Governance networks in the external dimension of EU migration policy: Europeanisation through the grapevine?

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Abstract
An often overlooked dimension of the EU's influence is the Europeanisation of Non-Member states. While Europeanisation in the case of member states and accession countries stems from the supranational influence of EU law and the increasing integration, EU influence in co-operation with third countries has been undertheorised. Drawing from insights of organisational sociology and neo-institutionalist theory, the analysis of the organisational field of the external dimension of EU migration policy reveals interorganisational dynamics that are likely to impact on the policy output in non-Member States and shape Europeanisation processes.

Complex interdependence leads to mutual influence whereby actors on all sides can impact on policy outputs. EU-influence is therefore dependent on the compatibility of understandings of migration and approaches as well as administrative capacities in the coordinating and implementing bodies. Rather than being dominated by EU actors, actors in third countries and implementation partners such as international organisations can be considerably empowered by Europeanisation. The process is hence not unidirectional but has multiple feed-back loops with considerable repercussions for policy output and process. This will be exemplified by empirical results from EU cooperation on migration with Morocco and Ukraine.

Keywords
European Union, Europeanisation, migration policy, Morocco, Ukraine, neo-institutionalism
1.0 Introduction

This paper draws on insights of a PhD project under the same title. The overall objective is to explore the meaning of Europeanisation in the European Union’s (EU) cooperation with non-Member States (NMS) in implementing migration policy. Such an approach responds to queries that Europeanisation is “‘something to be explained’ not ‘something that explains’” (Radaelli, 2004: 2). Since the Europeanisation of NMS can hardly be analysed via macro-level analysis of bilateral relations, the focus will be set on the meso-level of governance networks within the policy field. Governance networks are centred on implementation of EU migration policy and consist of Commission Directorate Generals (DGs), EC Delegations, national Ministries and agencies as well as contracted international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Europeanisation is hence the process which influences EU policy output via dynamics inherent in these networks. How can we make sense of interorganisational dynamics emerging during implementation and how do they influence EU policy output? What do we learn from these dynamics about the Europeanisation process in NMS?

Based on a critique of functional-rationalist approaches to understanding governance networks, it is argued that sociological insights about path-dependence, isomorphism and organisational beliefs constitute helpful lenses to reveal and explain dynamics in implementing EU migration policy in NMS. Acknowledging complex interdependence between actors in these networks cautions towards top-down understandings of implementation. These centre on questions of implementation ‘success’ or ‘failure’ following the perspective that decisions taken at an earlier stage are to be translated into action to fulfil those objectives (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, Gunn, 1978, Hill and Hupe, 2002: 41-51). In contrast, implementation is understood here as a policy-action relationship. Following Barret and Fudge (1981: 4), implementation “needs to be regarded as a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends”. This approach has the advantage of seeing policy not as something set in stone once implementation starts but as the output of interorganisational interpretation and negotiation shaping policy all the way through the implementation process.
In order to delineate the research area, at least three meanings of the external dimension of EU migration policy can be distinguished:

- effects of EU internal policies on migration flows from NMS;
- effects of EU internal migration policy on NMS;
- effects of explicit external EU migration policy towards NMS.

This research focuses on the last aspect because it provides us with the possibility to understand Europeanisation in clearly discernible policy projects and programmes that are meant to translate EU policy objectives into action. The focus is hence on policy output (i.e. interorganisational dynamics and project content) and not policy outcome (i.e. intended and unintended consequences on migratory flows and the like). EU policy interventions are analysed for Morocco and Ukraine. Both EU neighbours are policy targets as major countries of emigration and transit. Situated along an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ outer Schengen border along different migration systems, these cases can elucidate similarities or differences in the development of EU migration policy towards neighbouring countries.

After elaborating on the concept of Europeanisation, the benefits of meso-level versus macro-level analysis open space for a governance perspective with is sensitive to sociological and historical neo-institutionalist insights and those from organisational sociology. The empirical analysis flags interorganisational dynamics in three salient areas of EU interventions in migration policy: border management, readmission and asylum.

**2.0 Europeanisation**

Although Europeanisation can occur via a number of processes in different settings (Olsen, 2002), most attention has been paid to accession countries and little to NMS (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). The influence of European integration on domestic settings has been conceptualised as Europeanisation. Following Radaelli (2000: 4), “Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational)
discourse, political structures and public policies”. The Europeanisation literature has cautioned to take the policy type (“mode of governance” (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004) or “mechanism of Europeanisation” (Knill and Lehmkühl, 1999)) into account which impacts on the way in which policy transfer is taking place. This top-down perspective has been challenged by the “goodness of fit”-approach (Börzel and Risse, 2000) which points out the influence of mediating factors of EU influence in domestic circumstances (such as veto points in institutional change, formal institutions and their resources, political and organisational cultures, changes in opportunity structures and the possibility of learning on interests and ideas of the actors involved (Cowles et al., 2001: 6-12)). Notwithstanding, Europeanisation is still often seen from a top-down perspective that tries to distil the strength of adaptational pressures on the domestic level. This reveals a gap for a bottom-up understanding of Europeanisation which can be complemented by the introduction of implementation and governance literature (Bache, 2003). This perspective sensitises towards the influence of manifold actors and interorganisational dynamics in governance networks shaping Europeanisation processes and policy output.

Although Europeanisation of NMS implies convergence, it is a particular type of policy transfer (Bache and Jordan, 2006, Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004). Even though EU actors are playing an important and often initiating role, EU influence does not implementation dynamics within governance networks. Instead of assuming principle-agent relationships in a hierarchical implementation chain, EU implementation partners and NMS authorities are not simply decision-takers but shape policy output direct or indirectly via their actions. The following modifications to top-down Europeanisation approaches are necessary to accommodate for a dynamic and non-unidirectional understanding of implementation as a political process:

- non-EU specific influences on policy output
- interorganisational dynamics such as the role of privileged interlocutors like implementation partners and member states (MS)
- feedback loops that undermine the notion of the EU being the sole source of policy input
- domestic obstacles and sources of change with their influence on policy output.
This understanding of Europeanisation fits best within a meso-level analysis of governance networks.

3.0 Macro- versus meso-level of analysis

A governance perspective takes a meso-level approach to studying relations between EU actors and implementation partners in NMS. Attention is hereby on dynamics within the migration policy field and on potentially relevant actors within the NMS organisational context. Such an approach is questioning a macro-level perspective that assumes that the influence of EU migration policy on NMS mostly derives from power imbalances in terms of foreign and economic policy and the existence/absence of credible conditionality and incentives such as EU membership perspective (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, Missiroli, 2005). Following this perspective both Morocco and Ukraine would have good reasons to comply with EU wishes regarding migration policy.

Morocco is in a unique geographical and political situation vis-à-vis Europe. It has been cut off from sub-Saharan Africa due to the Western Sahara conflict for more than three decades (Maghraoui, 2003, Souaré, 2007) and stays disconnected from the rest of the Maghreb due to the 1994 border closure with Algeria based on fears of Algerian terrorists, border demarcation disputes and Algerian support for Saharawi separatism (Vermeren, 2006: 36f, 92f). The Kingdom is not member of the African Union and neither membership of the Arab League nor Arab Maghreb considerably strengthen its international stance. This geopolitical environment means that Morocco’s most important partner is the EU and its Member States (as well as the USA) which are also its main trade partners. Despite Morocco’s rejected 1987 EU member application, Morocco shares international trade and association agreements with the EU since the 1960s which recently culminated with the 2008 “advanced status” agreement (EU and Morocco, 2008).

Still hugely marked by fundamental transitions of the post-Soviet period since independence in 1990 (Kuzio, 1998), Ukraine can be still considered a “reluctant democratiser” (Kubicek, 2005: 271). The 2004 Orange Revolution triggered mostly an elitist coup with continuation of clique struggles, perceptions of political stagnation and even instability (Lane, 2008, Tudoroiu, 2007: 325-331). Despite
shared political support for European integration in Ukraine since the early 1990s (Derhachov, 2007, Wolczuk, 2006) and hopes that the 2004 events would overcome misunderstandings, frustration and fatigue in Euro-Ukrainian relations since independence, EU accession is as far as ever in 2008 (and NATO accession pigeonholed). At a joint summit, the EU let itself be carried away to “acknowledge the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice” (European Union and Ukraine, 2008). EU-Ukrainian relations are based on the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and are in process of renegotiation of a New Enhanced Agreement since 2007. The country is regionally split along political lines of strengthening relations with Russia or the EU (Zimmer and Haran, 2008: 546f) and closer integration with both partners are seen as favourable by the majority of the population (Lane, 2008: 540) despite protracted tensions with Russia about gas transit and import, NATO membership and territorial disputes. Ukraine’s location in the EU’s and Russia’s shared sphere of interest could potentially allow it to extrapolate concessions from both sides and is therefore more beneficial than Morocco’s unilateral dependence.

A macro-level perspective provides a useful contextual evaluation of bilateral relations which indicate the potential malleability of Morocco and Ukraine in the face of EU and MS policy interests and ideas. However, it obfuscates complex interdependence in the migration policy area and during implementation. The form of interaction and the types of actors in governance networks are likely to differ between policy fields leading to the influence of different norms, organisational beliefs and different forms of interdependence. This fits well with assessments that characterise the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a “composite policy” in which sectoral dynamics are only loosely coupled to foreign policy objectives rather than amounting to a unified and coherent approach (Sedelmeier, 2002). Hence, actors from countries of origin and transit can be active shapers of migration policy (Brand, 2006) and not just EU decision-takers. Instead of assuming NMS as unified actors, a governance approach sensitisises against assumptions of a central locus of power and opens way to neo-institutionalist insights, organisational sociology and implementation research. These point to the influence of implementers on the ground (Brunsson, 2000), the pressures and uncertainties they face and how they cope with these (Lipsky, 1971) as well as the influence of informal structured
relations outside of the formal interorganisational framework (Hjern and Porter, 1981). “[Policy] is mediated by actors who may be operating with different assumptive worlds from those formulating the policy, and, inevitably, it undergoes interpretation and modification and, in some cases, subversion” (Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 251). How can we account for organisational behaviour in the inherently political process of implementation (Barrett, 2004: 253)?

4.0 Analysing governance networks: a meso-level perspective

In order to analyse interorganisational processes within governance networks, two competing strands of literature can be consulted: functional-rationalist as well as historical and sociological neo-institutionalist approaches. It is argued that the latter trump functional-rationalist approaches in explaining dynamics within governance networks and Europeanisation processes.

4.1 A critique of functional-rationalist approaches

Functional-rationalist accounts of networks centre on the idea that networks are based on resource interdependence. It is assumed that resource dependent relations in institutionalised interorganisational settings are based on norms of reciprocity which aim at indebtedness and entail economic considerations. Hereby it is the nature of the issue which shapes the emerging governance structures (Marin and Mayntz, 1991: 20). Lavenex (2008: 10) elaborates for external governance structures in the ENP that a particular choice of institutional arrangement mirrors enforcement problems and distributive effects of cooperation within a given area. Such accounts can lead to an overly narrow understanding of resources which should also include symbolic factors such as legitimacy and organisational beliefs and may ignore the potential for normative conflict between actors.

Functional-rationalist accounts on the origin of cooperative structures are built on the assumption of hierarchical and non-conflicting preference structures, perfect information in institutional settings, the weighing of pros and cons and decision-taking based on optimal expected outcome (Haas, 1982: 212f). This makes assumptions about rationality which do not match empirical observations that organisations may actually be rational by not following such ‘rationalist’ forms of
decision-making and action (Brunsson, 2000). Functional-rationalist approaches have therefore been questioned by theorists and empirical analysts for being ahistorical and ignoring sociological influences in the life of an organisation (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

While it seems reasonable to assume functionality as one source of influence on a developing governance structure, it is by far not the only influence. Functional accounts assume the creation of the most effective structure in order to achieve a preferred output in the most efficient way of resource allocation. However, such theorising has the shortcoming that it cannot explain arrangements within an organisational field burdened by previous institutional relations and considerations than by the imminent will to contribute to a favoured output (Pierson, 2000, Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, Brunsson, 1989). This means that there are not only exogeneous factors of functionality and interdependence stemming from the policy object which influence the emerging structures (Marin and Mayntz, 1991: 18) but also endogeneous factors like already established interorganisational relations, ‘ways of seeing’ and ‘ways of doing’ (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999, Pierson, 2000, Berger, 1977). These insights have been supported by empirical research on peace-keeping forces and international regimes (Lipson, 2001), on IOs in the economic, political and human rights spheres (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) and on the educational sector (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Hence, organisational structures need unpacking to reveal underlying dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of actors from governance structures and subsequent dynamics therein.

4.2 Historical and sociological institutionalist insights

Based on the above critique of functional-rationalist approaches, it is suggested that path-dependence, isomorphism and organisational belief systems are likely to impact on the dynamics in interorganisational networks.

Standard operating procedures and previous organisational arrangements within the organisational field (IOs, MS, EU and NMS) are likely to impact on actor composition and practices within emerging governance network of EU external migration policy. Once organisations have established standard operating procedures that include particular forms of interactions and relations with other organisations, then it is
unlikely that these forms will be changed easily without considerable cost, rather incrementally and maybe rather by profound crisis. Path dependence therefore restrains the spectrum of policy alternatives via established (and possibly self-reinforcing) organisational perspectives making the establishment of new interorganisational relations potentially less functional and relatively more troublesome than to maintain already existing relations with other organisations (Pierson, 2004). Path dependent power relations can therefore be ‘imported’ into governance networks and hamper functionality. Path dependence has been empirically observed in the ENP (Kelley, 2006, Bicchi, 2006, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2006) and may also likely to be found in the external dimension of EU migration policy.

EU attempts to cooperate with NMS on migration are relatively recent and largely based on the European Council Conclusions of Tampere (CEU, 1999b). NMS along the EU’s outer border may not have had previous internal organisational arrangements on migration, external obligations stemming from international law or interorganisational relations prior to EU engagement. Under these circumstances, migration policy could be a new issue for these countries. The combination of these two factors leads to an opposing assumption to path dependence. The degree of institutionalisation of governance networks in the external dimension of EU migration policy may be relatively low. This means that network structures may still be quite malleable, actor composition unsettled and an experimental air about their approaches.

Isomorphism is the phenomenon whereby similar environmental conditions restrain developmental possibilities of organisations and bring about similar organisational structures. Isomorphism can be based on coercive pressure, particular norms that establish ‘ways of doing things’ and the copying of organisational setups and approaches of organisations that are seen as successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

In order for organisations to understand their environment, they need to enquire and obtain information about it. What they do not know is whether the information is actually providing them with the answer that explains to them the complexity of
social reality nor whether the original question was actually adequate in the first place. Even if organisations obtained ‘good’ information, how would they know that it is the answer and would they have the capacities to make sense of it? Underlying these observations and rhetorical questions is the understanding that organisational ‘sensemaking’ is a “symbolic process through which reality is created and sustained” (Weick, 2001: 11). Sensemaking is particularly important in interorganisational environments as organisational action is carefully scrutinised by other organisations and the public and is therefore not easily undone in its consequences, i.e. organisations need to justify their actions (Weick, 2001: 7, Brunsson, 1989). Organisations need to relate past decisions and actions to their original statute or to previous interpretations and at least symbolically justify their position to their environment even if this is achieved by means of ‘decoupling’ from their daily practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

Empirical research has confirmed the importance of belief systems in complex interorganisational settings. Students of these phenomena within MS and the European Commission have identified the impact of “administrative cultures” as the “institutional subconscious” (Cini, 1997: 88), of the “identity” of an organisation (McDonald, 1997: 51) and the “political and organisational cultures” (Cowles et al., 2001: 10) on how they relate to other organisations. If these factors exert an influence within an organisational framework such as Commission, they are also likely to exert influence in cross-boundary cooperation with actors that can be assumed to introduce an even broader range of interests and ideas into the governance structure. There are indications that organisational “identities” and belief systems are influenced by administrative capacity, competence in the policy process, size of budget, political support for its subject area and frequency of relations with other organisations (McDonald, 1997: 51).

In how far do macro-level relations account for EU policy output in NMS? What is the influence of path-dependence, isomorphism and organisational belief systems on policy interventions on migration? The following empirical insights from cooperation with Morocco and Ukraine are based on 62 semi-structured interviews with EU organisations, IOs, NGOs and governmental actors of MS and NMS in Brussels, Morocco and Ukraine between December 2007 and December 2008. Document
analysis of EU regulations, policy documents, speeches, etc. was furthermore used to substantiate the understanding of governance networks.

5.0 Empirical analysis

EU interventions in Morocco and Ukraine are not taking place in nothingness but require engagement with existing organisational structures and approaches. Following from the theoretical and conceptual considerations, any analysis of EU interventions has to consider politico-administrative systems, prior interorganisational relations and organisational belief systems which will be fed into the discussion where suitable. The present analysis is limited to three cooperation areas of migration policy which constitute EU priorities for both countries (CEU, 1999a, CEC, 2001, CEC, 2005b, CEC, 2005d), namely border management, readmission and to a lesser extent asylum. While the first two areas clearly reflect EU and MS interests in dealing with the regulation of peoples’ movements across the EU outer border, the asylum area is of interest because international law under the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol obliges Morocco and Ukraine as signatories to provide protection to refugees and asylum seekers and EU influence is largely channelled through cooperation with and funding of UNHCR whose interests and ideas both overlap and conflict with EU priorities.

5.1 Border management

International migration is characterised by crossing state borders for the purpose of at least temporary settlement. Controlling the movement of people across borders constitutes therefore an obvious means of state regulation of international migration. EU-interventions on border management aim at influencing central and exclusive activities of sovereign states like Morocco and Ukraine.

5.1.1 Morocco

The Moroccan case shows the necessity of prior consent of central political actors such as King and Interior Ministry for EU cooperation. Cooperation was largely dependent on Spanish-Moroccan relations. Spain is Morocco’s privileged partner

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1 EU cooperation also exists on fighting combating trafficking in human beings, migration and development as well as labour migration – the former for Ukraine and the latter two in experimental stages in Morocco. While cooperation with Morocco started already in 2001, projects in Ukraine were only financed from 2003 onwards, are less experimental and more limited in scope.
over the EU which could not force its conditions onto Morocco despite its macro-
level dominance. Quite the contrary, the EU-project conditions followed Morocco’s
ideas and interests and reinforced the position of the Interior Ministry as the
historically central actor in the organisational framework in Morocco forcing the EU to
compromise part of its objectives and increase funding in order to achieve
cooperation.

Due to Morocco’s geographical proximity to Spain, illegal migration has been an
issue of bilateral relations since the 1990s. In the context of Spanish boundary build-
up in compliance with Schengen requirements for internal free movement, visas
were introduced for Moroccan citizens in 1991, the SIVE surveillance system
gradually installed along the Spanish coastline, border fortifications erected and
controls strengthened. Although most Moroccan irregular migrants entered Spain via
regular ports of entry (Ortuño, 2005: 4, Khachani, 2003: 3), the issue of Moroccan
border management became a principal concern for Spain. As can be seen in
Spanish officials drafting the 1999 High Level Working Group action plan for
Morocco, Spain is the principal interlocutor of Moroccan immigration issues at EU
level.

During the Aznar government (1996-2004), Spanish-Moroccan relations were
marked by tension also in the area of migration. Spain attested lacking Moroccan
cooperation because Morocco opposed the idea of becoming the “Gendarme of
Europe” (Belguendouz, 2002) despite the incentive of a bilateral labour agreement in
2001. The Aznar government had already asked for EU-sanctions against Morocco
in 2001 and used its EU-presidency to increase the pressure via the Seville
European Council Conclusions of 2002 (CEU, 2002: 10f). Simultaneous to the
mounting European pressure, Moroccan civil society and the media brought the
issue of drowned Moroccan citizens from sunken pateras to public attention. The
decisive step to establish cooperation on border management via royal instructions
by King Mohamed VI have therefore been interpreted as the result of EU pressure,
reconciliatory steps towards Spain and internal public indignation (Interviews EC
Delegation1; Moroccan Policy Specialist; NGO1). The royal instructions led to the
creation of a specialised department within the Interior Ministry, Law 02/03 which
sanctions facilitating networks and attempts of irregular migration and cooperation
with Spain on border controls and via interministerial meetings. This commitment was rewarded by a €390 million Spanish economic investment package (Cassarino, 2004: 31). Cooperation has further eased and expanded under the Zapatero government since 2004: border patrols are coordinated; the Royal Gendarmerie and the Air Forces exchange information and train with Spanish troops; Moroccan agents are associated with the SIVE teams and Spanish border guards have been observed in Moroccan ports in the Western Sahara (Interviews Moroccan Foreign Ministry, Spanish Embassy in Morocco, Moroccan Policy specialist, Elmadmad, 2007: 29).

First plans to run an EU-project on border management in Morocco originated in informal discussions in 1998 and figured in the National Indicative Programme 2002-2003 (CEC, 2001: 45f, Khachani, 2008: 13). Its allocated budget of €40 million was a substantial response to the Council’s Tampere Conclusions to step up cooperation with NMS. The Commission planned implementation for 2003 but no progress was made until the royal discourse which encouraged the Commission to reiterate its cooperation offer. The project was agreed with the Moroccan authorities in 2004 and intended to provide mobile detection units and training for the Interior Ministry in cooperation with Spain and France (Interview EC Delegation1). However, the original project never materialised. Allegedly the Moroccan Interior Ministry wanted to use the money following its own priorities which raised fears of a politically contentious increase of Moroccan troops in the Western Sahara (Interviews Commission DGs RELEX1 and JLS1). Whether the Commission or the Interior Ministry halted the project is unclear but the controversial issues were monitoring and control over the project.

Despite a small EU-twinning exercise (CEC, 2005c) and Spanish cooperation with Morocco and Mauritania under the AENEAS project “Sea Horse” on the fight against illegal migration (Guardia Civil, n.d.), the MEDA border management project only regained momentum after the dramatic events of Ceuta and Melilla in autumn 2005. Part of the outcome of the Commission’s technical mission to Spain and Morocco (CEC, 2005e) was to transform the MEDA-project by increasing the original budget and employing a sector approach. This allowed the Interior Ministry to use €67 million EU-funding following its own priorities, on any border section and apparently without close monitoring (Interviews DG RELEX1 and EC Delegation1). With the project, the
Commission aimed at supporting Morocco to develop a “migration strategy” by building-up the Interior Ministry’s new department and installing a migration observatory for interorganisational coordination and inclusion of other Moroccan Ministries and agencies with a less securitised vision of migration than the Interior Ministry (Interview EC Delegation1, CEC, 2006a: 10). Project implementation is still ongoing but the Commission has already expressed satisfaction with the project output. However, if the Commission wanted to broaden Moroccan organisational perspectives on migration through this project, then its objective failed: the migration observatory has never come to life despite the stated interest of other Moroccan actors (Interviews Foreign Ministry, Labour Ministry). Maybe more importantly, the considerable EU-funding has strengthened the central position of the Interior Ministry therefore re-emphasising its securitised vision of migration in the governance network. This means that the EU made both far-reaching financial and operational concessions and sacrificed the idea of an integrated perspective on migration issues in order to achieve cooperation on border management.

5.1.2 Ukraine

The Ukrainian case needs to be viewed in the context of state-building. Ukraine has no tangible future of EU accession but shows political commitment to reform. Concerning border management, reform is however largely self-motivated by Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (SBGS) as the main beneficiary of EU funding. Although SBGS managed to influence project objectives, problems of insufficient funding, corruption and border demarcation persist as expressions of Ukraine’s transition experience.

When Ukraine abolished Soviet mobility restrictions and granted visa free entry to citizens of former Soviet republics and of some African and Southeast Asian countries, more than 2000km of Ukraine’s border were undemarcated and unguarded towards Russia, Moldova and Belarus (ICPS, 2006). With the collapse of state industry and collective farms, rising unemployment, worsening social services and public administration, internal migration and emigration increased substantially (Korobkov, 2007). In 2007, the Ukrainian Minister of Economy Kinakh estimated that four to seven million Ukrainians were living abroad (Söderköping Process, 2007a), most of whom illegally either in EU-countries or Russia. Border apprehensions of
irregular migrants furthermore confirm that Ukraine has become a transit country (ICMPD, 2005: 227-232) which hosts around half a million legal and illegal migrants (Interview SCNR). The 2004 EU enlargement of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and their 2007 accession to the Schengen area put EU-Ukrainian cooperation on border management onto the agenda.

Similar to EU programmes in the pre-accession process, cross border and regional cooperation programmes were established including Ukraine since 1997. These were continued in consecutive years and border management explicitly introduced into EU-Ukrainian cooperation since 2001. Their focus have been on infrastructure, equipment and staff training of border guards and customs services in order to facilitate and control the cross-border flow of goods and people (CEC, 2006b).

The main EU implementation partner for border management in the governance network is SBGS. A Presidential decree in 2000 initiated its reform from a military organisation to a law enforcement agency. Prior to EU-assisted reform, it exclusively focused on securing the borderline against invaders without investigative powers within Ukraine and partially recruited conscripts. Rather than simply being compelled to cooperate, SBGS had clear interests in the reform process (Interviews SGBS, EC Delegation2):

- Constitutional provisions prohibit military services to limit the freedom of civilians.
- Failure to reform would have banned SGBS from interacting with civilians and undermined its central tasks.
- Reform allowed its expansion into investigating cross-border criminal activities.
- Contact with other border guard services over the 1990s and early 2000s made SGBS aware of its archaic structure and limited capacities awaking the desire to match their Western counterparts and increase professionalism.

Although EU cooperation is dependent on Ukraine’s wish to go down the road of European integration (wherever it will take it), the above mentioned factors are important because they create ownership of SBGS in the EU assisted reform process. SGBS is autonomous and not subservient to particular ministries. In contrast to frequent changes of incumbents of most senior governmental and administrative positions in Ukraine, SBGS leadership has not changed since 2002.
Continuity of leadership and autonomy have greatly facilitated cooperation from an EU perspective (Interview EC Delegation2).

SBGS became beneficiary of a €10million TACIS-project under the sector approach (2006-2008). Since SBGS had little funds for equipment, EU aid has been concentrating on infrastructure and technical equipment. Following SBGS development concept to become “Schengen-compatible” until 2015 (SBGS, 2007b), the project also provided staff training with MS support. Since 2008, SBGS ceased conscriptions and is now officially a civilian body although still responsible for border defence.

In contrast to the Moroccan MEDA-border management project, benchmarking allowed for monitoring and project evaluation via the JHA scoreboard with Ukraine. EU conditionality is however limited to breaking off project commitments. The importance of the bilateral political climate for project implementation is reflected in the Commission’s project risk assessment about the detrimental effect of a possibly Eurosceptic outcome of the 2006 parliamentary elections (CEC, 2006b: 8).

SBGS’s organisational expansion was not uncontested by the Interior Ministry because SBGS transformation into a law enforcement agency limited its powers. This conflict produced an impracticable split of tasks² which resulted in apprehended illegal migrants staying beyond the legal limit in overcrowded detention centres which are furthermore highly underfinanced because neither the security services nor the SBGS feel responsible nor want to make funding available (Interview IOM1, CEC, 2007). This indicates that autonomy although conducive to implementation is also problematic to policy output if it leads to coordination problems.

SBGS also benefited from other projects financed by the US and/or EU (SBGS, 2007a). While US-funding has largely focused on fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, EU projects largely overlap with the 2006 TACIS-project and often use IOs as intermediary implementation partners. IOM managed the EU-funded HUREMAS I+II projects (Reinforcing SBGS Human Resources Management System, 2006-2009) (IOM, 2008). OECD is running a small risk

² SBGS is allowed to investigate for 10 days before the matter is passed on to the security services.
analysis project for SBGS and ICMPD concentrates on document security and exchanging know-how on asylum, visas, and border control via bilateral networking with MS. The most sizeable EU-programme is EUBAM (European Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, 2005-2009) with a budget of €44 million which was launched upon request of both countries and is administrated by UNDP. EUBAM is an advisory and technical body drawing on MS expertise which aims at enhancing capacities and cross-border cooperation of SBGS with their Moldovan counterparts. It focuses largely on one third of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border which is under control of the de facto autonomous Transnistria (and hence uncontrolled by Moldova). The objective goes beyond mere institutional capacity building but has clear foreign policy objectives “to seek a solution to the conflict in Transnistria” (UNDP, 2007) and to control weapon trafficking, ammunition storage and arms manufacturing plants (CEC, 2006c).

The EUBAM example raises the question of Ukrainian influence on EU project contents and geographical focus. Apart from its concerns about Transnistria, EU interest focuses on its shared border with Ukraine. Especially the Slovakian border segment in the Carpathian Mountains is hard to control and Ukrainian emigration has furthermore stemmed largely from western impoverished areas with traditionally close cross-border links. While the eight 2004 post-accession countries received €860 million EU-funding for border management for 4278 km of EU outer borders between 2004-2006, Ukraine (with 4673 km of land borders) received only €258 million in total. The one-sided EU emphasis on Schengen borders is problematic for Ukraine because of its unmarked borders. In 1997, Ukraine signed a bilateral border demarcation treaty which Belarus failed to ratify. Border demarcation with Russia is contentious due to territorial questions in the Azov Sea (Söderköping Process, 2007b) and to Ukraine’s split over its relations with its eastern neighbour. This scenario poses problems for border controls because intercepted criminal networks and individuals can claim not to know the respective state territory. Unilateral attempts at boundary fortification furthermore cause indignation by citizens living on both sides of the border and triggered Russian public statements of a split between brother nations (Interview SBGS, Jamestown Foundation, 2002).
EU border control enforcement along Ukraine’s western border in contrast to its transparent northern and eastern borders makes Ukraine an open receptacle for immigration and transit migration. SBGS argued that concentrating on the western border is largely superfluous due to strong EU border surveillance and managed to convince the Commission to invest funding also in equipment at other border segments (Interviews EC Delegation2, SBGS). There is also incongruence between EU funding for the fight against illegal migration from Ukraine and SGBS’ vision of Ukrainian migration. A high ex-official stated: “From the viewpoint of the SBGS, they are not illegal immigrants but legal emigrants – they are just citizens crossing the border” (Interview SBGS). Although SBGS seems to have adopted threat perceptions of irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, on the ground synergistic effects exist. Corruption among border guards has been endemic in Ukraine (as in other areas of public life) with facilitating effects on organised crime, illegal migration, weapons and drug trafficking (Interviews SBGS, Buzalka and Benč, 2007).

5.2 Readmission

Once people are found to have illegally crossed an international border without legal documentation or outside of regular ports of entry, EU countries have been interested in establishing readmission with countries of origin and transit. EU-readmission agreements aim at imposing the reception of forced returnees (citizens and non-citizens) on non-Member States. This clear-cut objective is especially salient for emigration and more recently immigration and transit countries like Ukraine and Morocco. While direct readmission at the border between border guard services seems to be common practise (Interview DG JLS2) 3, formal agreements including the readmission of third country nationals (TCN) have been contentious.

5.2.1 Morocco

Morocco has managed to fend off the conclusion of an EU-readmission agreement since 2000 despite its macro-level dependence. This unsuccessful attempt at Europeanisation has feedback effects at EU level and undermines the Commission’s

3 For example, two to three readmissions to Morocco occur daily at ports of entry in Spain without any formalities (HRW, 2008: 9).
position towards MS. The latter have been more successful with bilateral agreements but Morocco used implementation to limit their effects.

Signing a readmission agreement has been the most contested issue at the political level between Morocco and the EU (Interview EC Delegation3). Now in their twelfth round, negotiations have been stuck due to “technical points” (CEC, 2006a: 10). Although Morocco is willing to take back its own nationals, TCN readmissions are contested (Interviews DG JLS3, Spanish Permanent Representation, Moroccan Foreign Ministry). Given that the EU is not planning on signing further readmission agreements concerning TCNs apart from currently negotiated cases (Interview DG JLS2), this compels Morocco to sign readmission agreements with sub-Saharan countries raising the danger of chain-refoulement plus endangering Morocco’s relations with these countries due to the Western Sahara question. The solution to Morocco’s dilemma is unclear but Morocco seems eventually to give in. While a solution was found concerning TCN identification, Morocco wants a token for its signature like visa facilitation or a mobility partnership with emphasis on labour market access quotas and circular migration (Interviews DG JLS3, Moroccan Foreign Ministry, EC Delegation3). However, the Commission does not have a Council mandate to negotiate these issues with Morocco in comparison to negotiations with other countries. The exclusive Commission mandate on bilateral readmission negotiations with NMS which prohibit MS from parallel negotiations, informalised agreements by MS have been observed allowing for flexibility and operability (Cassarino, 2007). This tendency exerts pressure on the Commission and undermines its status. The Commission’s restricted mandate and lacking coordination between DGs limit incentives and leverage on Morocco in readmission negotiations (Interviews DG RELEX1, JLS3). Despite ulterior motives, bilateral negotiations on the Advanced Status agreement with Morocco did not spark Moroccan cooperation on readmission (Interview EC Delegation3).

However, the apparent success of MS to sign readmission (or related) agreements with Morocco should not overshadow that Morocco hampers their implementation. While readmission of Moroccan citizens seems to follow the agreement, the admission of sub-Saharan migrants is often contested on grounds of lacking proof of  

__4__ Both Spain (in 2003, 2007) and France (in 2001) have signed such agreements with Morocco.
transit via Morocco avoiding readmission without overtly breaching the agreement (Carling, 2007: 323). These implementation gaps are also supported by pressure from national and international NGOs which are strongly opposed to the readmission of nationals and particularly TCN on grounds of insufficient reception facilities and techniques or fundamental disagreement with selective border admissions.

5.2.2 Ukraine

“The EU migration policy approach to Ukraine is readmission” (Interview IOM2). On paper an EU-readmission agreement was easily achieved – implementation will prove to be more difficult if not costly for migrants’ human rights.

Based on a Council mandate from 2002, Ukraine entered into negotiations on an EU readmission agreement in conjunction with a visa facilitation agreement (based on the Russian model) in November 2005. Negotiations with the Commission progressed quickly and led to signing both agreements in April 2007. Similar to the EU-Albanian agreement, a suspension clause gives Ukraine two years to implement necessary measures in preparation of readmission from 2010 onwards. To ensure implementation, conditionality is invoked by coupling the start of visa-facilitation and readmission (CEC, 2007: 20). Despite holding out the prospect of further visa liberalisation, conditionality is weak for two reasons: 1) Visa-facilitation is only benefiting a select elite. 2) Given that most Ukrainian citizens travelled to CEE countries, the requirements under the visa-facilitation agreement still provided worse conditions than before the 2007 Schengen enlargement (Boratyński et al., 2006). What explains Ukraine’s signature of the agreements?

The ease with which the EU had achieved Ukraine’s cooperation on readmission after 2005 was based on “the particular historical moment” (Interview DG JLS1) because the post-Orange Revolution elite wanted to show commitment to cooperate with the EU after the Russian rapprochement in the last years of the Kuchma Presidency. The Commission was well aware of the difficulties that implementing the readmission agreement would cause and offered financial and technical assistance. However, it seemed clear that Ukraine would be left with returned TCN from countries with which Ukraine either did not have or could not achieve a readmission agreement of its own (namely China and Russia) (Interview DG JLS1). In fact, a
Russian-Ukrainian agreement has been signed in 2006 but not ratified by Russia. An additional difficulty is to prove the provenance of migrants as in the Moroccan case but also for Ukraine to provide the means for repatriation.

Concerns about the number of future TCN readmissions from 2010 onwards run high in Ukraine although IOM considers them as exaggerated (Interviews Interior Ministry, IOM2). EU assistance came in the form of €30million to the Ukrainian Interior Ministry. Spending will be supervised by both sides and partially administered by IOM. EU concerns revolve particularly around current detention conditions for irregular migrants which have been in violation of human rights standards (Council of Europe, 2007: 31-39). The objectives are consequently the improvement and enlargement of detention facilities that comply with international standards, the provision of adequate legal, sanitary and living standards to detainees, funding for NGO support in the provision of services to returnees, staff training and financial support for further return to the country of origin (CEC, 2007: 18f). Obstacles to speedy implementation involve corruption and consequent overspending as well as disputes over property rights and financing of facilities between the Ministries of Interior and Defence and SBGS. These disputes reflect the Ukrainian institutional fragmentation of the migration portfolio and the lack of coordination and a lead authority. Jealousies with staff can be also expected as funding only goes into holding facilities but not into staff facilities which are under the responsibilities of Ukrainian authorities (Interview IOM1). In addition, dangers to refugees and asylum seekers persist as the Ukrainian asylum process is inadequate. This is unlikely to be resolved until 2010 when the readmission agreement enters into effect. The agreement does not contain safe-guard clauses on asylum seekers and refugees and makes chain-refoulement likely (Interview UNHCR1). EU-funding will not resolve these issues.

5.3 Asylum

The asylum portfolio is peculiar because EU-funding supports NMS to fulfil their international obligations. Due Morocco’s and Ukraine’s reluctance and/or inability to effectively engage with asylum matters, EU cooperation with UNHCR as the central interlocutor is crucial for the governance network. In comparison with service-led
intergovernmental organisations such as ICMPD and IOM, UNHCR has a higher level of autonomy which can impact on EU ambitions.

5.3.1 Morocco

Morocco has been reluctant to engage with its obligations under the Geneva Convention. Hence UNHCR’s role has been crucial for asylum seekers and refugees. However, EU cooperation with UNHCR has not been void of coordination problems to the detriment of projects and the migrants themselves. Due to overlapping agendas between the two, UNHCR seemingly drives Morocco’s Europeanisation however based on its autonomy derived from international law and its experience.

Since UNHCR started to recognise increasing numbers of refugees in the early 2000s, Morocco officially closed its national asylum office in the Foreign Ministry in 2004 and froze cooperation with UNHCR (Interviews Foreign Ministry, UNHCR2). Subsequent detention and expulsion of refugees and asylum seekers by Moroccan authorities (especially around the 2005 events of Ceuta and Melilla) led to UNHCR intervention via its headquarters and to EU and US pressure to stop expulsions and regularise UNHCR’s cooperation with Morocco. Contributing factors to Morocco signing an accord de siège with UNHCR in 2007 were UNHCR’s continuing practise to recognise refugees which left Morocco with little other option than to accept cooperation at least on a basic level, the suffering international image of the country and the gradual recognition of mixed migration flows by the Moroccan authorities (Interviews EC Delegation1, UNHCR2). UNHCR’s introduction of security documents for refugees facilitated Morocco’s decision to sign the accord de siège because it feared increasing numbers of irregular migrants ‘disguised’ as asylum seekers and refugees on forged documents (Interview Foreign Ministry).

Although refugees do not have the right to state support or work permits in Morocco, access to local health centres has become common practise since 2008 and scholarisation in state schools is commencing (Interview UNHCR2, NGO2). The EU has engaged with the often precarious living conditions of asylum seekers and

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5 This fear is surprising given the low overall numbers. At the beginning of 2006 there were 2,129 asylum applications to UNHCR, 1,578 in 2007 and only 369 until September 2008. The recognition rate between 2005 and 2008 was around 20 percent and until September 2008 there 877 refugees recognised by UNHCR in Morocco (numbers UNHCR Morocco).
refugees through AENEAS-funding. This boosted UNHCR’s annual budget of €1 million by another €400,000 (2007-2009) and supported NGOs in providing assistance to sub-Saharan migrants. In fact, the arrival of EU-funding split the Moroccan NGO landscape over cooperation with UNHCR which was brandmarked as an EU agent and severely hampered it to find implementation partners (Interviews UNHCR2, NGO2, 3). Since EU-funding was running out in 2009, UNHCR missions in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia applied jointly for project continuation but no further EU-funding was granted. It seems that Brussels assumed the 2007 accord de siège resolved the problematic relationship with the Moroccan authorities although the EC Delegation in Rabat was aware of continuing difficulties for asylum seekers and refugees. This incoherent output prompted the comment: “Maybe we have become the victim of our own success” (Interview UNHCR2). Coordination issues between Rabat and Brussels and a lack of feedback and follow-up can hence seriously undermine EU objectives of approaching international asylum standards in Morocco.

Since 2007, UNHCR politically propagates asylum as an essential part of a comprehensive Moroccan migration policy. The UNHCR representative stated, “We cannot open the asylum room without developing the other rooms otherwise all migrants flock into the asylum room” (Interview UNHCR2). Together with other UN organisations UNHCR drafted an asylum system but without any official reply to date. UNHCR and EU interests in a comprehensive migration system overlap. UNHCR lobbies for asylum capacity building with reference to Morocco’s international obligations and economic capacities as a middle-income country. This will eventually allow the EU to implement its ‘safe third country’ principle and reduce the intake of asylum seekers. Although this influence could be interpreted as Europeanisation of Morocco’s migration policy, the influence of UNHCR is based on its own organisational beliefs and practical considerations.

5.3.2 Ukraine

Although Ukrainian asylum legislation is largely deemed satisfactory despite its lack of subsidiary protection, implementation is insufficient (Interviews UNHCR1, EC Delegation3, SCNR). Hardly any state support is provided for asylum seekers and refugees based on the argument of lacking funding and comparable living conditions.
of Ukrainian citizens. Although EU funding has concentrated on Ukraine’s asylum system (albeit comparatively lower than for border management and readmission), political instability, weak administrative capabilities and interagency competition have largely blocked effective procedures.

Based on a Commission proposal and its Council approval in 2004, the Commission developed the Regional Protection Programme (RPP) to improve protection in countries of transit and origin. Conveniently this reduces the potential number of asylum seekers in the EU. This argument applies to the choice of the Western Newly Independent States (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) as a pilot which reflect “a clear priority in discussions with Member States ... [and] a strong priority across Community external relations policy and financial assistance” (CEC, 2005a: 5). Although RPP concentrated €2million EU-funding in Ukraine (2005-2006) in form of four projects under AENEAS and TACIS funding, RPP’s greatest weakness is the deliberate decision not to provide additional funding, reducing possible initiatives elsewhere (Interviews UNHCR2, EC Delegation3).

EU-funding on asylum directly assists migrants in reception and detention centres, allows networking and capacity building between NGOs as well as cooperation with state authorities and raising standards during the asylum process. Furthermore, the intergovernmental Söderköping process which aims at information exchange and best practise on asylum (and irregular migration) since 2001 was added into the RPP. Funding for these implementation partners was prolonged for other asylum projects under the 2007/08 funding cycle.

The responsible state authority for asylum matters is the State Committee for Nationalities and Religion (SCNR) which is important but increasingly sidelined in the governance network. The body has been scarred by rapidly succeeding governments and subsequent changes of higher ranking staff. Constant restructuring have weakened SCNR and led to perverse effects (Interview SCNR). During the 2007 restructuring the term ‘migration’ was not only erased from its name but also from its mandate. Since this ‘accident’ eliminated the central decision-making body for asylum cases, no asylum decisions were taken between March and November 2007 until SCNR statutes were altered (Interview UNHCR). SCNR
oversees 24 regional offices responsible for asylum interviews and recommendations. These correspond with administrative units but not with the respective regional caseload leaving some without work while others are swamped with cases. UNHCR suggested resource relocation which has been resisted until 2008 (Interview UNHCR). At central as well as regional level, required staff qualifications are high but pay is low. Once capacity building projects have improved staff qualifications, personnel often move into higher paid jobs in the private sector. This phenomenon is also widely known in other areas of migration policy (Interviews UNHCR2, SCNR, EC Delegation3, ICMPD, IOM1) and often frustrates attempts at Europeanisation of practices.

Interagency competition between SCRN and SBGS hinders migrants from handing in asylum applications but such competition is also known within SBGS (Council of Europe 2007: 39, Interview UNHCR2). Due to its weak capacities and uncertain future, SCNR seizes opportunities to increase its overall profile. An EU project introduced an NGO platform on asylum which was usurped by SCNR to the discontent of NGOs which felt subordinated and contradicted project intentions (Interviews NGO4, 5). Such attempts also reflect competition between SCNR and Interior Ministry (currently responsible for illegal migration) about the future distribution of the migration portfolio, SCNR’s possible dissolution and integration into the Ministry. It generally seems that the EU prefers cooperating with one central actor rather than a fragmented organisational field. SCNR’s weakened position has raised doubts at EC Delegation level whether supporting SCNR is worth while (Interview EC Delegation3). These doubts in connection with already existing EU support for the Interior Ministry and its preponderance in Ukraine’s migration policy shape EU preferences about the organisational layout in Ukraine. Hence EU preferences reflect functional concerns about implementation rather than isomorphism by projecting the predominant institutional setup of MS in migration matters onto Ukraine. Despite the interorganisational impact of EU support as in the Moroccan case, the larger emphasis of politics over policies is central in the Ukrainian context. Since 2007, discussions about the institutional division of the migration portfolio have been hijacked and paralysed by struggles between Ukrainian Presidency and Government about the future power distribution in the semi-presidential system (Christensen et al., 2005, ICPS, 2008).
These factors hamper EU intentions of a functioning asylum system in Ukraine. Effective protection is a pre-requisite for activating EU readmissions without violating migrants’ human rights. Chain-refoulement is furthermore likely due to close collaboration between security services of former Soviet republics which puts current asylum seekers and refugees at risk. Ukraine’s copying of the ‘safe-third country’-clause from EU asylum legislation not only shows normative Europeanisation but conveniently serves as a backdoor for Russian-Ukrainian relations because Ukraine does not need to recognise refugees from Russia and simultaneously does not endanger bilateral relations (Interview IUNHCR3, Council of Europe, 2007: 39).

6.0 Conclusion

A macro-level analysis of EU relations with NMS misses the complexity of interorganisational dynamics which mark policy output in the area of migration policy. Policy output is shaped during the implementation process in what has been characterised as a policy-action relationship. This understanding sensitises against a simplified understanding of Europeanisation as a unidirectional top-down process. Quite the contrary, Europeanisation is a complex and ongoing process that is shaped by interorganisational dynamics within the governance network. A meso-level analysis allows assessing the influence of a wider range of actors involved in policy implementation including actors from NMS, NGOs and international organisations. It has been argued that interorganisational dynamics are not solely attributable to functional-rationalist considerations within organisations. Also sociological and historical factors need to be taken into account to overcome a limited understanding of governance networks.

- Both pre-existing centralisation and fragmentation of the organisational field within the NMS can introduce turf-wars and incompatible belief systems into EU projects.
- Even in areas of central and exclusive sovereignty of states such as border management, cooperation can be achieved but is dependent on consent of central political actors.
- Effective implementation depends largely on ownership over projects by central stakeholders and adequate administrative capacities.
• EU-funding provides opportunity structures that can reinforce existing belief systems and positions within governance networks and even undermine original policy intentions.
• EU-funding can introduce ideological tensions into an organisational field with direct repercussions for project implementation.

Furthermore, some tentative comparisons can be drawn from the Moroccan and Ukrainian case:
• A privileged interlocutor MS can exacerbate the potential for success or frustration in the development of EU migration policy interventions in NMS. In the Moroccan-Spanish example this targeted EU interest at first punitive then collaboratively and finally allowed for widening of the EU policy agenda in form of the EU’s global approach. Although Ukraine is interested in widening the agenda, the lack of a privileged partner at EU level limits its voice to be heard.
• Cohesion in the executive and strength of administrative system can substantially shape or hamper EU cooperation even to the detriment of original EU objectives. In contrast, political infighting, weak executive power with constant repercussions on the administrative system and high levels of corruption limit influence on the EU policy agenda but largely affect EU interventions.

All in all, direct EU influence is difficult to distil out of the opacity of interorganisational dynamics in a complex policy field like migration. EU funding provides and changes opportunity structures and provides impetus in some areas but does not determine policy outputs.
References


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