. Software vendors who care about risk transfer should expand traditional quality assurance efforts with security tools and techniques that answer the question "what can this software do that is should not do?"
5. Security flaw persists because: increasing complexity in software design, reduced product cycles, and there are flaws that can't be handled by a single tool.
6. The current solution to software flaw mainly involves revealing and patching. The researchers publish the existence of vulnerability and force the vendors to fix the problem. However patching is only a short-term fix, and has its problems, such as expensive, time consuming, not on time.
7. Researches have shown that investing in security engineering can yield attractive returns.
8. The bottom line of this change is secure software at release.

Summary of Article Three:

In the article "Go Ahead Visit Those Websites, You Can't Get Hurt...Can You?" , the authors emphasize on the following points:

1. Web browsers are not safe. Websites can exercise a lots of control over the local machine through web browsers.

2. Common tools that can be used by web server to gather information from or attach at users include:

  • CGI (Common Gateway Interface): The CGI program can obtain information from the browser user via an HTML forms dialog. As with any program, the information gathered by a CGI program can be processed immediately, or stored indefinitely at the website for some future use.
  • "helper" or " plug-ins": unfriendly or hostile extras downloaded can operate on local computers can do things that users are not aware of.
  • Java Applet: With a simple point-and-click operation, a remote website can download and run a program on your client with no prior indication. However, a lot of the flaws have been solved quickly with Sun's willingness to release source code.
  • JavaScript And JScript: since scripts are embedded directly in an HTML document and delivered to the browser as part of the document, JavaScript and JScript are being executed locally on user's computer.There is potential risk that can be used by server to gather user information. The risk is complicated by the unwillingness of browser manufactures to release source code.
  • ActiveX: Any object, if determined to be trustworthy, is executed by the ActiveX engine with no security restrains other than what is enforced by the local operating system. If the user is running an insecure operating system (such as Windows 95 or Macintosh System 7) and insists on allowing ActiveX objects to run on the browser without signature verification, he/she is leaving the machine open to total control by the web server.
  • Cookies: information can be stored on local computer and passed around to other web servers (with domain restrictions) at the discretion of the server that creates the magic cookie. The action does not need the user consent and is routinely done without his/her knowledge.

    3. The authors concluded by giving tips as to how to protect the user.

Article Analysis (Article one):

Here is the criteria used:

1. Clarity of Language

2. Bias

3. Technical Accuracy

4. Choice of Sources


Clarity of Language

The article is clearly presented, and the language is easy to understand. However the author failed to explain exactly what "human procedure" means in the draft, and how it will affect the feasibility of this draft.

Bias

The article is clearly biased in the implication that the major software vendors are the ones to benefit from this draft. That is, they are using this draft to get some breathing space. Although this draft is written by experts from two security companies, MITRE and @stake, the author failed to indicate what kind of benefits end users or security companies can get. According to the article "The Injustice of Insecure Software" written by @stake researchers, they are obviously tired of having to urge or force software vendors to fix problems. Sometimes it works well, especially with Sun in the case of Java, who is willing to publish the source code and cooperate actively. But most of the time, security watchers are dealing with companies that are unwilling to release code and are unwilling to tell end users about software flaws. It is under this situation that security companies are calling for a standard that forces software companies to take actions.

Technical Accuracy

Overall, this article contains very little information on flaws in software, the causes, implications, possible solutions, and how does this draft fit into the software flaw argument.

Choice of Sources

The article seems to be balanced by choosing speakers from security companies and software vendors. However the quotation from the former is centered on what to do next with the draft, while on the other hand, the quotation from the latter is centered on what benefits they can get from the draft.

Suggestions:

In all, this article leaves quite some questions unanswered, such as what does "human procedure" mean in the draft, how it will affect the feasibility of this draft, how can security companies, users, vendors benefit from this draft, what might be the possible destination of this draft. If the author added those information, it will definitely be a more informative and fascinating article to read.


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