The Historical Press 1862-1645

Allied Occupation

Influence of the Occupation on Media

The Culture of Japan

Government and Media

Newspapers

Television

Politics and the Kisha Club

Conclusion

Works Cited

This polarization of press styles helped to establish the current style of media practiced in Japan.  The modern media can be defined as both a ‘watchdog’ and an institution of the state.  This duality of media was furthered during the Allied Occupation (1945-1952).  The Allies wished to establish a democracy in Japan and thus encouraged press freedom.  However, the Allies’ wanted their political agenda accepted so badly that they censored anti-democratic news reports (12).  The Japanese did not receive full freedom of the press until the Allied forces left Japan in 1952.

There were several factors that made the occupation difficult.  First, there was no historical or legal precedent.  Secondly, the ethnic, social and religious differences between Japanese and American societies resulted in an increased missionary zeal (79).  Finally, unlike the occupation in Germany, there was no cancerous doctrine, like Nazism, which had to be removed.  The ‘cancer’ of Japanese society, as the West saw it, was Japanese culture itself (80).

To make this policy a reality, several paradoxes arose.  In order to crush rising communist sentiment and promote democratic ideals a “minimum control and censorship” of press, radio, film and private communications was enacted (75).  The social and political reforms were carried out from the top-down, instead of emanating from the people (80).  In addition, the democratic revolution was carried out during a neo-colonial military dictatorship (80-81).  Americans involved in the occupation were aware of these contradictions, but persisted undaunted. 

The persistence paid off.  The reform in Japan was widespread and touched every aspect of Japanese life.  Restraints on political expression were ordered dissolved, beginning with the 1925 Peace Preservation Law that resulted in the arrest of thousands of government critics (81).  The Special Higher Police, also known as the “thought police,” of the Home Ministry were abolished.  The heads of the Home Ministry and national police were removed.  Political prisoners, including pro-communist, were released.  Women received the right to vote as feudalistic family systems that legally rendered women inferior were destroyed (82).  Labor unions and open schools with more liberal curriculums were promoted.  As business monopolies in the cities fell, so did the landlord aristocracy in rural areas.  The electoral, criminal and civil codes were revised.  Greater local authority was promoted and the police were decentralized.  All these reforms came under a constitution that both retained the imperial system and established popular sovereignty with a broad range of human rights (82).  The reform was an astonishing movement that was “never seen before in history and, as it turned out, never repeated” (84).

As mentioned earlier the censorship during the occupation played a key role in the shaping of the modern media.  The post-war press drew a great deal of their influence from existing American models for mass media.  Even now, the Japanese readily accept any American or European theory of media and assume that it can easily be applied to Japan (Kunst, 250).  Only a few scholars have challenged the notion that American and European theories are applicable to Japan (250).  This acceptance of Western media was by no means complete.  The modern media system of Japan is neither a pure “watchdog” nor strictly an institution of the state, but both elements are deeply ingrained in the history of Japan’s press.  It has been argued that the media is in fact a “guide dog” that serves as an educator and informer of the public (Gunther, 273).  The Japanese media’s scope and depth of coverage is unparalleled.  This extensive amount of knowledge has helped the Japanese trust the media.  Media coverage, while completely non-partisan, indirectly encourages participation in politics (273).  The media has played little role in creating political turmoil for the majority of the post-war period because participation is done completely within the system.  This wealth of information has made an immeasurable contribution towards Japan’s evolution from an authoritarian government to a democracy and its' people’s evolution from subjects to citizens (273-274). 

Loyalty is considered a necessary personal trait.  When Japanese students decide where they will attend college, their future is “virtually sealed” (Cooper-Chen, 23).  Companies hire directly from universities and once a person becomes an employee, they are almost guaranteed lifetime employment.  Students rarely transfer; so future journalists, politicians and CEO’s establish friendships in college that will last almost the entirety of their careers.  Getting a job, however, is very difficult.  A student must pass several strenuous exams in order to be hired.  For example, about one out of every one hundred people who take the exam to work for the Asahi will pass (24).  Future journalists rarely even attain a degree in journalism because it is offered at so few universities.  Prior experience is discouraged, because employers believe it will develop unwanted habits.  As a result, no Japanese university has a student run paper, and internships by students are discouraged. 

Independence, assertiveness and outspokenness, qualities considered positive in the US, are all de-emphasized in favor of self-restraint, reticence and the ability to work well with others (Cooper-Chen, 18).  These values often result in little encouragement or respect for investigative reporting (18).  There is no ‘majority rule’ in Japan; a vote of 30 to 1 would be considered inconclusive rather than a majority victory (Reid, 80).  The values of conforming to the group has prompted some to say, “Official freedom of speech in Japan is well developed” while “socially Japanese don’t have freedom of speech” (Cooper-Chen, 18).  The Japanese media has been criticized because its “task to help defuse conflict rather than reflect it” results in a good deal of news going unreported (18).  In Japan, an individual has the right to speak out, but if his or her opinion is not that of the majority, it will be repressed (18).

Now that there is a basic understanding of the history and cultural values of Japan, it will be easier to understand the media system and the close relationship between reporter and government official.  Japanese, on average, consume more media than almost any other nation.  There are over 150 newspapers in Japan with an average circulation of 575 people out of every 1,000, which is the highest per capita rate in the world (Gunther, 267).  These circulation rates have been on the rise, climbing from one out of every five in 1945 to one out of every two and a-half in 1985 (268).  There are local, regional and national papers, with the national accounting for more than half the total circulation.  Three major papers, the Yomiuri Shinbun, the Asahi Shinbun and the Mainichi Shinbun (shinbun is Japanese for newspaper), dominate the national scene.  Each paper has a morning edition, which in 1998 had circulations of 10.2 million for Yomiuri, 8.3 million for Asahi and 4 million for Mainichi, and an evening edition, which contains all new news and has circulation rates of roughly half that of the morning edition.  All three papers rank among the largest in the world (268).

In spite of Japan’s great technological advancements, it was not until recently that the press began to take advantage of them.  The Asahi began publishing international editions in 1988.  This was made possible, in part, because eight years earlier the paper began to use the News Editing and Layout System of Newspapers (NELSON) (Cooper-Chen, 62).  The use of NELSON was by no means revolutionary, however.  In fact, most of Japan’s technological innovations of the mid-1990’s had occurred in America some two decades earlier (63).  There are two reasons for this reluctance to use technology.  The first is systematic.  Japanese use four different written languages, and there was no software to combine all four.  Secondly, since most Japanese are employed for life, there were no real cost-saving reasons to install a new, more efficient system (63-64). 

Political news can often be found on the front page and comprises roughly 10% of each paper’s news (Gunther, 269).  Political news ranks third in popularity behind society and local events.  While they carry prominence in the paper, political stories are often difficult to read.  These stories lack necessary detail and are crammed with vague writing, tortured syntax and overly general descriptions (Cooper-Chen, 29).  Reporters often alienate the average person by using language that is intended for political insiders.  Sujimono (according to the related people) is used as the source in about 90% of all political stories.  Political stories often contain vague phrases, for example nariso (it looks as if), ewareru (it is said that), and hirareru (it can be said to appear as if) (29).  The vague nature of political stories often encourages readers to turn to easier stories.

Most of Japan’s major papers are viewed as having leftist-political tendencies, however this assumption may not be accurate.  A survey conducted in 1973 found that the majority of the sampled 179 employees of the top five newspapers had little political affiliation and carried dislike for all parties (Gunther, 269).  The other popular assumption is that while the Mainichi can be found in the political center, the Asahi and Yomiuri are to the left and right respectively.  Editorially, this is true to some degree, but there is only a subtle difference in the articles if any at all (269-270).  As mentioned before the ‘Big 3’ has very similar content and this makes finding political stances very difficult.  Moreover, the limited space for each article makes political stances different to incorporate.  Japanese news stories are almost always devoid of anything but facts.  For example, a comparison of American and Japanese coverage of US-Japanese trade disagreement found that while American stories presented arguments for each side of the conflict, the Japanese media presented no arguments at all.  Japanese news stories were limited to short, factual accounts (270).

The NHK earns its revenue from receivers’ fees.  This economic independence does not translate into freedom from governmental control.  The board of governors is appointed by the Prime Minister of Japan and NHK’s yearly budget and any fee increases must be approved by the Diet.  As a result, NHK is “autonomous from, but somewhat accountable to, government” (Krauss, 90).  This unique relationship with the government does not hurt NHK’s ability to draw ratings.  In fact, NHK dominates all of its private competition in the ratings.  This is partially because the people trust NHK.  In the 1980’s it was considered the most trusted institution in Japan, more trusted than the police, courts, government, business or other media sources (90).  NHK’s news broadcasts have no commercials, but are divided into segments that deal with specific topics.  The top two news categories are Politics/Government and Society respectively (92).  Political news, however, is the dominant topic.  Half or more of the society stories are government related.  A quarter of foreign countries and defense news, the third most popular topic, and two-thirds of economic news, fourth in popularity, have political ties (98).  The newscasts are about information and not entertainment.  The anchors are indistinguishable from ordinary people, and they have no signature sign-offs like their Western peers (92).  In addition to stylistic differences, the content of NHK’s broadcast is different from that of American TV news.  NHK focuses on government decisions, proposals and ceremonies and unusual events rather than the crime, scandal and disasters that are common to American broadcasts (102).  The reason for this inconsistency in content is two-fold.  First, there is less crime, etc. to report in Japan.  Secondly, no news organization can cover all the news so executive decisions are made to determine what airs (106-107).  In this manner NHK determines the ‘reality’ that it’s audience is exposed to.  The Japanese media as a whole has received a great deal of criticism because of its decision to ‘censor’ some types of news.

Until recently, television has had little political impact.  Until 1993, television news only complemented newspapers.  TV often reinforced authority, downplayed conflict and had little impact on elections and political leadership (Gunther, 266).  The role of television changed forever during 1993.  A new Diet was to be elected and for the first time candidates appeared on TV.  The importance of TV in the 1993 election in Japan draws comparisons with the presidential election of 1960.  The LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) had had a monopoly on power since the end of the occupation, but they were overthrown by the JNP (Japan New Party) in the 1993 election.  The LDP party leaders came off very poorly on TV.  Their speech lacked clarity and they received criticism for being “extremely good at speaking a long time and saying nothing” (Cooper-Chen, 43).  JNP secretary general Ichiro Ozawa abolished the formerly exclusive kisha club briefings and late-night chats following the election (43).  The key policy makers for the first time began to speak directly to the people by means of the TV. 

The kisha club (reporter’s club) system is similar to the White House Press Corp or the British “lobby” system, but it can be found in all aspects of political news-coverage in Japan.  Companies pay a fee for each of their employees to belong to a specific club, and each club covers a specific aspect of Japanese politics.  There are clubs for government agencies, political parties, large businesses, and even labor federation headquarters (Gunther, 270).  The kisha clubs are so extensive and persuasive that they almost singularly characterize the newsgathering system in Japan.  The clubs provide full-time coverage of their organization, its leaders and policy.  The clubs are characterized by their formality in organization and rigid exclusivity.  Until 1993, freelance reporters, foreign journalist, political party journalist, union journalist, religious papers and magazine reporters were denied membership (271).  The club acts as a middleman for reporters and their sources by providing services such as hosting press conferences.  Each club, however, has a written set of rules that governs publication and release of information.  If these rules are broken, membership is lost and in-turn a reporter loses access to information.  In addition to the official events, such as press conferences, there are also yomawari or youchi sessions (late-night information sessions) (272).  These settings are always informal and often take place at a government official’s home.  While the yomawari is going on the official’s wife typically serves the journalist food and alcohol (272).  The information gathered at yomawari and at kondan (background talks) is often more valuable to editors than information given at formal events (Cooper-Chen, 31-32). 

Kisha clubs first appeared in 1890.  They were created to counteract governmental attempts to prevent reporters from covering certain stories (Foster, 41).  The clubs quickly became restricted, and non-members were denied coverage of stories.  Soon after the establishment of the clubs, the government realized it would be easier to work with them rather than against them.  This was the beginning of the relationship between journalist and politicians that defines the kisha clubs.  By the early 1900’s, the kisha clubs were increasing exponentially in number (55).  Important government ministries often had several clubs.  The Defense Ministry for example had one club for covering defense policy and another for covering human-interest stories, such as what happens to a solider when he went to war (58).  Once Japan fell under military rule in the early 1930’s, the kisha clubs and the media became little more than the propaganda branch of the government (69).  As the importance of the media fell, so did the number of clubs.  The military hoped to not only censor the media, but to one day control it completely (70).  The clubs continued to struggle during the occupation, but after 1952, they once again became a powerful institution. 

Today, the system allows reporters full access to news and policy, but reporters rarely take advantage of this access.  As a result, the majority of reporting in Japan is based on official pronouncements and kisha briefings.  Reporters often refrain from printing private, sensitive or potentially embarrassing information (192).  Japanese journalists do little digging to get their stories.  Journalists also have limited access to public documents because few jurisdictions in Japan have freedom of information laws.  When reporters do have access to these documents they will often discover divergences between the document’s information and the official information.  The lack of a national freedom of information law also makes it virtually impossible for journalist to confirm their stories (190). 

Journalists also do not take advantage of their information because they develop personal relationships with government officials.  Reporters often offer “personal counsel and suggestions” to Diet members during negotiations (32).  There are also several types of kisha reporters.  Regular kisha clubs cover non-political news and are usually assigned to an entire ministry or company.  Political kisha only cover politics.  It is in this branch of the system where reporters develop such close connections to politicians.  The Ban kisha are a sub-division of the political kisha, but they are assigned to a particular politician.  Social Affairs kisha cover human-interest stories and are the only kisha journalist that will cover scandal.  The final type of reporter does not belong to a kisha at all.  The yugun are roving reporters that have no assigned ‘beat.’  Japanese journalists take a division of labor approach to reporting that results in each reporter only covering their particular ‘beat.’  Policy reporters, for example, will never cover a political scandal.  This division of labor leads to some stories never getting reported.  These relationships are part of a larger censorship that the kisha takes part in almost daily. 

The kisha system is, at its worst, the ultimate form of gatekeeping.  Gatekeeping occurs when a news organization insider or outsider willfully attempts to thwart the public from receiving information (Foster, 31).  The kisha system allows both insiders and outsiders to practice this form of censorship.  On the one hand, sources often withhold information or threaten removal from the club if certain information is published.  On the other hand, reporters often work as a team with other employees from their paper.  These teams decide what information to include and what to exclude.  Major stories bring teams from rival papers together.  These teams of reporters confer over content ranging from leads to which quotes to include (35-36).  The kisha system gives government officials the ability to determine the news.

The kisha system is very unique and has advantages as well as disadvantages.  The most important aspect of the system is that it provides the public with a first hand look into the world of national politics.  Every step of the policy making process is documented and reported by members of the club (Gunther, 271).  In addition, the system meets the Japanese need for harmony.  With the kisha system, every reporter is guaranteed the same information and will never miss a story.  The consequences, when looked at from an American perspective, far outweigh the advantages.  First, the clubs encourage uniformity, not only in what is covered but also in coverage methods (270).  Secondly, the constant interaction between journalists leads to uniformity in priorities and approaches.  The clubs are similar to ‘pack journalism’ in many respects.  Finally, and most importantly, the club system forces journalist to be dependent of government officials for their information.  A reporter who alienates an official by printing news the official considers unacceptable to print loses his or her main source on all future stories and risks losing membership in the club.  The threat of alienation leads the elite media to do little, if any, investigative reporting.  The elite media, however, will pursue a story once it has gone public. 
 

Japan is, in many respects, a Western nation.  Fundamentally, however, Japan is a unique nation.  The kisha clubs and the Japanese media as a whole are illustrative of the unique approach Japanese take towards public policy.  Society and societal harmony are more important than individuality.  Information is restricting so it will not cause social upheaval.  News coverage is simplified so that no one will be offended.  Reporters are taught to conform to the group and to ignore stories that are not within their ‘beat.’  The media is neither a ‘watchdog’ nor an apparatus of the state.  It is something unique, something that wavers between those two extremes.  Despite acceptance of Western values, symbolized by a democratic constitution, Japan holds on to its cultural values.  The Japanese approach to media and society is unique, and while critics claim the media is corrupt, it is the only system that can maintain Japan’s balance of traditional culture and modern freedom.

Dower, John W.  Embracing Defeat: Japan in The Wake of World War II.  New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.,         1999.

Foster, Hal.  The Evolution of Japan's Press Club System.  Chapel Hill, North Carolina: 1998.

Gunther, Richard and Anthony Mughan, eds.  Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective.  Cambridge, UK:             Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Krauss, Ellis S. and Susan J. Pharr.  Media and Politics in Japan.  Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1996.

Kunst, William B. Gudy, ed. Communication in Japan and the United States.  Albany, New York: State University of New         York Press, 1993.

Reid, T.R.  Confucius Lives Next Door: What Living in the East Teaches Us About Living in theWest.  New York: Vintage         Books, 1999.