Introduction: Political actors frequently resolve their conflicts through bargaining of some form, and the use of other means of resolving conflicts, such as strikes, war, or economic sanctions, suggests the failure of the bargaining process. The observation that political actors frequently attempt to resolve their conflicts through bargaining indicates that political science may require an understanding of the bargaining process and bargaining behavior. This seminar involves a theoretical analysis of negotiation in political science. We will undertake a critical analysis of numerous bargaining models and the empirical research designed to test their propositions. The goals of the seminar are to survey the bargaining literature, learn about some of the benefits of the modeling approach, construct our own models, and discuss how to best test the empirical implications of these models.

Readings: There is one textbook for this course:


The textbook presents a discussion of some of the key topics in the bargaining literature. Since it is very recent, you'll have to purchase it on your own. The rest of readings from this course will come from journals in political science or economics. All of the articles will be available through Sakai. The reading list each week is somewhat limited (which means that there is more out there for you to survey on your own). Keeping the reading list small will allow us to have a more in depth about the models. Although the classes will involve discussion, I will also be doing more lecturing early in the semester as we go through the nuts and bolts of the models. This dynamic will change as we move forward.

I am assuming that most of you have some basic familiarity with game theory. However, I am assuming that everyone will benefit from an introduction/refresher. My intention is to therefore go slowly through the material to help everyone along. If you are less familiar with game theory, I would recommend taking a look at the following texts as overviews:


Grading: Your final grade in the course will be determined as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Memos</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final Paper</td>
<td>50%</td>
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1. Participation: Each member of the seminar is expected to complete all the required reading prior to each class meeting and contribute to class discussions. The material presented will be challenging. We will rely heavily on each other to get the most out of the readings. Your individual contributions, as well as the quality of the group discussion for each week, will be factored into your participation grade.
2. **Response Memo:** In order to encourage active thinking about the readings and discussion in class, students will write two brief commentaries (3-4 pages, single-spaced) on the readings for a particular week. Students should seek in these notes to engage one or more themes in the works, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and suggest future research questions facing that area of the literature. Students will sign up for their weeks at the first class meeting of the seminar. The papers will be circulated electronically to the entire class, and will be due at 9:00 a.m. on the relevant class day. Please do so by emailing the class participants, including me. Students that write for a particular week will be expected to take a more active role in the discussions. Failure to submit memos and/or participate in your role in the discussion will be greeted with ill-humor.

3. **Final Paper:** The major course requirement is a research paper that can address any topic in political science, provided that it relates to bargaining theory and has my approval. It must present original research (not just summaries of old research) and make a new contribution. This contribution can be a formal bargaining model, theoretical framework, or can test propositions from the bargaining literature. The main goal is to get you to build this paper into your research agenda, including beyond this class. That is, this could be the start of a dissertation or turn into a publishable paper. Since I want you to enjoy working on this project, I am very flexible with your topic choice. I would encourage you to talk to me early and often, though this semester, I will probably be most available via email. In addition to writing the papers, all of you will present your research to the class during the final two weeks. I will assign each of you one or two papers from your peers for you to review prior to the presentation. At this point, the paper does not need to be complete, but you should have enough for one of your peers to make comments on your work. This is designed to be constructive and helpful to the presenter prior to turning in your final paper. Non-constructive comments will be greeted with ill-humor. Papers will be due on **December 5.** Late papers will also be greeted with very ill-humor.

### Course Schedule and Reading List

**August 18. Introduction.**

1. Kydd, Ch. 1, 2.


**August 25. Formal Approaches to Bargaining.**


   *Recommended.*


**September 1. Outside Options.**


*Recommended.*


**September 8. Incomplete Information.**

1. Kydd, Ch. 6.


*Recommended.*


**September 15. Signaling and Communication.**

1. Kydd, Ch. 9.


*Recommended*


**September 22. Bargaining with an Audience.**

1. Kydd, Ch. 11.


*Recommended:*


**September 29. Bargaining in Conflict.**


*Recommended.*


**October 6. Commitment Problems and Shifts in Power.**

1. Kydd, Ch. 5.


*Recommended.*


**October 13. Bargaining Failure due to the Cost of Peace.**

1. Kydd, Ch. 7.


**October 20. Conflict over Future Sources of Power.**


**October 27. Intervention and Enforcement.**


**Recommended:**


**November 3. Institutions and Multilateral Bargaining.**

1. Kydd, Ch. 10.


**November 10. Challenges to Bargaining Theory.**


**November 17. First Round Presentations.**

**November 24.** Research Day.

**December 1. Second Round Presentations.**