DEMOCRACY PROMOTION & THE E.U., U.S. FORMULAS:
PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES OR POTENTIAL RIVALRIES?

Imtiaz Hussain
Department of International Studies
Universidad Iberoamericana
Mexico City, DF--01210
imtiaz.hussain@uia.mx

Prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association convention,
Montréal, Canada, May 2007
Abstract:

Why do we think more of the United States (US) than the European Union (EU) when we discuss Afghani or Iraqi democratization, and EU more than US when it is East European? Should not democratization be the same?

A comparative study asks what democracy has historically meant in the two regions, how democratization has been spelled out, why instruments utilized differ, and where democracy lies in the broader global leadership context. Neither treats democracy as a vital interest, but differences abound: (a) While the US shifted from relative bottom-up to top-down democracy, the EU added bottom-up to its top-down approach; (b) the US interprets democracy as the ends of other policy interests, the EU treats it as the means to other goals; and (c) flexible US instruments contrast with rigid EU counterparts. Among the implications: (a) the 4-stage US approach has wider global reach than EU’s multi-dimensional counterpart, but EU’s regional approach sinks deeper than the US’s; (b) human rights find better EU than US anchors; (c) whereas the US approach makes intergovernmental actions the sine qua non of democratization, the EU admixture of intergovernmentalism, transnationalism, and supranationalism, adapts quid pro quo dynamics, promotes incremental growth, and broadens democracy; and (d) competitive democratization patterns creates lock-ins for both recipient and supplier countries.
Scanning the democratization map, why is the United States (US) behind the Afghani or Iraqi steering wheel and not the European Union (EU), and similarly why the EU behind East European’s efforts and not US? Neither the EU conveyed disinterest in democratizing Afghanistan and Iraq nor the US East European countries, but is the democratization formula the same? Must it be so?

A first-cut response might point to geographical proximity pushing the EU more into East Europe than Afghanistan and Iraq, and strategic interests driving the US into Afghanistan and Iraq, much as they led the US into Germany and Japan after World War II. Different triggers conceivably produced dissimilar democratization formulas, but one might argue if democracy is the bottom-line in both, why worry, would not the end-product be similar? Yet, by reassessing a critical assumption that EU and US have similar meanings of democracy, other pertinent questions arise: How do they go about the democratization processes? What instruments do they utilize? Where in the larger scheme of internal and international interests do they position democracy?

Whether the EU and US have been on the same policy wavelength since the Cold War ended or not is a broader literary debate.¹ Much has been written about how they compete over trade policies and market access,² respond differently to environmental protection and human rights safeguards,³ and take distinctive stands over, for example, the

---

²A number of articles address these in Thomas L. Ilgen, ed., Hard power, Soft Power of transatlantic Relations (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2006);
place and role of the United Nations or other organizational visions, the need for regime-change in defectively structured countries, the efficiency of collective action over individual state pursuits, and increasingly over an area of enormous and successful past cooperation—the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). Does democracy also show a transatlantic divergence?

Taking a stab at the transatlantic democratization puzzle, this study explores what democracy means on either side, how is it to be gotten, and where to place it among other state interests. Four sections address the definition of democracy, processes of democratization, the instruments of democratization, and placement of democracy in the larger sphere. Conclusions are drawn and implications projected thereafter.

Meaning of Democracy:

Beginning with generic definitions, this section then traces how democracy evolved structurally on either side of the Atlantic.

---

4 Jürgen Habermas, *The Divided West* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006).
**Working Definition:**

Stemming from *demos* and *kratos*, the Greek for people and rule, respectively, democracy represents a different form of governance but whose minimum qualifications still remain contentious. In his historical study of the two “comings” of democracy, John Dunn succinctly describes democracy as “a state in which sovereignty . . . is exercised by a council composed of the common multitude.”\(^7\) Jack Plano and Milton Greenberg, in turn, distinguish between “direct and indirect democracy,”\(^8\) while Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl specify conditions of democracy. Among them: a regime or system of governance, a public realm of norms of choices, citizenship, competition, majority rule, cooperation, and representativeness.\(^9\) From democracy’s second “coming,” beginning in the 18th Century and spilling on to the 20\(^{th}\) Century, George Sørensen highlights the role of civil society, thus introducing the well-spring of more sublime and subtle wrinkles.\(^10\)

As part and parcel of this second coming, John Stuart Mill and Joseph Schumpeter placed plural voting and people’s will--two relevant wrinkles--under the microscope. With plural voting, Mill argued, the vote of the “wiser and more talented” would become more useful than that of “the ignorant and less able,” even though the end-goal of liberty is sought by both.\(^11\) Schumpeter similarly challenged the notion of democracy in Dunn’s first coming, that is, in classical Greece, as representing “the will of the people” seeking “the common good,” when in practice it basically creates an “institutional arrangement” by which “individuals acquire the power to decide by means

---

\(^9\) Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What democracy is . . . and is not,” *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 3 (Summer 1991).
\(^11\) From ibid.
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”\textsuperscript{12} Levels of education, institutional capacities, and how power is translated can take the people’s will and the search for common goods in entirely different directions, breeding varieties of democracy.

Based on these extrapolations and nuances, Robert A. Dahl’s “rule of the many,” what he called polyarchy instead of democracy,\textsuperscript{13} offers a widely respected political democracy framework of 3 opportunities, 8 institutional guarantees, and 3 dimensions.\textsuperscript{14} Citizens must have opportunities, he argues, to (a) formulate preferences; (b) convey these preferences publicly through individual and collective means; and (c) have those preferences considered by the government. These must be augmented by institutional guarantees to (a) form and join organizations freely: (b) express liberty; (c) vote; (d) be eligible for public office; (e) compete for support and vote by political leaders; (f) provide alternate sources of information; (g) have free and fair elections; and (h) make government policies depend on votes and other forms of expression. The emerging political democracy, he argues, permits (a) competition, (b) participation, and (c) civil and political liberties. In short, dahlian democracy features contestation and participation.

\textit{Transatlantic Evolution:}

Shifting from definitions to transatlantic playing fields shows how quite different democratic structures developed. On one shore emerged a more top-down democracy, on

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{14}]By “widely respected,” I mean serving as the well-spring of theoretical formulations, as in Samuel P. Huntington, \textit{The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century} (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), esp. 6-9; Sørensen, \textit{Democracy and Democratization}, 11-6; Renske Doorenspleet, \textit{Democratic Transitions: Exploring the Structural Sources of the Fourth Wave} (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 14-22; as well as Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, \textit{The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution} (Houndsmills, Basingtoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 28-9. The list is only partial.
\end{itemize}
the other a relatively more bottom-up counterpart. Both top-down and bottom-up concepts expose hypothetically different dynamics and state structures: top-down reflects bourgeoisie interests and greater state centralization, bottom-up mass interests and decentralization. Arguably at stake were land ownership and vested interests. The more the land belonged to the aristocrats, the more likely the route to democracy would be top-down and the state centralized. Great Britain is the classic example. Conversely, the more common people had access to land ownership, the more likely the route to democracy would show a bottom-up flavor, without fully becoming bottom-up, and greater respect for decentralized government. The United States fits this bill. Similarly with vested interests: the longer land is owned, or a business is operated, the more vested the interests become; and contrariwise, the more recent land ownership or brevity of business enterprises, the less the vested interests. The deeper the cleavages, the higher the chances the society will be top-down, and likewise, the more shallow those cleavages, the more likelihood of a bottom-up orientation.

Alexis de Tocqueville, who noted several of these patterns during his 1831-32 US visit, left some rather striking US-European comparisons, or rather contrasts. He associated sovereignty, for example, with the people in the United States but with

---

15 How both approaches are defined depends, in part, on the context. My usage here is similar to Paul G. Buchanan’s, with top-down representing “a gradual liberalization and political opening followed by competitive elections,” and bottom-up “when civil society mobilizes and expands the range of its demands while moving to secure a greater voice in the governmental decision making process.” See Buchanan, “From military rule in Argentina and Brazil,” Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, ed. Hans Binnendijk (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1987), 224, but see 223-33. Other definitions later in this paper is consistent with these.
17 Ibid., ch. 3.
monarchs and princes.\textsuperscript{18} Since there was a lot of land to own in the US, people spread out, built townships and associations, and lived as if born-free of vested interests; by contrast, European land was limited, spoken for, and managed from the center by princes, nobles, or monarchs. With its bottom-up and decentralized structures and fewer vested interests, the United States contrasted the European top-down, centralized counterpart where vested interests were dense and deep. Exceptions, of course, exist: land-ownership was concentrated on too few a group originally in the United States, even creating an aristocracy, for example, in the southern states; while in Europe, England’s 16\textsuperscript{th} Century enclosure movement invited mass participation and democracy far ahead of bottom-up US,\textsuperscript{19} and certainly continental Europe. One caricatures a stratified, and thereby socially more closed Europe, another a more horizontal, thus more socially open, US.

These distinctions matter today. Since citizenship carries the right to vote, immigrants acquire citizenship faster in the United States than they do in Europe. The European case is complicated by EU membership. Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty adopted European citizenship, European immigrants in other European countries cannot always get the right to vote or be elected. At the time of the treaty, only five countries permitted this (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden), seven did not (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg), while three lay in between (Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom).\textsuperscript{20} Only until very recently, blood was the only passport to German citizenship; but birth and naturalization have always been the US

counterparts. Even though Abraham Lincoln’s democracy “of the people, by the people, and for the people” was fulfilled several decades after his time when women got the right to vote in 1920 and Afro-Americans in 1964, US citizens can make stronger claims to Lincoln’s expectations than many Europeans can in their own country.

Even more relevant to the present study, since the US had elements of democracy from its very birth while European countries had to adapt various monarchies to democracy, it is quite ironic how the US is more a regime-change advocate today than the European countries. One of the triggers behind US-led democratization today is the need for regime-change, evident in Afghanistan and Iraq; yet when the European Community encouraged the East European democratization movements in the 1980s, we did not hear as much of regime-change trigger as the deployment of inter-governmental, transnational, and non-governmental agencies to fuel democracy-mindedness.

How democracy evolved on both sides of the Atlantic, then, demonstrates quite different adjustments, with class barriers spearheading the inclusion processes across stratified Europe and gender, race, as well as immigration the agents of making US democracy more representative. Whereas the slower European adjustment created more representative institutions, for example, the British House of Commons, the US adjustment proved more open to diversification--to include other groups.

*Process of Democratization:*

To capture both different perspectives and various nuances, democratization is disaggregated into four strands: (a) meaning of democratization; (b) nation versus state-building distinction; (c) functional levels of analysis; and (d) pathways in the literature.

*Meaning of Democratization:*
Whereas the US initiates democratization through regime-change, European countries increasingly nurture ongoing democratic processes. In the relevant literatures, regime-change is treated under democratic transition, while democratic processes fall under consolidation. Democratization flows from both.

According to Huntington, democratization involves three broad tasks: (a) end the authoritarian regime; (b) install a democratic regime; and (c) consolidate the democratic regime. Whereas the United States makes the first the necessary condition, European countries, through the EU, prioritize the third, believing regime-change can be induced through policy changes than military-driven regime-removal. Whereas US intervention knows no geographical boundaries, European democratic consolidation shows a rough geographically concentric pattern reflecting proximity: greater emphasis on neighboring countries than on distant ones.

Just from the meaning of the term, we find two very different orientations. Whereas force-usage changes the status quo in the US conceptualization, the EU counterpart threatens the status-quo less, and in fact, is willing to work within it. Similarly, the geographical open-ended US engagement differs from the proximity-driven EU meaning. Both these differences spell a third: the nuts and bolts of democratization may be less important to the US than to the EU, meaning by simply and officially changing the ideology suffices for the US but may not satisfy the EU.

Not to say similarities do not exist. Both believe the end-goal should not only be democracy, but also that democracy is implicitly a better and more efficient form of government. The US would not want a regime changed by democracy if democracy was not capable of offering a higher threshold of performances or satisfying interests better;

21Huntington, op. cit., 35.
and the EU would not admit members unless a democratic government existed, capable of fulfilling the necessary policy adjustments.

**Nation versus State-building: Functional Identity**

Neither nation-building nor state-building are new labels. Nation-building enjoys a long literary history reflecting the evolution of citizenship, and particularly so in post-World War II newly independent countries; state-building also captures transitional countries, whether shifting from conflict, colonialism, or authoritarianism. What is fascinating in reviving both terms is the explicit association with democratization, rather than leaving that connection implicit or as an assumption. Among the implications: (a) the greater distinction between state and society; and (b) possible linkages between both, perhaps as stages toward democracy or in some sequential fashion.

Francis Fukuyama’s distinctions between state-building and nation-building take us farther. Whereas state-building to him is concerned with “creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collecting agencies, health and education systems, and the like,” nation-building prioritizes “creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind people together as a nation.” Returning to some prior discussions, state-building reflects

---


top-down dynamics and nation-building bottom-up. With the US preferring the former and the EU emphasizing both, we notice another historical reversal: As the US itself became more bottom-up after extending voting rights, it increasingly advocated top-down democracy elsewhere; but the top-down European pattern, though not completely reversed, is certainly more diversified across Europe today than ever before.

How do we explain these changes? One response is to distinguish between the domestic and external contexts, between domestic and foreign policy interests. The US was bottom-up only in comparison to the typical European state, but as soon as voting rights became more universal by the 1920s, exporting democracy climbed the policy-making agenda ranks. Woodrow Wilson spoke of “making the world safe for democracy” almost as the suffragette movement entered its last protest lap before acquiring voting rights. Championing democracy abroad by one of the few countries to have been born with democratic propensities was as natural as the growing global power distribution change was to pushing the US to claim world leadership at the League of Nations. Perhaps the two trends were more formally related: Global leadership was transiting from purely military determination towards the demonstration of a domestic, “civilized” order to ostensibly “less civilized” others; and certainly as a unique form of government, in a world filled with colonies and mandates ruled largely by European empires, the US could champion the new order. Democratization distinguished the old world from the new.

Europe’s bottom-up supplement to a top-down appraisal depended on a domestic-international link. Having acquired democracy though trials and errors across centuries, West European countries knew of no other way for democracy to be established than fidgeting with democratization procedures. Regime-change was not only not an option
since it was a policy approach of the strong, but also an illegitimate democratic action since it involved military intervention, which, a long line of philosophers from Dunn’s second coming, such as Immanuel Kant through his 1795 *Perpetual Peace*,\(^{27}\) refused to associate with democracy: Democracy could accept defensive wars, but not initiate them. Here too the relative power factor also proved influential. European countries were not interested in seeking global leadership roles, least of all resort to force on the same continent or with former colonies. They sought an economic club, had a different democratic stripe to demonstrate, and believed it pragmatic to pursue a two-track top-down, bottom-up approach to fulfill their goals.

While regime-change necessitates a functional state immediately, state-building must pave the way for nation-building, thus creating a four-stage sequence; but when regime-change is peacefully induced, both nation-building and state (re)-building must resonate off each other. In exemplifying the former, the United States has paid more attention to establishing institutions first, whether in Germany, Japan, Afghanistan, or Iraq, leaving for citizens and groups to anchor their activities and expectations on those institutions. Similarly, in accenting the latter, the EU’s two-track approach involves institutional support for proper policy adjustments and civil society mobilization, since the policies must ultimately reflect majority opinion. A closer appraisal suggests top-down institutional support counts more for membership than the presence of civil society.

*Approaches and Levels of Analysis:*

As the subject of both top-down and bottom-up approaches, democratization distinguishes between levels of analysis, at least implicitly. Top-down democratization,

according to Richard Youngs,\textsuperscript{28} incorporates the institutions of the state, along with political parties, playing a vital role in the aggregation of interests, and one or more levels of local government. He calls this the political-institutional sphere within a political society. It mirrors the lockean political contract of democracy being by, of, and for the few, at least in the initial stages. On the other hand, bottom-up democracy addresses “the associational, non-office-seeking activity located in the space between the state and the family unit.” This designates the civil society sphere.

Just as the state can also invoke an international level through the combined action of states, or a regional level with a smaller group of like-minded countries, the society level includes both multinational and transnational corporations, or corporations and non-governmental organizations. While the top-down approach does not prohibit society-level groups, less attention is paid to them in democratization tasks; while bottom-up approaches remain indifferent to state-level engagements and initiatives, even to international organizations, like the UN, they nevertheless adapt well.

Approaches and levels of analysis need not be cast in stone just as the EU and US need not represent polar opposite democratization formulas. In an age with unprecedented globalizing forces, and the simultaneous expansion of liberalization opening limitless opportunities for private sector enterprises, the top-down and bottom-up approaches may face many more parallel actions in the middle than at the top or the bottom: non-governmental organizations move in and out, as do corporations, not to mention international organizations, tourists, reporters, and lots of others in their individual capacities. Yet, the point of initiation remains the key distinction: Whether

institutional imperatives or civil society pressures serve as catalyzers, democratization matters. Without the former, the result would be anomie; and without both simultaneously, the institution-building and civil society growth may bypass each other, creating greater harm.

When the US began with selected leadership and institutions in Germany, Japan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it was able to determine democratization thresholds, essentially stages, to which the subsequent exposure to a consumer culture anchored citizens. That Germans and Japanese did better than Afghans and Iraqis has less to do with the democratization formula than the idiosyncratic mix: Germans and Japanese had less to worry about ethnic rivalries than Afghans and Iraqis. Yet, this points precisely to the one-size-fits-all democratization problem: cultures have the capacity to adapt, but in forcing the pace or streamlining different adaptation rates, the top-down approach risks losing legitimacy. Even by successfully adapting to the US, Germany and Japan retained their own styles in many arenas and with which they even challenge the US today, indicating the propensity of a top-down approach to produce competitors even as homogenization takes place. Afghani and Iraqi attempts to do likewise keep being undermined by stricter deadlines and an army of democratization scholars constantly alarmed when unfolding patterns drift from paradigm expectations (Larry Diamond in Iraq is a notable example).

The EU faces the same one-size-fits-all outcome but with better safeguards. Its bottom-up surge faces softer, rather than dramatic, institutional changes at the top, and can also reach out to EU institutions incrementally from the very start. In the end, Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, and Slovenes, among others, look like streamlined Europeans, as
ethnicity distinctions get toned down (compared to what it was during the Cold War); yet another destabilizing force appears, based on economic status. East Germans, for example, continue to look like the impoverished East Germans of the Cold War era rather than upwardly-mobile or prosperous post-Cold War Germans. Unlike the ethnic-conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, those between East and West Europeans have been relatively dampened; and unlike the US-based top-down approach which comes without any social or economic safeguards, the EU has compensatory programs, such as the regional development funds, which, though tortuously slow in operationalizing, can be resorted to against brewing class-based or income-based differences in transitional countries.

**Pathways in the Literatures:**

Even though this is a comparative study of EU-US democracy, democratization pathways are not always country-specific. A proposed paradigm utilized in Europe does not convert it into a European pathway. Pathway proposals seek maximum applicability. In that sense, Table 1 plucks out four illustrative pathways.

**TABLE 1: DEMOCRATIZATION PATHWAYS: EU-US COMPARISONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youngs’s Pathway:</th>
<th>Fukuyama’s Pathway:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalize civil society</td>
<td>Stability through humanitarian assistance, infrastructure rebuilding, and economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ Liberalize economic spheres (market reforms)</td>
<td>↓ Build self-sustaining economic and political institutions necessary for democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ Promote good governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(attack corruption)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pridham’s Pathway:</th>
<th>Paris’s IBL Pathway:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inaugurate democratization</td>
<td>Rebuild institutions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ Decision to liberalize democracy</td>
<td>(a) prepare conditions for elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ Constituent phase</td>
<td>(b) create an electoral system favorable to moderate groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) develop a stable civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) discourage extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e) promote conducive economic policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(f) rebuild effective state institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16
Both Youngs and Pridham applied their pathways to the EU, Pridham to the US as well. Fukuyama’s two-step bottom-up nation-building approach and Roland Paris’s institutions-before-liberalization (IBL) top-down, state-building post-conflict paradigm, offer alternate gleanings, the former carrying a nation-building, thus bottom-up bias, reminiscent of the EU, the latter prototypically US.

One notices both the EU and US depicting half-way positions. While the EU embracing the bottom-up rousseauvian approach, without making it the only element of any democratization strategy, the US accents the top-down lockean approach, without abandoning bottom-up possibilities nor incorporating them into the formal processes. When push comes to shove, the US would much rather adopt the top-down approach while the EU does not have a choice since streamlining EU policies can only be supervised from the top by the EU while bottom-up forces remain intrinsic EU agents of democratization given the way the EU consciously seeks devolution and promotes rural or regional development plans.29 Whereas the EU begins with forces already on the ground, that is, networks of extant relations, the US prefers the drawing board as its starting point, that is, starting from scratch--both reflecting their own historical experiences, the European by echoing the long and arduous transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy, the US by resonating how its own Founding Fathers constructed a quick constitution for a born-free country, essentially building a new regime rather than adapting to an old one.

---

29On the EU’s top-down policy approach, see Martis Brusis, “The instrumental use of European Union conditionality: regionalization in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,” *East Europe Politics and Societies* 19, no. 2 (Spring 2005):291-316.
Expectations were matched by concrete developments. Youngs goes on to show how the EU strategy was applied to East Europe in the 1980s. Even though the US first blew the whistle on democratizing East Europe through President Carter’s human rights comments in the late-1970s, the EU played a more dominant role and exerted greater long-term influence over East European countries. That is not to say East European sentiments belong hook, line, and sinker in the EU camp, since the “new Europe” US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld spoke about during the 2003 Iraq war prelude seems to give its heart to the US as much as keep its feet in Europe. However, the road to EU membership prevailed then, even as it does today, in determining where East European countries must finally stand, illustrating (a) how EU’s democratization sees the US as a challenger; and (b) the *quid pro quo* policy-linking democratization processes.

Similarly for the United States, whose drawing-board approach suited the transformation of totalitarian Germany and Japan into democracies after World War II, much as it suits Afghanistan and Iraq today. True, the United States could not dislodge, not instantly at any rate, *kereitsu* patterns of interest intermediation in Japan or Germany’s close business-government social policy collaboration, but the transformation was distinct where it mattered the most: in the form of government, and thereby the democratization pathway taken. By this time the US drawing board was shifting from the ideal to the practical, but as Afghanistan, Iraq, and other cases show, the *practical* was defined through US experiences, not Afghani or Iraqi.

Woodrow Wilson’s intention to “make the world safe for democracy” relied heavily and even exclusively on an ideal: self-determination. Although self-determination

---

is a local and not US-inspired sentiment and expectation, its international enforcer and advocate was the US before international organizations adopted it. When self-determination was replaced as a vehicle towards democracy by anti-communism during the Cold War, the vanishing US role as vanguard and enforcer suggested democracy to be a variable, not as important as self-determination was in the larger picture. It was retrospectively argued to be the ends for which communism had to first be eliminated, if necessary by dictators. Yet, when the Cold War ended and the need for dictators in this line of thinking dissipated, democratization continued to serve as the ends rather than means (to other goals, such as the kantian international law or cosmopolitan law, or towards a regional trading organization as the EU), with WMDs and terrorism as the new threats needing elimination first. Whereas the US entered World War II in reaction to German and Japanese behavior, it also intervened in Afghanistan out of a 9/11 reaction; but the pre-emptive Iraqi intervention opened a new standard needing a new rationale. Democratization through regime-change provided that rationale.

In the final analysis, arguments, theories, and models addressing the EU experience hold up better than their US-oriented counterparts; and the critical reason also shows vividly: the absence of or dependence on the military. Although military-driven democratization worked in Germany and Japan after World War II, as well as in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), Min Xin Pei and Sara Kasper find these to be the only successful cases, out of 17 US-led nation-building intervention, down to the present time. Fukuyama’s two-steps were not satisfied in the other 13 cases; and Paris’s argument

---

of institution-before-liberalization (IBL) suggests, unless successful military intervention occurs, even institutions cannot become functional. On the other side of the Table 1 ledger, Youngs’s and Pridham’s frameworks remain in tact, not just in European experiences, as both testify, also US’s, as Pridham finds. Awakening civil society, liberalizing to democratize, and promoting good governance do not need military intervention; but even as a soft approach, they worked better than the hard US approach. Clearly Youngs’s framework would become irrelevant in Taliban’s Afghanistan and Saddam’s Iraq; but the alternate US approach struggles to survive as policy prescription and theoretical formulation in both. Driving the argument deeper, Pridham’s framework explaining both the EU and US experiences confirms the oddity of including military intervention, either on the drawing board or on the ground, if democracy is the goal.

**Instruments of Democratization:**

For the EU, instruments have been collapsed under the label *conditionality*, for the US through *stages and sequences*. Two sub-sections address these, while a third compares and contrasts.

**EU Conditionality:**

Central to the discussion of EU instruments is the term conditionality. The relevant conditionality, as Elena Fierro informs us, is “the field of development cooperation;”\(^{33}\) and as a legion of Europeanists remind us,\(^ {34}\) it influences European Union

---


membership. Though conditionality did not emerge from EU membership criteria, it marks some of the most carefully specified criteria and contexts, distinguishing the tighter EU usage of the terms to refer to specific instruments from the looser US usage to refer to intent and identity instead.

Fierro defines the term “to denote the donor’s practice of tying aid to specific conditions whereby recipients remain eligible for aid.” Substituting the term donor for democratizer helps the definition adjust to the looser US usage of the term. Although the EU formalized membership recruitment in 1993 through what is called the Copenhagen criteria, even before the collapse of the Iron Curtain, between 1986 and 1989, the EU was conditioning aid. The Copenhagen criteria, established essentially for EU membership but also offering relevant insights on democratization, were fourfold: The candidate country had (a) stabilized institutions guaranteeing democracy; (b) a functioning market economically capable of competing within the EU; (c) the capacity to adjust to the goals of the political, economic, and monetary union; and (d) an understanding of the EU’s capacity to recruit and balance new members in the larger comity. These represent the political, economic, membership, and institutional obligations of the new member.

As Heather Grabbe points out, these were further “tightened” between 1998 and 2002: The Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy (PHARE) shifted attention from generic reform and democratization to specific EU legislation and policy adjustments; short-term and medium-term goals faced new and

---


35Fierro, op. cit., 94.

varied political criteria for Slovakia, Estonia, and Latvia; strengthening institutional and administrative capacities in banking supervision and financial control; internal market reforms in liberalizing capital movements, adopting competition law, and establishing anti-trust laws, and more effective border management.\textsuperscript{37} Klaudijus Maniokas found these to be “stricter than the requirements for applicant countries in previous enlargements.”\textsuperscript{38} Although he finds conditionality forming “the backbone of [EU’s] new method,” the tightened rules were added to the 6 “classical principles”: (a) accept the \textit{acquis communautaire} in full; (b) accession negotiations to focus on the practicalities of application; (c) membership expansion necessitates new policy instrument creation in addition to existing one; (d) admission to EU’s institutions entail more detailed review after enlargement; (e) EU prefers candidates having closer relations with each other; and (f) enlargement reflects the EU’s desire to externalize external problems and existing member states to pursue their own interests.

On another track, first the European Community (EC), then the EU, adopted what was called democracy promotion (DP). Applied largely in the south, especially northern African countries, it began informally with the December 1990 Renovated Mediterranean Policy, but culminated in the more formal Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) of November 1995. As the EMP continued the democratic reform commitment of associational states like Morocco and Tunisia, Richard Youngs argues, this democracy promotion goal “was driven more strongly by strategic than by commercial considerations.”\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37}Grabbe, op. cit., 16. 
\textsuperscript{39}Youngs, “The European Union and democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: a new or disingenuous strategy?” \textit{Democratization} 9, no. 1 (Spring 2002):44, but see 40-62.
US Stages and Sequences:

Just as the EU conditionality transformation was from the general to the specific, the US moved through a sequence of distinctive stages. As evident explicitly in Afghanistan and Iraq, but implicitly in Germany and Japan, US democratization comes in a rapid 4-phase package: (a) bring about the regime change, whether this is in reaction to what the regime did, as in Afghanistan, Germany, and Japan, or in pre-emption, as in Iraq; (b) establish an interim government by selection to harness the legitimate organs and procedures to develop a constitution; (c) shift to a transitional government, elected by the people but still screened through US filters, to actually write the constitution, have it ratified, and supervise the resultant elections; and (d) announce a democratically elected government based on a constitution providing ample rights and freedoms. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the entire process was to be completed within 2 years; and although the deadlines were not strictly met, delays were not significant. Yet, democracy is struggling to plant roots in both. In Germany and Japan, the process took longer since a formula did not exist, necessitating more trials and errors. Roots, however, went deeper. Again, the different outcomes may be a function of the legitimacy of intervention, the domestic ethnic calculus, the increasingly mobilized populations today, thus raising the ante of expectations and attracting more spectators, as well as the higher opportunity costs, not just of alternatives to democracy but also of a larger democracy market where the availability of more models means the ability to shop around.

As the only case of pre-emption of the four, Iraq went through an additional phase, before the interim government was established: administration by the Iraq Governing Council (IGC), selected mostly from exiles, by the US through its newly-created
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), from April 2003. Unlike the 3 other cases, Iraq’s
democratization was directly supervised by the occupying army: in the other 3 cases, the
political and military roles were sufficiently separated as to let democratization flourish
independently. Along with the supervision came restrictions: the Baathists could not
participate, the military was totally disbanded, and so forth. Which of these actually
contributed to Iraq’s democratization failure is hard to isolate, but a number of foregoing
arguments apply here: top-heavy institutions were created without people using them as
anchors; bottom-up mobilization initiated, not by the US but by transnational groups
targeting the US, creating anomie, to say the least, civil war more realistically; an elected
government marooned from the people, ruling from fortresses, and losing legitimacy; and,
ironically, a surprisingly coherent democratization formula fulfilled in toto.

Afghanistan’s case is not nearly as bad for the obvious reason: It did not go
through a conjoined military-political democratization initiation. Its government is
functional, indicating, as in Iraq, the formula is not the source of problems; but symptoms
of Iraq’s malaise persist in Afghanistan. Without a lengthy military shield, Afghanistan’s
democratization remains vulnerable.

Finally, Germany and Japan made it through for many reasons. First, the strength
of remorse for having a totalitarian government culminated not in resignation, but
acceptance of an alternate regime. Second, both had functional economic and political
infrastructures even after conflict, easing the return to routine and productive lives. Third,
neither were desperately divided societies, whether ethnically or economically, providing
a source of unity Afghanistan and Iraq never had. Fourth, since no democratization
formula existed, trials and errors by the US permitted more relaxed deadlines. Fifth, as
victor, the US was still at war, this time with the communists, and since both Germany and Japan were expected to play major Cold War outposts, US commanders were much more compassionate than in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the US appeared as the sole world power, more arrogant than ever before.

**Comparisons:**

Two broad differences illustrate the transatlantic orientational difference: treating defaulters and conditionality. Both show the US to be more relaxed than the EU.

The US approach invites more defaults and showed greater flexibility in accommodating defaulters than the EU’s, a subtle transatlantic difference with many causes. First, EU conditionality applied to formal club membership, but US conditionality was to open-ended democracy with no membership criteria. Secondly, though profound, regime-change in the EU experience did not involve military intervention, but for the US, it did. Third, EU regime-change initiatives were directed at countries at a higher developmental threshold than were their US counterparts, thus leaving less margin for maneuverability in the former than in the latter. Finally, whereas EU conditionality did not intervene with other donor-recipient exchanges, just as these other exchanges did not affect EU conditionality, almost all donor-recipient exchanges in the US domain had to go through or be channeled by the US.

According to Fierro, conditionality may be utilized to push the recipient country to adopt a policy it would not have pursued otherwise, or even to encourage or accelerate a policy already adopted. Similarly, it can be imposed before or after entering a desired relationship, what she calls *ex-ante* or *ex-post*. Given such open-endedness, instruments could be utilized to impose conditions until democratization is enhanced or acquired,
depending on the country involved, or simply promote democracy without conditions. Geofrey Pridham, who utilizes this distinction, sees the US illustrating democracy promotion (DP) better than the EU, though the narrow focus of the US just on “electoral democracy” does not permit ample comparisons with the wide-ranging EU approach.\footnote{Geoffrey Pridham, \textit{Designing Democracy EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe} (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 50.} Richard Youngs prefers the terms democracy assistance (DA) instead. Describing purpose to be “to fund projects aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and practices,” he contrasts this “positive engagement” with the “coercive” counterpart of political conditionality (PC), defined as “the possibility of trade and aid provisions being linked to degrees of political pluralism.”\footnote{Youngs, \textit{European Union and Promotion of Democracy}, 21.}

Behind these orientational differences lie substantive dissimilarities, captured in the following sub-sets of this sub-section.

Tone, Thrust, Temperament:

Instruments vary accordingly. Drawing from Youngs’s study, Table 3 compares and contrasts positive and coercive instruments for both the EU and the US. While the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the first EU attempt to promote human rights, democracy, and rule of law within a development framework, the Copenhagen criteria adopted the next year set the tone, thrust, and temperament of EU’s approach to democratization. The tone was simply to make democracy the pre-condition to all else, particularly membership, but as Fierro reminds us, even human rights.\footnote{Fierro, op. cit. 118.} It was a fundamental analogue to the EU variation of economic liberalism, in itself the heart, mind, and soul of trade regionalism. Attention, in turn, was directed at East Europe, though colonial
legacies also pushed the EU into promoting democracy across parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Clearly the end of the Cold War created the opportunity to undertake regime-change for both the EU and US; but since the dominant Cold War battlefield was “from Stettin to Trieste,” i.e., the Iron Curtain, West European had no choice but to take the lead with the actual instruments. In particular, West Germany shifted attention almost entirely to absorbing East Germans, and since Germany would become the largest financial supplier of EU democracy promotion in the 1990s,\textsuperscript{43} West Germany’s new ostpolitik became the EU’s new priority. Full advantage was taken of the opportunity, since the EU invited more new membership applicants than ever before, all from south and east Europe. With limited budget, as Youngs calculates, roughly 1% of the EU’s development budget, the EU thrust was in the east and south, not elsewhere. Yet, eastern and southern European democracy promotion shaped the EU temperament: With hands-on experience, it became a world leader in monitoring elections, meaning establishing criteria where and when needed, and promoting human rights--a far cry from the Cold War years when agriculture, monetary policy, and market expansion dominated EU headlines and agenda. Although agriculture still consumes half the EU budget, foreign and security policy, and with it democracy and human rights--what Allan Rosas dubs the Siamese twins’\textsuperscript{44}--increasingly demand greater attention. The Mediterranean served as an unofficial dividing line in the EU vision: Mediterranean African countries would be encouraged, but not obligated, to democratize and certainly not with policy leverages as with east and south Europe, or towards becoming full-fledged EU members.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Types of Democratic Engagement}
\end{table}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item In absolute numbers. Sweden gave a larger proportion of its GDP. See Youngs, op. cit., 30-34.
\end{itemize}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Engagement:</th>
<th><strong>EU:</strong></th>
<th><strong>US:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercive Engagement (political conditionality)</td>
<td>1989: Lomé Convention IV: Human Rights respect enshrined, but democracy not mentioned and legal basis lacking (Substituted by Cotonoy Agreement, signed in Benin, June 2000)&lt;br&gt;*1995: Human Rights and Democracy Clause: suspend or abrogate contractual relationship when democratic principles abused (did not spell out voting requirements)&lt;br&gt;*June 1997, Amsterdam Treaty: Clarified voting requirements; since unanimity adopted, European Parliament was sidelined; called for mixed competence (European Commission and member states)</td>
<td>4-phase approach: (a) change the regime, usually backed up by military means and involving conflict; (b) establish an interim administration to summon a legitimate body to initiate shift to constitution-building; (c) shift to transitional government, to some extent elected, to prepare the constitution, have it ratified, and conduct democratic elections; and (d) a popularly elected government takes over under the new constitution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other side of the Atlantic, the end of the Cold War also revitalized the search for democracies, but the tone, thrust, and temperament differed. The US temperament was driven by global interests in contrast to the EU’s concentric dynamic. One critical dimension of the US global orientation was its military pre-eminence: Unlike the EU, the US had to calculate military or strategic interests in determining its position on democracy. For example, whether it would be worth pushing democracy in Saudi Arabia or not when inexpensive oil imports could be seriously threatened at a time of market expansion and increased competition. The consequence resonated with the Cold War US stand: a soft approach to democracy. It would be prioritized at the rhetorical
level, non-governmental organizations and social groups would be encouraged to campaign for it, but few, if any, instruments would be galvanized on a generic basis to enhance democracy—somewhat similar structurally to the EU’s African option.

Given the long history of US aid being conditioned, one finds the thrust to be more indirect than direct: rather than condition democracy, the Cold War tendency was to guard against the return to, or embrace of, communism. After the Cold War, new agencies took up the drive to promote democracy: the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in particular, not just through its publications, but also election monitoring and institution-building support; the State Department’s creation of the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and the Agency for International Development (AID) agency of Center for Democracy and Governance.

Unlike the EU, the tone was not heightened. The US still wanted democracy, but only by default: by removing communism, then terrorism. In other words, more funds went into the wars against communism and terrorism than in promoting democracy; or to put it another way, an anti-communist or anti-terrorist claim carried more weight than a claim on behalf of democracy. George W. Bush’s “with us or against us” warning had little to do with either protecting or promoting democracy. Since the US was spending as much as the EU on these tasks, as Youngs shows, one might argue democratization was not a top-priority in either. It was useful, but other interests mattered much more.

Moreover, the war against terrorism provided opportunities to claim democracy leadership. One opportunity came in the form of regime-change. Thus, just as West Europeans also sought regime-change in East and South Europe when the Cold War ended, the US also embarked upon regime-change worldwide—first in Latin America and

45Youngs, op. cit. 31-2.
through an economic policy approach of liberalism, which produced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) in the decade before 9/11; and especially in “rogue” countries the world over after 9/11 through military intervention. Afghanistan paved the way at reinventing governments, and thereby ideologies and ultimately political cultures. Iraq followed suit.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US adopted similar blueprints, heavy on goals and deadlines within breathtakingly short time-spans, but soft on actual conditions or penalties to be imposed if those deadlines were not kept or the goals were not met. This was the transatlantic difference: Whereas democracy remained a variable, intangibly anchored, and subordinated to strategic interests for the US, for the EU it had a fixed definition, was tangible through the policy requirements, and where pursued, a top priority. As Table 3 points out, both countries had the tools, but only the EU utilized them purposefully. Why the EU could do what the US would not takes us to another difference, this one to do with the rationale: Democracy promotion was necessary for EU membership, but fulfilled only strategic US interests; in turn, DP reinforced EU unity and identity in and of itself, but fed into other US interests claiming unity and identity, such as Bush’s “with or against us” call.

Pridham’s comparisons echo these findings from a different angle. His five dimensions appraising the scope and mechanisms of DP and DC show this: (a) political-systemic, addressing political dynamics from a systemic perspective, where the system is defined by fulfilling EU membership obligations, for example, set within the European Commission context, or the Council of Ministers, and so forth; (b) party-political, examining the creation or development of political parties, especially as they align with
European-level counterparts; (c) election monitoring, which is more interested in how elections are conducted and if key criteria have been satisfied; (d) political-societal, a context capturing civil society dynamics; and (e) political-cultural, which addresses such issues as educating the masses and streamlining human rights responses.

**TABLE 4: PRIDHAM'S MEASUREMENT OF DP AND DC THROUGH SCOPE AND MECHANISMS: EU-US COMPARISONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions:</th>
<th>Top-down:</th>
<th>Bottom-up:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political-systemic (local government, elite training):</td>
<td>EU: its own institutions</td>
<td>EU: PHARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US: its own institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-political (transnational elite socialization):</td>
<td>EU: transnational party cooperation</td>
<td>EU: activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US: activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election monitoring:</td>
<td>EU: Council of Europe Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-societal (civil society issues):</td>
<td>EU: national governments</td>
<td>EU: PHARE, NGOs, private foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US: national governments</td>
<td>US private foundations, NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political cultural (political education, human rights):</td>
<td>EU: Council of Europe</td>
<td>EU: private foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US: private foundations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When examined along top-down and bottom-up perspectives for both the EU and US, he finds: (a) the US as a DP leader, EU the DC leader; (b) EU showing greater top-down than bottom-up engagement; (c) top-down orientations in inter-governmental agencies like NATO and the World Bank; and (d) transnational agencies like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) balancing both approaches.

**Placement in a Dynamic Global Context:**

Pursuing democracy and democratizing can not be the only tasks of any given government. Security must be provided, commerce allowed to flow, education be imparted, healthcare be maintained, and a host of other tasks constantly demand governmental attention. How, then, do the pursuits of democracy and democratization fit
into this busy agenda? Three sub-sections address this by comparing (a) democratization checklists; (b) exogenous and endogenous factors; and (c) time thresholds.

**Democratization Checklists:**

One approach to an answer is to redirect the checklist Albert Somit and Steven A Peterson developed from the democratization literature. Meant for a study of specific instances of US-driven democratization, its 9 elements can be utilized here for a comparative EU-US study. Table 5 illustrates.

**TABLE 5: CHECKLIST FOR SUCCESSFUL NATION-BUILDING: EU-US COMPARISONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Checklist:</th>
<th>EU:</th>
<th>US:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Willingness by democratizing country to invest personnel and resources:</td>
<td>Yes, but within limits, especially of humans</td>
<td>Yes, has been fairly open-ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Willingness to keep military and civilian presence:</td>
<td>Yes over patience, no over civilian and military presence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Commitment to reduce post-conflict deaths from combat:</td>
<td>No examples to rely on; and not immediately attractive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Appreciation of local culture and avoidance of arrogance:</td>
<td>EU enlargement proceeds very frankly on “asymmetrical” basis:</td>
<td>Mixed report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Restore infrastructure and human capital:</td>
<td>Yes, through its many programs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Remove from the key positions those associated with past regime:</td>
<td>Not a task diligently pursued</td>
<td>Yes, diligently pursued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Be able to understand deeply divided countries reduce chances of success:</td>
<td>Yes, but intervention has been economic where this question has not been important</td>
<td>Yes, but largely ignored given the reasons for intervention; hope that intervention reduces inter-ethnic divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Streamline external and internal interests:</td>
<td>Yes, and emphatically so with regards EU</td>
<td>Not a priority if outside country is not the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Rebuild social, economic, political institutions as base for liberal reforms:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A first-level analysis of Table 5 finds two critical differences. First, intervention, especially military, has not been a EU practice and is not an option the EU is likely to pursue, although it is the very essence of US regime-change since many regimes needing change are in conflict-ridden countries or inimical to US interests. Second, the subdued EU tone to many of the checklist questions contrasts with US enthusiasm. One might
argue the checklist suits the US since it was developed largely with US experiences in mind, thus reaffirming US-EU differences. Previous comparative frameworks utilized, for example, Youngs’s, also carried a similar EU bias, thus offsetting the checklist US bias, and ultimately accentuating EU-US differences.

If we turn to the Somit-Peterson checklist for the emergence of democracy in targeted countries, we again see contrasts. Table 6 illustrates. Also drawn from US experiences, this check-list is more favorably slanted towards the EU. Among the critical differences, first, the EU is better able than the US in facilitating democratic practices and establishing functional institutions; second, economic development faces more favorable circumstances under EU efforts than US, although this may again be a function of the US democratizing more difficult countries than the EU; and third, the more obscure EU seeds of conflict than in US disguise the ongoing EU membership process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Checklist:</th>
<th>EU:</th>
<th>US:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Functioning government institutions:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mixed report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Internal peace (e.g., no civil wars):</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Largely no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Adequate levels of economic development:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Largely no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Adequate levels of education:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Largely no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Existence of basic liberties:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Largely no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lack of previous authoritarian regime:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Pro-democratic “out-elite”</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pro-democracy civic dispositions:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but constrained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Religious conflict is absent:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not always</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ethnic, tribal, and racial conflict is absent:</td>
<td>Largely</td>
<td>Not really</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Exogenous and Endogenous Factors:**

How do exogenous and external factors fare in both cases? Table 7 lists some relevant exogenous and external factors, before comparing and contrasting the two cases.
### TABLE 7: EXOGENOUS AND EXTERNAL FACTORS: EU-US COMPARISONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous and External Factors:</th>
<th>EU:</th>
<th>US:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Key characteristics of the democratization sponsor (EU or US):</td>
<td>Multi-membered group; democracy is passport to joining an economic club; EU socialization proceeds at multiple levels and over multiple years of grooming; membership idea is attractive, grooming is tough, and end-product is one-size-fits-all European</td>
<td>Single-membered sponsor (US Alone); democratization and liberalization often proceed simultaneously; multiple-level process but time-frame usually a lot tighter; democratization usually without choice, adjustment is difficult; and end-product rarely achieved, especially if one-size-fits-all US type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How singular is the model target countries must follow?</td>
<td>In satisfying Copenhagen criteria, it is very singular: a European model devoid of any national or statist pattern; in developing political structures, target countries have many options to follow from the many EU members</td>
<td>Both in economic and political anchors, the US model is heavily advocated, creating greater singularity (presidential favored over prime minister in form of government, and so forth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To what extent can other external forces contribute to target country democratization?</td>
<td>The door is open, but EU membership imposes a <em>sine qua non</em> trajectory target countries do not which to deviate from or subordinate</td>
<td>The door is open, but through US filters, both politically and economically (corporations, for example)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Prospects for international organizations:</td>
<td>Mostly welcomed, but with so detailed EU grooming, international organizations have lesser scope for engagement</td>
<td>Washington Consensus institutions (IMF, IBRD) very welcomed, UN utilized as instrument of last resort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Room to diverge from democratization sponsors (EU or US):</td>
<td>Yes, as evident in 2003 Iraq war: it divided EU membership</td>
<td>Theoretically yes, but practically difficult</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Five dimensions chosen to fill in analytical cracks in the relevant literatures offer quite a mouthful of contrasts. Highlighting the key characteristic of the EU and US in their democratization pursuits, the first dimension informs us why both enter the game with very different baggages and capacities. As a group of several countries, the EU cannot impose the styles and patterns of any one country, but it does require, by virtue of Article 6(1) of the Treaty of European Union and Article 177(2) of the TEC, democratic credentials for membership. By contrast, the US is a single-member democracy sponsor, and while the only passport to creating democracy is to have an authoritarian government
which can be demolished, both liberalization and democratization efforts proceed simultaneously. Progress is more loosely monitored by the US compared to the EU, and while both establish thresholds in their pursuits, the EU has been more stringent in satisfying them than the US. For example, Afghanistan and Iraq frequently missed deadlines in creating constitutions, but the US was more flexible than the EU would have been to a candidate country not fulfilling any particular criterion.

EU democratization necessitates the candidate country to socialize with a variety of EU institutions and policy networks, something the US encourages but does not require. Consequently, over the many years of socializing, EU candidate members acquire a europeanness, in spite of the occasional bouts of frustration from not fully satisfying any given membership criterion; but the US does not normally allow a long leash of time, and though an americanness is desired, it is usually not required nor obtained. Germany and Japan continue to retain idiosyncratic practices, such as in interest intermediation over policy-making; while Afghanistan and Iraq, if a first-sight is any indicator, are quite unlikely to mirror the US in many areas.

Against the background of this closer EU-identity imperative and the more flexible US counterpart, the second dimension asks if the target countries must follow their patrons as a model, and how singular is the patron itself. In satisfying the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries have no choice but to follow the singular EU model, but fortunately for them, this model is the net product of several members, not any one of them in particular. By contrast, the US model is singular, and the target country is heavily encouraged to follow US preferences over both political and economic policies.
There is no written law they must follow US patterns, unlike the EU counterparts where convergence is a requirement.

The third dimension explores other external forces, whether they can chip in to the democratizing process, and what consequences may ensue. Both the EU and US invite other actors to contribute, and both also have their own filtration systems. Since the EU is interested in democratization to determine membership, no matter how many other external actors engaged, the bottom-line remains a variety of EU preferences those other actors can do nothing about. While the US does not impose such a *sine qua non* trajectory, it is cognizant of the nature and extent of participation of other actors, be they non-governmental organizations, opportunity-seeking corporations, or a variety of international organizations.

In fact, the fourth dimension treats these international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the UN, separately. They are all welcome by both the EU and US, but they both have implicit or explicit qualifiers. For example, EU target countries typically go through such a lengthy grooming period, there is not much more these organizations can do, unless an emergency arises. Even in such instances, if the EU has counterpart arrangements, these are forwarded in lieu of the IMF, World Bank, or the UN. For the US, Washington Consensus institutions like the IMF and the World Bank normally do not pose any problems, and often go hand-in-hand with US development or democratization efforts. Once in a while, the UN becomes a problem due to its wider audience and membership, which the US normally tries to avoid.
Finally, the fifth dimension inquires if the target countries can diverge in their preferences from the sponsoring agency, the EU or US. This seems to be more possible in the EU, in part owing to its large membership, than with the US. Although not prohibited by the US, divergences in any one area could result in reduced rewards or withheld promises in another, creating a disincentive to defect.

Time Thresholds:

Given the contrasting performances of Germany and Japan, on the one hand, and Afghanistan and Iraq, on the other, why has US pursuits of democratization not produced the uniform results the EU pursuit has: Table 8 addresses this by creating time thresholds as comparative dimensions.

TABLE 8: TIME THRESHOLDS & EU-US DEMOCRATIZATION RESPONSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time-thresholds:</th>
<th>EU:</th>
<th>US:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pre-World War II: “making the world safe for democracy” with self-determination as instrument</td>
<td>No EU existed, but many European countries with colonies rejected self-determination; and many were undergoing regime-change themselves</td>
<td>As much a US rhetoric as reality: first instances of regime-change started (the Philippines, Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti, in that order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cold War era (1945-1986): “making the world safe for democracy” by quashing communism:</td>
<td>US security umbrella helped consolidate fledgling democracies, institutionalize liberalism, and initiate regional identity</td>
<td>Friendly dictators fighting communism more valuable than democracy-seeking groups (Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Post-Cold War era: “making the world safe for democracy” by promoting democracy:</td>
<td>East and South European opportunity: to democratize, expand membership, and seek role as democratization leader</td>
<td>East European opportunity extended to Soviet-successor states and across Africa, Asia, and Latin America: greater emphasis on liberalization than democratization; NGOs growth to spearhead democracy abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Post-9/11 (2001-): “making the world safe for democracy” by eliminating terrorism:</td>
<td>Moment of consolidating East and South European membership; champion democracy elsewhere through electoral monitors</td>
<td>Regime-change given more urgent billing, resort to military intervention elevated as instrument; democratization rhetorical headline, but subordinated to stamping terrorism out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four dimensions show four interpretations of the Wilsonian maxim of making the world safe for democracy. The first is identified in terms of self-determination, advocated
by the United States, essentially against European colonial powers, and a globally popular position to adopt as well as lodge among the fundamentals of the emerging international organization, the League of Nations. It was a time when the US could have become what it did in the fourth time-threshold: the sole world power. Interestingly in this fourth phase, when the maxim was interpreted in terms of ridding the world of terrorism, the US stood aloof, and at times, against the European current, not just in terms of democratization, but over other issues as well. Three features made this fourth phase an entirely different era: there was no need to create an international organization, and the dominant one existing, the UN, stood as handicapped in promoting democracy as the League of Nations was empowered to seek it (through self-determination and mandates); the US had a democratization game plan, which it didn’t in Wilson’s time, as well as domestic support to implement it; and there now existed a competitive thrust to pursuing democracy, with the EU promoting the same goal by other means.

In between, as the campaign to spread democracy waned during the Cold War, independent democracy movements in southern and eastern Europe, in what Samuel P. Huntington and others call the third democratic wave, brought the European Community on to the democratization stage. The US was left to catch-up for at least two reasons: Its authoritarian Cold War clients could not be automatically strung out to dry when the Cold War ended; and, led by West Germany, European countries began thrashing out the nuts and bolts of democratization more vividly, even if the efforts primarily sought a facilitative economic order for EU membership.

The rest became democracy history. Democracy came out of the development planning cocoon, demanding its own independent plans, which, once initiated by the EU,
among others, spiraled into pushing other countries, such as the United States, to create their own conditions or thresholds and confront other countries whether they wanted it or not, were ready for it or not. As a conglomerate of countries with limited available resources, the EU would not take on this campaign at the global level, except in rhetoric; but the United States was ready, willing, and able to do so, at the least to compensate for a historical negligence, at most to remodel the world in its own image. Unlike the war against communism when democracy could be left to languish on the back-burner, in the war against terrorism, democracy cannot but be given greater glow.

In the final analysis, both the EU and the US have their own distinctive democracy orientations and democratization formulas, but one seemingly echoes off the other: Without the US-driven Cold War, who knows what might have happened, and when, to East European democratization; and without the West European interest in East European democratization, who knows if the US would have even mustered a democratization formula. Both could end up in the same ballpark and with similar guises of democracy, but more likely they will give democracy their own different stripes.

Conclusions:

A survey of what democracy broadly means, how democratization is spelled out, why certain instruments are used, and where democracy lies in the larger compass of domestic and external interests point to two different transatlantic protagonists. Both the US and West European countries have been shifting their historical orientations, the former from a relative bottom-up approach towards a top-down position, the latter shifting towards the bottom-up without abandoning the top-down. Where they belong in the global context might have a lot to do with this shift: World leadership demands a
proactive democratization position, whereas would-be leaders can be more pedantic about the task while basking in the shadows of the leader; and so it was, the US adopting a more decisive top-down approach the more it behaved like a world leader, and the EU increasingly creating *quid pro quo* democratic opportunities the more robust its regional organization became. In between the definition and the larger picture, the two sides implemented different strategies utilizing different instruments: In part as a world leader, the US could make democracy the ends of policy alignments, the EU the means; in other words, a looser US definition of democracy permitted less rigid democratization beginning no less on the battlefield, but a tighter EU counterpart narrowed the processes to specific instruments. In neither is democracy made a vital interest, since the US ranks a favorable global alignment much higher as does the EU economic integration. Yet, by simultaneously championing democracy, both lock themselves and other countries in.

The 4-stage US approach may go globally farther than the multidimensional EU counterpart, but the EU approach may sink regionally deeper than the US formula: Not many countries can fulfill the EU criteria, and even if they do, EU membership or privileged trading arrangements, remain prohibitive. The option to defect to the other side, that is, the US, opens up, and on less stringent terms; and even though many countries find the spotty US democracy record attractive, very few, if any, would volunteer to begin with a military conflict. Democracy’s multiplying facets is but a reaction to the many country-cultures it must adapt to. Promoting it necessitates flexibility. Though the US shows this characteristic more than the EU, reactions and criteria flexibility no longer seem sufficient to explain democracy.